


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
THE

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

WITH HIS FINAL ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,
A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,
BY HIS BROTHER,
THE LATE LORD REDESDALE.



CAREFULLY REVISED
BY WILLIAM KING,
EDITOR OF THE FIRST POSTHUMOUS EDITION.

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The Vignette on the Titlepage represents A SILVER COIN OF LACEDÆMON, copied from a Specimen in the British Museum.

THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER VIII.

HISTORY OF GREECE FROM THE ACCESSION OF XERXES TO THE THRONE OF PERSIA TILL THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THAT MONARCH'S EXPEDITION AGAINST GREECE.

SECTION I.

Accession of Xerxes to the throne of Persia. Immense preparations of the court of Persia for conquest in Europe. Assembly of the army at Sardis, and of the fleet in the Hellespont. March of the army. Muster of the army. Arrival of the army and fleet at Therme in Macedonia.

HERODOTUS relates some anecdotes attributing to Darius an acrimonious resentment against Athens, very repugnant to his general character, as it stands marked by authors of highest credit, and even by what that historian himself has reported, evidently on better authority. Asia, he adds, was agitated for three years by preparations for a second expedition into Greece, to revenge the disgrace of Marathon. Prudence perhaps, not less than honour, would require the attempt; but three years could not be necessary to the resources of the Persian empire for such a purpose; and more important objects in the mean time called the attention of its rulers. Egypt re-

CHAP.
VIII.

Æsch. Pers.
Plato.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 1.
& seq.

CHAP.
VIII.

Ol. 73. 4.
B. C. 485.
Herodot.
1. 7. c. 7.

volted, and a dangerous dispute about the right of succession to the throne is said to have arisen between the sons of Darius. That monarch had the satisfaction to see the succession amicably settled in favour of Xerxes, his son by Atossa, daughter of Cyrus, in preference to elder sons by a former marriage; but he died soon after, leaving Egypt to be recovered, and Greece to be punished, by his successor. The former object was accomplished in the second year of the reign of Xerxes: the other seems to have been for some time neglected.

1. 7. c. 8.
s. 1.

But the Persians had not yet forgotten the character, which their fathers had raised so high, of a warlike and conquering people. They were not accustomed to insults within their dominion like that of the burning of Sardis; and still less to defeats in the field like that of Marathon. We cannot suppose Herodotus often well informed of intrigues about the person of the great king; but we may believe what he puts as a remark into the mouth of Xerxes, ‘that it had not been the custom of the Persians to be ‘quiet.’ Nor is it to be doubted but there would be men about that prince ready to encourage an idea, natural enough to a youth inheriting such immense power from a race of conquerors, that it became him also to be a conqueror, to enlarge still the bounds of his vast empire, and to emulate the military fame of Darius, of Cambyses, and even of the great Cyrus.¹ To punish Athens and to conquer Greece were there-

¹ This is the motive also alleged by Æschylus, in the person of Atossa, for the expedition of Xerxes. Speaking to the shade of Darius, she says:

Ταῦτα τοῖς κακοῖς ὁμιλῶν ἀνδράσιν διδάσκεται
Θούριος Ξέρξης· λέγουσι δ’ ὡς σὺ μὲν μέγαν τέκνοισ
Πλοῦτον ἐκτίσω σὺν αἰχμῇ, τὸν δ’ ἀνανδρίας ὕπο
Ἐνδον αἰχμάζειν, πατρώον δ’ ὄλεον οὐδὲν αὐξάνειν.

fore small objects; nor does what Herodotus has suggested appear improbable, that the ardent ambition of the youthful monarch, and some among his counsellors, might look as far as the Western Ocean, howsoever little its shores or the intermediate nations were known to them, for the term of their career of glory. Four years, it is said, were employed in preparation. An army was collected, greater than the world ever saw either before or since. The commanders on the western frontier of the empire had had opportunity for observing that the most formidable land force could not secure maritime provinces against insults by sea; and, still more, that the conquest of maritime states would be in vain attempted without naval power. Every seaport therefore, in the whole winding length of coast from Macedonia to the Libyan Syrtes, was ordered to prepare ships and to impress mariners. A prodigious work was undertaken for the purpose of making the navigation secure from the Asiatic along the European coast, and to prevent all risk of future disasters like that of the fleet under Mardonius. It was no less than to form a canal, navigable for the largest galleys, across the isthmus which joins Athos to the continent of Thrace. A fleet was assembled in the Hellespont, under the command of Bubares son of Megabazus, and the crews were employed on the work. Herodotus has supposed mere ostentation to have been the motive to this undertaking; because, he says, less labour would have carried the fleet over land, from one sea to the other; yet it seems no rash conjecture that policy may have prompted it. To cross the

Herod. 1. 7.
c. 8. s. 3. &
Corn. Nep.
v. Themist.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 20.
Diod. Sic.
1. 11. c. 1.
& seq.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 21.
Diod. Sic.
1. 11. c. 2.

Τοιάδ' ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ὀνειδὴ πολλάκις κλύων κακῶν,
Τήνδ' ἐξούλευσεν κέλευθον καὶ στράτευμα' ἐφ' Ἑλλάδα.

Pers. v. 753.

Ægean, even now, with all the modern improvements in navigation, such are the changes of wind, and multitudes of insulated shores, is singularly dangerous. To double the cape of Athos is still more formidable. The object therefore being to add the countries west of the Ægean sea to the Persian dominion, it was of no small importance to lessen the danger and delays of the passage for a fleet.² At the same time, to facilitate the communication by land, a bridge was

² Scarcely any circumstance of the expedition of Xerxes is more strongly supported by historical testimony than the making of the canal of Athos. The informed and exact Thucydides, who had property in Thrace, lived part of his time upon that property, and held at one time an important command there, speaks of the canal of Athos, made by the king of Persia, with perfect confidence.* Plato, Isocrates, and Lysias† all mention it as an undoubted matter; the latter adding that it was, in his time, still a subject of wonder and of common conversation. Diodorus relates the fact not less positively than Herodotus. That part of Strabo which described Thrace is unfortunately lost; but the canal of Xerxes remains confidently mentioned in the epitome of his work. The place was moreover so surrounded with Grecian settlements that it seems impossible for report of such a matter, if unfounded, to have held any credit. At the very time of the expedition of Xerxes there were no fewer than five Grecian towns on the peninsula itself of Athos, one even on the isthmus, situate, as Thucydides particularly mentions, close to the canal, and many on the adjacent shores.‡ Yet the poet Juvenal has chosen the story of this canal for an exemplification of the Grecian disposition to lie: and a traveller who two centuries ago visited, or thought he visited, the place, has asserted that he could find no vestige of the work.§ For myself I will own that I cannot consider the sarcasm of a satirist desiring to say a smart thing, or such negative evidence as that of the modern traveller, of any weight against the concurring testimonies of the writers above quoted.

* Thucyd. l. 4. c. 109.

† Plat. de Leg. l. 3. p. 699. t. 2. Isocrat. Paneg. p. 222. t. 1. Lys. or. funeb.

‡ Herodot. l. 7. c. 22. Thucyd. l. 4. c. 109. Excerpt. ex. Strab. l. 7.

§ Bellon. Singul. Rer. Obser. p. 78.

laid over the river Strymon. Magazines meanwhile were formed all along the coast as far as Macedonia, chiefly in the towns of the Grecian colonies then subject to Persia.

SECT.
I.

At length, the levies being completed, the forces from all the eastern and southern provinces were assembled at Critali in Cappadocia. Thither the monarch himself went to take the command. He marched immediately to Sardis, where the land force from the west of Asia Minor joined him. Thence heralds were sent into Greece, to all the cities except Athens and Lacedæmon, where, in violation of the law of nations, even of that age, the Persian heralds, in the reign of Darius, had been cruelly put to death. Earth and water were demanded in token of subjection; and, according to the oriental custom, orders were given to prepare entertainment for the king against his arrival. Xerxes wintered at Sardis. Meanwhile a work, scarcely inferior to the canal of Athos, was prepared in the Hellespont. Two bridges of boats were extended from near Abydus on the Asiatic to near Sestos on the European shore. The width is seven furlongs. The bridges were contrived, one to resist the current, which is always strong from the Propontis, the other to withstand the winds, which are often violent from the Ægean sea; so that each protected the other.

Ol. 74 $\frac{3}{4}$.
B. C. 481.
Herodot.
l. 7. c. 26.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 33.
Plat. de
Leg. l. 3.
p. 699. t. 2.
Strabo,
l. 13. p. 591.

Early in spring the army moved. For so vast a multitude one principal difficulty was so to direct the march that water might not fail. Several rivers of some name, of torrent character issuing from mountains, abundant or over-abundant and impetuous in winter, in summer of scanty and quiet current, were found unequal to the supply. Among them is mentioned the celebrated stream of Scamander, cross-

Ol. 74.
B. C. 480.
Herodot.
l. 7. c. 37.
& seq.

CHAP.
VIII.

ing the Trojan plain. Seven days and nights were employed unintermittingly in passing the bridges of the Hellespont. The march was then continued through the Chersonese. The fleet, which had been assembled in the Hellespont, was at the same time ordered to proceed along the coast westward. The land and sea forces met again at Doriscus, near the mouth of the Hebrus, where Darius, on his return from his Scythian expedition, had established a Persian garrison. Both the country and the coast there were favourable for the review of so immense an armament, and there accordingly the monarch reviewed his forces of sea and land.

There too, Herodotus tells us, the army was mustered. Later ancient writers have taken upon them to differ from him concerning its strength; but we may best believe the simple honesty of the original historian, who, in describing the manner of the muster, sufficiently shows that even the Persian generals themselves knew not how to ascertain the numbers under their command. Indeed those who know how difficult it is, amid all the accuracy of division and the minuteness of detail in modern European armies, and comparatively handfuls of men, to acquire exact information of effective numbers, will little expect it among the almost countless bands, of various languages and widely differing customs, which composed the military multitude under Xerxes, when, though for important purposes writing was common, yet a convenient and cheap material for writing was unknown, and memory was necessarily, far more than in modern times, trusted for authority. Herodotus has reckoned among its numbers no less than twenty-nine nations, from Scythia north to Ethiopia south, and from India east to Thrace and

Libya west. To acquire a foundation for guessing the total effective strength, without an attempt to ascertain the detail, the method taken by the Persian generals, he says, was this: Ten thousand men, being counted, were formed in a circle as close as possible. A fence was then raised around them. They were dismissed, and all the army in turn passed into this inclosure, till the whole was thus counted by tens of thousands. According to this muster, such as it was, the historian says the infantry alone amounted to one million seven hundred thousand fighting men; but he expressly declares that no one ever undertook to give an account of the detail.³ The cavalry he makes only eighty thousand; by no means an improbable number, and likely to have been better ascertained. Arabian camel-riders, and African charioteers he computes at twenty thousand. Horses, mules, asses, oxen, and camels, for the baggage, were besides innumerable.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 60.

1. 7. c. 87.

Of the fleet he gives a more particular account. The trireme galleys of war amounted to twelve hundred and seven; and his distribution, which may show the comparative naval strength of different nations at the time, makes the total appear hardly beyond probability. Three hundred were furnished by the Phenicians with the Syrians of Palestine; two hundred by Egypt; one hundred and fifty by Cyprus; by Cilicia one hundred; Pamphylia thirty; Lycia fifty; Caria seventy; by the Dorian Greeks of Asia thirty; one hundred by the Ionians; sixty by the Æolians; seventeen by the islands, and by the Hellespontine towns one hundred. The average comple-

1. 7. c. 89.

³ Ὅσον μὲν νυν ἕκαστοι παρεῖχον πλῆθος ἐς ἄριθμον, οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι τὰ ἀτρεκές· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται πρὸς οὐδαμῶν ἀνθρώπων. 1. 7. c. 60.

CHAP.
VIII.

ment of men to each trireme galley he reckons at two hundred. The crews of the whole fleet would thus amount to two hundred and forty-one thousand four hundred. But over and above the ordinary crew there were thirty Persians or Medes or Sacians in each galley. These would make an addition of thirty-six thousand two hundred and ten men. The Phœnician ships, he says, were the best sailers, and among those the Sidonian excelled. Beside these, the transports, some for infantry, some particularly fitted for cavalry, storeships, some of great burthen, together with smaller vessels of various sorts and for various purposes attending the fleet, would not easily be numbered. He reckons them, by a gross calculation, at three thousand, and their average crews at eighty men : the amount of their crews would thus be two hundred and forty thousand ; and the number of men in the fleet, all together, five hundred and seventeen thousand six hundred and ten.

Of this extraordinary expedition naturally many anecdotes would be remembered and propagated ; many true, many false, mistaken, or exaggerated. Among those related by Herodotus some appear perfectly probable, some concern circumstances of which he could hardly have had authentic information, and some are utterly inconsistent with the characters to whom they refer. Among the latter I should reckon the ridiculous punishment of the Hellespont by stripes and chains, together with executions, equally impolitic as inhuman, and repugnant to what we learn, on best authority, of the manners of the Persians. But the account which that historian gives of the march of the army, and of the attending motions of the fleet, is clear and consistent beyond what might be expected. The march was continued from Doriscus in

Herod. i. 7.
c. 35. & 39.

i. 7. c. 121.

three columns. One, under Mardonius and Masistes, kept along the coast, the fleet nearly accompanying. Another, under Tritantæchmes and Gergis, proceeded far within land. Xerxes himself led the third between the other two, Smordomenes and Megabyzus commanding under him. These passed the Samothracian towns, the most westerly of which was Mesambria on the river Lissus, on whose opposite bank was Stryma, a town belonging to the islanders of Thasos. This river did not suffice for the consumption of the army. Maronæa, Dicæa, Abdera, Grecian colonies, lay next on the road. Everywhere the commands to prepare for the reception of the monarch and his forces had been zealously executed. Beside vast magazines of corn, meat, and forage for the troops, many of the cities, emulous to court favour, or anxious to avert wrath, had prepared, with a sumptuousness proportioned to their hopes and fears rather than to their revenues, for the entertainment of the king and his court. Wherever the halt of the royal train had been announced a superb pavilion was erected, adorned with the most costly furniture. Many cities provided even vessels of gold and silver for the table. The rapacious attendants of the Persian court spared nothing; in the morning, when the army marched, all was carried off. This eastern style of robbery gave occasion for a saying of Megacreon of Abdera, which Herodotus has recorded as having become popular, ‘That the Abderites ought to go with their wives in procession to their temples, and pray to the gods always equally to avert half the evils that threatened: for upon the present occasion their most grateful thanks were due for the favour shown in disposing Xerxes to eat but once a day: since, if he had chosen to dine on the morrow

SECT.
I.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 108.
& seq.

l. 7. c. 118.
& seq.

CHAP.
VIII.

‘as he had supped over night, there would have been
‘an end of Abdera.’

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 108.
& 110.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 3.

Not contented with their forces, already innumerable, the Persians continued everywhere on their march to press men. The youth, equally Grecian and Thracian, were compelled to join either the army or the navy. Yet, according to Herodotus, the Thracians preserved such veneration for the soil which this enormous armament had trodden, that to his time they avoided breaking or sowing it. He does not account for this particularity; but perhaps the Persians favoured the Thracians against the Greeks; all whose establishments on that coast were encroachments upon Thracian ground. From Abdera the division under Xerxes proceeded to Eion, (a Grecian town on the river Strymon, with a Persian garrison, established there by Darius,) and thence by Argilus and Stagirus to Acanthus, all Grecian settlements. In the neighbourhood of Acanthus the three divisions met: and there Artachæas, a Persian of high rank, related to the royal family, and in great favour with Xerxes, died. The few words in which Herodotus describes his funeral contribute to show the extensiveness, and to connect from remotest antiquity the history, of those artificial mounts, numerous in our own country as in many other parts of the world. The whole army, he says, heaped the mount which formed the sepulchral monument of Artachæas.⁴ After this solemn ceremony the march was continued

⁴ Ἐτυμβοχόρῃ δὲ πᾶσα ἡ στρατιή. l. 7. c. 117. Homer gives a corresponding description of the sepulchral barrow raised by the Grecian army under Agamemnon in honour of the heroes who fell before Troy.

Ἄμφ' αὐτοῖσι δ' ἔπειτα μέγαν καὶ ἀνύμωνα τάμβον
Χεύαμεν Ἀργείων ἱερὸς στρατὸς αἰχμητῶν,

westward, with the country called Chalcidice, full of Grecian settlements, on the left. The fleet, which had met the army at Acanthus, proceeded thence through the canal of Athos, and round the peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallene, into the bay of Therme; pressing ships and seamen at all the Grecian towns on the coast. The army, arriving soon after, occupied with its encampment the whole extent of the Macedonian shore, from Therme and the borders of Mygdonia, to the river Haliacmon near the borders of Thessaly.

Ἀκτῇ ἐπὶ προὔχουσῃ, ἐπὶ πλατεῖ Ἑλλησπόντῳ
Ὡς κεν τηλεφανὴς ἐκ ποταφῶν ἀνδράσιν εἴη
Τοῖς οἱ νῦν γεγάασι, καὶ οἱ μετόπισθεν ἔσονται.

Odyss. l. xxiv. v. 80.

Now all the sons of warlike Greece surround
Thy destined tomb, and cast a mighty mound :
High on the shore the growing hill we raise,
That wide th' extended Hellespont surveys ;
Where all, from age to age, who pass the coast,
May point Achilles' tomb

Pope's Odyss. b. xxiv. v. 101.

The concluding words of the line, 'and hail the mighty ghost,' are an addition of the translator, not warranted by Homer, in this or any other passage of his works.

The custom of forming these sepulchral barrows, long lost over the greater part of Europe, is yet preserved in Spain. 'By the road side,' says Townsend, 'are seen wooden crosses, to mark the spot where some unhappy traveller lost his life. The passengers think it a work of piety to cast a stone upon the monumental heap. . . . Whatever may have been the origin of this practice, it is general over Spain.' Journey through Spain, vol. 1. p. 200.

SECTION II.

State of Greece at the time of the invasion under Xerxes. Themistocles. Responses of the Delphian oracle concerning the invasion. Measures for forming a confederacy of Grecian commonwealths. Disunion among the Greeks. Assembly of deputies from the confederated commonwealths at Corinth. The defence of Thessaly given up by the confederates. Measures for defending the pass of Thermopylæ.

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VIII.

THE Greeks had long had intelligence of the immense preparations making in Asia; professedly for the punishment of Athens, but evidently enough with more extensive views of conquest. Yet still, as on the former invasion, no measures were concerted for the general defence of the country. On the contrary, many of the small republics readily and even zealously made the demanded acknowledgment of subjection to the great king by the delivery of earth and water.⁵ Nor will this appear strange to those who read the honest historian of the age, and consider the real state of things in the country, however it may militate with later declamation on Grecian patriotism and love of liberty.⁶ For it was surely no unreasonable opinion,

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 138.

⁵ Οὔτε βουλομένων τῶν πολλῶν ἀντάπτεσθαι τοῦ πολέμου, Μηδίζόντων δὲ προθύμως.* This is in a great degree confirmed by Thucydides: Σπάνιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Ξέρξου δυνάμει ἀντιτάξασθαι†: and still more by Plato: Πολλὰ δὲ λέγων ἂν τις τὰ τότε γενόμενα περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν πόλεμον, τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐδαμῶς εὐσχήμονα ἂν κατηγοροῖ· οὐδ' αὖ ἀμύνασθαι τὴν γε Ἑλλάδα λέγων, ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τό τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸ Δακεδαιμονίων κοινῇ διανόημα ἤμυνε τὴν ἐπιούσαν δουλείαν, σχεδὸν ἂν ἤδη πάντ' ἦν μεμινγμένα, κ. τ. λ.‡

⁶ That declamation had its origin in Greece when Grecian liberty was in decay, but has been mostly produced under the pressure of the imperial despotism of Rome, when men, not

* Herodot. l. 7. c. 138.

† Thucyd. l. 3. c. 56.

‡ Plat. de Leg. l. 3. p. 692. t. 2.

held by many, that the might of Persia was irresistible.⁷ All the Asian Greeks had formerly in vain attempted to defend themselves against the very inferior potentate of Lydia; and, when reduced, scarcely found themselves losers, but on the contrary seem to have been in many points gainers by their subjection. But now that immense power which had not only swallowed up the Lydian monarchy with all its appendages, but was already far advanced into Europe, and to a land force that could not be numbered added by far the greatest naval strength, collected from various subject states, that had ever been seen in the world, how was it to be resisted by a few little republics, whose territories together were comparatively but a spot, and which were nevertheless incapable of any firm political union among one another? Quiet men would naturally think it wisely done to merit favour by early submission; and the ambitious might hope that their field would even be extended, through the establishment of the Persian dominion in Greece. Some, perhaps not unreasonably, would prefer subjection, under the Persian empire to submission under the domineering spirit of the Spartan oligarchy⁸, while

daring to speak directly of the government under which they lived, enjoyed a weak revenge in reviling it obliquely, or in obliquely exciting opposition to it, through immoderate eulogy of times past. Thus we have seen, in modern Europe, people denied the liberty of speaking, concerning the government of their own country, with eager zeal take an interest in English and American politics.

This was written while the perhaps ill-undertaken, certainly ill-managed, war between England and its American colonies was going forward.

⁷ Even Isocrates admits this as a sufficient apology for the smaller Grecian states: *Ἡγοῦντο γὰρ ταῖς μὲν ταπειναῖς τῶν πόλεων προσήκειν ἐξ ἀπαντος τρόπου ζητεῖν τὴν σωτηρίαν*. Panegy. p. 226. t. 1. ed. Auger.

⁸ See the Panathenaic of Isocrates.

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the more oppressive tyranny of the Athenian democracy had yet little shown itself. Some might even wish for a superintending authority to repress those often horrid violences of domestic faction by which almost every Grecian city was unceasingly torn. Those therefore who had given the demanded earth and water rested satisfied in the confidence that they should suffer no greater than former evils; those who had refused were in very great alarm.⁹ ‘And here,’ says Herodotus, ‘I am driven of necessity to profess ‘an opinion, invidious I know to most men, which ‘yet, as I think it the truth, I shall not withhold. If ‘the Athenians, in dread of the approaching danger, ‘had either fled their country, or surrendered themselves, not even an attempt could have been made ‘to oppose the enemy by sea. What then would ‘have followed may be easily conceived. The fortified lines proposed by the Peloponnesians across ‘the Corinthian isthmus would have been nugatory. ‘For the Persian, having it in his choice where to ‘make his attack by sea, would have subdued the ‘several states one by one; and the Lacedæmonians ‘at last, reduced to their single strength, would ‘have had no alternative but to die gloriously, or ‘submit to a power which they could no longer withstand; so that all Greece must inevitably have fallen ‘under the Persian yoke. Whoever therefore shall ‘say that the Athenians preserved Greece will not ‘err from the truth: for, to whichever party they ‘joined themselves, that would preponderate. Their ‘resolution then being decided by their zeal for ‘Grecian independency, THEY excited to energy ‘those Grecian states which had not yet submitted

⁹ Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτέων, δόντες γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ, εἶχον θάλασσαν ὥς οὐδὲν πεισόμενοι ἄχαρι πρὸς τοῦ βαρβάρου· οἱ δὲ, οὐ δόντες, ἐν δαίματι μεγάλῃ κατέτασαν. Herodot. l. 7. c. 138.

‘to Persia; and THEY, next under the gods, repelled
‘the invasion.’

SECT.
II.

This testimony in favour of Athens appears upon the whole not less true than honourable. The business of history however being neither panegyric nor satire, but to form a just estimate of the conduct and characters of men, it will be proper, having adverted to the circumstances which might apologise for those Greeks who yielded on the first summons, to advert also to the circumstances which led the Athenians to such determined and animated opposition to the Persian power. Nor is the investigation difficult. The burning of Sardis first, then their treatment of the Persian heralds, and finally their victory at Marathon, had made the Athenians so peculiarly obnoxious that, in submitting, they could little hope for favourable terms. Though moreover Hippias was now dead, yet the Pisistratidean party still existed, and the court of the satrap of Sardis was the common resort of Grecian refugees; of whom some, richer or more aspiring, or of rank to introduce them to consideration, carried their intrigues as far as the monarch's court at Susa. Among these Herodotus names some Thessalian princes, some of the Pisistratidæ, and more particularly Demaratus, the banished king of Sparta, who had received a most liberal provision from the generosity of the late Persian monarch, Darius. All would expect to profit from the success of the Persian arms in Greece, to which indeed many looked as the only circumstance that could ever restore them to their country; while, on the contrary, those who now led the affairs of the Athenian commonwealth must, on that very account, expect from it the more inevitable and deeper ruin. But the glorious day of Marathon would naturally give new

Herod. 1. 7.
c. 3. & 6.

1. 7. c. 104.

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energy to every Athenian mind. Extraordinary success easily excites among a people the presumption that nothing is too arduous for them. Now also, as on the invasion under Datis, there arose among the Athenians a leader born for the occasion. Themistocles was a man of birth less illustrious than those who had hitherto generally swayed the Athenian counsels ; but whom very extraordinary talents, joined with a general vehemence of temper, and a singular enthusiasm for glory, could not fail of raising, in a popular government, to the highest political eminence. We have observed how the war with the little island of Ægina had contributed to the former spirited opposition of Athens to Persia. It is the remark of Herodotus that, upon the present occasion also, Greece owed its preservation to that war ; for it was that war which first obliged the Athenians to raise a marine. At Laurium, in Attica, was a very productive silver-mine, public property. But it had been determined, in the true spirit of democracy, that, as the treasury was rich, the revenue from the mine, instead of being reserved for public service, should be divided among all the Athenian people for their private use. That enthusiastic ardour for a great object which, when genius feels, it can communicate, Themistocles communicated among the Athenian youth. While their minds were generally exasperated against the Æginetans he procured a decree, which the graver and more experienced leading men dared not even propose, that no dividend should be made of the income from the mines till it had provided for the building of two hundred trireme galleys. The threatened invasion from the East had stopped the Æginetan war, and the galleys were now complete.

Corn. Nep.
& Plut.
v. Themist.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 143.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 144.
Plut. v.
Themist.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 14.

What Herodotus relates concerning the consultation of the Delphian oracle in this tremendous crisis tends much to mark the temper and character of the times, which modern language will more perfectly portray the more nearly it can imitate the expression of the original. ‘Neither then,’ says the historian, continuing his panegyric of Athens, ‘did the alarming oracles from Delphi, however inspiring terror, persuade the Athenians to desert the cause of Greece. . . . For persons deputed by public authority to consult the god¹⁰, having performed the prescribed ceremonies, entered the temple; and, as they sat by the shrine, the Pythoness, whose name was Aristonica,’ meaning *noble victory*, perhaps a name given for the occasion, ‘prophesied thus: *Wretches, why sit ye there? Leave your houses and the lofty ramparts of your city, and fly to the farthest parts of the earth. For not the head shall remain firm, nor the body, nor the extreme feet; not therefore the hands, nor shall aught of the middle remain, but all shall pass unregarded. For fire and keen Mars, urging the Syrian chariots, shall destroy. Nor yours alone, but many other strong towers shall he overthrow. Many temples of the immortal gods shall he give to the consuming fire. Even now they stand dropping sweat, and shaking with terror. Black blood flows over their highest roofs, foreseeing the necessities of wretchedness. Depart therefore from the sanctuary, and diffuse the mind in evils.*’ The Athenian deputies were thrown into the deepest consternation. Consulting with Timon son of Androbulus, one of the principal Delphian citizens, he advised them to take

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 139.
& seq.

¹⁰ Θεσπρόποι is their Grecian title, for which modern speech cannot, without many words, give an equivalent phrase.

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the symbols of suppliants, and go again to the oracle. They did so, and addressed the shrine thus : ‘ O sovereign power, prophesy to us more propitiously for our country, regarding these suppliant tokens which we bear ; or we will not depart from the sanctuary, but remain here even until we die.’ The prophetess answered : ‘ *Minerva is unable to appease Olympian Jupiter, though entreating with many words and deep wisdom. Again therefore I speak in adamantine terms. All else, within Cecropian bounds and the recesses of divine Cithæron, shall fall : the wooden wall alone Jupiter grants to Minerva to remain inexpugnable, a refuge to you and your children. Wait not therefore the approach of horse or foot, an immense army, coming from the continent ; but retreat, turning the back, even though they be close upon you. O divine Salamis ! thou shalt lose the sons of women, whether Ceres be scattered or gathered !*’¹¹

Writing down this answer, which appeared milder than the former, the deputies returned to Athens. Various opinions were held among the Athenian elders about the meaning of words which interested them so deeply. Some thought they directed the defence of the citadel, which having been anciently surrounded by a palisade, might be intended by the term wooden wall. Others insisted that the wooden wall could mean nothing but the fleet, upon which

¹¹ These two oracles, though in verse in the original, fall remarkably into English almost word for word ; even the ambiguous expressions almost exactly corresponding in the two languages. It is not every oracle, reported by Greek authors, that can be thus literally rendered, or even rendered at all, in another language, if indeed they bear any certain sense in the original. It has therefore been a prudent practice of translators to give their representations of them in verse.

alone therefore the oracle encouraged them to depend: yet this construction seemed overthrown by the concluding sentence, which the diviners deemed to portend that, if the fleet ventured a battle, it would be defeated off Salamis. They advised therefore by no means to risk any kind or degree of engagement, but to make use of the fleet for quitting, with their families and effects, a country which they could not defend, and to seek a settlement elsewhere.

It was not likely that the prudent managers of the Delphian oracle would prophesy any thing very favourable to Athens, so peculiarly devoted to Persian vengeance, when the innumerable forces of that mighty empire were already assembled at Sardis, while the little country of Greece was so unprepared and so disunited. Yet the consultation was probably a necessary compliance with popular prejudice; and it depended then upon genius to interpret the response advantageously, after having perhaps suggested what might bear an advantageous interpretation. Themistocles was not at a loss upon the occasion. There was one emphatical word, he said, which clearly proved the interpretation of the diviners to be wrong. For, had the last sentence been meant unfavourably to the Athenians, the oracle would scarcely have used the expression, ‘O divine Salamis,’ but rather, ‘O wretched Salamis.’ Defeat at sea therefore was portended not to them but to their enemies: the wooden wall unquestionably meant their fleet; and a naval action must save the country. The Athenian multitude was predisposed to the character and sentiments of Themistocles. It was determined, in pursuance of his opinion, to put the whole strength of the commonwealth to the navy, to increase the

Herod. *ibid.*
& Plut. v.
Themist.

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number of ships to the utmost possible, and, together with such other Greeks as could be persuaded to join them, to meet the enemy at sea.

Then at length measures were taken for forming a league among those Grecian states which, according to the historian's expression, were disposed the better.¹² It was presently agreed that all enmities among themselves should cease; for many yet existed, and principally between Athens and Ægina. Information came that Xerxes was arrived at Sardis. Besides that his court was a common resort for refugee Greeks, many of his Ionian and Æolian subjects would be constantly about it, though probably very few ever near his person. Means however were thus open for Greeks to pass with little suspicion, and easily to acquire information concerning all public transactions of the Persian government. To ascertain report, and pry if possible more deeply into things, some confidential persons were sent to Sardis. They were apprehended as spies, and condemned to death: but, the circumstances being reported to Xerxes, that prince, disapproving the rigid caution of his officers, directed that the spies should be carried round the whole army, and, after seeing every thing, dismissed with passports to go where they pleased. Some ships about the same time, carrying corn from the Euxine for Ægina and Peloponnesus, were stopped by the Persian officers in the Hellespont. Xerxes directed that they should be suffered to proceed on their voyage: 'For we are going to the same country,' he said, 'and the corn may be useful to us.' The appearance of magnanimity in this conduct is lessened by the immensity of the Persian armament, seemingly

Herod. l. 7.
c. 146, 147.
Polyæn.
Strateg.
l. 7. c. 15.
Plut.
Apophth.

¹² Ἑλλήνων τῶν τὰ ἀμείνω φρονούντων. Herod. l. 7. c. 145.

far over-proportioned to its object; yet upon the whole the anecdotes are not unworthy of the son of Darius, and grandson of Cyrus. Analogous transactions may have happened among other people in other ages: a story similar to the former is related in Roman history. But in justice to Xerxes it ought not to be forgotten that he stands first on record for this treatment, generous at least, if we refuse to call it magnanimous, of enemies whose lives were forfeited by the law of nations of all ages.

SECT.
II.

The principal Grecian states, whose resolutions remained yet doubtful, were Argos, Coreyra, Syracuse, and the Cretan cities. Ministers were sent to all, urging them to an alliance against Persia. Argos had not, with the power, lost all the pride of her ancient pre-eminence among the Grecian states. Weak still from slaughter in battle and the massacre which followed in the invasion under Cleomenes, nourishing, since those events, an increased animosity against Lacedæmon, and fearing worse oppression from neighbouring Greeks than from the distant Persian, the Argives applied to the Delphian oracle for advice, or perhaps negotiated for sanction to resolutions already taken. The response, evidently composed by a friend to the Argives, appears, as far as it can be understood, to favour their ancient pretension to superiority over all other Grecian states, and at the same time to direct them to enter into no league for common defence, but merely to provide for their own security. They nevertheless received the ministers of the confederates with great civility; and having, in the oracular response, an excuse, which Grecian religion could not dispute, for refusing, if they chose it, to engage in any league, they endeavoured to profit from the pressing ne-

Polyb.
l. 15. p. 695.
Liv. l. 30.
c. 29.
Frontin.
l. 4. c. 7.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 145.
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 14.

Herodot.
l. 6. c. 76.
& seq.

l. 7. c. 148.
& Isocrat.
Panathen.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 148.
& seq.

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cessity of the occasion for procuring advantageous terms as the price of their assistance. They required, first, that the Lacedæmonians should bind themselves to maintain peace with them for thirty years; and then they said that, though command among the Grecian states justly belonged to Argos, yet they would be contented to share it equally with Sparta. The Lacedæmonian deputies hesitated, and gave an unsatisfactory answer. The Argives then closed the conference with declaring, ‘That the Spartan arrogance was intolerable; they would rather be commanded by the barbarians than subject to Lacedæmon;’ and they ordered the ministers to leave the Argive territory before sunset on pain of being treated as enemies. This, says Herodotus, is what the Argives themselves say about these matters. Other reports less favourable to them were current in Greece. But after an account of these the historian adds: ‘I do not undertake to vouch for these stories, nor for any thing relating to the business, farther than credit is due to what the Argives themselves say. But this I know, that if all men were to bring their domestic disgraces together, for the purpose of exchanging with their neighbours, they would no sooner have inspected those of others than all would most willingly take back their own. Thus neither upon this occasion was the conduct of the Argives the most shameful.’¹³

The ministers of the confederates were not more successful in Crete. Herodotus, from whom alone

¹³ The testimony of Plato to the justice of this assertion (*De Leg.* l. 3. p. 692. t. 2.) may suffice to turn upon Plutarch himself that charge of malignity which he has urged against Herodotus.

we have any detail of the political affairs of these times, was too nearly contemporary to be wholly unbiassed by the interest which persons yet living would have in the credit of the principal actors. He makes a handsome apology for the refusal of the Cretans to join in the confederacy. They were desirous, he says, of taking their share in the common defence of Greece, but an oracle forbade them. In regard to the Corcyraeans he has not been scrupulous : he plainly accuses them of scandalous treachery to the Grecian cause, after having engaged to support it. Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, was a very powerful prince, and his alliance would have been a great acquisition. But difficulties arose in accommodating his pretensions to command with those of the leading states of Greece. Partly absurd pride, partly perhaps a reasonable jealousy, prevented them from immediately acceding to his terms ; and shortly the invasion of Sicily by a Carthaginian army made his whole force necessary at home.

SECT.
II.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 169.

l. 7. c. 168.
& Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 15.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 157.
& seq.

Corinth was the place appointed for the meeting of deputies from the confederated states to consult about the conduct of the war. None among the Grecian people had been more forward to join the confederacy than the Thessalians. Intelligence arrived that the Persian army had crossed the Hellespont and was directing its march westward. This decided that Thessaly was the frontier to be first attacked. The Thessalians reasonably expected that a force would immediately be assembled, competent, as far as the strength of Greece might admit, for the defence of the passes into their country, by nature very strong. Alarmed to find no measures taken for that purpose they hastened a remonstrance to Corinth, urging that the strength of their province

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Herodot.
1. 7. c. 173.
Diod. Sic.
1. 11. c. 2.

alone was utterly unequal to oppose the prodigious army coming against them ; that it ought not to be expected they should sacrifice themselves with their families, for the sake of people who would not stir to assist them ; that a powerful body must therefore, without delay, join them from the southern states ; otherwise, however unwilling, they must necessarily endeavour to make terms with the enemy. This reasonable remonstrance roused the sluggish and hesitating counsels of the confederacy. A body of foot was embarked under the command of Evænetus a Lacedæmonian and Themistocles the Athenian. They proceeded through the Euripus to Allus, a port of Thessalian Achaia ; and then, marching across the country, occupied the valley of Tempe between the mountains Olympus and Ossa, the only pass from Lower Macedonia into Thessaly. The infantry, from different states, amounted to ten thousand men. Thessaly was the only province of Greece that possessed any considerable strength of cavalry. The whole of the Thessalian horse joined the confederate infantry, and together they made a force competent to defend the pass against any numbers.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 173.

But the Grecian army had not been many days encamped in Tempe when confidential messengers arrived from Alexander son of Amyntas, a Macedonian man, as Herodotus in the simple language of his age calls him, though heir apparent of the kingdom of Macedonia through a long race of ancestors of acknowledged descent from Hercules. The Macedonians represented that the invader's force by land and sea was immense ; that there was another way into Thessaly, practicable for an army, from Upper Macedonia through Perrhæbia, to the town of Gonnus, so that, in their station in Tempe, they

might be taken in the rear¹⁴; and if they would avoid being trodden under foot by their enemies, they would do well to retreat in time. It was not probably unknown to the commanders of the republican forces that a party among the Thessalians was disposed to the Persian interest. As the Persian army advanced, that party would be likely to gain strength. The Macedonian prince's information being altogether highly alarming, and his advice clearly reasonable, they embarked their troops again, and returned to the Corinthian isthmus. Then presently the Persian became the ruling party in Thessaly, and profession of submission was hastened to the Persian monarch. The following conduct of the Thessalians justified the measure of the commanders of the forces of the confederated republics.¹⁵

The Grecian confederacy, which remained to resist the whole force of the Persian empire, now consisted of a few little states, whose united territories did not equal single provinces of France, and the sum of whose population in free subjects was con-

¹⁴ Our geographical information concerning this country, though much improved of very late years, is still very deficient. The able and indefatigable D'Anville seems to have been able to procure none of any value. His map, to which, in the want of another guide of any comparable reputation, I trusted for the former editions, is grossly incorrect. Some better information has been obtained through recent travellers, from which Barthélemy has profited. But since his work came out the modern geography of the countries round the Ægean has been very superiorly given in a map compiled by De la Rochette, and published by Faden. With its assistance I have ventured to give the explanation in the text of a passage of Herodotus, in itself so far from clear that translators and commentators, would they own the difficulty, might be excused their misconception of it.

¹⁵ Ἐμῆδισαν προθύμως, οὐδέ τι ἐνδοιαστῶς, ἅσπερ ἐν τοῖσι πρήγμασι ἐφαίνοντο βασιλεῖ ἄνδρες ἐόντες χρησιμώτατοι. Herod. l. 7. c. 174.

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siderably inferior to that of Yorkshire in England. Nor was there, even among these, either a just unanimity or any established mode of general administration which could command the constant and regular exertion of united strength; which might have repressed the disaffected party among the Thessalians, and, obviating thus the necessity for the precipitate retreat from Tempe, might have delayed, or rendered very hazardous, the march of the Persian multitude over the rough country northward of the Thessalian plain.

The valuable assistance of Thessaly being lost, the consolation remained for the congress at Corinth, that, as their defence was now narrowed, their strength, such as it was, would be less divided; the fleet might more certainly co-operate with the army, and if the attack was to begin nearer the centre of the confederacy, the pressure itself of danger might enforce that union in council, without which all defence would be hopeless. The nature of their country, and of its surrounding seas, was a farther encouragement: the one every where mountainous, the other broken with innumerable islands and headlands, and subject to sudden storms, both were peculiarly favourable for defensive operations. The southern boundary of Thessaly, which now became their frontier, was advantageous beyond the rest. The ridge of Ceta, which forms it, extends from sea to sea; every where impracticable for an army, or so nearly so that the smallest force might advantageously oppose the greatest. This ridge is crossed, nearly at right angles, by another scarcely less formidable; which, rising immediately from the Corinthian isthmus, stretches northward, under various names, Helicon, Parnassus, Pindus, and, still in a northerly direction, shoots be-

Strab. l. 9.
p. 418. &
428, 429.

Ibid.
& p. 434.

yond Grecian bounds far among the barbarous nations. To enter Attica and Peloponnesus therefore from Thessaly 'by the western side of the country, first Pindus, then Cæta, then Parnassus, must be surmounted; on the eastern, Cæta alone. But here was only one pass practicable for an army, where the ridge, at its eastern extremity, meets the sea. This was termed 'the Gate;' a term of precisely the same import in the common speech of many parts of England. In former ages the Phocians, on the south of the mountains, to prevent predatory incursions upon their lands from the Thessalians, who lived on the northern side, had occupied the commanding fastnesses, and established a garrison there. Across the middle of the narrow, where was a width of about fifty-feet nearly level, they had erected a wall; and, to strengthen the defence, they formed, on the Thessalian side, an inundation from some hot springs, which rose near the foot of the mountain. Hence the place became distinguished from other mountain passes by the name of Thermopylæ, Hot-gates; but Pylæ, simply the Gates, as the most important pass of the kind within their country, remained always among them the ordinary appellation. A little northward of Thermopylæ the mountains so closed, and again a little southward, they so pressed upon the sea, as barely to admit the passage of a single carriage. Nothing could be more commodious than this spot for the small force of the Greeks to make a stand against the immense army of Persia. It had the farther extraordinary advantage that, near at hand, and within ready communication, was a secure road for a fleet; so landlocked as to favour that also against superior numbers, yet affording means of retreat. Hither it was determined to send the whole

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 176.

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naval force that could be collected, together with a body of troops sufficient to defend the pass.

But in the conduct even of this business the union of the confederated states was grossly defective. Jealous of one another, destitute of any sufficient power extending over the whole, and fearing, not unreasonably, the naval superiority of the enemy, which would enable him to choose where, when, and how he would make his attacks, each little republic seems to have been anxious to reserve its strength for future contingencies. Even Lacedæmon again, as in the former war, pretended religion as a hinderance. The festival called Carnia was to be celebrated, immediately after which the whole force of the state should march against the enemy. Most of the Peloponnesian cities made similar excuses; and where no peculiar religious ceremony could be pleaded, the Olympian festival, whose period coincided with these events, was a common excuse for all who desired one. Lacedæmon therefore sent only three hundred men; Corinth four hundred; Phlius two hundred; Mycenæ (at this time, though an inconsiderable town, yet independent of Argos) sent eighty men. The mountaineers of Arcadia alone, less versed in the wiles of politics, and unable to estimate the danger to be expected from naval operations, honestly exerted their strength in the common cause. The cities of Tegea and Mantinea sent each five hundred soldiers: the other towns made the whole number of Arcadians two thousand one hundred and twenty. To these the little city of Thespiæ in Bœotia added no less than seven hundred: Thebes, far more powerful, but ill-affected to the cause, gave only four hundred. The whole strength of Athens went to the naval armament. The other provinces without Pelopon-

Herodot.
I. 7. c. 206.

I. 7. c. 202.
Pausan.
I. 10. c. 20.

nesus had no large towns, and their inhabitants, less civilised, were little politically connected with the southern states.

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The assembly at Corinth however was not wanting either in industry or ingenuity to persuade and encourage those nearest to the point of attack to use their utmost exertion against the invader. Ministers were sent through the towns and villages: The force now marching for their protection, it was asserted, was only the advanced guard of a powerful army, expected every day. That excessive fear of the Persian power, it was added, which had so pervaded Greece, was absurd:—from the sea there was no cause for apprehension:—the Athenians, Æginetans, and others who composed the allied fleet, were fully equal to the defence of the country on that side. ‘Nor was it a god that was coming against them, but a man; and there neither was, nor ever would be a mortal, in whose lot, from his very birth, evil was not mingled, and most in that of those of highest station. In the common course of things therefore their invader, a mere mortal, would be disappointed of his hope.’ Hearing these things, continues the historian, whose original and almost contemporary pencil gives us the very lineaments of the age, the Opuntian Locrians marched with their whole force, and the Phocians sent a thousand men. Leonidas, one of the kings of Sparta, commanded in chief.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 203.

SECTION III.

Station of the Grecian army at Thermopylæ; of the fleet at Artemisium. Responses of the Delphian oracle. Progress of the Persian fleet to Sepias; of the army to Thermopylæ. Numbers of the Persian forces. Storm and shipwreck at Sepias. Battle of Thermopylæ.

OL. 74. 4. XERXES halted several days at Therme, to refresh
75. 1. his troops, to acquire intelligence, and to collect
B. C. 480. guides capable of conducting his multitudes through
the difficult country which he was approaching. It
was determined to proceed by Upper Macedonia into
Thessaly; that road being more favourable than the
shorter way by the valley of Tempe. The fleet, no
such circuitous course being required for it, waited
in the bay of Therme eleven days after the army had
recommenced its march.

1. 8. c. 12. Summer was already advanced when intelligence
1. 7. c. 177. reached the assembly at Corinth that Xerxes was
arrived in Pieria. The forces under Leonidas then
immediately marched to their station at Thermopylæ,
and the fleet proceeded to the neighbouring road
of Artemisium, on the Eubœan coast. Hence three
c. 179, 180. galleys, one of Trœzen, one of Ægina, the third
Athenian, were sent off the island of Sciathus to
watch the motions of the enemy. Ten Persian
galleys, also sent to explore, fell in with them. The
Greeks immediately fled. The Trœzenian ship and
the Æginetan were taken with their crews. The
Athenian captain, running his galley ashore near the
mouth of the Peneus, escaped by land with his people.
The Persians took possession of the deserted vessel.
Immediately signals by fire, from the heights of Sci-
athus, gave notice to the Greeks at Artemisium of the

enemy's approach. So little firm then were the leaders yet in their counsels, and so dreading the enemy's force¹⁶, that they immediately withdrew their fleet to Chalcis. Scouts were left on the heights at the north-western end of Eubœa, to watch the hostile fleet, and it became the purpose to wait attack in the narrow pass of the Euripus, where the enemy's great superiority in numbers would be less availing.

In this time of extreme difficulty and danger to the Greeks constant and equal prudence appears hardly any where but among the managers of the Delphian oracle. The Delphian citizens, dreading, like others, the approaching invasion, consulted their god. The response directed them to pray to the winds; for these might be powerful assistants to Greece. This divine admonition was communicated among the confederate Greeks, and most thankfully received.¹⁷

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 178.

Another response was reported directing the Athenians to invoke their son-in-law. According to ancient tradition, Boreas god of the north wind, coming from Thrace, perhaps really a Thracian chief of that name, had married Orithyia daughter of Erechtheus king of Attica. The prayers of the Athenians were therefore particularly directed to the north wind, with some confidence, at least among the vulgar, that they were not without peculiar interest with that deity. Those indeed, who know the power of whistling, or of an eggshell, upon the minds of English seamen at this day, may imagine what the encouragement of the Delphian oracle to expect

c. 189.

¹⁶ Καταβρώδῃσαντες is the strong expression of Herodotus, l. 7. c. 182. In another place he adds the corroborating adverb, δεινῶς.

¹⁷ Καί σφι, δεινῶς καταβρώδεουσιν τὸν βάρβαρον, ἐξαγγείλαντες, χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο. Herod. l. 7. c. 178.

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assistance from Boreas and their princess Orithyia might do among the Athenians. The event however which soon followed gave more solid ground of hope, and might naturally excite the recollection of the relation of Athens to the north wind, if it had not before been thought of.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 183.

The ten Persian galleys, after the capture of the Grecian vessels, proceeded in their business of exploring ; but in passing between the island of Sciathus and the main three of them struck upon a rock called Myrmex. The fleet in the bay of Therme, upon intelligence from the exploring ships that the passage to the Grecian coast was clear of the enemy, and dangerous only from rocks, sent vessels with stone to erect a mark on the Myrmex, and Pammon, a Greek of the island of Scyros, (for Herodotus has been careful to record the traitor's name,) was engaged to pilot the fleet through the channel of Sciathus. Proceeding then from the bay of Therme, one day brought them to the bay between the town of Casthanæa and the foreland of Sepias on the Thesalian coast.

c. 184.

The army meanwhile had made its way through Upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, and across Thessaly to the neighbourhood of Thermopylæ, without opposition. Here Herodotus again enumerates the Persian forces by land and sea, with the addition acquired since the departure of the armament from Doriscus. This addition, he says, cannot be ascertained, but may be computed. The Greeks of Thrace and the adjacent islands furnished one hundred and twenty ships, whose crews would amount to about twenty-four thousand men. The land force, from the various people of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, he estimates at three hundred thousand.

The number of fighting men in the whole armament, by sea and land, would thus be two million six hundred forty-one thousand six hundred and ten. The attending multitude, he supposes, could not be fewer, but rather more. Reckoning them equal, the numbers under the command of Xerxes, which arrived without misfortune at Sepias and Thermopylæ, were five million two hundred eighty-three thousand two hundred and twenty men, exclusive of women and eunuchs without number, and a vast train of incumbrances, little known to European armies, but which in all ages have attended the Asiatic. Whatever exaggeration may be in this account, more authentic information does not remain from later writers. Herodotus's detail of the nations from which the armament was collected, and of the measures taken to provide for its subsistence, defective as the latter is, afford the best of any existing means for forming some idea, if not of its numbers, yet of its immensity. Exactness we cannot have, nor anything approaching it : but we have assurance that Asia has often sent forth armies which appear next to prodigious ; and every testimony makes it probable that the forces led by Xerxes against Greece were the most numerous ever assembled in the world.

The road of Casthanæa was open to the north and north-east winds ; and so little spacious that an eighth division only of the vast fleet of Persia could be moored in one line against the shore ; the other seven rode at anchor with their heads toward the sea. Such a situation could never be safe for the ancient galleys, peculiarly fitted for a navigation where want of sea-room makes a storm most dangerous to the stoutest vessel. The night after their arrival was calm : but in the morning the wind freshened from

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 188.
& seq.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 12.
About the
middle of
July.
Dodw.
Annal.
Thucyd.

the north-east.¹⁸ In those seas, where storms are often very sudden and always very dangerous, the seaman, unacquainted with those great principles of navigation which direct a vessel over the globe, but which, in his narrow sphere of action, would be useless, is yet singularly attentive in observation of the weather, and singularly acute in prognostication of it. As soon as it was perceived in the Persian fleet that a violent storm was approaching, the division of galleys next the shore was drawn upon the beach; the rest were to provide for their safety as they could. According to Herodotus they seem to have scattered to seek a port, or a safe and unoccupied beach, which to the ancients was a port. But the storm hastily grew excessive. Some of the vessels were stranded on the place; some were driven upon the Sepiad foreland; some against the cliffs of Pelion; some to the towns of Casthanæa and Melibœa. Three days the tempest lasted with unabated violence. The Persian commanders were in the utmost alarm; apprehensive not only for what might be lost, but also for what was yet unhurt on shore. The Thessalians

¹⁸ Herodotus calls the wind Apeliotes, but he says the people of the country called it the Hellespontine wind. The apeliotes, according to Stuart's account of the tower of the winds, yet remaining at Athens, was the east. But the Hellespont lay nearly north-east from Sepias; and the effects of the storm described by Herodotus show that the wind must have been some degrees northward of the east. The accuracy however in stating winds, usual with our seamen, was not common among the ancients; nor is it at this day in the Mediterranean, where generally winds are still named from the countries whence they blow, without any very exact reference to the points of the compass: I have said thus much on a subject, in itself of little consequence, principally because I would not be thought to controvert the authority of the tower of Andronicus Cyrrhestes, or of Stuart's account of it.

were but very lately become friends and subjects : a reverse of fortune might shake their fidelity, and tempt them to hostilities. A rampart was therefore formed around the naval camp, chiefly from the ruins of the wrecked vessels.

The simplicity with which Herodotus details the actions of men often marks the genuine workings of human nature more faithfully as well as with more animation than the cautious and polished manner of writers of more artificial judgment. The dread which pervaded the Grecian fleet on the approach of the Persian armament may be imagined from the hasty, and apparently improvident, retreat from Artemisium ; which must expose the land force at Thermopylæ to certain destruction, as the fleet alone could secure it from being taken in the rear. The joy at the view of the rising tempest, and the consequent confidence in divine favour, would be proportional. The Athenian seamen did not now forget the god of the Thracian wind with his Attic princess. Immediately they set with great earnestness to sacrifices and prayers, requesting those deities ‘to vindicate Attica, and bring destruction on the barbarian fleet, as they had formerly done at Athos.’ Whether this really induced Boreas to fall upon the barbarians, says Herodotus, I cannot undertake to say¹⁹ ; but the Athenians assert it, and in consequence they have built a temple to him on the bank of the Ilissus. Whether indeed Herodotus believed the oracular admonition to have been promulgated before the event appears dubious : his expressions imply suspicion. On the second day of the storm the destruction and distress produced in the Persian fleet became manifest to

¹⁹ Εἰ μὲν νυν διὰ ταῦτα τοῖσι βαρβάροις ὀρμεῖν οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι. Herodot. l. 7. c. 189.

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the Grecian scouts on the Euboic heights, and they hastened to Chalcis with the intelligence. Immediately public thanks were returned, and libations poured to Neptune the deliverer : and, in confidence that now the Persian naval force would be no longer formidable, it was determined to reoccupy the former station at Artemisium.

The loss of the Persians was very great. It is not likely that the Greeks would ever have any correct account of it ; but, according to the lowest report, four hundred galleys of war were sunk or destroyed. The loss of men could be computed only from that of vessels : and means were totally wanting to estimate the destruction of storeships and attending vessels. As soon as the weather was become moderate and the sea smooth, the Persian commanders, without waiting to collect the scattered remains of their fleet, hastened to leave so dangerous a station : coasting Magnesia, they entered the Pegasæan gulf, known afterward by the name of the Pelasgian. Fifteen galleys, of those dispersed by the storm, following some days after, fell in with the Grecian fleet, which had resumed its station off Artemisium ; and, mistaking it for the Persian, all were taken. Among the prisoners were Sandoces governor of Cuma in Æolis, Aridolis tyrant of Alabandæ in Caria, and Penthylus commander of the squadron of Paphos in Cyprus. Of twelve galleys, which Paphos had furnished, the one only in which the commander was taken had survived the hurricane. This capture was very fortunate for the Greeks. Beside the loss to the enemy and the gain of so many ships of war to themselves, spirits were added to the multitude, and intelligence was acquired to the commanders. As soon as the prisoners had been examined before the

principal officers of the fleet they were sent to the congress at Corinth.

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The prospect of Grecian affairs was now brightened a little. If the fleet could oppose the enemy with but equal success, it might be hoped that the nature of the frontier would render defence against the prodigious numbers of his army at least possible. To the south of Thessaly, mount Cæta, as formerly observed, stretches across the country from sea to sea. North of Thermopylæ, and bordering upon the Malian bay, is a plain, in one part wide, in others very narrow, inclosed by high and impracticable mountains called the Trachinian rocks. The Persian army, moving in three divisions from Upper Macedonia, crossed the mountains by the passes indicated to the Greeks by Alexander, and proceeding by Gonnus through Thessaly, to the valley and town of Anticyra, there again met the sea. Crossing then the river Sperchius, it entered the Malian plain, in the widest part of which, at the town of Trachis, the king fixed his head-quarters. Southward of this town the river Asopus, after washing for some way the foot of the mountain, which is a branch of Cæta, enters a cleft of it, and the only road is by the course of that river. A little farther southward a small stream called the Phœnix, falling from the hills, meets the Asopus: and here masonry had been necessary to render the way passable for a single carriage.²⁰ The Asopus having made its course by the cleft through the mountain-ridge, which is here narrow, enters a valley of some length, but little width, and presently discharges itself into the Malian bay. In this valley,

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 198.

c. 131.

Toward the
end of July.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 200.

²⁰ That appears to be the sense of the phrase ἀμαξίτος γὰρ μὴ μόνῃ δέδμηται. Herodot. l. 7. c. 200. The curious reader may consult Wesseling's note.

CHAP.
VIII.Herodot.
I. 7. c. 201.

on the bank of the Asopus, was the town of Anthela, with the temple of Ceres, the temple of Amphictyon, and the place of meeting of the Amphictyonic assembly. Thermopylæ was a little beyond them, and less than two English miles from the junction of the Asopus and Phoenix. The Persian monarch commanded all to the north of the mountains; the Greeks under Leonidas held the pass.

c. 207.

Plut.
Apoph.
Lac.

A prince like Xerxes, wholly inexperienced in war, might expect, as Herodotus says of him, that the force under his orders was capable of any thing against men, and almost against nature. According to that author he waited four days, in expectation that the Greeks would retreat from his irresistible numbers, and leave him an uninterrupted passage. And this, according to the same honest historian, would actually have happened, but for the superior genius and unshaken courage of the Lacedæmonian king. It has been added, by later writers, that a herald was sent to Leonidas, commanding him, in the name of Xerxes, to come and deliver his arms; to which the Spartan prince answered, with Laconic brevity, 'Come and take them.' But among the Persian generals there were probably men of experience and judgment, not incapable of informing their sovereign how useless his numbers would be in the pass of Thermopylæ. But numerous as the Greeks were under his command, information moreover might reach him of divisions among those who opposed him, and of a disposition of some to retire. He might also be told that the Spartan king boasted his descent from the hero Hercules, who is said to have ended his mortal life on mount Cæta, and to whom, as a god, an altar stood dedicated in the valley of Anthela: but such matters the Persians

would not be likely much to regard ; and of the superior talents of Leonidas, who had never yet had opportunity for making them conspicuous, they could have but little assurance. The credit due then to Herodotus we continue to find very nearly proportioned to his probable means of information. When these were good he has seldom or never related absurd tales ; when they have been deficient he has rarely scrupled to report any rumour. Information of public orders to the Persian army might reach him ; but the actions, and still more the passions, of Xerxes upon his throne, which he has pretended to describe, would not be matters of common notoriety. He may however have had some authority for his report that on the fifth day after his arrival at Trachis, Xerxes commanded the Medes and Cissians of his army alone to go and bring the Greeks under Leonidas alive into his presence. The attack, made in consequence, is likely to have been ineffectual enough to disgrace those troops, in some degree, in the eyes of their inexperienced sovereign. The Persian guards, called the immortal band, were next ordered to the assault. According to Herodotus the efforts of this band were very spirited ; and he accounts very candidly for their want of success. Their short spears were inefficacious, and their numbers useless, against the longer weapons of the Greeks, and on ground so confined. Their attacks were however renewed and varied in all the ways that their leaders could devise. Numbers fell, and no impression was made. The report, which the historian adds, is likely enough to have become afterwards popular in Greece, that the Persian monarch leaped thrice from his throne, as he anxiously viewed the conflict. From the description of the place however it seems impossible that his throne could have

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 210.

c. 211.

c. 212.

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been within sight, and little likely that he should himself have seen the action. The immortal band, after having suffered severely, was at length recalled, and the Persian generals were greatly at a loss. The attempt was however renewed the next day, in the hope that wounds, and the fatigue of repeated action, might weary the scanty numbers of the Greeks, and oblige them to quit their advantageous ground. But the little army of Leonidas was equal to his purpose; his reliefs were judiciously managed, and the second day's attack was unavailing like the former.

Among the various advantages, beyond estimation, which the Persian monarch possessed over the little Grecian confederacy, may be reckoned the means, almost unbounded, of rewarding those who would serve him. The hope of profiting from these brought information of another pass over the mountain; circuitous indeed and difficult, but by which, after the fortifying of Thermopylæ, the Thessalians had sometimes invaded Phocis for plunder. In more settled times it had been neglected; but, being not unknown among the neighbouring inhabitants, Leonidas had appointed the Phocians under his command to the guard of it. The path began at the cleft in the mountain through which the Asopus has its channel. Hence, by a winding course, it ascended a hill, distinguished by the name of Anopæa, from the heights of Cæta on one side, and the Trachinian rocks on the other. Holding then for some space along the top of the ridge, it descended directly to Alpeni, the first town of Locris. A strong detachment, under the command of Hydarnes, marching about dusk, arrived, without opposition, by daybreak, near the summit of Anopæa, where the Phocian guard had its station. The oaks, with which the mountain was covered, had concealed

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 213.

c. 175.

c. 212. &
217.

c. 216.

c. 217.

the approach of the enemy.²¹ The Phocians, whose discipline, in general, was probably less cultivated than that of Lacedæmon or Athens, had neglected the necessary precautions of advanced guards and out-sentries. They were first alarmed by the noise of a multitude of men treading among the fallen leaves; heard, as the weather was perfectly serene, at some distance. Immediately they ran to arms. But with the inconsiderateness of men surprised, imagining themselves the ultimate object of attack, instead of taking proper measures to fulfil the important purpose of their post by preventing the passage of the enemy, they retreated on one side of the path to gain more advantageous ground for defence. The judicious Hydarnes, leaving them to their desired security, continued his march, and quickly descending the mountain, reached the plain unmolested.

The Persian army so abounded with Greeks, many involuntarily pressed, that deserters would not be wanting to inform Leonidas of whatever could be generally known in the enemy's camp. That very night intelligence came that a strong detachment was marched for the mountains. Early in the morning the scouts of the army²² arrived, with information that the enemy had already passed the Phocian guard, and were descending toward the plain. Immediately

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 219.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 8.

²¹ These mountains, according to all travellers, are now woodless. Nor has the destruction been a modern event: it is noticed by Statius, as in his time extensive in the Roman empire, and especially in Greece:

Nusquam umbræ veteres; minor Othrys, et ardua sidunt
Taygeta; exuti viderunt æra montes.
Jam natat omne nemus; cæduntur robora classis.
. Ipsum jam puppibus æquor
Deficit, & totos consumunt carbasa ventos.

Stat. Achill. l. 1. v. 426.

²² . . . οἱ ἡμεροσκόποι, καταδραμόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων, κ. τ. λ.

Herod. l. 7. c. 219.

6th Aug.
B. C. 480.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.;
but it may
have been
some days
earlier.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 220.

a council of the Grecian commanders was held. Opinions were divided; some thinking it became them still to maintain their post; others, that the consequence of the attempt could be but a useless waste of lives, which ought by all means to be preserved for the future wants of their country. The debate ended in a general resolution to retreat with all speed to their respective cities, the Lacedæmonians and Bœotians only remaining. Herodotus mentions it as uncertain whether Leonidas dismissed the rest. The Thespians alone appear to have resolved voluntarily to abide the event with him: the Thebans he would not suffer to depart; keeping them as hostages, on account of the known disaffection of their city to the Grecian cause.

c. 104.

Leonidas himself determined, upon this great occasion, to exhibit to the world a memorable example of obedience to that law of Sparta, which forbade, under whatsoever disadvantage, to fly from an enemy. Considering the disposition, so widely prevailing among the Greeks, to fear the Persian power, and shrink before it, there appears not less true patriotic wisdom than admirable magnanimity in that prince's conduct. The oracular response from Delphi, said to have declared that either Sparta or its king must fall, adds nothing to its lustre. Upon fair historical testimony it has been fully equal to the warm and abundant eulogies which writers of various ages and nations have vied in bestowing upon it. Animated by his example, every Lacedæmonian and Thespian under his command was resolved to die; but to die gloriously for himself, and, as far as possible, usefully for his country. To be surrounded being now unavoidable, the object was no longer to guard the pass, but to choose the spot where, in sacrificing themselves,

they might make the greatest destruction of the enemy. The narrow therefore, at the junction of the Phoenix and Asopus, was abandoned, and the little band was collected at the wall of Thermopylæ.

Before sunrise the whole Persian army was under arms, the king himself attending, in solemn pomp, to wait the appearance of the luminary above the horizon, for beginning the devotional ceremonies prescribed for that favourite hour of Persian religion. After these were concluded, the troops were dismissed to wait for orders. About the middle of the forenoon ²³, when it was supposed Hydarnes might be nearly arrived in the rear of the Greeks, a chosen body was commanded to the assault in front. Leonidas now gave a loose to the fury of men prepared for death. Advancing before the wall, he attacked the Persians in the wider part of the valley; and the Grecian long spears in the hands of practised men, protected by superior defensive armour, making great slaughter, caused such confusion that, through want of room for the ill-disciplined multitude, numbers were forced into the sea, and many expired under the pressure of their own people. Himself, fighting at the head of his band, fell early. The engagement was nevertheless continued, with advantage on the side of the Greeks, till Hydarnes came in sight in their rear. Then they retreated to the narrow at the wall. The Thebans used opportunity to beg mercy of the conquerors: but, in the very act of surrendering, many, through the confusion, were killed: the rest were made prisoners. The surviving Lacedæmonians and Thespians gained a hillock, where they fought, surrounded, till all were slain.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 223.
& seq.

²³ . . . χρόνον ἐς ἀγορῆς καὶ μάλιστα πληθώραν.

Herodot. 1. 7. c. 223.

CHAP.
VIII.Herodot.
l. 7. c. 229.
& seq.

c. 224.

Such is the account given by Herodotus of this extraordinary and celebrated action. The circumstances might come in a great degree authenticated to him through the Greeks who served with the Persians; and every anecdote that could be collected would be heard with eagerness, and preserved with care.²⁴ The names of all the three hundred Spartans were still upon record in the historian's time. Two of them survived the battle, having been accidentally absent; Aristodemus, who was, with the prince's leave, for the recovery of his health, at Alpeni; and Pantites, sent on public business into Thessaly. It being however reported at Lacedæmon that Eurytus, who had also had leave from Leonidas to remain at Alpeni on account of sickness, nevertheless joined on the day of battle, and fell with his comrades, and that Pantites might have so hastened his return as to have shared in the glory of the day, both were dishonoured. Pantites, in consequence, strangled himself: but Aristodemus, with greater fortitude, supported life; and was happy enough, in the sequel, to find opportunity for distinguishing his courage in the cause of his country, so that his memory has been transmitted with honour to posterity. The body of the Spartan king, as the same historian affirms,

²⁴ Some seem to have been invented after the age of Herodotus, as the annotator Valckenarius has justly observed, n. 92. p. 609. of Wesseling's Herodotus. The report of Diodorus, followed by Plutarch, Justin, and others, that Leonidas with his Spartans attacked the Persian camp by night, and penetrated to the royal tent, is inconsistent with the other circumstances, whether of place or time; nor does it seem too much to say that it is an absurd fiction. Indeed, most of the tales, the omission of which by Herodotus has so much excited the indignation of Plutarch, appear fitter for poetry or romance than history.

being discovered amongst the heaps of slain, was, by order of Xerxes, beheaded, and the trunk ignominiously exposed on a cross : but this, he adds, was contrary to the general principles and practice of the Persians, who were accustomed, beyond all other people, to honour military merit, even in their enemies. This observation to the credit of the enemies, and in opposition to the prejudices of his country, proves not less the extensive information and just judgment than the candour of Herodotus ; for every authentic account marks the Persians for a people of liberal sentiments and polished manners, beyond almost any other in all antiquity.

SECTION IV.

Numbers of the Grecian fleet. Sea-fights off Artemisium. Retreat of the Grecian fleet. March of the Persian army toward Athens. Attempt against Delphi.

DURING this memorable scene at Thermopylæ the hostile fleets had met in the neighbouring channel. The Persians wanted to force the passage between Eubœa and the main, for the double purpose of a safer navigation than by the more open sea, and of attending more closely the motions of their army. The business therefore of the Grecian fleet, as Herodotus has observed, was like that of the army, to defend the strait. It consisted of two hundred and seventy-one trireme galleys, with a few of those smaller vessels called penteconters. The penteconter, the vessel of Homer's age, had, like the modern row-boat, only one tier of oars, and its complement of rowers was from fifty to sixty. The trireme, it is generally supposed, had three tier of oars ; by which it gained that swiftness, so important in the ancient

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 1.

Herodot.
1. 6. c. 15.
1. 7. c. 184.
&
1. 8. c. 130.

mode of naval action.²⁵ Its ordinary complement of rowers was, at the time of which we are treating, from a hundred and fifty to a hundred and sixty ; beside whom it commonly carried forty soldiers, and sometimes more ; but, on emergencies, particularly when boarded, the whole crew acted with arms. Of the triremes, now in the Grecian fleet, no less than one hundred and twenty-seven were furnished by Athens, a very few years before unable to cope at sea with the inhabitants of the Æginetan rock ; and more were still preparing in the Athenian ports. Forty were sent by Corinth ; twenty by Megara : the Chalcidians of Eubœa manned twenty lent to them by the Athenians : Ægina sent eighteen ; Sicyon twelve ; Lacedæmon only ten ; Epidaurus eight ; Eretria seven ; Trœzen five ; and the islands of Styros and Ceos each two. The Plataëans, an inland people, unacquainted with naval business, but zealously attached to Athens, served, with their best ability, in the Athenian fleet. To these triremes the Opuntian Locrians added five penteconters, and the Ceans two.

Herodot.
1. 8. c. 2.
& seq.

In an armament to which they contributed so much the largest proportion, the Athenians might seem justly to claim the chief command : yet, such was the reputation and influence which Lacedæmon held among the Greeks, the allies absolutely refused to serve under any but a Spartan commander. Eurybiades was therefore admiral of the fleet. Historians have, upon this occasion, justly applauded the moderation of the Athenian leaders, who patiently acquiesced under this decision, and, superior to little punctilio, continued with unabated zeal to prosecute the great purposes of the common cause. But the Athenian

²⁵ Some remarks on the ancient vessels of war will be found in an Appendix at the end of this chapter.

counsels, at this time, were directed by a man who could conceal unbounded desire of glory under the appearance of modesty, and, with a temper as pliable as his genius was penetrating, weighing the necessities of the times, and foreseeing the opportunities of ambition, could not only accommodate himself to all seasons and circumstances, but had skill to lead the froward populace of Athens to submit their passions to his opinion. Herodotus relates an anecdote of him, too remarkable, whencesoever the information was derived, and too characteristical to be omitted.²⁶ The Persian fleet, collected after its late misfortune, was observed in the road of Aphetæ, at the mouth of the Pelasgian gulf, opposite Artemisium, at the distance of not more than ten miles from the station of the Grecian fleet, less diminished in force than had been hoped for. At the same time the whole neighbouring country was filled with the immense multitude of the military host. Alarm spread on all sides, and the contagion reached the commanders of the Grecian squadrons, insomuch that it was proposed to retreat, according to the historian's expression, to the interior seas of Greece.²⁷ The Eubœans, in the highest consternation, sent to Eurybiades, begging that the fleet might remain for their protection, till they could remove their families and most valuable effects. The admiral refused. The Eubœans then applied to the Athenian commander. Themistocles,

²⁶ The note 45. p. 621. of Wesseling's Herodotus, may perhaps deserve the notice of the curious reader. Plutarch, who, in his Treatise against Herodotus, has expressed great indignation at this tale, has nevertheless, in his Life of Themistocles, related very nearly the same.

²⁷ *Εσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Herodot. l. 8. c. 4. Εἴσω τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Plut. vit. Themist.

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whose opinion was before decided against retreat, told them that, though words could not persuade, gold might; and for thirty talents, something more than seven thousand pounds sterling, he would engage that the fleet should remain and fight the Persians. The money was presently paid into his hands. Five talents then brought over the commander-in-chief; and under his orders all the commanders of squadrons readily consented to remain, except Adimantus the Corinthian. ‘To him then,’ says Herodotus, ‘Themistocles swore, saying: Neither shalt thou leave us; for I will give thee more than the Persian king would send thee for deserting thy allies;’ and immediately ordered three talents to be conveyed to his ship. Fear of the accusation, or gratification with the present, prevailed; and thus, according to the historian, were the commanders bribed to the opinion of Themistocles, and to the protection of the Eubœans: the fleet, probably to the great advantage of the common cause, remained in its station.

Herodot.
I. 8. c. 6.
& 7.

Next morning at daybreak the Persian admirals moved. They had proposed immediately to attack the Grecian fleet; but after approaching near enough to observe how inferior it was to their own, they concluded that, if they should advance, the Greeks would certainly retreat, and, through their knowledge of the narrow seas behind them, would probably escape. On consultation it was therefore determined to send two hundred galleys round Eubœa, to take a station in the rear of the Greeks; the main body abstaining from attack, till it should be known by signals that the detached squadron was arrived at the station proposed.

c. 8. & seq. During these transactions, Scyllias, a Greek of

Scione, an expert diver, who, from having been useful to the Persian commanders in recovering many things of value from the wreck of their lost ships, had been introduced to means of information, deserted to the Greeks. He brought a more exact account of the actual strength of the enemy's fleet than had yet been obtained, and he gave intelligence of the squadron sent round Eubœa. A council of war was held; and, after much debate, it was determined that the whole fleet should weigh at midnight, and go against the detached squadron, in the just hope that, taken separately, it might easily be overpowered. In the evening however, having received no confirmation of the intelligence (for, to avoid observation, the enemy kept a considerable distance from the Eubœan coast,) the Grecian commanders determined to try an attack upon the main body of the Persian fleet; or rather perhaps upon some part of it, toward evening, when daylight would not suffice for bringing the whole into action, and when, should they nevertheless be overpowered, night would favour their retreat. They founded hopes also on a friendly disposition in the Ionian commanders; of whom some were indeed well inclined to them, though others were eager to gain the Persian monarch's favour, and earn the rewards promised for zeal shown in his service. A sharp engagement ensued. If we may believe Herodotus, the Greeks took thirty galleys; though he says afterward that neither side could claim a victory. Among the prisoners however, made by the Greeks, was Philaon, brother of Gorgus prince of Salamis in Cyprus, a man of great estimation among the enemy's officers. Lycomedes, an Athenian captain, obtained the reward of valour for being the first who took a Persian galley. Antidorus of Lemnos, a Grecian cap-

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tain in the Persian service, deserted with his ship to the confederate Greeks. The Athenian government afterward rewarded him with a grant of land in the island of Salamis. In the night the Greeks resumed their station at Artemisium; the Persians remained at Aphetæ.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 12.

The Grecian fleet had scarcely cast anchor when a storm arose, attended with heavy rain and violent thunder. The drift of the storm carried the wreck of the late engagement, and the floating bodies, among the Persian ships. Their cables were entangled, their oars impeded. Repeated flashes of lightning, amid extreme darkness, just served to discover the horrors of the scene, while the uncommon resonance of the thunder, among the neighbouring summits of Pelion, struck the seamen with the imagination that the gods themselves were thus loudly declaring their anger: a fancy likely enough to arise in the minds, at least, of the Grecian seamen in the Persian fleet, who, according to belief in their age, were making war, under foreign gods, against the gods of their mother-country. The detached squadron meanwhile, in the open sea, as it was there called where none was truly open sea, driving before the storm, and ignorant of their course, fell among the rocks of that peculiarly dangerous bay of the Eubœan coast called the Cœla.²⁸ All perished; 'and thus,' says Herodotus, 'the deity interfered to reduce the Persian force more nearly to an equality with the Grecian.'

c. 13. &
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 13.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 14.
& seq.

All the next day the Persians remained in their station; while a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian galleys joined the Grecian fleet, bringing with them

²⁸ 'Sinus Euboicus, quem Cœla vocant, suspectus nautis.' Liv. Hist. Rom. l. 31. c. 41. See note 78. p. 625. of Wesseling's Herodotus.

the welcome news of the destruction of the enemy's squadron on the Euboic rocks. Thus encouraged, the Grecian commanders were the more intent upon watching opportunities for farther advantages. Means were observed for cutting off the Cilician squadron. The attempt was made in the evening, and succeeded ; and in the night the fleet again resumed its station at Artemisium.

The Persian commanders, irritated by repeated insults from an enemy so inferior, and apprehensive of blame for remissness, determined, on the following day, to attack the Grecian fleet with their whole remaining force. About noon they advanced, formed in a semicircle, with a view to surround the enemy. The Greeks waited in their station, probably an advantageous one. The plan of attack of the Persians, if well conceived, appears to have been ill executed. Such a multitude of vessels indeed, manned with people of different nations and languages, who varied both in method and in degrees of skill, would be very liable to disorder in the tumult of battle. Even in approaching the enemy they crossed and fell against one another. The battle nevertheless was warmly maintained ; the Egyptians distinguished themselves ; they took five Grecian galleys, and more than half the Attic squadron was disabled. Apparently it was that part of the Grecian fleet the defeat of which the Persian commanders justly reckoned their most important object. Thus the opportunity was afforded for Clinias son of Alcibiades, grandfather of him who afterward raised the name of Alcibiades to historical fame, to distinguish himself in a galley which he commanded, built and manned at his own expense, whence the *Aristeia*, the usual honours for the first merit in the action, were decreed to him by the Athenian people.

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VIII.Herodot.
1. 8. c. 18.
& c. 21.c. 19.
& 22.
Plut. v.
Themist.
Justin.
1. 2. c. 12.

According to Herodotus, the Greeks remained masters of the wreck and of the dead ; yet he acknowledges that they suffered greatly, and proceeds to give proof of it, reporting that, in a council of war, held immediately after the engagement, it was resolved to retreat farther on the coast of Greece. This measure was hastened by the arrival of Abronychus, an Athenian officer, who had been stationed with a light vessel at Thermopylæ for the purpose of communicating intelligence, bringing information of the circumvention of Leonidas and his party, and the retreat of the rest of the army. It was then resolved not to delay for a moment the retreat of the fleet. The whole moved in the accidental order of the instant ; the Corinthians leading, the Athenians forming the rear.²⁹

But Themistocles, ever fertile in expedients, conceived the idea of making even the flight of his fellow-countrymen useful to his country. With some of the swiftest galleys of the squadron under his command, he went to the watering-places of the road of Artemisium, which he concluded the enemy for necessary supply would visit next day, and there on the rocks he wrote thus : ‘ Men of Ionia, you do ill in ‘ making war upon your fathers, and helping to en- ‘ slave Greece. Come therefore over to us ; or, if ‘ that cannot be, remain neuter, and persuade the ‘ Carians to the same measure. But, if the necessity, ‘ which compels you to the part you are engaged in, ‘ is such as to make a secession impracticable, yet,

²⁹ Later writers tell of Grecian victories off Artemisium utterly inconsistent with the events that followed ; but Plato’s slight mention of the actions there confirms Herodotus’s account * ; and even Plutarch gives some degree of corresponding testimony.†

* Plat. de Leg. l. 4. p. 707. t. 2.

† Vit. Themist.

‘when we come to action, avoid exertion against us ; remembering that you are descended from one blood with us, and that the enmity of the Persians was first drawn upon us in your cause.’ I imagine, continues the historian, that Themistocles had two views in this. If the inscriptions should be observed only by the Greeks of the Persian fleet, he hoped that some might be persuaded by them ; but if the matter should be reported to the Persian chiefs, the Ionians would become suspected, and perhaps might be excluded from the line of battle in future engagements.

The road of Artemisium was no sooner clear than a Greek of the neighbouring town of Histiaëa hastened in a light boat to the Persian fleet, to obtain the reward for such intelligence. Some of the swifter vessels were immediately dispatched to ascertain the truth of the report, and at sunrise the whole fleet weighed and proceeded to Artemisium. The same day the Persians took possession of the town of Histiaëa, and the neighbouring district of the island sedulously made submission.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 23.

About the same time the army recommenced its march from Thermopylæ. Some Arcadians, poor and without prospect at home, had been tempted by the fame of the great king’s riches and liberality to wander thus far to offer their services to him. The practice of seeking hire in foreign military service appears to have obtained among that inland mountain-people before it became usual with the other European Greeks. Herodotus seems to relate the story of these adventurers not more for the purpose of eulogy than of admonition to his country. They were introduced, he says, to the presence of Xerxes, and, being asked ‘what was doing in Greece,’ they

c. 26.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 34.

Ol. 75.
B. C. 480.

answered, with great simplicity, ‘that it was the season of the Olympian games, and that consequently the Greeks were amusing themselves with seeing athletic exercises and horse-races.’ Being then asked, ‘What was the reward of the conquerors in those games,’ they answered, ‘An olive garland.’ Upon which Tritantæchmes, a prince of the blood-royal of Persia, exclaimed, ‘O Mardonius, what a people have you brought us to fight against, who contend among themselves not for riches but for virtue!’

Thucyd. l. 3.
c. 56. & 62.
Plat.
Menex.
p. 241. t. 2.
Isocr. Pan.
& Panath.
Plut. Arist.

But whatever might be the general simplicity or the general virtue of the Greeks of this age, their patriotism at least was of very various complexion in the different states, and in the different factions of the same states. Of the provinces from mount Cæta to the isthmus Phocis almost alone was faithful to the confederate cause, the cause of Grecian independency. From the moment when the Persians became masters of Thermopylæ the adjacent Locris could hardly avoid submission. Doris, and all Bœotia, excepting the little cities of Thespiæ and Plataæ, were led by a few principal men of Thebes, who had in view to confirm and advance their own power through the patronage of the great king. Influenced by these men, those provinces had always been adverse to the confederacy, and now with ready zeal acknowledged themselves subjects of the Persian monarch. Herodotus, with great appearance of reason, attributes the firmness even of the Phocians more to their extreme animosity against the Thessalians, their hereditary enemies, and to the partial consideration of the peculiar interest of their province, than to any generous regard for common welfare, or any enlarged

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 62.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 30.

view of Grecian independency. If the Thessalians, he says, had held with the Greeks, the same animosity would have led the Phocians to join the enemy.

The Persians proceeded from Thermopylæ with the Thessalians for their guides. Turning immediately to the right along the root of Œta, they then directed their march through the narrow vales of Doris toward the river Cephissus. The Dorian, as a friendly territory, was spared; but as soon as the army entered Phocis, at the instigation of the Thessalians rather than from the disposition of the Persians, destruction was begun with sword and fire. The main body of the army followed the course of the Cephissus. Detachments burnt the towns, apparently village towns mostly, of Drymus, Charadra, Erochus, Tethronium, Amphicæa, Neon, Pedieæ, Triteæ, Elatea, Hyampolis, Parapotamii, Abæ, with their temples. The people fled, many to the fastnesses of mount Parnassus, some to Amphissa and other towns of the Ozolian Locrians, beyond the ridges of Parnassus and Helicon, and so in less immediate danger. A few were taken and reduced to slavery. From Panopeæ a detachment was sent to seize the treasure of Delphi, known to Xerxes, as Herodotus professes to have believed, more exactly and circumstantially, through the forward information of the Greeks following his banners, than what he had left in his own palace at Susa. The main body continued their march through the friendly province of Bœotia toward Athens.

Herodot.
c. 31, 32.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 14.
Plut. v.
Themist.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 35.

The defence of Delphi, itself a curious object, is not less so for the veil with which interested ingenuity industriously covered it, and which superstitious ignorance would rather double than withdraw. The account transmitted by Herodotus, mixed as it

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Herodot.
l. 8. c. 36.
& seq.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 14.

is with the preternatural, was apparently altogether current with the credulity of his age. As soon as news arrived, he says, that the Persians were in possession of Thermopylæ, the Delphian citizens, anxious for themselves, their temple, and the riches of which they were guardians, consulted their own oracle. They requested directions particularly concerning the sacred treasures ; whether they should bury them, or whether they should carry them to some other country. The god, says the historian, would suffer nothing to be moved ; declaring, that he would himself take charge of what belonged to him. The Delphians, thus relieved from a very heavy responsibility to the Greek nation, could more freely direct their cares to themselves and their families. Their wives and children were sent across the Corinthian gulf into Achaia. The men, except a few, perhaps mostly the less able, who withdrew to Amphissa in Locris, occupied the neighbouring fastnesses among the crags of Parnassus. The Corycian cavern, a vast natural vault in the side of the mountain, near the city, received many.³⁰ All quitted Delphi except sixty men and the prophet. The Persian detachment meanwhile approached by the way of Panope, Daulis, Lilæa, Phocian towns, which they burnt. As they drew near Delphi, and were now in sight of the temple, the prophet, whose name was Aceratus, saw the sacred armour, which it is unlawful for any mortal to touch, brought by some invisible power from the recess of the fane, and laid before the building. But no sooner was the advanced guard arrived at the chapel of Minerva, which is an outbuilding in front of the great temple, than thunder from heaven fell upon them ; two vast fragments from the mountain rolled down

³⁰ This cavern is described by Pausanias, l. 10. c. 32.

with prodigious noise, and killed many: a voice of warlike acclamation issued from within the walls. Dismay became general among the Persians. The Delphians then, rushing from the cavern, and descending from the summits, attacked them and made great slaughter. The survivors fled precipitately into Bœotia.

From this story the preternatural being detached, the remainder appears not improbable nor very defective. The priests, unwilling to trust the treasures to others, and anxious for the credit of their oracle, which could scarcely but suffer should the place fall into the hands of foreign plunderers, determined upon a bold measure, which they executed with courage and prudence. A clear and firm response from the oracle first inspired the citizens with confidence. Then the best refuge that Greece afforded was provided for their families. The ablest and most trusty men were reserved for the defence of the place. If the mode of defence was uncommon, it appears however to have been perfectly adapted to the situation and circumstances, which were also very uncommon. Surrounded and almost overhung by very lofty mountain summits, the site itself of the city was composed of crags and precipices. No way led to it but through mountain defiles, narrow and steep, shadowed with wood, and commanded at every step by fastnesses above; and the approach from Bœotia was of considerable length through such defiles. Every measure seems to have been taken to make the enemy believe that the place was totally abandoned, and to induce them to advance in all the carelessness of perfect security. The surprise appears in consequence to have been complete. A thunderstorm at midsummer, among the mountains, was likely to be an accidental assistant. The rolling down of the rocky fragments might appear miraculous

Strabo,
l. 9. p. 416.
& seq.
Pausan.
l. 10. c. 6.
& seq.
Justin.
l. 24. c. 6.
Wheel. b. 4.
Chandler,
c. 65. and
more
modern
travellers.

to those who did not know that numbers of men concealed among the crags were prepared to give them motion. Possibly artificial fires and explosions might imitate a thunderstorm and increase the horror.³¹ The Delphians then attacked with every advantage. The remainder of the Persian detachment, who reached the plains of Bœotia, readily adopted the reports of superstition to excuse their surprise and flight. Two persons, they said, superior in their appearance to anything human, joined the Delphians in the pursuit and slaughter. The Delphians affirmed that these could be no other than Phylacus and Autonus, ancient heroes of their country, to whom temples stood, in Herodotus's time, near the chapel of Minerva. Some of the fragments of rock, thrown down from the summits of Parnassus, were preserved within the chapel as memorials of the divine protection afforded upon that pressing emergency.

SECTION V.

Unsteady counsels of the Grecian confederacy. The Athenians, deserted by the Peloponnesians, remove their families from Attica. Aristides. Ostracism. Athens taken by the Persians. Artemisia. Ancient manner of naval Action. Battle of Salamis. Return of Xerxes into Asia.

WHILE any hope remained of defending the pass of mount Ceta, the Athenian fleet was of the utmost consequence to the confederated Peloponnesians: without its assistance, every part of their coast would be open to the enemy's navy. The safety of Attica therefore being a first object in the plan of operations, it had been resolved that, in case the enemy should penetrate across the mountains, the whole force of the confederacy should meet them in Bœotia, and

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 40.

³¹ Dutens' Inquiry into the Origin of the Discoveries attributed to the Moderns, c. 5. sect. 207.

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oppose their farther progress. But the usual dilatoriness of confederacies recurred, enhanced probably by the want of revenue. The Peloponnesian troops were yet within their several states when the news arrived of the death of the Spartan king, with his little band of self-devoted comrades, and of the retreat of the rest of his army. Then all hastened to the Corinthian isthmus, where Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, took the command. But the vehemence of the alarm, which spread on all sides, now set selfish counsels again afloat. Shortsighted through fear, the Peloponnesians determined not to risk anything for the preservation of Attica, but to contract their defence to their own peninsula. Their first business was to occupy, as an advanced post, the difficult passage of the Scironian rocks; another Thermopylæ, by which was the only road immediately from Attica into Peloponnesus. Then with earnest diligence they commenced strong lines across the isthmus. The people assembled there were the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleans, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, Hermionians. ‘These,’ says Herodotus, ‘met in arms at the isthmus, in deepest anxiety for the fate of Greece. The other Peloponnesians, principally the Argives and Achæans, were careless of the event, or rather, if I may speak freely, they were disposed to the party of the enemy.’

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 71.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 15.
Plut. v.
Themist.

Chandler's
Travels in
Greece,
c. 44.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 72.

The fleet, in its hasty retreat from Artemisium, had made no stop till it arrived in the bay of Salamis, on the Attic coast. There information met the Athenians, whose crews, now in the fleet, were the principal part of their commonwealth, that no force was assembled in Bœotia; that the Peloponnesians had resolved to confine their defence to their own

l. 8. c. 40.

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peninsula ; that they had begun their measures for that purpose ; that Attica thus was abandoned to destruction. The alarm was extreme. All that could be obtained from their allies was the assistance of the fleet, to transport their families and effects to Salamis, Ægina, and Trœzen ; places less exposed than Athens, but which expected only a delay of ruin. Nor were the Athenians now, like the Greeks of old, practised in wandering, and ready for migration. In proportion to the established security of property, and the peace of domestic life, the distress of families was great. At the awful moment of abandoning their country, a thousand anxious thoughts crowded upon every mind. In such excess of public misfortune administration commonly loses its powers ; the people, as in a shipwreck, become ungovernable through despair. All the wisdom, all the firmness, all the popularity of the ablest statesmen were wanted at Athens to preserve order, and to enforce those measures which political prudence required.

Plut. v.
Arist.

But one of the wisest and most virtuous citizens that any country ever boasted was in banishment. ARISTIDES son of Lysimachus, of a noble but not a wealthy family, had been patronised in early youth, and brought forward in public business, by Clisthenes the expeller of the Pisistratidæ ; and he is said, together with Themistocles, to have held a high military command under Miltiades, at the battle of Marathon. Themistocles, whose vast ambition was controlled by no scruple, avowed party principles. ‘ The gods forbid,’ he is reported to have said, ‘ that I should be in power, and my friends no better for it.’ Aristides, on the contrary, was, in public as in private life, so strictly upright and scrupulously impartial, that the title of THE JUST became applied to

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him as a common appellation. But democratical jealousy, or rather perhaps the ingenuity of ambitious individuals to make popular passion serve their private purposes, had invented a peculiar mode of repressing the dangerous superiority which great abilities and superior character might acquire in a republic. An assembly of the people, by what was called OSTRACISM, voted an illustrious citizen into banishment for five, ten, or twenty years; alleging no crime, meaning no punishment, but only guarding against the overbearing influence of individuals: the exile's property and his honour remained unhurt. Aristides had been thus banished; through the management, it is said, of Themistocles: for Aristides inclined to the aristocratical party; opposing that increase of the general assembly's power which it had suited the ambition of Themistocles to promote. But, in this tremendous crisis of the commonwealth, the name of the just Aristides began to be mentioned among the people; and it became evident that his absence was very generally regretted. Themistocles, whose capacious mind was never, by views of faction, blinded to greater interests, caught at the opportunity for popularity, and had the magnanimity himself to propose a decree which would enable his rival to return.

Diodor.
l. 11. c. 55.
Plut. v.
Themist.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 79.
Plut. v.
Aristid. &
Themist.

CIMON, son of the great Miltiades, is said also to have distinguished himself upon this trying occasion. Being, by inheritance from a long line of ancestors, one of the principal landed men of the Athenian commonwealth, he would not naturally be forward to abandon his country. But when proclamation was made that all should forthwith remove their families and effects out of Attica, and that every man capable of bearing arms should immediately repair to his

Plut. v.
Cimon.

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duty aboard the fleet, Cimon, at the head of a band of the principal youths of Athens, marched in procession through the most public parts of the city, to the temple of Minerva in the citadel. In their hands they carried their bridles, (the ensigns of that military service to which their birth and possessions had destined them,) and, with solemn rites, dedicated these to the goddess. Then, arming themselves, the whole party set off for the fleet at Salamis; not a little encouraging the admiring citizens by this demonstration of confidence in the gods, and alacrity in devoting themselves to that new service which the actual crisis of their country required.

Nor were the advantages to be derived from popular superstition neglected. It was believed from ancient times in Athens, that a large serpent, observed in the citadel, was a divine guard to the temple of Minerva; and it was an established practice to place cakes as an offering to this reptile every new moon. The chief priest of the temple declared that the cakes, which hitherto had never failed to be eaten by the divine serpent, now remained untouched: proof that the goddess herself had forsaken the citadel. This, says the contemporary historian, whatever truth was in it, not a little contributed to induce the Athenians readily and quietly to quit the city.

The general business of the confederacy was not conducted either with equal wisdom or equal spirit. The want of one supreme authority was again felt. The measures of the land forces were determined by the assembly at Corinth; of which the officers, commanding the troops of the several states, were principal members: those of the fleet seem not to have been taken into the consideration, but remained for the

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 41.
Plut. v.
Themist.

commanders of the several squadrons to decide. A council was held for the purpose. The great question was, Where they should now await the attack of that fleet from which they had been flying. Fear prevailed, and the majority were for retreating to the Corinthian isthmus; because there, it was urged, if they should be defeated, which seems to have been expected, though the ships were lost the crews might escape ashore, and still assist by land in the defence of their country.

Herod. l. 8.
c. 49. & 74.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 15.
Plut. v.
Themist.

The Persian army meanwhile, advancing from Thebes, burnt the abandoned towns of Thespiæ and Plataea; and, entering Attica, found no resistance till they arrived at the citadel of Athens. This was still held by some ministers of the temple of Minerva, some of the poorer citizens unable to support the expense of migration, and a few others, obstinately addicted to that interpretation of the Delphian oracle which supposed it to declare that the citadel should remain inexpugnable. The city was delivered to those Athenians of the Pisistratidean party who accompanied the Persian army. The citadel was immediately invested. Terms were offered to the besieged by the Pisistratidæ, and obstinately refused. After a resistance beyond expectation, the place was taken by assault, and all within put to the sword.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 50.
& seq.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 14.

Intelligence of this event, according to the probable detail of Herodotus, came to the fleet while a council of war was sitting. It occasioned such alarm that some of the commanders of squadrons, without waiting for a decision of the question before them, hastened aboard their galleys and prepared for immediate flight. The rest, less panic-struck, were still, for the most part, of opinion that the proposed retreat to the isthmus should be executed without

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 56.
& seq.

delay. Night advanced, and all was confusion. It is not uncommon in human affairs for little circumstances often to decide the greatest events. Themistocles, according to the historian, returning to his galley, was met by Mnesiphilus, an Athenian officer, his particular friend, who anxiously asked, What was the determination of the council. ‘To retreat instantly,’ said Themistocles. ‘Then,’ replied Mnesiphilus, ‘Greece is lost! for neither the present commander, nor any other man, will have influence to keep the fleet together. All will disperse to their several homes; and, through the folly of her chiefs Greece is enslaved for ever!—Is there no possibility of persuading Eurybiades to wiser measures?’ Touched by his friend’s earnestness in delivering an opinion perfectly coinciding with his own, the active mind of Themistocles could not rest. Returning immediately to Eurybiades, he prevailed to have another council hastily summoned. Naturally vehement in his temper, Themistocles was forward and copious in his discourse upon the subject for the consideration of which the council met, before it was regularly proposed by the commander-in-chief. The Corinthian commander, Adimantus, who was as warmly for different measures, interrupting him, said, ‘Themistocles, those who, at the games, rise before their time, are corrected with stripes.’ To so affronting a reprimand the Athenian chief calmly replied, ‘True, Adimantus, but those who neglect to engage in the contest never win the crown.’³² In

³² Later writers, to make a better story, instead of Adimantus, name Eurybiades, and add that he shook his cane over the head of Themistocles, who calmly said: ‘Strike, but hear me.’ Plutarch, through an inattention not unusual with him, in his *Life of Themistocles* has attributed the reprimand to Eurybiades, in his *Apophthegms* to Adimantus.

the course of the debate then he urged the importance of preserving Salamis, Ægina, and Megara, which upon the retreat of the fleet must immediately fall; the advantage of the present station, a confined bay, which would render both the numbers and the superior swiftness of the enemy's galleys useless; and the total want of such advantage in any station that could be taken near the Corinthian isthmus. When all this proved ineffectual, he concluded with declaring, 'That if so little regard was shown to the Athenian people, who had risked everything in the Grecian cause, their fleet would immediately withdraw from the confederacy, and either make terms with the enemy, or seek some distant settlement for a people so unworthily treated.' Eurybiades, alarmed, bent to this argument: a majority of the other commanders either felt its force, or were decided by the Spartan admiral; and it was determined to expect the enemy in the bay of Salamis.

The Persian fleet had remained three days in the road of Artemisium, to refresh the crews after their sufferings by storms and engagements. Three days then brought them through the Euripus to Phalerum, at that time the principal port of Athens. Herodotus supposes the Persian numbers, by sea and land, not less than on their first arrival at Sepias and Thermopylæ. For by land they were reinforced by the Malians, Dorians, Locrians, and Bœotians. Their fleet was increased with galleys from Andros, Tenos, Eubœa, and other islands. The recruits to the land forces might easily supply the loss by battle; but those to the fleet would scarcely balance the damage by storms, which seems to have been very much greater than any hitherto suffered in action. The fleet and army being again met, a council of naval

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 66.
& seq.

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VIII.Herodot.
1. 7. c. 99.

commanders was summoned, to consider whether the Grecian fleet should be attacked in its present station. It is difficult to determine how far credit may be due to Herodotus's account of a Grecian heroine in the Persian fleet ; who is yet so mentioned in all histories of the times that she must not be passed unnoticed.

Artemisia, daughter of Lygdamis, a Halicarnassian, by a Cretan lady, had married the tyrant of Halicarnassus, the native city of Herodotus, who had extended his command over the neighbouring islands Cos, Nisyrus, Calydna. On his death, Artemisia succeeded to his authority. When the orders of the Persian court came to the Asian Greeks to prepare forces for the European expedition, she fitted five galleys, which were confessedly superior to any of that vast armament, except the Sidonian ; and she formed the extraordinary resolution of undertaking herself the command of this little squadron. On joining the fleet in the Hellespont, she was regularly admitted to her seat in all councils of war ; and she acquired in a high degree the esteem of the Persian monarch. At the council held off Phalerum she alone dissuaded the proposed attack of the Grecian fleet.

1. 8. c. 67.
& seq.

‘Offensive measures,’ she said, ‘should be prosecuted only by land. There the superiority was decided, and operations more certain.’ The fleet should be reserved as an indispensable attendant upon so immense an army, which could not fail to suffer extremely, if by any misfortune it should lose the means of supply by sea. Besides,’ she added, ‘the Greeks cannot long hold their present advantageous situation ; for, if I am rightly informed, they have no magazines on the island which they occupy, and the main is already yours. Wait therefore only a little ; you will see them disperse of themselves, and

‘all Greece will be open to you.’ This wise advice was overruled, and it was determined to attack the Grecian fleet next morning.

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The Grecian commanders meanwhile were far from being all heartily disposed to the measure resolved on. Eurybiades appears to have been a man not of great abilities : his authority therefore, as commander-in-chief, over forces from various independent states, was very uncertain. Themistocles was yet fearful of the defection of some of the squadrons ; and, to insure what, in his judgment, was necessary for the common good, he is reported to have resorted to a very extraordinary measure. A trusty person was sent to the Persian fleet, with orders to say that he came from the Athenian admiral, who was desirous of revolting to the Persians ; that he was therefore to give an account of the dissensions among the Grecian commanders, and of what was likely to follow : adding that, if the present opportunity for destroying the whole Grecian fleet together should be neglected, such another would not be found. That very night the Persians moved and formed a semicircle, from the point of Salamis to the port of Munychia : the Egyptian squadron was detached to block the western passage ; and a force was landed upon the little island Psyttalea, between Salamis and the ports of Athens, to assist any of the Persian vessels, and seize any of the Grecian, that might be driven upon it. For the same purpose the Attic shore, to a considerable extent, was lined with troops ; and by daybreak the whole multitude of the army was in motion ; those whom no duty required going, urged by curiosity, to take their stand on the adjacent heights. The most commodious eminence was chosen for the monarch himself, surrounded by his guards, and attended by

Æschyl.
Pers. v. 355.
Herodot.
l. 8. c. 75.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 17.
Plut. v.
Themist.
& Aristid.
Corn. Nep.
v. Themist.

Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 17.
Æschyl.
Pers. v.
364. 450.
Herodot.
l. 8. c. 76.
Plut. v.
Themist.
& Aristid.

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his splendid retinue, to view at leisure the action to ensue.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 79.
& seq.
Plut. v.
Themist.
& Aristid.

During these preparations of the Persians, Aristides, then in Ægina, informed of the decree which had put a period to his exile, hastened to restore his services to his country; and, under favour of the night, passing through the middle of the enemy's fleet, arrived at Salamis. Aristides wanted not magnanimity, upon this great occasion, to lay aside both private animosity and the animosity of faction. He went directly to Themistocles, his rival and political enemy, related what he had seen, and offered his assistance for anything useful to the commonwealth. Themistocles, who, with a character of far less disinterestedness, could yet equally command his passions, and well knew the value of such assistance, joyfully accepting the offer, requested that Aristides would accompany him to the council of war then sitting, and deliver his information in person; which, he said, would have much more weight than anything he could repeat, accustomed as he had been to combat the military and political opinions of most of the Grecian commanders. Aristides immediately complied. He had scarcely delivered his intelligence, when confirmation of it came by a captain of a trireme galley of the island of Tenos, who had deserted from the enemy. Then at last, pressed by necessity, the commanders with one voice declared a determination to exert themselves in action.

Among the ancients, for a naval engagement, a small space sufficed, in comparison of what modern fleets require; not only because of the smaller size of their vessels, but still more because of the different manner of working and fighting them. Our ships of war, very deep as well as large, and deriving motion

only from the wind, with deep and open seas, want large intervals also between ship and ship. The ancient galleys, on the contrary, always light, however large, and in action receiving impulse from oars alone, could form and move in very close order, and were not afraid of narrow seas. From their mode of engagement also they required comparatively little space. Our ships, whose artillery decides their battles, must bring their broadsides to bear upon the enemy; avoiding as much as possible to expose themselves in any other direction. They engage therefore, according to the sea-phrases, close-hauled to the wind, and with the line of battle formed ahead. But the ancients, whose principal weapon was a strong beak of brass or iron projecting from the stem of the galley, advanced to the attack always with the line of battle formed abreast. The greatest advantage one galley could obtain over another was to bring its head to bear directly upon the enemy's broadside; the next, to gain the means of an oblique impulse, which might dash away some of his oars. By the success of the former attempt a galley was often sunk; by that of the other it became unmanageable till the lost or damaged oars could be replaced; and this gave opportunity for the more decisive attack with the beak. Hence the importance of oars in actions; by them alone attacks could be made, warded, or avoided in every direction. But Themistocles appears to have been the first to conceive the full advantage thus to be obtained. Missile weapons were much used by all nations; but it had been hitherto the great object of the Greeks to grapple ship to ship. The engagement then resembled an action by land; and the superiority of the heavy-armed soldier on the deck decided the contest. It seems to have been partly

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on this account that the Persian commanders had added thirty men of their best national troops to the ordinary complement of heavy-armed in every galley of their fleet; and they seem to have depended much on this increase of strength for certainty of victory. The discernment of Themistocles, apparently instructed by observation in the various actions off Artemisium, led him to a contrary principle: he would depend less upon arms wielded by the hands of individuals than upon the vessel itself, as one great and powerful weapon, on a squadron, as a combination of such weapons. It was, with this view, important to have his vessels light and unencumbered. He therefore reduced the complement of soldiers in each trireme to eighteen; of whom fourteen only were heavy-armed, and four bowmen.³³

Since the retreat from Artemisium the Grecian fleet had been very considerably reinforced. The Lacedæmonians had added six triremes to their former ten: the Athenian squadron was increased to a hundred and eighty; some had been gained from other states; a few from the islands; and the total number of triremes was now three hundred and eighty. The triremes of the Persian fleet are said to have been more than a thousand: according to Herodotus, they were above thirteen hundred.³⁴ Should

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 43.
& seq.
c. 82.
Isocr. Pan.
p. 226. t. 1.
ed. Aug.
Herodot.
l. 7. c. 89, &
184, 185. &
l. 8. c. 66.

³³ These numbers we have only on the authority of Plutarch, who, being neither soldier nor seaman, merely states the fact. It receives however confirmation from Thucydides and Xenophon; and, as occasion will occur hereafter more particularly to observe, they explain the purpose of the alteration.

³⁴ The passage of Æschylus*, which mentions the number of the Persian galleys, both as it stands in all the editions of his works, and in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles, seems clearly enough in itself to say that they were in all but a thousand; yet the commentators and translators have been generally desirous

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exaggeration be suspected, even in the lowest report, it is yet little reasonably to be doubted but the fleet under Xerxes, however inferior in the size and quality of the vessels, exceeded in the number of men which it bore any other naval armament ever assembled in the world.

Confident therefore in their strength, and urged by the common necessity of invaders to push vigorous measures, the Persians were impatient for decision. Accident seems to have made the Greeks at last the assailants; and thus perhaps contributed not a little to the greatness of their success. By daybreak, it is said on the twentieth of October, in the four hundred and eightieth year before the Christian era, they had formed their fleet in order of battle. The Athenians, on the right, were opposed to the Phenician squadron; the Lacedæmonians, on the left, to the Ionian. As the sun rose trumpets sounded, pæans were sung, and the Grecian leaders endeavoured by all means to excite that animation among their people which their own divided and hesitating counsels had so tended to repress. A trireme galley returning from Ægina, excluded from the Grecian fleet by the enemy's line, and nevertheless endeavouring to pass, was attacked. An Athenian galley commanded by Aminias, brother of the poet Æschylus, advanced

Dodw.
Ann.
Thucyd.Herodot.
l. 8. c. 85.Æschyl.
Pers. v.
386. et seq.Herodot.
l. 8. c. 84.
Æschyl.
Pers.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 27.

of straining it to mean that, to make the total, the two hundred and seven, which the poet mentions as the swiftest of the fleet, should be added to the thousand. On this Stanley's note may be seen. Plato says the Persian fleet was *χιλίων καὶ ἑτὶ πλεόνων*†; an expression sufficiently indicating that he did not believe it to have been of many more than a thousand. According to Æschylus, the Grecian triremes were only three hundred. It is not impossible but Herodotus might have collected more accurate information of the numbers furnished by the several states.

* De Leg. l. 3. p. 699. t. 2.

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to her rescue : others followed : then the Æginetans moved, and the battle soon became general.

The onset was vigorous on both sides. But space did not suffice for the Persians to bring their whole fleet regularly into action, nor for the Phenicians, in particular, to profit from the superior swiftness of their galleys and skill of their seamen. The Athenians and Æginetans therefore, after a sharp contest, broke the part of the Persian line first engaged. Numbers of galleys, yet out of action, pressed to its support. Among the various nations who composed the Persian fleet, commanded in chief by Persian officers little versed in naval business, while the vast army which lined the Attic shore, with the sovereign of the East at its head, were witnesses of the scene, zeal itself contributed to disorder. Damage and loss of oars, and wounds in the hull from the beaks of their own galleys, ensued ; while the Athenians and Æginetans, forgetting their late enmity, or remembering it only as an incentive to generous emulation, with the most animated exertion preserved the steadiest discipline. Shortly the sea itself became scarcely visible for the quantity of wreck and floating bodies. Such is the strong expression of the poet who himself fought in the Athenian squadron. In the mean time the business was easier to the Lacedæmonians and other Greeks in the left wing. Some of the Ionian officers exerted themselves to earn the favour of the monarch whom they served ; but others were zealously disposed to the cause of the confederates. The confusion arising, thus and variously otherwise in the Persian fleet, spread and rapidly became general and extreme. All their galleys which could disengage themselves fled. Some were taken : many were sunk ; and numbers of the crews, inland men,

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unpractised in swimming, were drowned. Among those who perished were very many of high rank, who had been forward to distinguish themselves, in this new species of war, under their monarch's eye. According to Herodotus, Ariabignes, brother of Xerxes, and admiral of the fleet, was among the killed ; but he is not mentioned by Æschylus. Forty Grecian galleys are said to have been sunk, or otherwise destroyed : but the crews mostly saved themselves aboard other ships, or on the neighbouring friendly shore of Salamis. When the rout was become total, Aristides, landing on Psyttalea at the head of a body of Athenians, put all the Persians there to the sword, under the very eye of Xerxes, who, with his immense army around him, could afford them no assistance.

Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 19.Æschyl.
Pers.
Herodot.
l. 8. c. 95.
Plut. v.
Arist.

In considering Herodotus's account of this memorable sea-fight we find not less reason than on former occasions to praise his scrupulous honesty and modesty. His narrative is doubtful and incomplete, as all faithful narratives of great battles must be, unless some eye-witness, very peculiarly qualified by knowledge and situation, be the relater. It is therefore matter of regret, not indeed that Æschylus was a poet, but that prose-writing was yet in his age so little common that his poetical sketch of this great transaction is the most authoritative, the clearest, and the most consistent of any that has passed to posterity. Concerning a day however so glorious, so singularly interesting to Greece, and particularly to Athens, anecdotes would of course abound ; and a historian, a few years only later, desirous to shine in description rather than to relate the truth, could not have wanted materials. Anecdotes indeed of particular circumstances in great battles may often be

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VIII.Herodot.
1. 8. c. 87,
88. & 93.

authenticated; and to those Herodotus has chiefly confined himself; avoiding a detail of the battle at large, with an express declaration that he could obtain none upon which he could rely. Among his anecdotes, one is too remarkable and of too much fame to be omitted. The queen of Halicarnassus, after showing extraordinary bravery during the action, being among the last who fled, was closely pursued by the Athenian galley which Aminias commanded. In this extremity, at a loss for other refuge, she suddenly turned against the nearest galley of the Persian fleet, which happened to be that of Damasithymus, prince of Calynda in Lycia, with whom she is said to have been upon terms not of perfect friendship: and taking him totally unprepared for such an attempt, the stroke of the beak of her galley against the side of his was so violent and so well aimed that the vessel instantly sunk, and the Calyndian prince and his crew were at the mercy of the enemy and the waves. Aminias, in the hurry of the moment, without means for inquiry, concluding from what he had seen that Artemisia's galley was either one of the confederate fleet, or one that had deserted to it, turned his pursuit toward other vessels, and the queen of Halicarnassus escaped. According to Herodotus, though in this instance we may have difficulty to give him entire credit, Xerxes, from the shore where he sat, saw, admired, and applauded the exploit.

It is indeed impossible here not to wish for those Persian histories of these great events which probably once existed, and which a learned orientalist of our own country would flatter us with the hope of still recovering³⁵: but most they become objects when the

³⁵ Richardson's Dissertation on the Languages, &c. of the Eastern Nations.

Persian counsels become particularly interesting, of which the Grecian historian has undertaken to give a detail that could not come to him duly authenticated. Not that an author under a despotic monarchy, who often must not publish what he knows or believes, and sometimes may not dare even to inquire, could be put in any general competition with a republican writer, who not only might inquire everywhere and speak anything, but has actually manifested his free impartiality by relating, with the ingenuous severity of a reproving friend, the disgraces of his fellow-countrymen, and by bestowing liberal and frequent eulogy upon their enemies ; yet even from the flatterer of a despot might be gathered some information of which the total wreck of Persian literature hath deprived us. The Greeks however were not without considerable means of information, often even of the intrigues of the Persian court. The eunuchs of the palace, the persons perhaps most intimate about the monarch, (for, according to Xenophon, even the great Cyrus preferred eunuchs for his confidants,) were of any nation rather than Persian. Some of them were Greeks ; at least born among the Greeks, though mostly perhaps of foreign origin as of servile condition. Herodotus mentions a Greek of Chios who acquired great wealth by the infamous traffic of castrated boys. One of these, Hermotimus, born at Pedasa in the territory of Halicarnassus, was in high favour with Xerxes, attended him into Greece, and, both before and after that expedition, was employed in affairs in Asia Minor which would lead him to communication with the principal Greeks of that country. Refugee Greeks moreover, from the various republics, continually swarmed about the courts of the Persian satraps, and even of the monarch

Xenoph.
Cyropæd.
l. 7.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 104,
105, 106.

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himself; so that, although the speeches which Herodotus puts into the mouths of Persian cabinet counsellors must be as fictitious as those which Livy attributes to his fellow-countrymen at the head of armies, yet large means were certainly open for Greeks of rank and character to know the manners of the Persian great, and even to pry into the politics of the empire, as far perhaps as the Persians themselves: for under a despotic government the counsels which direct the greatest affairs are generally open to very few.

After the battle of Salamis however the transactions of public notoriety bespeak, in a great degree, the counsels that directed them. The defeat of the fleet necessarily deranged the measures of the Persian commanders. No port was near, capable of protecting its shattered and disheartened, but still large remains. Phalerum, then the principal harbour of Athens, could not contain half its numbers. A hasty order, of the very night after the engagement, is said to have directed it to move immediately for the Hellespont. Day broke, and the Greeks, who expected a renewal of the action, looked in vain for an enemy. For the Persian army then quick determination of new measures was necessary. No sufficient magazines having been collected, it was, by the departure of the fleet, reduced, with its attending multitudes, to immediate danger of starving. In a few days accordingly it withdrew from Attica into the rich and friendly province of Bœotia, and thence shortly into Thessaly.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 107.

c. 96. & 108.

Æschyl.
Pers.
Herodot.
l. 8. c. 113.

l. 8. c. 100.
& seq.

Probably the punishment of Athens, with the submission of so many other provinces, may have been, in the Persian council, held sufficient, if not to satisfy the monarch's hope of glory, yet to prevent the im-

putation of disgrace, and perhaps even to form some shadowy claim to honour. The defeat of the fleet would be of course attributed to the faults of the immediate commanders, and to the defects and inferiority to be expected in an armament, not properly Persian, but composed almost entirely of the conquered subjects of the empire. The spoil of Athens, and among it the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton, were sent as trophies, to mark to the interior provinces the exploits of that prodigious armament, which had so diminished their population and exhausted their wealth. The affairs of the empire might require the presence of the prince. The conquered countries were not yet so far settled that it could be particularly agreeable to a young monarch, by education and by disposition probably not much either a warrior or a man of business, to pass the winter among them. To support all his forces there, during the stormy season, even had he still had command of the sea, would have been impossible. Xerxes was therefore to return into Asia.

But the projects of conquest were not to be yet abandoned. Three hundred thousand men were chosen from the whole army to remain under the command of Mardonius, who with that force undertook to complete the reduction of Greece in the following summer. The rejected multitude were to return with all haste eastward; urged by the prospect of famine, and the apprehension that the approach of winter might totally bar the passage of the mountains and rivers of Macedonia and Thrace. Of the three hundred thousand selected by Mardonius, sixty thousand under Artabazus were to march as a guard for the royal person as far as the Hellespont. These were perhaps, among the innumerable crowds of

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 113.
Æschyl.
Pers.

Herodot.
ut sup.

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various nations and languages who attended, or endeavoured to attend, the monarch's retreat, those who alone deserved the name of soldiers. Of these, as of soldiers forming a guard necessary to the prince's dignity and even safety, some care apparently was taken. The rest suffered beyond description, from the haste of the march, and almost total want of magazines: for the invasion only had been considered, the retreat was unprovided for. The disorderly multitude therefore lived by rapine, from friends equally and foes; but all was insufficient. Other sustenance failing, they ate the very grass from the ground, and the bark, and even leaves from the trees; and, as the historian, with emphatical simplicity, says, 'they left nothing.' Dysenteries and pestilential fevers seized whom famine spared. Numbers were left sick in the towns of Thessaly, Pæonia, Macedonia, and Thrace, with arbitrary orders, little likely to be diligently obeyed, that support and attendance should be provided for them. On the forty-fifth day from the commencement of his march in Thessaly, Xerxes reached the Hellespont, with an escort which, compared with the prodigious numbers a few months before under his command there, might be called nothing.³⁶ The bridges were already destroyed by storms and the violence of the current; but the fleet was arrived.³⁷ Artabazus immediately marched his de-

4 Dec.
B. C. 480.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 126.

³⁶ ἀπάγων τῆς στρατιῆς οὐδὲν μέρος, ὡς εἶπαι. Herodot. l. 8. c. 115.

³⁷ Herodotus is not among the reputable fablers who report that Xerxes in his retreat, without any army, without a fleet, and almost without an attendant, crossed the Hellespont in a cock-boat. He tells indeed another story, not perhaps wholly undeserving attention, as a specimen of tales circulated in Greece concerning these extraordinary transactions, though he declares

tachment back toward Macedonia. The monarch proceeded to Sardis.

APPEN-
DIX.

APPENDIX TO THE EIGHTH CHAPTER.

Of the ancient ships of war.

THE form of the ancient galleys of war, the trireme and quinquereme, and especially the arrangement of the rowers, have been much objects of inquiry and much of imagination, but yet remain very uncertain. The most satisfactory conjectures that I have met with, by far, are those of general Melvill, of which an account is given in the Appendix to Governor Pownall's Treatise on the Study of Antiquities. Along the waist of the galley, according to the general's supposition, from a little above the water's edge, a gallery projected at an angle of about forty-five degrees. In this the upper rowers were disposed, checkered with the lower. Space for them being thus gained, partly by elevation, partly by lateral projection, those of the highest tier were not too much above the water to work their oars with effect. The general says he has been confirmed in his opinion that this was the real form of the ancient galleys of war by representations of them, though imperfect, in ancient paintings and reliefs, which he has seen in Italy. He has not specified those paintings and reliefs. There were, in the collection at Portici, pictures of sea engagements, but so damaged that, when there in the year 1788, I was unable myself to discern the parts of the vessels, so as to judge at all whether they might confirm or confute the general's notions. The most perfect ancient monument to the purpose, for himself that he did not believe it. The curious may find it in the 118th and 119th chapters of his 8th book.

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VIII.Thucyd.
.2. c. 93.

that ever fell in my way, was a marble fragment of a bireme in high relief, preserved in the Vatican museum at Rome. It had the incorrectness usual in the representations of such objects by the ancient sculptors, but it nevertheless, in my opinion, went far to show that the general's idea was well founded. Moreover it explained, to my mind satisfactorily, the meaning of a nautical term used by Thucydides, which the scholiast, and after him lexicographers and translators, have, I think, certainly misinterpreted. In that curious monument the oars are represented projecting from the vessel's side through apertures, like the rowports in our small ships of war, every oar having about it a bag, attached to the vessel's side, the obvious purpose of which has been to prevent influx of waves and spray; and the need of it for vessels for which swift rowing was a prime object, and consequently the smallest elevation that might be of the rowlock above the water, will also be obvious. Thucydides, describing the march of some seamen to seize some unprovided triremes for a hasty expedition, says every one carried his oar with, according to the scholiast and following interpreters, his cushion * and loop or thong. The loop or thong to fasten the oar to the rowlock is yet common in boats for some purposes, especially gun-boats. The need for it in the ancient manner of naval action is obvious. If the purpose was to dash away the enemy's oars, the oars of the assailing vessel must be, in a moment, secured; which could be managed for those projected through a rowport only by letting them float the closest that might be to the vessel's side, attached to it by the loop; and equally the vessel attacked could avoid the proposed shock only by dis-

[* See note 6. on sect. 2. of ch. xv.]

posing its oars on the attacked side in the same manner. But the need for every man to have his cushion on such an expedition is not equally obvious. I have indeed seen a Thames wherryman use a cushion, but I suppose an invalided seaman, for some disorder. I can little doubt that the word which has been translated *cushion* meant the bag represented in the marble monument already mentioned, the need for which the historian, in proceeding with his narrative, shows probably to have occurred. The ingenious and learned Winckelmann*, in a treatise on the monument in question, has blundered, as might be expected of a closet critic, pretending to dissert on rowing without ever having handled an oar.

In the account of a voyage round the world in 1767, and following years, by Pagés, an officer of the French navy, there is a description of a vessel of the islands of the western verge of the Pacific ocean, the principle of which is exactly, and the construction very nearly, what general Melvill has imagined for the ancient war-galley. Pagés himself, apparently a diligent officer, and a liberal and candid writer, seems to have had little classical learning, and has not indicated that he had any idea of a Greek or Roman ship of war while he was describing what seems to have been so nearly the very thing. ‘The vessel,’ he says, ‘called *booanga* (Fr. *bouanga*) is perhaps but an enlargement of that of the Marian Islands, described in lord Anson’s voyage. It is a sort of very long-decked canoe or *periagua*. The hull does not rise more than a foot above the water. The upper-works, raised upon it, are very light, much like those of our old shebecks. It consists of a double gallery

[* See note 22. on sect. 7. of ch. xviii.]

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‘of bamboo, each two feet wide, running nearly the length of the vessel, leaving a small space beyond it, both at head and stern. The first gallery, ranging against the gunwale, on its outside, is about eighteen inches higher than the deck: the second, ranging against the first outward, rises only about a foot above it. The first gallery is supported by knees fixed to the upper works: the second by knees fixed to timbers projecting beyond the upper works. Thus there are three rows of rowers on each side, whose rowlocks are disposed like the portholes in a ship’s side, the highest over the lowest, and the middle tier between. The highest oars thus sufficiently overstretch the lowest, so as not to interfere in stroke with them; and the middle tier avoids interference with either, by taking the middle of the interval between every two oars of the upper and lower.’

Thus far the description is almost exactly general Melvill’s of the ancient war-galley. Pagés proceeds then to notice an inconvenience of the contrivance, which the ancients probably obviated, though probably otherwise than the islanders of the Pacific ocean. ‘Each row,’ he says, ‘containing from twenty to twenty-five rowers, the utmost attention would be constantly required to trimming, if the inconvenience of overbalancing was not remedied thus: at about the distance of a sixth of the length of the vessel from its head and from its stern, are fixed, across it, two large bamboos, projecting from twenty to twenty-five feet on each side. At each end of these, parallel to the vessel’s side, are fixed two or three other bamboos, whose buoyancy, assisted by so long a lever, prevents any considerable heeling, whether from wind, or from defective trimming;

‘and, in fine weather, they serve as a fourth bench
‘for rowers, who however use not oars, but paddles.’

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The author adds, it is difficult to conceive the swiftness of these vessels, though the oars are of awkward form, and the rower is too near the rowlock to make the most advantage of his lever.

The Mahometan Indians, who have eternal enmity with the Spanish Indians of the Philippine Islands, are those whom he mentions as principally using them.³⁸

³⁸ When the foregoing observations on the ancient ships of war were first published, Pagés' publication was recent. Among numerous following accounts of voyages in the same seas, I have not found any of such vessels as those described by him. Nevertheless, not only as he is a writer of simplicity more than ordinary for a Frenchman, and clearly of general veracity, but more particularly as his account tends beyond anything beside published, with which I am acquainted, to give an idea of the form and general character of the ancient ships of war, I still think it well deserving notice.

CHAPTER IX.

HISTORY OF GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS TO
THE CONCLUSION OF THE PERSIAN INVASION.

SECTION I.

Return of the Athenians to their country. Measures of the Grecian fleet. Dedication to the gods for the victory at Salamis. Honours to Themistocles. Revolt of Chalcidice from the Persians. Siege of Potidæa by Artabazus.

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IX.

B. C. 480.
OL. 75. 1.

THE various affections of Grecian minds after so glorious, so important, so unexpected a victory as that of Salamis, and the consequent hasty retreat of that numberless army, the means of resistance to which seemed beyond human calculation, may in some degree be conceived, but scarcely can be described. Neither Persian garrison nor any Pisistratidean Athenians appear to have remained in Athens. That city and its whole territory seem to have been recovered by the naval conqueror's party without a struggle. For measures to be taken by the confederate fleet meanwhile much difference of opinion and consequent debate arose among the commanders. It was proposed by some to pursue the Persians to the Hellespont, and, at once crushing the naval power of the empire, thus render its gigantic land force less formidable to a country hardly to be successfully invaded without a co-operating fleet. This was overruled.¹ But the most powerful naval armament that

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 108.

¹ It appears difficult to determine what should be thought of the story told by Herodotus, Cornelius Nepos, and Plutarch,

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I.

Greece had ever yet assembled, flushed with unhopedor success, would not immediately rest. Many of the islanders were obnoxious for their forwardness in the Persian cause. It was determined to exact a fine from them to be applied to the expenses of the war. Themistocles, whose great qualities, according to generally concurring imputations, were sullied by a sordid attention to his private interest, is said on this occasion to have enriched himself through the influence which his high command and high reputation procured him. The Parians avoided all public payment, it is asserted, through a bribe to the Athenian commander. The Andrians alone, of the islanders on the European side of the Ægean, resolutely refused to pay anything. Siege was in consequence laid to their principal town, but without effect; and the fleet returned to Salamis.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 111,
112.

Winter approached, with a political calm which for a long time had been little expected by the confederate Greeks. Gratitude to the gods, for the great deliverance obtained, was among the first emotions of the public mind. It was usual, after a victory, to select some of the most valuable articles of the spoil, to be offered, under the name of Acrothinia, first c. 121.

and supported in some degree by the authority of Thucydides*, of a message sent by Themistocles to Xerxes, informing him of the intention of the Greeks, after the battle of Salamis, to send their fleet to destroy the bridges of the Hellespont, and interrupt his return into Asia. Herodotus mentions it as an act of treachery, or at least of selfish policy; and were it not for the support derived from the slight mention of the circumstance by Thucydides, some incoherence in Herodotus's detail would lead to suspect that it was a mere fabrication of the adverse faction at Athens. Nepos and Plutarch, on the other hand, commend the deed as an act of the most refined, but the most patriotic policy.

* Herodot. l. 8. c. 108, 109, 110. Corn. Nep. & Plut. vit. Themist. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 137.

CHAP.
IX.Herodot.
l. 8. c. 121.

fruits to the supposed propitious deities. On the present occasion three Phenician trireme galleys were first chosen. One was dedicated in Salamis to the hero Ajax ; another at the promontory Sunium, probably to Minerva ; and the third at the Corinthian isthmus to Neptune.² Other offerings required more preparation. A statue, twelve cubits high, holding in one hand a galley's prow, was dedicated to Apollo at Delphi. The oracle demanded a particular acknowledgment from the Æginetans ; because in the glorious contest of Salamis they were said to have excelled among the Greeks. Those islanders, gladly receiving the honourable testimony, sent to Delphi a brazen mast, adorned with three stars of gold. These public dedications being made or decreed, the remaining booty was divided. The fleet then proceeded to the isthmus, where another ceremony, of established practice among the Greeks, remained to be performed. Honours were to be decreed, first and second, for merit in the war.³ The chiefs of the several states delivered their opinions in writing upon the altar of Neptune. Every one gave the first vote for himself ; but a large majority of the second appeared for Themistocles. Thus it remained undecided to whom the first honour should be paid, and

² Minerva and Neptune are not mentioned by the historian ; but the conjecture seems little hazardous. The ruins of the temple of the Suniad Minerva remain on the promontory to this day ; and Neptune was not only the tutelary deity of the Isthmian games, but esteemed proprietary of the isthmus ; and a statue, we find, was erected to him there upon occasion of the following victory of Platæa. See Herodot. l. 9. c. 81. & Pausan. l. 2. c. 1.

³ . . . ἀριστήϊα δώσοντες τῷ ἀξιώτάτῳ γενομένῳ Ἑλλήνων ἀνὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον . . . τὸν πρῶτον καὶ τὸν δεύτερον κρίνοντες ἐκ πάντων. Herodot. l. 8. c. 123.

the squadrons separated to their several states; but the general voice of the people sounded the fame of Themistocles far beyond all others. Unsatisfied however with such vague applause, and disappointed of the degree of distinction which his ambition affected, Themistocles went to Lacedæmon, probably knowing that he should be well received. The Spartan government took upon itself to determine the claims of merit. It would have been invidious to have refused the *Aristeia*, or first honours for bravery and general conduct, to their own admiral, who had commanded in chief; but a new and singular compliment was invented for the Athenian commander: they adjudged to him the prize of wisdom and maritime skill. Eurybiades and Themistocles therefore together received, from the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, the honourable reward of olive crowns. Themistocles was besides presented with a chariot; and, at his departure from Lacedæmon, three hundred Spartans, of those called Knights, or Cavalry, were appointed to escort him to the frontier⁴; a kind of honour never, to the time of Herodotus, paid to any other stranger.

The news of the victory of the Greeks at Salamis, and of the consequent retreat of Xerxes into Asia, was quickly conveyed through all the Grecian settlements in uncertain rumours, here exaggerated, there deficient, according to the information, the temper, the interest, the memory, or, sometimes, the invention of individuals reporting it, where public and certain means of extensive communication were little known. But the Greeks of the Thracian colonies, who had seen, with trembling, the proud march of the immense host of Persia towards Greece, were also eye-

⁴ Σπαρτιητέων λογάδες, οὔτοι οἵπερ ἱππῆες καλέονται. Herodot. l. 8. c. 124.

CHAP.
IX.Herodot.
1. 8. c. 126.
& seq.

witnesses of the miserable reverse, when the monarch precipitated his retreat into Asia. Their information was however probably little exact concerning the force yet left hovering over their mother-country, and their knowledge of the resources of the Persian empire generally very imperfect. According therefore to the common nature of that tide of the human mind, which operates generally with more force upon the determinations of a multitude than of an individual, the fruitful province of Chalcidice, on the confines of Thrace and Macedonia, boldly revolted from the Persian dominion, each little town asserting its beloved but altogether impolitic independency. Meanwhile Artabazus, having seen his sovereign safe on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, hastened back with his detachment, itself a large army, to rejoin Mardonius. But as the quarters of Macedonia and Thessaly were already crowded, he halted in Chalcidice. Receiving intelligence of the revolt, he reckoned, not unreasonably, that he should scarcely escape censure if he suffered the winter to pass without punishing it. Immediately he laid siege to Olynthus and Potidæa. Olynthus was presently taken; and, if Herodotus should be believed, the inhabitants, conducted to a neighbouring marsh, were there all massacred. The town, which had been occupied by a colony from Bottiæa on the Macedonian coast, was given to native Chalcidians; and, according to that common policy of the Persians heretofore remarked, the government was entrusted to Critobulus, a Greek of the town of Torone in the neighbouring peninsula of Sithonia.

But the actions of Thermopylæ and Salamis had had a quick effect in diminishing the extreme dread before entertained of the Persian power, and in pro-

moting, among the Greeks, a general emulation in arms, and in the spirit of independency. The Potidæans, whose situation commanded the neck of the fruitful and rebellious peninsula of Pallene, defended themselves so vigorously that little progress was made in the siege. But the wealth of Persia, continually brought forth to supply the deficiency of military science and discipline, formed a weight in the balance of war, against which the Greeks with difficulty found a counterpoise. Timoxenus, commander of the Scio-næan auxiliaries in Potidæa, was bribed to a treasonable correspondence with the Persian general. They communicated by letters, wrapt around arrows, which were shot to spots agreed upon. The accidental wounding of a Potidæan by one of those arrows however discovered the treason before it had gone to any pernicious length. A crowd immediately gathered about the wounded man; and, on extracting the arrow, a letter from Artabazus to Timoxenus was found upon it. Three months had now been consumed in the siege, and little progress made, when the tide, to which many of the recesses of the Ægean sea are subject, flowing to an unusual height, flooded the Persian camp.⁵ Immediately upon the ebb the general ordered the army to march, meaning to take a station on higher ground within the peninsula of Pallene. Not half the troops had passed the flats when the flood made again with increased violence. Many of the Persians were drowned; the Potidæans, sallying in boats, killed many; and Artabazus found his measures so disconcerted that he raised the siege, and proceeded with the remains of his army into Thessaly.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 128.

⁵ Herodot. l. 7. c. 198. note 48. p. 680. of Wesseling's edition may also deserve notice.

SECTION II.

Preparations for the campaign. Congress at Athens: speeches of Alexander king of Macedonia, of the Lacedæmonian ambassador, and of the Athenian minister. Athens a second time abandoned. Zeal of the Athenian people for the prosecution of the Persian war.

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Herodot.
l. 8. c. 130.
& seq.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 27.

WHEN XERXES had reached Asia, the Persian fleet, quitting the Hellespont, went part to Samos, part to Cuma, and in their ports wintered. In the following spring the whole assembled at Samos. Mistrust of those conquered subjects of the empire, who alone were mariners, then led those who directed the affairs of the navy to an alteration of the establishment of their crews, the direct contrary to that which the genius and experience of Themistocles had imagined, and which had proved so advantageous in practice: they increased the proportion of Median and Persian soldiers. The fleet, with its loyalty supposed more assured, remained at Samos, to awe the Asiatic and Thracian coasts and neighbouring islands, making no attempt westward.

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 131.

Spring, and the recollection that Mardonius was in Thessaly, according to the histoian's expression, awakened the Greeks. The assembling of the army was yet delayed, but a fleet of one hundred and twenty trireme galleys was collected at Ægina, under Leotychides, king of Lacedæmon. Xanthippus, the prosecutor of Miltiades, commanded the Athenian squadron. During the winter some of the leading men of Chios had conspired against Strattis, whom the Persians had appointed governor, or, in the Greek term, tyrant of their island. They were detected; but finding opportunity to fly, they went to Ægina,

and addressed themselves to the naval commanders there, urging, that all Ionia was ripe for revolt, and wanted only the countenance of the victorious fleet of Greece to make a powerful diversion for the Persian arms. Following history shows this likely to have been the exaggeration of men stimulated by party interest ; for in Ionia political interests were divided nearly as in European Greece. Nevertheless, as it would be desirable to favour any disposition toward stirring against the enemy, the fleet moved as far as Delos, and there took its station. The Persian fleet meanwhile held its port, and the space between Samos and Delos, as the historian proceeds to observe, remained in peace through mutual fear.

Mardonius meanwhile had not neglected measures to promote the success of his arms. Sensible of the importance of naval co-operation, he resolved upon the endeavour to detach the Athenians from the Grecian confederates ; justly thinking that, if this could be effected, the Persian fleet would immediately resume a decided superiority. Alexander king of Macedonia was chosen for his ambassador to the Athenian commonwealth. That prince was intimately connected with both the Grecian and Persian nations. His family boasted its descent from Hercules and Perseus through Temenus, the Heraclidean king of Argos. It held, with the Athenian commonwealth, the sacred connexion of hereditary hospitality, in the revered offices of which Alexander himself had communicated with Athens. But his sister Gygæa was married to Bubares, a Persian, high in rank and in command, son of that Megabazus who in the reign of Darius had conquered the western Thracians, and compelled Amyntas, father of Alexander, to the delivery of earth and water. Yet, though Alexander had con-

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 136.
& seq.
Diod Sic.
l. 11. c. 28.

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Herodot.
l. 8. c. 141.

stantly acted with the Persians, he had nevertheless, as far as his dependent situation would permit, always shown himself friendly to the confederate Greeks. He was accordingly well received at Athens. But as the news of his arrival would quickly be spread through Greece, and would probably excite jealousy among the confederates, especially the Lacedæmonians, the leaders of the Athenian administration deferred admitting him to audience before the assembly of the people, till ministers came from Sparta.

Plut. v.
Arist.

Herodotus has not said who, during these remarkable transactions, led those measures of the Attic government, which, both in wisdom and magnanimity, at least equal anything in the political history of mankind. Plutarch attributes all to Aristides. Supported by the aristocratical party, jealous of the eminence of Themistocles, he appears in all accounts to have been at this time of highest consideration. On the arrival of the Lacedæmonian ministers an assembly of the people was summoned. The Lacedæmonian ministers and the king of Macedonia were together admitted to this public audience. Silence having been, as usual, proclaimed, Alexander rose, and, according to the original historian, spoke in this simple and antiquated, but emphatical style of oratory⁶: ‘Athenians, thus saith Mardonius: ‘The commands of the king are come to me, saying, I FORGIVE THE ATHENIANS ALL THEIR OFFENCES AGAINST ME. NOW THEREFORE, MARDONIUS, THUS DO: RESTORE TO THEM THEIR TERRITORY, AND ADD TO IT WHATSOEVER THEMSELVES SHALL CHOOSE, LEAVING THEM TO THEIR OWN LAWS;

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 140.

⁶ Testimony is borne to this remarkable transaction by Demosthenes, in his 2d Philippic, as well as by Diodorus Sic. l. 11. c. 28. and Plutarch in his Life of Aristides.

‘ ‘ AND IF THEY WILL MAKE ALLIANCE WITH ME,
‘ ‘ REBUILD ALL THE TEMPLES WHICH HAVE BEEN
‘ ‘ DESTROYED. Such being the king’s commands to
‘ ‘ me, so I must necessarily do, unless you prevent.
‘ ‘ From myself I say to you thus: Why would you
‘ ‘ persevere in the folly of making war against the
‘ ‘ king? You cannot overcome him: you cannot long
‘ ‘ resist him. You know how numerous his armies are,
‘ ‘ and what they have effected. You are informed of
‘ ‘ the force under my command. Should you overcome
‘ ‘ me, which in reason you cannot hope, immediately
‘ ‘ a still greater force will be sent against you. As a
‘ ‘ friend I recommend to you not, in the vain con-
‘ ‘ test with the king, to lose your country, but to
‘ ‘ seize the honourable opportunity of this offer, from
‘ ‘ the king himself, for making peace. Be free; and
‘ ‘ let there be alliance between us without fraud or
‘ ‘ deceit.’ These things, O Athenians, Mardonius
‘ ‘ commanded me to say to you. For my own part,
‘ ‘ I shall omit to enlarge upon the friendship I bear
‘ ‘ you, since this is not the first occasion upon which
‘ ‘ you have had experience of it. I beseech you to
‘ ‘ accept the terms proposed by Mardonius; for I
‘ ‘ well see the impossibility of your long contending
‘ ‘ against the Persian empire. Upon no other con-
‘ ‘ sideration would I have come to you thus com-
‘ ‘ missioned. But the king’s power is more than
‘ ‘ human: his arm is of unmeasurable length. I
‘ ‘ dread the event for you if you refuse the great con-
‘ ‘ ditions now offered. The very situation of your
‘ ‘ country should indeed admonish you: lying in the
‘ ‘ road to the rest of the confederates you alone are
‘ ‘ first exposed, and actually bear all the brunt of the
‘ ‘ war. Comply therefore; for it is not a little honour-
‘ ‘ able to you that you alone among the Greeks are

CHAP.
IX.Herodot.
l. 8. c. 142.

‘selected by that great king for offers of peace and
‘friendship.’

The king of Macedonia concluded, and the chief of the Spartan ministers rose: ‘The Lacedæmonians,’ he said, ‘have sent us to request that you will admit
‘nothing to the prejudice of Greece, nor receive any
‘proposal from the Persian. For such a proceeding
‘were unjust, unbecoming any Grecian people, and
‘on many accounts most of all unbecoming you. To
‘you indeed we owe this war, which was excited
‘contrary to our inclination. The quarrel was ori-
‘ginally with you alone; now it is extended to all
‘Greece. That the Athenians therefore, who from
‘of old have, more than all mankind, asserted the
‘liberties of others, should become the authors of
‘slavery to Greece, were most heinous. We grieve
‘for your sufferings, that now for two seasons you
‘have lost the produce of your lands, and that the
‘public calamity should so long press so severely upon
‘individuals. The Lacedæmonians and the other
‘confederates are desirous of making you reparation.
‘They will engage, while the war shall last, to main-
‘tain your families, and all those of your slaves who
‘may not be wanted to attend you on military ser-
‘vice. Let not therefore Alexander the Macedonian
‘persuade you, softening Mardonius’s message. He
‘is certainly acting in his proper character: a tyrant
‘himself, he co-operates with a tyrant. But for you,
‘prudence utterly forbids what he advises: you well
‘know that among barbarians there is no faith, no
‘truth.’

c. 143.

In the name of the Athenian people the following answer, in the report of Herodotus, was then made to the king of Macedonia, according to Plutarch by Aristides: ‘We know that the power of the Persian

‘ empire is many times greater than ours. With this
 ‘ therefore it was needless to reproach us. Never-
 ‘ theless, independency being our object, we are de-
 ‘ termined to defend ourselves to the utmost, and
 ‘ you would in vain persuade us to make any terms
 ‘ with the barbarian. You may therefore tell Mar-
 ‘ donius, that the Athenians say: ‘ While the sun
 ‘ ‘ holds his course we will never make alliance with
 ‘ ‘ Xerxes; but, trusting in our assisting gods and
 ‘ ‘ heroes, whose temples and images he setting at
 ‘ ‘ naught has burnt, we will persevere in resisting
 ‘ ‘ him.’ Come then no more to the Athenians with
 ‘ such proposals, nor, with any view of promoting
 ‘ our welfare, recommend what is dishonourable and
 ‘ unjust. For yourself, we shall always be desirous
 ‘ of showing you all the friendship and respect to
 ‘ which the ancient hospitality and alliance between
 ‘ us entitle you.’

The orator is reported to have then addressed the
 Lacedæmonians ministers thus: ‘ The apprehension
 ‘ of the Lacedæmonians, that we might accept the
 ‘ terms proposed by the barbarian, was, upon a general
 ‘ view of human nature, certainly not unreasonable :
 ‘ but, after the proof you have had of the resolution
 ‘ of the Athenians, it becomes a dishonourable appre-
 ‘ hension. No riches, nor the offer of the finest
 ‘ country upon earth, should bribe us to connect
 ‘ ourselves with the Persians to the enslaving of
 ‘ Greece. Were it possible that we could be so dis-
 ‘ posed, yet the obstacles are many and great. First,
 ‘ and what principally affects us, the images and
 ‘ temples of the gods burnt and reduced to rubbish.
 ‘ This it is our indispensable duty to resent, and
 ‘ revenge to the utmost, rather than make alliance
 ‘ with the perpetrator. Then, as a Grecian people,

Herodot.
l. 8. c. 144.

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‘ our connexion in blood and in language, our common dedications to the gods, our common sacrifices, and our similar customs and manners. Of these the Athenians cannot become the betrayers. Know then this, if before you knew it not, that, while one Athenian survives, we never will ally ourselves with Xerxes. Gratefully we acknowledge your kind attention, amid the distress and ruin of our private affairs, in proposing to maintain our families. We will however still make the best we can of our own means, without burthening you. These then being our resolutions, let there be, on your side, no delay in corresponding measures. Your army must march immediately; for, according to all appearances, it will not be long before the barbarian will invade our country: he will move instantly upon receiving information that we have rejected his proposals. Before therefore he can arrive in Attica, it will behove us to meet him in Bœotia.’ With these answers the king of Macedonia and the Lacedæmonian ambassadors departed.

Herodot.
1. 9. c. 1.

Mardonius did not deceive the expectation of the Athenian leaders: he advanced immediately, by nearly the same road that Xerxes had taken, toward Attica. The wonted hesitation and dilatoriness meanwhile prevailed in the counsels of the Peloponnesians: the Persian army was already in Bœotia, and no measures were taken by the confederacy for defending Attica. Once more therefore it became necessary for the Athenians hastily to abandon their country. Probably however the necessity was less grievous than on the former occasion: for, beside being more prepared, they had less to apprehend; their own fleet now commanding the Grecian seas. In their own island of Salamis therefore their families and effects

c. 3 & 6.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

would, for the present at least, be beyond annoyance from the Persian arms. Thither all were removed; and, about eight months after Xerxes had quitted Athens, Mardonius, unopposed, retook possession of that city.

SECT.
II.

June,
B. C. 479.
Ol. 75. $\frac{1}{2}$.

The conduct of the Peloponnesians, but most particularly of the Lacedæmonians, the leading state, is marked by Herodotus, whom Plutarch here has followed, as ungenerous, ungrateful, and faithless, if not even dastardly⁷: that of the Athenians magnanimous even to enthusiasm. Deprived of their country, and apparently betrayed by their allies, the Persian general thought this a favourable opportunity for attempting once more to draw the Athenians from the Grecian confederacy. Accordingly he sent Murichides, a Hellespontine Greek, to Salamis, with the same offers which he had before made by the King of Macedonia. The minister was admitted to audience by the council of Five Hundred. Lycidas, alone of the counsellors, was for paying so much attention to the proposal as to refer it to an assembly of the people. This circumstance was communicated; and, so vehement was the popular zeal for persevering in enmity to Persia, a tumultuous crowd, on the rising of the council, stoned Lycidas to death. The frenzy spread; and what it may be desirable not to believe, though Herodotus the friend and panegyrist of Athens affirms it, and the philosophic Plutarch seems even to applaud the deed, the Athenian women attacked the house of the unfortunate senator, and his widow and children perished under their hands. The law of nations was at the same time so far

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 4.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 5.
Demosth.
de cor.
p. 296.
ed. Reiske.
M. T. Cic.
de Off.
l. 3. c. 11.

⁷ Plutarch, in his Treatise against Herodotus, has censured that historian for relating what, in his Life of Aristides, he has himself in strong terms confirmed.

CHAP. IX. respected that Murichides was dismissed without injury or insult.

SECTION III.

Campaign in Bœotia. Battle of Plataea. Punishment of Thebes.

Herod. i. 9.
c. 6. & 7.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

B. C. 479.
Ol. 75. $\frac{1}{2}$.

Herod. i. 9.
c. 8. & 11.
c. 7. & 8.

c. 1.

c. 28.

MINISTERS had been sent from Athens, accompanied by others from Plataea and Megara, to remonstrate with the Lacedæmonian government on their shameful neglect of their engagements, and to learn what were now to be the measures of the confederacy. The Lacedæmonians were celebrating their feast of the Hyacinthia, one of the most solemn of their calendar. This furnishing some pretext, the ephors, those magistrates who had usurped a power in the Spartan government superior to that of the kings, delayed their answer from day to day for ten days successively. The works at the Corinthian isthmus, never meanwhile intermitted, were now nearly completed. The Athenian ministers, thinking themselves insulted and their country betrayed, determined on the morrow to declare to the Lacedæmonian senate their sense of such treatment, and to leave Sparta. At length however the Lacedæmonians, after consultation with their allies, and, it is added, some reproaches from them, had determined upon juster measures. Five thousand Spartans marched silently out of the city in the evening, under the command of Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, regent for his cousin Plistarchus son of Leonidas, yet a minor. Five thousand Lacedæmonians of the country towns were ordered to follow. Next morning, when the Athenian ministers came to make their final complaint to the senate, they were told that the Lacedæmonian army was already on the confines of Arcadia in its

way to meet the Persians. The Argives, according to Herodotus, were so thoroughly in the Persian interest that they had undertaken to intercept any Spartan troops which should attempt to quit Laconia. The suddenness and secrecy of the march defeated their intention. Receiving intelligence that the Lacedæmonian army had entered Arcadia, they hastened information to Mardonius.

SECT.
III.

While the Persian general had any hope of leading the Athenians to his purpose he had carefully spared Attica; but as soon as he was assured that their resolution was immoveable, he gave up the country for plunder to his troops, and destroyed the city. Learning then that the Peloponnesians were advancing, he returned into Bœotia; a country more commodious for the action of his numerous cavalry, nearer to his magazines, which were principally at Thebes, and whence, in any misfortune, retreat would be more open, while in success the way was equally ready into Peloponnesus. He fixed his camp in the Theban territory, extending it along the course of the Asopus, from Erythræ toward Hysiæ, on the border of the Plataean lands. Within this tract he chose a situation where he fortified a space of rather more than a square mile.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 13.

c. 15.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 28.
Herodot.
l. 9. c. 41.

c. 15.

The Lacedæmonians were joined at the isthmus by the other Peloponnesians of the confederacy; and there, according to the constant practice of the Greeks in all momentous undertakings, after solemn sacrifices, the bowels of the victims were observed, whence persons believed to be inspired, or, if such were not to be found, persons who had reputation for skill in divination, undertook to know how far and upon what conditions the gods would be propitious. Tisamenus, an Elean, attended Pausanias in quality of prophet

c. 33.

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to the army. The Lacedæmonians had such confidence in the fortune and prophetic abilities of this man that, to secure him to themselves, when he had refused all other price, they admitted him and his brother to the full privileges of Spartan citizens; an honour never, to the time of Herodotus, conferred upon any other person. Among the Greeks policy and superstition were so intimately blended that it is often difficult to discover what should be attributed to each. Upon the present occasion the symptoms were very favourable; which would perhaps commonly happen when measures were already resolved upon. At Eleusis the combined army was joined by the Athenian forces, to the chief command of which Aristides had been raised, by a particular decree of the people, marking the prevalence of the aristocratical interests. Sacrifices were there repeated, and the symptoms of the victims were again favourable. The army therefore proceeded with confidence into Bœotia, and took a position at the foot of mount Cithæron, opposite to the camp of the Persians, the river Asopus flowing between them.

Mardonius had judiciously left the passage of the mountains uninterrupted to the Grecian troops; his business being to draw them into the champaign country, where, through his cavalry, on which then as at this day was the principal reliance of Asiatic armies, victory would be nearly certain to him, and probably easy. But Pausanias would not move from his advantageous ground; and his position was so strong that an attempt to force it could not prudently be ventured. Mardonius therefore, whose numbers, in a confined territory, made early decision necessary, ordered Masistius, his general of the cavalry, to advance with all the horse, and, by harassing in various

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 19.

c. 19. & 28.
Diod. Sic.
l. II. c. 30.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 20.

parts, to make the Greeks uneasy in their situation; not neglecting at the same time, if he could find or create opportunity, to attempt an impression. The Persian cavalry all used missile weapons, darts or arrows, or both; a practice by which, more than four centuries after, they destroyed the Roman army under Crassus, and in which the horsemen of the same countries are wonderfully skilful at this day. Like the eastern cavalry at this day also, they commonly attacked or harassed by small bodies in succession; vehement in onset, never long in conflict, but, if the enemy was firm in resistance, retreating hastily, still to prepare for another charge.

The Megarian camp was in the part of the Grecian line the most accessible to cavalry. Hither therefore Masistius directed his principal efforts. The Megarians, somewhat surprised at the novel manner of the attack, nevertheless maintained their station. Wearied however at length by the unceasing succession of fresh troops, all of whom approached just enough to give opprobrious language, and discharge their darts and arrows, after which they instantly retired, the Megarian leaders sent to inform Pausanias of their distress, adding that they must abandon their post if not quickly relieved. Pausanias himself was at a loss how effectually to oppose those desultory attacks of the Persian cavalry. He assembled the generals for advice, and expressed his wish that volunteers could be found to undertake a business so new to him that he was unwilling to risk orders upon it. The Athenians alone offered themselves. Aristides had had the advantage of serving in a high command under the great Miltiades at the battle of Marathon. Upon the present occasion he selected an active officer named Olympiodorus, under whose

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Herodot.
l. 9. c. 21.
Plut. v.
Arist.

Plut. v.
Arist.

Herod. &
Plut. ut sup.

orders he placed three hundred chosen heavy-armed foot, with a large proportion of bowmen and dartmen. These seem to have been, in the Athenian armies, superior to the light troops of the Peloponnesians, and probably also to those of the Megarians; who, being a Dorian people from Peloponnesus, would pride themselves upon adhering to the Peloponnesian discipline, that of the phalanx, heavy-armed, in which the Peloponnesians had an allowed superiority. Olympiodorus hastened to the relief of the pressed part of the line. The Persian horse, who, by the swiftness of their retreat, eluded every effort of the Megarian heavy-armed foot, found themselves unexpectedly incommoded by the Athenian bowmen. Charging to disperse them, they were received by the supporting heavy-armed foot, upon whom they could make no impression, but suffered in the attempt. Masistius, vexed to be thus baffled, and anxious to recover an advantage from which he had promised himself credit, advanced to direct and encourage those desultory attacks, so harassing to regular infantry. In the instant of a charge, his horse, wounded with an arrow, reared upright, and he fell. His troops, attentive to their usual evolution, without adverting to their general's misfortune, wheeled and retreated at full speed. The Athenian heavy-armed foot, rushing forward, overpowered the few remaining about Masistius. His horse was caught and led off by the Greeks. Himself, lying on the ground, after the excellence of his armour, said to have been complete like that of the knights of western Europe in the times of chivalry, had resisted many efforts of the Athenian soldiers, was at length pierced in the eye by a javelin, which penetrated to the brain. The Persian cavalry halting at their usual distance from the enemy, waited

in vain for fresh orders. Perceiving then their loss, the whole body prepared to charge together, to revenge their slain general, or at least to recover the body. Olympiodorus, expecting this, had sent for succour; but the Persians made their charge before any sufficient reinforcement could arrive, and the Athenians were obliged to retire for more advantageous ground. Assistance however was not delayed. The Grecian foot charged the Persian horse, put them to flight, and recovered their prize. The cavalry stood again at the distance of about a quarter of a mile; but, after some consultation among the principal surviving officers, retreated to their camp.

Masistius was a man very high both in rank and in esteem among the Persians, and, as Herodotus indicates, next in command to Mardonius. His death was therefore lamented in their camp, with all the pomp of public mourning, and every honourable testimony of general grief. The event was, on the other hand, not a little encouraging to the Greeks. The leaders derived just confidence from the experience that the formidable cavalry of the East could be resisted; and the body of the slain general, borne on a carriage through the whole camp, however in itself a melancholy object, was, in this season, an animating spectacle to the soldiers. It was now determined to quit the present ground, which, though otherwise advantageous, had been found inconvenient from scarcity of water, (for the decided superiority of the enemy's cavalry made it difficult to water from the Asopus,) and to venture to a lower situation, within the Plataean territory, near the Gargaphian fountain. In their march from Erythræ they held the mountain-ridge by Hysiaë, but

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 24.

c. 25.

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the ground of encampment consisted of gentle eminences only.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 25,
26.

In this situation, nothing forbidding, the troops of every Grecian state claimed their accustomed post in the line. The Lacedæmonians, having been long the leading people of Greece, had the right as their acknowledged privilege. The Athenians, unquestionably next in consequence, thought themselves entitled to the second rank; but having never acted in any large body with Peloponnesian armies, no custom had established their degree of precedency. The Tegeans therefore claimed the left of the line, as their post by ancient prescription. The dispute was brought before a meeting of the officers of the army. The Tegeans urged their claim in a studied oration, supporting it by a long detail of the great actions of their ancestors. Aristides answered for the Athenians.⁸

c. 27.

‘We understand,’ he said, ‘that we came hither not to harangue, but to fight. Otherwise, were we disposed to boast of the deeds in arms of our ancestors, we could go as far into antiquity as the Arcadians, and perhaps find more honourable testimonies in our favour. For what has passed in our own times we need only mention Marathon. But we think it highly unbecoming, in a moment like the present, to be disputing about precedency. We are ready to obey you, Lacedæmonians, wheresoever, and next to whomsoever you think it for the common advantage to place us. Wherever our station may be appointed, we shall endeavour to act as becomes us in the common cause of Greece. Command therefore, and depend upon our obedience.’ The La-

⁸ Herodotus, in relating this transaction, speaks of the Athenians in general, without naming any one: Plutarch attributes all to Aristides, and, though too often careless of authority, probably here on good ground.

cedæmonians without hesitation and with one voice exclaimed, ‘The Athenians ought to have the post of honour in preference to the Arcadians.’

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Herodot.
I. 9. c. 28.

The army was then disposed in the following order : five thousand Spartans of the city held the first place on the right, attended each by seven light-armed Helots, thus making a body of forty thousand men : then five thousand Lacedæmonians of the other towns of Laconia, attended each by one Helot : so that, according to the historian, the whole Lacedæmonian force was fifty thousand. Next to these were the Tegeans, in number fifteen hundred : then five thousand Corinthians, three hundred Potidæans from Pallene, six hundred Orchomenians of Arcadia, three thousand Sicyonians, eight hundred Epidaurians, one thousand Trœzenians, two hundred Lepreats, four hundred Mycenæans and Tirynthians, one thousand Phliasians, three hundred Hermionians, six hundred Eretrians and Styrians, four hundred Chalcidians, five hundred Ambraciots, eight hundred Leucadians and Anactorians, two hundred Paleans of Cephalenia, five hundred Æginetans, three thousand Megarians, six hundred Plataæans. The Athenians were eight thousand, holding the extreme of the left wing. Thus the heavy-armed foot were thirty-eight thousand seven hundred. But every Spartan of the city having seven attending Helots, every other Lacedæmonian one, and the slaves attending the other Greeks, and acting as light-armed soldiers, being, according to Herodotus, nearly in the proportion of one to every heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed would be, in all, sixty-nine thousand five hundred, and the total number of fighting men ⁹ a hundred and

c. 29.

I. 9. c. 29.

⁹ Ἀνδρῶν μαχημῶν. There were perhaps other slaves who did not bear arms, and there might be light-armed soldiers who

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eight thousand two hundred. There were besides eighteen hundred Thespians, not regularly armed, who would make the whole a hundred and ten thousand. Herodotus mentions no horse in the Grecian army; probably because the force was inconsiderable, and utterly incompetent to face the numerous and excellent cavalry of Persia.

Herodot.
1.9. c.31.
& 40.

c. 31.

Corn. Nep.
v. Arist.

Herodot.
ut ant.

Herod. 1.9.
c. 37, 38.

As soon as it was known that the Greeks had filed off toward Plataea, Mardonius also moved and encamped over against them, keeping still the Asopus in his front. Herodotus supposes his army to have consisted now of three hundred and fifty thousand fighting men; of whom, including Macedonians, fifty thousand were Greeks; but, he says, the number was never exactly ascertained. With regard to the others also he has omitted to deduct those probably lost in the march of Artabazus and in winter-quarters, together with the sick, besides those, by his own account, destroyed at the siege of Potidæa. The report of Cornelius Nepos thus seems likely to have been nearer the truth, making the infantry two hundred thousand, and the horse twenty thousand. But these, being all chosen troops, would not require less than the usual proportion of attendants on Asiatic armies. Among the Greeks, under the Persian banners, a thousand Phocians followed with extreme reluctance; while their fellow-countrymen, who had taken refuge among the fastnesses of Parnassus, were, with all the activity that the zeal of revenge and the lust of plunder united could excite, continually harassing the outskirts of the army.

Mardonius, as well as Pausanias, had an Elean prophet in his pay. Herodotus affirms that he even were not slaves. Such apparently the Thespians were. On this subject the note 49. p. 706. of Wesseling's Herodotus may deserve attention.

solicitously consulted Grecian oracles concerning the event of the war; and gives a very detailed account of his application to the prophetic cavern of Trophonius at Lebadea in Bœotia. Possibly he may have judged well in thinking it advantageous to propagate among the Greeks, both his auxiliaries and his enemies, the belief that their own gods favoured the Persian cause, and more especially as the Greeks under his command had their particular prophet, whose predictions might be inconvenient to him, and against whom a Grecian prophet, under his own influence, might be useful. For himself, it is utterly unlikely that he would pay any regard to the oracles of deities, the belief in whom the religion of his country taught him to despise and abhor. The Grecian prophets however in both armies, on inspection of the sacrificed victims, foretold victory to their own, provided it received the attack. These prophecies, if dictated by policy, appear on both sides judicious.¹⁰ For the Greeks had only to keep their advantageous ground, while the vast camp of their enemy consumed its magazines, and they would have the benefit of victory without risk. To the Persians also the same predictions might be useful; to account to the soldier for the inaction of his general before an army so

¹⁰ If the simple Herodotus sometimes tires with reiterated details of the superstition of his age, yet the philosophical Plutarch is far more disgusting. Herodotus, drawing his pictures from the life, is often informing, and never fails to be in some degree amusing. It may be indeed sometimes difficult to judge what he believed himself; and often it may be desired in vain to discover how far the real belief of statesmen and generals has operated, and where their policy only has made use of the credulity of the vulgar. Here assistance might be expected from the philosopher of an enlightened age, but he is wholly disappointing.

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IX.Herodot.
1.9. c. 39.

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inferior, and to keep him quiet under sufferings from scarcity and probably badness of provisions, together with the want of many things to which Asiatics were accustomed, while the means were sought to entice or force the Greeks from their position. Eight days passed without any material attempt on either side. But, during this pause, Mardonius obtained exact information of the defiles of mount Cithæron, through which the Grecian army received its supplies. On the evening of the ninth day a large body of horse marched. Just where the defile meets the plain they fell in with a convoy. They killed men and cattle till sated with slaughter, and drove the remainder to their own camp. Two days then again passed without any considerable event, neither army venturing to pass the Asopus; but the Persian horse, in detached bodies, were unceasingly harassing the Greeks.

Herodot.
1.9. c. 42.

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Whether the Grecian soothsayer in the Persian general's pay was really intractable, or whether only the historian's zeal for the credit of the religion of his country induced him to propagate, and perhaps believe, the report, Mardonius, we are told, at length determined to disregard the Grecian prognostics, which forbade attack, and to follow the laws and customs of the Persians alone in engaging the enemy. The conduct however, which Herodotus attributes to him upon this occasion, shows both the general and the politician. Having summoned the principal Grecian officers of his army, he asked if they knew of any oracle declaring that a Persian army should perish in Greece. Report of such an oracle, it seems, had been circulated, but none would own they knew of any such. 'Then,' said Mardonius, 'I will tell you that I well know an oracle has foretold the destruction of a Persian army that shall plunder the

‘ temple of Delphi. Be however assured that the
 ‘ army under my orders shall never violate that
 ‘ temple. The Greeks therefore, allies of the Per-
 ‘ sians, may proceed, confident of the favour of their
 ‘ gods, and of victory.’ He then declared his intention
 to attack the confederates on the next day, and di-
 rected to prepare accordingly. As the historian had
 conversed with Bæotians of rank who served under
 Mardonius, the account of this transaction, in itself
 probable, might come to him well authenticated.

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 III.

Herodot.
 1.9. c. 16.

Among those of Grecian race now subjects of the
 Persian empire, Alexander king of Macedonia, from
 an independent sovereign become the follower of a
 Persian general, would not naturally be the most
 satisfied with his new situation. Revolving in his
 mind the possible consequences of the approaching
 day, he could not rest. At midnight he mounted his
 horse, rode to the Athenian line, and demanded to
 speak with the general. Aristides, informed that an
 unknown person on horseback from the Persian camp,
 and apparently of rank, demanded to speak with him,
 assembled some of his principal officers, and went
 with them to the place. The king of Macedonia told
 them, ‘ that Mardonius had determined to attack the
 ‘ Grecian camp next morning, and had given his
 ‘ orders for the purpose. Should anything neverthe-
 ‘ less prevent the attack from taking place, he advised
 ‘ that the Grecian generals should persevere in hold-
 ‘ ing their present situation, for the deficiency of the
 ‘ magazines would soon compel the Persians to retire.
 ‘ His affection for the Greek nation in general, and
 ‘ his particular regard for the Athenian people, had
 ‘ induced him to hazard the very dangerous measure
 ‘ in which they saw him engaged. He need not
 ‘ therefore, he was sure, request from them that

c. 44, 45.
 Plut. v.
 Aristid.

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IX.Herodot.
1. 9. c. 46.

‘ secrecy which his safety required ; but, on the contrary, should the war at last have a favourable issue for them, he trusted that his known inclination for the Grecian cause, and more especially his service of that night, would be remembered, when Greece, being free, might assist Macedonia in recovering independency.’ Alexander hastened back to his own camp; Aristides immediately went to Pausanias with the intelligence he had received.

On the arrival of the Athenian general at the commander-in-chief’s tent, the important consultation was entered upon, in what manner to resist the attack, expected in a few hours, which was to decide the fate of Greece. It had been observed that the native Persians, esteemed far superior to the other Asiatic infantry, held the left of the enemy’s line, against the Lacedæmonians, and the Greeks in the Persian service the right, against the Athenians. Pausanias proposed a change in the order of the Grecian army; that the Athenians, who alone of the confederates had any experience of action with the Persians, and who were elate, not only with the memory of their great victory at Marathon, but also with the event of their recent engagement with the cavalry, should move to the right wing, and that the Lacedæmonians, long accustomed to be superior to all the Greeks, should take the left. Aristides readily consented, and orders were given accordingly.

21 Sept.
Herodot.
1. 9. c. 47.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

Day broke, and the Persian generals observed the Grecian troops in motion. This unexpected circumstance induced them to defer the intended attack. Change in their own disposition might become necessary; changes were made; the day was consumed in evolutions of both armies, and the Persian infantry never came into action. But the cavalry harassed

unceasingly the more accessible parts of the Grecian line. Generally they did no more than discharge their bows, and hastily retire; thus however keeping a constant alarm, and, while they inflicted many wounds, receiving little injury. But a more serious attack was made upon that part of the Lacedæmonian line which guarded the Gargaphian fountain: there the Persian horse remained masters of the field.

Herodot.
t. 9. c. 49.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

Night put an end to this desultory kind of action, when, after a day of unremitted fatigue¹¹, the Grecian army was without water. Provisions also began to fail, the activity of the Persian horse intercepting supplies. To move therefore was indispensable. At little more than a mile from the Gargaphian fountain, toward Plataea, the waters of the Asopus, in their descent from mount Cithæron, formed an island, not half a mile wide. This spot, for the sake of water, it was determined to occupy. At the same time it was resolved to send half the army to the mountains, to bring in a convoy of provisions which waited there, not daring to stir beyond the defiles. But it was feared to attempt a movement in the plain, in presence of the Persian horse, which in the very camp had given such annoyance. The second watch of the night was therefore the time appointed for the march. But when, danger pressing, fear ran high, the troops of each independent state little regarded the orders of the commander-in-chief. The Tegeans steadily observed the motions of the Lacedæmonians, and the Plataeans those of the Athenians; but the rest, instead of halting at the island, fled (for that is the term used by Herodotus, and confirmed even by Plutarch) as far as the temple of Juno, under the

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 50.

c. 51.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 52.
Lys. or. fun.
p. 107.
vel. 195.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

¹¹ Κεῖνῃν μὲν τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν προσκειμένης τῆς ἵππου, ἔχον πόνον ἄτρυτον. Herodot. l. 9. c. 52.

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Herod. l. 9.
c. 53, 54.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

walls of Plataea, at the distance of two miles and a half from the Gargaphian fountain.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 55.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

The obstinacy of a Spartan officer, from which only unfortunate consequences could be reasonably expected, led immediately to the great and most important victory which followed. Amompharetus, whose military rank was that of locage, but who was besides vested with the sacred dignity of priesthood, urging the laws of his country against his general's orders, absolutely refused to retreat. Pausanias, incensed at this disobedience, yet, as the circumstance was altogether new in the Spartan service, at a loss how to act, detained the Lacedæmonian forces while the others were pressing their march. But the Athenian general, ever attentive to the interest of the confederacy at large, before he would suffer his own troops to move, sent to inquire the cause of the delay of which he was informed among the Lacedæmonians. The officer dispatched upon this occasion found the commander-in-chief in high altercation with Amompharetus; who at the instant of the Athenian's arrival, taking up a large stone in both his hands, in allusion to the Grecian mode of voting, by casting a shell, a pebble, or a die into an urn, threw it before his general's feet, saying, 'With this die I give my vote not to fly from the strangers:' for by that gentle term the Lacedæmonians usually distinguished foreigners, whom the other Greeks called barbarians. Pausanias desired the Athenian officer to report to his immediate commander what he had seen, and to request that the motions of the Athenian troops might be directed by what should be observed of the Lacedæmonian. At length, day breaking, he gave his orders for the Lacedæmonians with the Tegeans, who alone of the other confederates

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 56.

remained with him, to move toward the proposed ground of encampment. They directed their march along the hills; the Athenians only ventured in the plain. Then at last Amompharetus, yielding something of his obstinacy, ordered his lochus, with a slow pace, to follow the rest of the army.

The dawn again discovered to the Persians the Grecian army in unexpected motion. The horse, always alert, and now elated with the success of the preceding day, was quickly upon the Lacedæmonian rear. The movement of the Greeks being taken for flight, Mardonius led the Persian infantry in pursuit. The whole army followed, with great haste, and not without somewhat of the confusion of an ill-disciplined multitude, eager to share in certain victory. The Grecian general had not been immediately aware of the cowardly disobedience of that large part of his forces which had pushed on beyond the ground intended to be occupied. It was now advisable, if possible to join them; but the Persian horse so annoyed his rear, with desultory attacks continually reiterated, that it became necessary to make a stand. He sent therefore to inform the Athenian general of all circumstances, and to request his immediate co-operation in an effort to repel the enemy's cavalry. Aristides readily consented; but, before he could join the Lacedæmonians, the Grecian troops in the Persian service were upon him, and he had himself to contend with superior numbers. The Lacedæmonians and Tegeans however of themselves formed a considerable army. They were above eleven thousand heavy-armed foot, attended by more than forty thousand light-armed slaves. But the light-armed of the Peloponnesians were of so little estimation that, notwithstanding their numbers, Pausanias had par-

22nd Sept.
Herodot.
1. 9. c. 57.

c. 58.

c. 59.

c. 60.

c. 61.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

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Herodot.
1. 9. c. 62.
& seq.

ticularly desired a reinforcement of Athenian bowmen. The ground however, consisting of the rugged roots of mount Cithæron, with the Asopus flowing at the bottom, was favourable for defence, and adverse to the action of cavalry. The Persian infantry was therefore brought up; and a fierce engagement ensued. The Persians, after discharging their missile weapons, closed upon the Greeks, and showed themselves, says the impartial historian, neither in strength nor in courage inferior.¹² But they were very inferior in arms for close fight, and not less so in practice and in science. With their undefended bodies and short weapons they nevertheless made vigorous assaults, many of them seizing and even breaking the long spears of the Greeks. Unacquainted with that exactness of close formation and that steady march, in which the Greeks, and especially the Lacedæmonians, excelled, they rushed forward singly, or in very small bodies, and perished in vain attempts to penetrate the Spartan phalanx. As their efforts at length, through repeated failure, began to relax, the Greeks advanced upon them. The Tegeans, according to Herodotus, made the first impression; the Lacedæmonians then pushed forward, and confusion soon became general among the Persian infantry.

Mardonius, who, a little before, had thought himself pursuing an enemy neither able nor daring to withstand him, was seized with the deepest anguish on finding victory thus turning against him. Had he instantly determined upon retreat, he might probably still have avoided any considerable loss; for his infantry would soon have been safe in the plain,

¹² To the same purpose also even Plutarch speaks: *Περσῶν πολλοὺς . . . οὐκ ἀπράκτως οὐδὲ ἀθύμως πίπτοντας*. Vit. Aristid. And at least as much is implied by Plato, *Laches*, p. 191. t. 2.

under the protection of his numerous cavalry. But possibly signal and speedy success was indispensable to him. His fortune, perhaps his life, and the lot of all his family, might depend upon it: less however through the caprice of the prince than that of the people; always most dangerous under a despotic government, which, as Aristotle has well observed, is congenial with that of universal suffrage. His army was too numerous to subsist long in a narrow and mountainous country, without supplies by sea. The necessity of decision therefore urging, in the crisis before him, he determined to rest all upon the fortune of the present moment. At the head of a chosen body of cavalry, he hastened to rally and support his broken infantry. By a vigorous and well-conducted charge, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground, he checked the progress of the Spartan phalanx: but he could not break that firm and well-disciplined body. In his efforts, after some of his bravest officers and many of his soldiers had been killed, he received himself a mortal wound. His fall then was the signal for instant flight to those about him, and through them to his whole army. For in Asiatic armies, the jealousy of despotism being adverse to that close succession of various ranks in command which, in the European, contributes so much to the preservation of order in all events, the death of the commander-in-chief can scarcely fail to superinduce complete confusion, and the certain ruin of the enterprise. Artabazus, next in command to Mardonius, is said not only to have differed in opinion from his general in regard to the mode of conducting the war, but to have disapproved of the war itself. It does not appear that he was at all engaged in the

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Herod. 1. 8.
c. 99. & 100.

Arist. Polit.
1. 5. c. 10.

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battle.¹³ As soon as he was assured of the rout of the Persian infantry, leaving the rest of the army to any who would take charge of it, he retreated with forty thousand men, who had been under his immediate orders, hastily towards Phocis.

Herodot.
1.9. c.67.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

While the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans were thus unexpectedly victorious upon the hills, the Athenians were sharply engaged with the Bœotians in the plain below. The greater part of the other Greeks in the Persian service, little earnest in the cause, kept aloof. The abilities of Aristides therefore, and the valour of the Athenians, not exposed to a contest too unequal, at length prevailed. The Bœotians fled toward Thebes. The rest, prepared to act according to circumstances, made a timely retreat. The crowd of Asiatics, of various nations, dreading the charge of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans, fled profusely on the first appearance of flight among those bands of native Persians who had borne the brunt of the battle. The horse however, both Persian and Bœotian, still kept the field, and gave considerable protection to the fugitive infantry.

Herodot.
1.9. c.68.

¹³ Rollin, though he sometimes mistakes the Greek military writers, as Thucydides and Xenophon, on subjects merely military, is otherwise, in this early part of Grecian history, generally exact; but I know not where he learnt that Artabazus distinguished himself by his gallant exertion in this battle. Herodotus mentions on a prior occasion*, that Artabazus got credit for his conduct in the business of Plataea; apparently for his counsel given before the battle, which was justified by the event; and for an able retreat, by which alone any part of the army was saved; but neither Herodotus nor Diodorus nor Plutarch, in describing the battle, mention that he was at all engaged. Diodorus gives an account of his retreat exactly corresponding with that of Herodotus.

* 1.9. c.41. & 66.

Intelligence had quickly passed to the Greeks under the walls of Plataea, that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans were engaged and successful. Anxious then to repair their shameful misconduct, with that usual unhappiness of error which leads to farther error, they advanced with more haste than good order toward the field of battle ; and the Megarians and Phliasians, venturing by the plain, were attacked by the Theban horse, who killed six hundred, and drove the rest to the mountains.

Herodot.
1.9. c.69.

The Lacedæmonians and Tegeans meanwhile, animated by unexpected success, yet steady through practised discipline, repelling all the efforts of the Persian cavalry, pressed on to the fortified camp, the refuge of the greatest part of the routed troops, and the depository of all the valuables of the army. Immediately they attempted an assault ; but the Lacedæmonians, as remarkable for ignorance of sieges as for skill in the field, were baffled with loss till the Athenian forces arrived. Under the direction of the Athenian officers, after vigorous efforts on both sides, an assault succeeded. A horrid slaughter ensued. The victory indeed of a free people, fighting for their possessions, their families, and their independency, against foreign invaders, is never likely to be mild. Of near two hundred thousand Asiatics, the lowest reported numbers of the Persian army, only three thousand, exclusively of those who retreated under Artabazus, are said to have survived. Both Herodotus and Plutarch however avoid all detail of this massacre. How much of it happened within the fortified camp, and what execution was done on fugitives over a country so surrounded by seas and mountains that it would be difficult for one to escape, information at all approaching to exactness is indeed not to be expected.

c. 70.
Plut. v.
Aristid.
Diod. Sic.
1.9. c.32.

CHAP.
IX.Herodot.
1.9. c. 80.

Ibid.

When opposition ceased within the Persians lines, and the spirit of slaughter was at length sated, the rich plunder of the camp drew the attention of the conquerors. Here the wealth of the lords of Asia displayed a scene so new to the citizens of the little Grecian republics that they were at a loss on what objects in preference to fix their avidity. The Tegeans however, who had first surmounted the rampart, and throughout the action had well supported their pretension to precedency among the Greeks, having the fortune also to arrive first at the magnificent pavilion of Mardonius, did not hesitate to stop there. Instantly they laid their rapacious hands upon all its rich contents, great part of which had been the furniture of Xerxes himself, which, on his hasty departure for Asia, he had presented to his general and brother-in-law. But they were not permitted entirely to enjoy this precedency in pillage. The commander-in-chief quickly issued orders, That none should presume to appropriate any part of the booty, but that the whole should be collected, to be fairly divided among those who had together earned it. A brazen manger only, of very curious workmanship, the Tegeans were allowed to retain, as an honorary testimony to their particular valour and fortune. The Helots attending the Lacedæmonian forces were ordered to collect the rest. Tents and their furniture, adorned with gold and silver, collars, bracelets, hilts of cimeters, golden cups, and various other utensils of gold and silver, together with horses, camels, and women, were the principal spoil. Rich clothes in abundance, which at another time, says the historian, would have been thought valuable plunder, were now disregarded. But the vigilance of those appointed to superintend the business did not suffice to prevent the Helots from concealing many thing

of value, which they sold, principally to the Ægeians; a nation (if we may so call the inhabitants of a rock) of merchant-pirates, who, by this unworthy traffic, acquired riches before unknown among them.

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The booty being collected, a tenth was set apart, according to the customary piety of the Greeks, for an offering to the gods. From the produce of this, continues the contemporary historian, was dedicated to the god at Delphi the golden tripod which stands upon the three-headed brazen serpent next the altar, the brazen statue of Jupiter at Olympia, ten cubits high, and the brazen statue of Neptune, seven cubits high, at the isthmus. The Tegeans dedicated their manger at Tegea in the temple of the Alean Minerva. To attribute to them a modesty becoming their valour, and which had profited from reproof, we might desire to interpret the goddess's title, from analogy in a language derived from the Arcadian, to signify, That divine wisdom which directs what human ignorance calls Chance. The rest of the spoil was divided among those who had fought for it.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 81.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 33.

Among the anecdotes transmitted concerning this great event, one, related by the original historian, has been particularly celebrated. The appendages of the royal household were found in Mardonius's tent, nearly entire; and most of the domestic slaves had escaped the massacre. Pausanias, after admiring the various riches of the scene and the many contrivances of luxury, ordered a supper to be prepared by the Persian slaves, exactly as it would have been for Mardonius, had he been living and in his command. The orders were diligently executed: the splendid furniture was arranged; the sideboard displayed a profusion of gold and silver plate; the table was covered with exquisite elegance. Pausanias then

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 82.

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directed his usual Spartan supper to be placed by the side of this sumptuous entertainment. Little preparation was necessary. Then sending for the principal Grecian officers, 'I have desired your company 'here,' he said, 'to show you the folly of the Persian 'general. Living as you see at home, he came thus 'far to take from us such a miserable pittance as 'ours.'

Herodot.
1.9. c. 77.

The Mantineans had arrived from Plataea presently after the storming of the camp. Vexed to have lost their share of glory and reward, both so extraordinary, they marched immediately, contrary to the inclination of Pausanias, in pursuit of Artabazus. Having reached the borders of Thessaly however, they returned without effecting anything. Presently after them the Eleans had arrived. The generals of both, on their return to their respective countries, were punished with banishment.

c. 85.

After the collection of the spoil, the next care of the Greeks, and what upon all occasions they esteemed a necessary and sacred office, was the burial of their slain. The Lacedæmonians formed three separate burial-places; one for those who had borne sacred offices¹⁴, of whom the gallant Amompharetus had fallen; another for the other Lacedæmonians; and

¹⁴ This obvious interpretation of the term *ἱεράς*, which stands in all the editions of Herodotus, does not appear to me loaded with any difficulty. I wish to avoid discussion of matters which lie within the proper province of the critic or the antiquarian rather than of the historian; yet I must own that I think the ingenious conjectures of Valckenarius and others upon this passage, stated in the notes of Wesseling's edition, all more open to objection than the old reading. [The reading now adopted by Schweighæuser and others is *ἱεράς*. In his *Lexicon Herodoteum* it is thus explained: 'Ἰρην, (sive Εἰρην,) ἑνος, ὁ, Ado-
'lescens, Juvenis, Lacedæmoniorum sermone.']

the third for the Helots. Herodotus relates a remarkable instance of the severity of their maxims of discipline at this time. Aristodemus, who in the preceding year had been disgraced for not taking his share in the action at Thermopylæ, distinguished himself beyond all others in the battle of Plataæ, and was at length slain. The merit of his behaviour was acknowledged; but it was admitted only as sufficient, in his circumstances, to obviate infamy, and not to earn honour. The historian however, with the inclination, has not wanted the power, to bestow on him more liberal reward; and the eulogy of Herodotus will transmit the name of Aristodemus with glory probably to the latest generations. The Athenians, Tegeans, Megarians, and Phliasians had each a single burying-place. Barrows, raised according to that extensive practice of antiquity which occasion has occurred already to notice, distinguished to following ages the several spots.¹⁵

¹⁵ Plutarch in his Life of Aristides expresses wonder, and in his Treatise against Herodotus much indignation, at the assertion that the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians alone gained the victory of Plataæ; yet in the former work, relating, much in the same manner as Herodotus, the disorderly flight of the other Greeks before the battle, he has given no indirect testimony of the fact. Lysias, in his funeral oration, asserts it positively. (Lys. Or. Fun. p. 107. vel 195.) It is indeed little likely that, while memory of the transaction was yet fresh, a historian, writing for the Greek nation, would venture a false assertion so dishonourable to so large a part of it, concerning facts in their nature of such public notoriety; and it is still less likely that such an assertion would remain to be refuted in Plutarch's age. The interest which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians afterward had in courting the other Grecian states may sufficiently account for the epigrams, barrows, and other such uncertain evidences as Plutarch has quoted. Indeed, before Plutarch's testimony against Herodotus can be of any weight,

Plut. v.
Aristid.

Herodot.
1.3. c. 1.
Thucyd.
1.3. c. 54.

Thucyd.
1.3. c. 55.
& 63.

Herodot.
1.6. c. 108.
Plut. Arist.
Thucyd.
1.3. c. 56.

These solemn ceremonies were scarcely over, when a dangerous jealousy broke out between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians on the question to whom the accustomed *Aristeia*, or first honours of military merit, were due upon this great occasion. Immediate ill consequences were however prevented through the influence of the Corinthian leaders; who, interfering as mediators, named the Plataeans as having merited beyond all others. When the common cause particularly required exertion by sea, they, though an inland people, had served aboard the fleet; and in the campaign by land, which had now had so glorious an issue, none had more distinguished themselves by their zeal and bravery. Their actions on the day of Plataea are not particularly recorded by any writer; apparently because, being citizens of Athens, as they are modestly called by Thucydides, or subjects, as they are perhaps more truly styled by Herodotus, they had formed one body with the Athenians, under the orders of Aristides. Their commonwealth was too small to excite jealousy: all the other Greeks approved the determination of the Corinthians; and the Lacedæmonians and Athenians acquiesced.

This threatening business being thus accommodated, he must be first reconciled to himself. It does however appear extraordinary, that Herodotus, in his narrative of this great event, should never once have mentioned the Plataeans. The assertion of Plutarch, that the Greeks decreed to the Plataeans the first honours for military merit on the occasion, though Diodorus differs from him, is confirmed by Thucydides, against whose authority that of Diodorus is not to be mentioned. Possibly on account of their following fate Herodotus might have had some reason for omitting all mention of them, similar to that, whatever it was, which has made him totally silent concerning the first two Messenian wars. Considering his extreme freedom by turns with all the most powerful states of Greece, both omissions appear mysterious.

dated, a council was held to consider of farther measures. The battle of Plataea, it is said, was fought on the twenty-second of September.¹⁶ The season was therefore not too far advanced for taking vengeance on those Greeks who had joined the Persians. It was determined to march immediately against Thebes, and to require the delivery of Timegenides and Attaginus, heads of the faction which had led the Boeotians to the Persian alliance. On the eleventh day from the battle of Plataea the army entered the Theban lands. The delivery of the obnoxious persons being refused, plunder and waste of the country and preparations for the siege of the city were begun. This was borne during twenty days. Timegenides then, fearing the turn of popular favour against him, proposed to the Theban people to offer the payment of a fine, as atonement for the transgression of the republic against the common cause of Greece; declaring that if it should be refused, he would be ready to surrender himself with

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B. C. 479.

Herodot.
1.9. c. 86.
& seq.
Diod. Sic.
1. 11. c. 33.

3d Oct.

¹⁶ Thus the chronologers have determined, not without authority: but the Grecian calendar was yet too little exact for absolute certainty to a day. Ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἐμαχέσαντο (says Plutarch, speaking of the battle of Plataea) τῇν τετράδι τοῦ Βοηδρομιῶνος ἰσταμένου κατ' Ἀθηναίους, κατὰ δὲ Βοιωτοὺς τετράδι τοῦ Πανέμου φθίνοντος, ἣ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἀθροίζεται συνέδριον, καὶ θύουσιν τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ Διὶ Πλαταιεῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς νίκης. Τὴν δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν ἀνωμαλίαν οὐ θαυμαστόν, ὅπου καὶ νῦν, διηκριβωμένων τῶν ἐν ἀστρολογίᾳ μᾶλλον, ἄλλην ἄλλοι μηνὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν ἄγουσιν. Plut. vit. Aristid. The fourth day of the Attic month Boedromion, according to our chronologers, would correspond with the 23rd of September; but they have preferred the authority of the copies of Plutarch's Life of Camillus, and of his treatise on the Glory of Athens, in both of which the third of the month Boedromion is named as the day of the battle of Plataea. The day of the battle being fixed, Herodotus furnishes the other dates given in the margin.

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Attaginus, rather than be the occasion or pretence for the destruction of his country. The proposal was accepted by the assembly. But in the following night Attaginus fled, leaving his own family, as well as his associate Timegenides, to the mercy of the enraged Thebans. His children were immediately delivered to the commander-in-chief of the confederate Greeks. But the Spartan prince did not want liberality to distinguish between the criminal father and the innocent offspring, whom he immediately dismissed unhurt. Timegenides and some other principal Thebans being then demanded, were surrendered. They expected that time would be allowed them to prepare for a public defence, and trusted that their interest, assisted by money well bestowed, would insure their safety. Pausanias, suspecting this, determined to prevent it. Detaining them till the confederate forces separated for their several homes, and then leading them to Corinth, he caused them to be there executed : a salutary severity, no doubt, for the security of Greece against the common enemy, but, as far as appears, unsupported by the solemnity of a trial, and certainly unauthorised by any positive law.

Meanwhile Artabazus, who had withdrawn from the field of Plataea with numbers forming still a powerful army, nevertheless, on receiving information of the extent of the disaster to the Persian arms, saw no small difficulty and danger before him in the retreat to Asia. He was aware that even those nations which had been most forward in submission to Xerxes at the head of advancing myriads would not scruple to avow their real disposition of hostility toward him, were the defeat of Mardonius known, and his own march taken for flight. He therefore gave out that his forces were only the advanced guard

of the victorious army, which was immediately following. Using rapidity and precaution, he passed the mountains of Thessaly and crossed Macedonia without loss. But report would soon outstrip the march of his numbers. Alexander king of Macedonia, who had found himself forced, as a kind of hostage, to follow the train of the Persian general, would not fail, on the defeat of the Persian army, to use his best diligence for returning to his kingdom. The Macedonian forces assembling, under the command of his son Perdiccas, hung on the rear of Artabazus. The difficult passage of the large river Strymon afforded opportunity which was ably and successfully used. A large part of the Persian army was cut off, and such numbers made prisoners that the portion of their ransom, which Grecian piety usually offered to the gods, provided a statue of gold which Alexander dedicated at Delphi. How far his conduct was consistent with faith pledged to Persia remaining history fails of assurance; but the Athenian people acknowledged in it the virtue of a Grecian patriot: they voted honours and privileges to Perdiccas, and the battle of the Strymon had lasting fame, as the consummation of misfortune and disgrace to Persia, and of safety and glory to Greece.¹⁷

¹⁷ . . Τέλειον τὰτύχημα ποιήσαντι τῷ βασιλεῖ. Demosth. περὶ συντάξ. p. 173. and in Aristocr. p. 687. ed. Reiske. In both these orations Perdiccas is mentioned as the person to whom the Athenian people decreed honours, though they differ somewhat in regard to the amount. The great Philip, afterward king of Macedonia, in his letter to the Athenian people, preserved with the oration of Demosthenes entitled, On the Letter, mentions only Alexander, in whose name the dedications of course would be made, and under whose authority the army which defeated the Persians would act, though Perdiccas might be the immediate commander. Ep. Phil. ad Ath. p. 164. ed. Reiske.

SECTION IV.

Measures of the Grecian fleet. Battle of Mycale. End of the expedition of Xerxes.

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B. C. 479.
Ol. 75. $\frac{1}{2}$.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 90.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 34.

WHILE the arms of the confederate Greeks were thus wonderfully attended with success and glory against the immediate invaders of their country, the fleet, which during the summer had lain inactive at Delos, was at length excited to enterprise. In the island of Samos there had been always a strong party ready to take any opportunity for spirited opposition to Theomestor, whom the Persians had raised to the tyranny of the island. Engaging in their views Hegesistratus, son of Aristagoras the Milesian chief, the Samians deputed Lampon and Athenagoras, two principal men among them, to attend him on a mission to the commanders of the confederate fleet. In a conference with Leotychides and Xanthippus, Hegesistratus represented, ‘That on the least encouragement the whole Ionian people would revolt against the Persians and join the Grecian cause: that the bare appearance of the Grecian fleet off their coast would suffice to excite them to spirited action: that the Persian government was remiss and weak beyond what could be readily believed; insomuch that never did the means offer to the commanders of a powerful armament for so rich a booty with so little risk.’ He proceeded to urge the Spartan king and the Athenian chief, invoking their common gods, to use the means so easily in their power, for rescuing a Grecian people from subjection to barbarians; and he offered, for himself and his colleagues, if their fidelity was doubted, to remain hostages with the fleet. Leotychides, according to a common super-

stitution of both Greeks and Romans, struck with the name of Hegesistratus (signifying the leader of an armament) as a favourable omen, readily acceded to the measure proposed. Dismissing the two other deputies, he detained Hegesistratus; and, only one day being allowed for preparation, the whole fleet, consisting, according to Diodorus, of two hundred and fifty trireme galleys, moved, on the next, for Samos.

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Herod. l. 9.
c. 91. & 92.

Diodor.
l. 11. c. 34.

The season was so far advanced that the commanders of the Phenician squadron in the Persian service, finding enterprise neither intended by the Persian admiral, nor expected from the Greeks, had requested leave to depart for their own distant ports before the equinoxial storms should set in; and this had been granted. Having thus incautiously parted with their best ships and ablest seamen, the Persians were highly alarmed with intelligence that the Grecian fleet was approaching. Hastily quitting Samos, they passed to the neighbouring promontory of Mycale on the Ionian coast; where an army, according to Herodotus, of sixty thousand men, was encamped under the command of Tigranes. Here, says the historian, near the temple of the venerable deities, and that temple of the Eleusinian Ceres which Philistus son of Pasicles built when he followed Neleus son of Codrus to the founding of Miletus, they hauled their galleys upon the beach, and, with stones found upon the place, and palisadoes formed of olive and other cultivated trees, they raised a defence around them.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 96.

c. 97.

The Grecian commanders had expected to find the Persian fleet in full force at Samos, and proposed to engage it on that friendly coast; but they were not prepared for the more hazardous measure of following it to the Asiatic shore. A council of war was

c. 98

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therefore held, in which it was deliberated whether to retire again immediately to their own seas, or first to make some attempt in the Hellespont. But intelligence received of the departure of the Phenician squadron gave encouragement; the spirit of vigorous enterprise gained; and it was shortly determined to seek the enemy's fleet. On approaching the Ionian coast, it was not without surprise that they found the sea completely yielded to them, and the enemy prepared for opposition by land only. Ardour on one side rose in proportion to such evident backwardness on the other, and the bold measure was resolved upon to debark the whole of their force capable of acting by land, which would be by far the larger part of their crews, and to attack the Persians in their fortified camp. Probably the leaders had reasonable hopes, and perhaps confirmed information, that the numerous Greeks among the Persian forces wanted only opportunity to revolt. Leotychides however practised an expedient like that of Themistocles at Artemisium. He sent a herald in a boat, within hearing of the Ionian camp, who made proclamation, according to the original historian, in these words: 'Men of Ionia, attend to what I say, of which the Persians will understand nothing. When we engage, it will become every one of you to think of the liberty of all: the word is Hebe. Let those who hear inform those who are out of hearing.' The Samians had become suspected by the Persian leaders, through their generous kindness to about five hundred Athenian prisoners, who had been brought from Attica and disposed of as slaves in Asia Minor, having ransomed all, and sent them, with subsistence, to Athens. The Samian troops in the Persian army were there-

Herodot.
ut ant. et
Diod Sic.
l. 11. c. 34.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 99.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 35.

fore deprived of their arms ; and the Milesians, being also suspected, were detached on pretence of service.¹⁸

Leotychides debarked his forces without opposition at some distance from the Persian camp. To add to their animation, he caused report to be spread, that Pausanias had gained a complete victory over Mar-donius in Bœotia ; though intelligence of this could not have arrived if, as historians affirm, it was the very day of the battle of Plataæ. Possibly however information of the death of Masistus, with some exaggeration of the success obtained upon that occasion, might have reached him. The Grecian forces marched in two columns ; one under the command of Xanthippus, composed of the Athenian, Corinthian, Sicyonian, and Trœzenian troops, holding the plain against the shore ; the other, consisting of the Lacedæmonians with the remaining allies, under Leotychides, going by the more inland and hilly road. The former arrived first, and, eager to engross the glory of the day, proceeded immediately to assault ; and this was so sudden, so well conducted, and so vigorous, that they had already entered the Persian rampart before the Lacedæmonians could arrive. The rashness was favoured, and perhaps justified, by the ready zeal of the Greeks in the Persian service to give them every assistance. The Samians, exasperated by the treatment they had received, exerted themselves, though unarmed, by all means in their power ; and their exhortations and example determined the other Asian

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Herodot.
l. 9. c. 100.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 35.
Polyæn.
Strateg.
l. 1. c. 33.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 102.

c. 103.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 36.

¹⁸ It is evident, from the account of the nearly contemporary historian, that the Persian commanders were yet unaware of the kind of policy requisite for gaining hearty co-operation from the republicans, even those most hostile to the enemies of the Persians, but which, in course of long communication, their successors, as in the sequel of this history will appear, learned.

CHAP.
IX.Herodot.
1.9. c. 102.

c. 103.

c. 104.

c. 106.

c. 106.
Diod. Sic.
1.11. c. 37.

Greeks. From all reported by Herodotus it appears that the proper Persians had not yet deserved to lose that military reputation which they had acquired under the great Cyrus; but of all the infantry in the service of the empire they almost alone seem to have merited the title of soldiers. Probably the proportion of them at Mycale was not great. The other Asiatics shrunk before the vehemence of the Athenian attack; but the Persians were still resisting when the Lacedæmonians arrived. Then they were overpowered, and mostly destroyed. Tigranes, general of the Persian land forces, and two of the principal naval commanders, were among the slain. Of the Greeks in the Persian service the only man of rank who fell was Perilaus, commander of the Sicyonians.

Mycale was a small peninsula; and from the place of action was no retreat by land, but through narrow passes over a mountain. The Persian commanders, little expecting so sudden an attempt upon their numerous forces within fortified lines, thought they had provided sufficiently for security by disarming the suspected Samians; and detaching the Milesians to guard the passes. Their confidence in these however was grossly misplaced. The Milesians, with the most determined enmity, intercepted the fugitives, and of the whole army, it is said, few escaped. When slaughter ceased, the Greeks, remaining quiet possessors of whatever the Persian camp and fleet had contained, carried off every valuable of easy removal, and then set fire to the rest. The ships were the next object, and the whole Persian fleet was burnt.

After this signal blow to the Persian power the Grecian fleet returned to Samos. A council was immediately held to consider what measures should be

taken for the present security and future welfare of the revolted Ionians. The islanders might be safe under protection of the fleet. Against this it would be difficult, even for the resources of the Persian empire, soon to raise a force capable of disputing the command of the sea. But it was generally deemed impossible for any power of Greece to protect the long but narrow extent of continental colonies against the land force immediately behind them. Confirmation arriving of the news of the complete victory over the Persian arms in Bœotia, the Peloponnesian commanders proposed to remove the Ionians from Asia to Greece, and to put them in possession of all the seaports of those states which had sided with the Persians. But the Athenians dissented; not only denying the necessity of so violent a measure, but insisting peremptorily that the Peloponnesians had no right to interfere in the disposal of Athenian colonies, and the Peloponnesians had the moderation to yield to this argument. Under example then of the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians, the most powerful of the islanders all took solemn oaths to be faithful to the Grecian confederacy. Their sea-girt shores would afford present refuge for those continentals, most obnoxious to Persian vengeance, whom the walls of their towns could not protect. Farther measures being then taken into consideration, it was observed that Sardis was too near, the force there too great, and the season besides too much advanced, for any farther attempt in Ionia; but that the Hellespont, more distant from the centre of the Persian force, was open to enterprise by sea. Thither therefore the fleet directed its course, with the purpose especially of destroying the bridges, which were supposed to be

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 114.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 37.

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still standing, and protected by a garrison ; but they had already yielded to the weather and current, and the Persians had deserted the place.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 118.
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 89.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 37.

Winter now approaching, Leotychides, with all the Peloponnesians, returned to Greece. Xanthippus resolved nevertheless, with his Athenians and their Ionian allies, to attempt the recovery of the Chersonese, an Athenian colony, where the Greeks were still numerous. The Persians, exposed to attacks in various parts through the command which the Athenian fleet possessed at sea, collected their force in Sestos. After an obstinate defence, pressed by famine, they made good their retreat ; upon which the Grecian inhabitants joyfully surrendered the town to the Athenians.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 107,
108.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 36.
Strabo,
l. 1. p. 28.
M. T. Cic.
de Nat.
Deor. l. 1.
& de Leg.
l. 2.

The Persian monarch had remained in Sardis so as to see the sad relics of his forces which found means to fly from Mycale, and to receive the calamitous news of the still greater loss of his army in Greece. Shortly after he moved to his distant capital of Susa. On his departure he ordered all the Grecian temples within his power to be destroyed, it is said, by fire ; whether supposing the deity offended with his long sufferance of them, or thinking to gain popularity among his subjects of the upper provinces by this sacrifice to the prejudices of the Magian religion. Accounts of the destruction of the earlier Grecian temples by fire, often said to have been accidental, are too numerous, some of too high authority, for the fact to be doubted ; and hence it may be concluded that, as in the temple of Solomon at Jerusalem, timber was much more employed in them than in those of later times, whose valuable though injured relics to this day show much of what once they were.

Such was the conclusion of the expedition of Xerxes, after two campaigns, wonderfully glorious to Greece, and, both in themselves and for their known consequences, perhaps the most remarkable and important in the annals of mankind.

SECT.
IV.

CHAPTER X.

VIEW OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES POLITICALLY CONNECTED WITH THE GREEKS, AND OF THE GRECIAN SETTLEMENTS IN SICILY AND ITALY.

SECTION I.

Of Carthage. Of Sicily: Agrigentum: Phalaris: Syracuse: Gelon: invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians: battle of Himera.

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X.

DURING those great transactions in Greece and its eastern colonies, which decided, for the time, the fate of Europe and Asia, and then first displayed that superiority of the former over the rest of the world, which it still maintains, events less important for their consequences, and less intimately affecting the interests of the mother-country, less accurately also related to us, yet upon sufficient evidence great and glorious, were taking place among the western settlements of the nation.

The warlike and enterprising spirit of the Greeks had long ago driven the industrious and informed Phenicians from all their ancient establishments in the Grecian seas; had then wrested from them the greater part of the distant and large island of Cyprus, whose situation would seem to allot it rather to the Phenician than the Grecian dominion, and had appropriated all that valuable part of the African coast which, after the powerful kingdom of Egypt, lay nearest to the Phenician shore. But in maritime skill, and still more in commercial system, in the

spirit of commercial adventure, and in those manufactures which formed the principal and most advantageous basis of commerce, the Phenicians remained yet unrivalled. On the coast of Africa, from the deserts bounding the Grecian colonies on the west, they had extended their settlements to the western extremity of the Mediterranean, penetrated into the ocean beyond, and have been supposed to have carried their traffic as far as the shores of Britain, then the extreme of the known world, and, excepting the Phenicians, unknown among civilised nations. Wherever the Greeks did not interfere, the Phenicians were superior, in arms as in arts, to all maritime people. Nevertheless, confined at home within a narrow territory; pressed, on the land first by the power of the Jewish kingdom, then by the more overbearing weight successively of the Assyrian and Persian empires; and, on the sea, interrupted by the Grecian spirit of war, and, it must be added of piracy, they were equally prevented from becoming a great nation on their own continent, and from assuring their dominion over their distant maritime settlements.

In their voyages westward, the large projection of AFRICA, over against Sicily, could not fail, by its position to attract, and by its circumstances to fix, the attention of the Phenician navigators. At a very early period accordingly some settlements were formed there, among which Utica had the fame of being the most ancient. Afterward the princess immortalised by Virgil's poetry, driven to seek refuge with her adherents from the tyranny of her brother the king of Tyre, is said either to have founded or increased the colony which in process of ages became the powerful and renowned CARTHAGE. The era of these transactions is very uncertain. The more re-

Vell.
Paterc. l. 1.
c. 2.
Justin. l. 18.
c. 4. & 5.
Strabo,
l. 17. p. 632.

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ceived system places Dido two centuries later than the Trojan prince, whose intercourse with her the Roman bard hath so interestingly described : Newton's calculation, reducing the age of the Trojan war, makes them contemporary. Carthage however, situate nearly midway between Phenicia and the ocean, happy in its climate and territory, and preferable to Utica for its port, was a most eligible situation for a place of arms, to command the communication with the invaluable western settlements, with Spain, the country of silver and gold mines, the Indies of the old world. For in the eastern part of the Mediterranean navigation was exposed to continual piracy from the Greeks, who possessed the northern and southern shores; and in the western from the Tuscans. Thus principally Carthage seems to have risen early to eminence, and to have become in some degree the capital of the Phenician colonies. The troubles of Phenicia, and the wars which, with its very scanty territorial strength, it had to sustain against the force of the Assyrian empire, seem to have given to its dependencies an emancipation which perhaps they did not desire; and for which no struggle remains reported. Probably, on the reduction of Tyre by Nabuchodonosor king of Assyria, many Tyrian families would migrate to the colonies; and Carthage was likely to attract the greatest number. Carthage however then profiting from its strength and its situation, appears to have taken decidedly the lead. It is remarkable that, excepting Assyria and Egypt, whose extreme antiquity, together with the uncertainty of their early history, makes them exceptions to all rule, none of the ancient people, who flourished by arts, arms, and policy, were great nations, like those which form the states of modern Europe; but

Strabo,
l. 5. p. 219.

Hist. des
Anc. Colo-
nies, par
le Baron
de S. Croix,
p. 32.

Ch. 6. s. 2.
of this Hist.

each a small society of men, inhabiting one city, and there served by slaves, who were commonly the far larger portion of the population. The Carthaginian government, established, like all the Grecian, upon these principles, in taking the lead among the sister colonies, did not associate but subjected them. Even the towns in its immediate neighbourhood were not admitted to a share in the government : each had its own municipal administration ; and so far each was a separate commonwealth ; but all were held under political subjection, and that apparently a severe subjection, to Carthage ; while Carthage itself appears to have had the best balanced and wisest constitution known to antiquity.

Arist. Polit.
l. 2. c. 11.
Polyb.
l. 6. p. 498.
S. Croix,
p. 32. & 37.

As long as the Phenician settlements remained under the authority and protection of the mother-country, few or perhaps none were more than factories ; for the government of Tyre was little able to maintain armies and make conquests at the farther end of the Mediterranean. But when Carthage was become the independent capital of those colonies, greater views than the mere acquisition of riches by commerce began to animate the ambition of her citizens. Along the coast of Africa, as far as the Atlantic ocean, and on the extensive shores of Spain, having only ignorant barbarians to contend with, they established their dominion, apparently with little difficulty, wherever they chose to exert their force. But on the nearer coast of SICILY, the Phenician factories, some of them probably as old as Carthage itself, had been disturbed by the successive arrival of Grecian adventurers ; skilled as well as daring in the practice of arms, and, though not always averse to commerce, generally preferring piracy. Against those new occupants of that fruitful country other pre-

Thueyd.
l. 6. c. 2.
S. Croix.

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Thucyd.
ibid.

Ch. 5. s. 2.
of this Hist.

cautions were necessary than had sufficed against the simplicity of the native barbarians. Uniting therefore their factories, which had been scattered all around the island, the Phenicians confined themselves to three settlements; Soloïs and Panormus (now Palermo) on the northern coast, and Motya at the western extremity; and they began to cultivate more attentively the friendship of the ancient inhabitants, particularly of the Elymians, a mixed people, it is said, Greek, Trojan, and Sicel, who held the towns of Eryx and Egesta. This easy acquiescence of the Phenicians, which, till the age of Xerxes, allowed no opportunity for the Greek historians to boast of a single feat of arms to the honour of their nation in Sicily, sufficiently proves that, though the foundation of the city of Carthage may have been as ancient as it has been pretended, yet the power of the Carthaginian state was comparatively of late growth. The Phenician colonies thus assembled toward the western part of the island might readily receive such protection as Carthage could give; and their need of protection would lead them to admit willingly its superintending authority. As soon therefore as Carthage itself became independent, the Phenician settlements in Sicily would become appendages of its dominion; and disputes between Carthage and the Greek settlements would be consequently unavoidable.

Little remains for history concerning the GRECIAN COLONIES in Sicily, till toward that splendid period which has been treated in the preceding chapters; and indeed it appears that, before that period, the Sicilian and Italian Greeks had no important transactions, and little political connexion with the mother-country, unless with the one commercial

commonwealth of Corinth. Some of the towns however appear to have been populous and wealthy; Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, Camarina divided between them the southern coast, fruitful beyond the rest of that island, fruitful especially in grain; Syracuse had one of the most commodious harbours of the Mediterranean, in a situation very advantageous for trade, and surrounded also by a territory of uncommon fertility.

Already in the age of Solon AGRIGENTUM, originally a colony from Gela, was become a considerable independent commonwealth, when Phalaris, a Cretan, acquired the sovereignty. Crete had been, jointly with Rhodes, the mother-country of Gela. Phalaris, whose history, on more than one account, excites curiosity, is represented as a monster in human nature; possessing, with very extraordinary abilities, the most opposite virtues and vices, the most abominable cruelty, with the most exalted magnanimity and generosity. But though all traditions concerning that famous tyrant are extremely doubtful and imperfect, yet the contradictions concerning his character are not wholly unaccountable. He fell, we find, a victim to the party in opposition to his government, and that party held the sway in Agrigentum, under a democratical form of administration, sixty years. What happened in Athens, on the expulsion of the Pisistradidæ, would happen, during this period, from the same causes, in Agrigentum. To render odious the character of the deceased tyrant would tend to weaken the credit of his party, and proportionally to strengthen the situation of the ruling party and advance their power. Nothing therefore that could produce such effects would be neglected.

SYRACUSE was already considerable, yet not, as far

B. C. 560.
to 570.
Ol. 54.
nearly.

Cic. de Off.
l. 2. c. 7.

Ch. 7. s. 5.
of this Hist.

CHAP.
X.Herodot.
1. 7. c. 153.c. 154.
Ol. 74. 1.
B. C. 484.*
Dodw. Ann.
Thueyd.

as appears, particularly eminent among the Sicilian Greek cities till, toward the age of Xerxes, it was raised to power and fame by its great and beloved tyrant Gelon. That illustrious man was born of an ancient and noble family, of Rhodian origin, established at Gela. The Sicilian colonies, beyond all other Grecian states, were remarkable for frequent revolutions, the sudden elevation and downfall of tyrannies, and every change of government and every calamity which faction and internal war could occasion. Cleander, tyrant of Gela, being killed by Sabyllus, a Geloan citizen, was nevertheless succeeded in the sovereignty by his brother Hippocrates. Gelon, already of reputation for abilities and bravery, was appointed by the new tyrant commander-in-chief of the Geloan cavalry; for in Sicily, a country much more generally adapted than Greece to the breeding of horses and the operations of cavalry, that service was early and extensively cultivated.¹ Hippocrates, an ambitious and able prince, made successful war upon some of the Sicel tribes, and upon the Grecian states of Syracuse, Callipolis, Naxos, Leontini, and Messena; all of which, excepting Syracuse, he compelled to acknowledge his sovereignty. The Syracusans, defeated in a great battle and reduced to extremity, applied to Corinth, their metropolis, for assistance. The interference of that rich maritime commonwealth, in conjunction with its powerful colony of Corcyra, procured an accommodation; by

[* This date is at variance with the computation of Mr. Clinton, who considers B. C. 485. to be the date of the occupation of Syracuse by Gelon, as he reigned seven years, and was succeeded in the eighth by Hiero, B. C. 478.]

¹ *Arduus inde Acragas ostentat maxima longe*

Moenia, magnanimûm quondam generator equorum.

Virg. Æn. 1. 3. v. 703.

which however the town of Camarina, previously subject to Syracuse, was yielded to the Geloan prince. Hippocrates was soon after killed in an action with the Hyblæan Sicels. Gelon, who had distinguished himself very advantageously in all the late wars, was left guardian of his infant sons, and administrator of their government. To this trust, according to Herodotus, Gelon was unfaithful. Gathering a pretence of some commotions among the Geloans, which were repressed by arms, he assumed the sovereignty. At Syracuse, about the same time, in the prosecution of that contest for power between the higher and lower citizens, which was nearly perpetual in almost every Grecian commonwealth, the leaders of the populace, engaging the slaves of the rich in the party against their masters, compelled these to seek their personal safety by flight. Finding refuge at Casmenæ they applied to Gelon, who readily undertook their cause. The Syracusans in possession dreaded the power of that prince; but according to the same historian, who imputes to him treachery against the sons of Hippocrates, they had confidence in his character. The result is highly remarkable. They professed themselves not unwilling to readmit the refugees, and to restore their property, provided only security could be given that an equal government should be established; that an act of amnesty for what had passed should be strictly observed; that the nobles, on being restored to wealth, honour, and authority, should neither exert their power and influence to the persecution of individuals who had been active in expelling them, nor to the subversion of the constitution of the commonwealth, by the establishment of oligarchal despotism. The expedient in which both parties concurred was to appoint Gelon supreme

Herodot.
I. 7. c. 155.

CHAP. moderator between them, making him king of Syra-
 X. cuse.

Ch. 4. s. 1.
 of this Hist.

This important acquisition of dominion thus extraordinarily made, it became the object of Gelon to mould into one the many little states which acknowledged his authority. The circumstances of every Grecian government required that the capital should be strong, and all the dependent towns weak. For, on account of the universal narrowness of territory, occasion has occurred heretofore to observe, it was necessary that every cultivated spot should have its fortified town at hand for refuge and protection; and, on account of the universal scantiness of public revenue, it was necessary that the inhabitants of every town and its district should be the garrison. If then these were able to defend themselves against an enemy, they might also defy the authority of their own capital. The interest or the ambition of individuals would often lead the municipal government to aspire to independency; and the interest or ambition of neighbouring states would seldom fail to afford encouragement for such views. But if it was necessary for every Grecian government to attend to these circumstances, it was peculiarly so for the dominion of Gelon, composed of so many conquered cities, comprising now, with a small part of the northern coast and the greatest part of the southern, the whole eastern of the island.

Among the towns of this range of country Syracuse possessed advantages which attracted the notice of Gelon. His native city, recommended by its territory, the celebrated Geloan plain, eminent even among the Sicilian fields for fruitfulness, was near one extremity of his dominion, and without a port. A cent situation, the completest harbour of the

island, the largest town, a rich surrounding country, and a people of whose favour he was apparently most secure, determined Gelon to make Syracuse the seat of his government. This being decided, he proceeded to the arduous business of forming the heterogeneous parts which composed his dominion into one harmonised whole. His measures, in the present circumstances of Europe, would appear violent and extravagant; yet, if we may judge from what we learn of their effects, they were wisely accommodated to the times in which he lived; and perhaps beyond any other that could have been devised productive of happiness to his subjects, as well as of security to his own authority. Without a distribution of powers legislative, judicial, and executive, among a favouring party, a tyranny could hardly subsist. Of that favouring party it was necessary to have in the capital a decided majority; and it was also necessary that the other towns should want the protection of the capital, and be unable to resist its force. With these views, destroying Camarina, Gelon established all its people in Syracuse: he removed thither more than half the Geloans: of the Eubœans in different towns he gave the higher ranks only to enjoy the privileges of the capital²; leaving the poorer, with their several municipal administrations, to cultivate the country: but the lower people of the Megarians of Hybla he sold for slaves, with an express obligation on the purchasers to transport them out of Sicily, as the last resource against those disturbances which their mutinous disposition, and rancour against their superiors, would, if they lived within the same country, perpetually occasion.

Strabo,
l. 6. p. 270.
Thucyd.
l. 6.

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 156.
Thucyd.
l. 6. c. 5.
Strab.
p. 268. &c.
l. 10. p. 449.

² Πολιήτας ἐποίησε. Herodot. l. 7. c. 156. Πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. Aristot. Polit. l. 3. c. 1.

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X.

The state of Sicily when Xerxes invaded Greece then appears to have been this: the barbarian Sicans and Sicels yet held the centre of the island, and the Elymians the western corner. A part of the northern coast was possessed by the Carthaginians; never, probably, in perfect friendship with all the Greeks, and lately in open hostility with some; for, while Cleomenes, king of Sparta, was yet living, his half-brother Dorieus, elder brother of the renowned Leonidas, conducting a fleet with the view to settle a colony in Sicily, in action with a Carthaginian fleet, was defeated and killed. The dominion meanwhile commanded by Gelon, very small compared with the kingdoms of modern Europe, and still more below comparison with the Persian empire then existing, was yet considerably larger than any under one government elsewhere among the Greeks; and this he ruled with such wisdom, uprightness, and vigour that he was equally beloved by his subjects and respected by all neighbouring powers. At the same time Agrigentum was administered by Theron, a man also of high merit, who had raised himself to that called tyranny; and he had lately reduced Himera on the northern coast, ejecting its tyrant Terillus.

This was what gave immediate occasion to the first considerable effort of the Carthaginians toward extending their dominion in Sicily; the first important transaction in which they were engaged with the Greeks, while the Romans, afterward conquerors of Carthage, Greece, and the known world, had yet scarcely a name among nations. It is therefore to be regretted that Herodotus has treated this part of history so slightly, and that little satisfactory remains upon it from any other writer. The narrative of Diodorus is the injudicious, and sometimes even ridiculous attempt of a man little versed in political,

Herodot.
l. 5. c. 41.
& 46. &
l. 7. c. 158.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 17.
Herodot.
l. 7. c. 165.
Diod. l. 9.
c. 20. & 77.

and still less in military business, to exalt his fellow-countrymen, the Sicilian Greeks, above the fame of Lacedæmon and Athens. Circumstances enough however remain, either reported or confirmed by better authority, whence a general idea may be gained of the principal events.

It was a solace, among the miseries occasioned by the frequent revolutions in the little Grecian republics, that as every state had always enemies, open or secret, the exiled of every state could generally find some degree of friendship and a disposition to protection somewhere. But beside the resources within Greece itself, the Persian empire had been, for some time, a common refuge for the unfortunate who were of any consideration in their own country: Tuscany also had afforded settlements to some; and now Carthage, rising to new importance among foreign powers, offered prospect of new relief. Here the expelled prince of Himera applied, and found a favourable reception. The opportunity was inviting for the Carthaginians to extend and secure their own dominion, by crushing that of the Greeks in Sicily; while the collected force of the Persian empire, on the point of overwhelming Greece itself, would effectually prevent any assistance thence. Under pretence therefore of reinstating their ally in his dominion they assembled a very powerful armament. By a treaty with the Tuscans they engaged the naval force of that people in their service; and, according to the practice which is found afterward usual with them in their wars with the Romans, they collected mercenary land forces from many of the barbarous nations with which they had commercial intercourse. Beside those of Phenician blood, Herodotus mentions Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Elisycians, (a name

Herodot.
l. 7. c. 165.

Pind.
Pyth. 1.
v. 138. &
Ephor. ap.
Schol.

CHAP. not occurring elsewhere,) Sardinians, and Corsicans.
X.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 165.
Polyb. 1. 6.

The command in chief was committed to Hamilcar, one of the two magistrates who, with the title of Suffete, presided over the Carthaginian commonwealth, and whose eminence of dignity and authority was such that the Grecian writers, generally averse to foreign terms, not unusually styled them kings.

In the same summer in which Xerxes invaded Greece Hamilcar passed into Sicily, and immediately laid siege to Himera. Theron, unable with his own forces to cope with the Carthaginian armament, applied to the king of Syracuse for assistance. Though the war was professedly intended only against the Agrigentine prince, yet the whole Grecian interest in Sicily was too evidently concerned in the event for Gelon to remain a quiet spectator. Putting himself therefore at the head of his army, which, according to the most probable accounts, consisted of about ten thousand heavy-armed foot, and two thousand horse, and, with the usual addition of light-armed slaves, might be in all perhaps twenty-five thousand men, he marched to join the Agrigentine forces. His fleet, according to Herodotus, two hundred trireme galleys, and, as we are assured by Thucydides, more powerful than that of any other Grecian potentate of the age, he committed to his brother Hieron. This prince met and defeated the combined fleets of Carthage and Tuscany. About the same time the united armies of Syracuse and Agrigentum engaged the Carthaginian army near Himera, with complete success. Hamilcar himself fell; a large proportion of his army was destroyed, and almost the whole remainder were made prisoners.

The concurring testimony of ancient writers to these glorious events, which appear to have at once

terminated the war, little as we are assured of any particulars, is confirmed by the irrefragable evidence of the growing greatness and lasting splendour of Syracuse and Agrigentum. The prisoners, according to the practice of the times, were all condemned to slavery. The larger share, we are told, was acquired by the Agrigentines, who employed great numbers on public works, which remained to late ages, and some even yet remain, proofs both of the greatness of the victory, and of the taste of the victors.. Here however, on considering the account given by the Sicilian Diodorus, the zealous eulogist of his country, a suspicion cannot but arise that all those prisoners were not Carthaginian soldiers. For the battle was fought near Himera, on the northern coast of the island. The Carthaginians, in the confusion of their defeat, says Diodorus, fled in great numbers up the country, and mostly toward the Agrigentine territory, where they were afterward taken by the Agrigentines. It seems much more probable that they would have directed their flight toward their own garrisons of Solois and Panormus, which were not far distant on the coast; or, if they were cut off from these, and compelled to take an inland road, Egesta, the strong hold of their Elymian allies, would have been their object, rather than the Agrigentine territory. But if they fled up the country, and did not reach Egesta, they would get among the highlands held by the Sicans and Sicels; and would be much more likely to stop there than pass on into the Agrigentine lands. It seems farther improbable, that the powerful Gelon would permit his people to be defrauded of their fair share of the booty by those who owed to them, not only the victory, but perhaps even their existence as a people. Upon the whole therefore it seems more than

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probable that the Agrigentines took advantage from the blow given to the Carthaginian power, perhaps making a pretence of some shelter afforded to fugitives, for oppressing the Sicans and Sicels of their neighbourhood ; and that the stupendous works of art, which travellers yet admire at Girgenti, were in large proportion the produce of the labour and the misery of those unfortunate barbarians. It is the purpose of history to represent men not such as they should be, but such as they have been : and thus learning what they should be, through observation of what they should not be, far more valuable instruction, both political and moral, may be gathered than from any visionary description of perfection in human nature. Thus at least Herodotus and Thucydides and Xenophon and Polybius and Sallust and Tacitus thought ; though some other historians, Greek, Roman, and modern, have written upon a different plan. It is indeed little allowable for the historian to go beyond authority ; yet when some important facts are certain, with some attending circumstances doubtful, it will be his duty to lead his reader as near to the whole truth as he can. The general spirit of the Grecian commonwealths, and even the doctrine of the Grecian philosophers, the methods ordinarily practised among the Greeks to obtain slaves, the full assurance we have of the great works executed at Agrigentum, and the account even of Diodorus, partial as he is to his fellow-countrymen, compared with the known state of Sicily at the time, all concur to mark the conjecture ventured concerning the prisoners made by the Agrigentines as very likely to be true, and even very near the truth.

Among the deficiencies of Sicilian history however nothing is so much to be regretted as the scantiness

of information about the form of government established by Gelon, and the civil occurrences of his reign. It is not the number of prisoners he made nor the buildings he erected that excite curiosity, so much as the general prosperity of the country under his administration, and the lasting popularity of his character. Of the former some valuable testimony remains transmitted by the arts, which the literature of his age, much less proportionally advanced, does not afford. There are golden coins yet existing of Gelon and his immediate successor, though no commonwealth of Greece, not Athens itself, coined gold, as far as can now be discovered, for more than a century after. Nor are the coins of Gelon more remarkable on this account than for the beauty of the design and workmanship; which are of a perfection at any rate surprising, and which would appear almost miraculous, did we not learn from an author living so near the time and so possessing means of information as Herodotus, that the western Greek colonies had constant communication and intimate connection with those of Asia. With regard then to the government of Gelon, comparing what remains from Herodotus with the anecdotes reported by later writers, we can but gather some general idea. Power, it appears, was committed principally to the higher ranks of citizens, yet Gelon was always the favourite of the lower; and in this he appears to have been singular among the Grecian political leaders, that he could reconcile the jarring pretensions of the two, and maintain concord between them. Probably the forms of a mixed republic were observed, as under the Pisistratidæ at Athens, and an impartial administration of just laws assured property and civil liberty to all. We are told that, after the defeat

Diodor.
l. 11. c. 26.
Æl. Var.
Hist.
l. 13. c. 37.

of the Carthaginians, and the return of the Grecian forces to their several homes, the people were summoned to a general assembly at Syracuse, with a requisition that they should come completely armed as for a military expedition. Gelon attended in the habit of a private citizen, unarmed and without guards. The assembly being formed, he mounted the speaker's stand, and, after giving a detailed account of his administration in peace and in war, concluded with observing to the people that he was now in their hands: if he had done well, they would reward him with their good words and good wishes; if he had done ill, his doom was in their power. He was answered with loud acclamation; styled benefactor, deliverer, and king, and required to continue the exercise of the supreme authority; and a decree was passed directing that a statue should be erected at the public expense, representing him, in memory of this transaction, habited as a private citizen. Nor was this mere flattery to the living prince: above a hundred and thirty years after, when, in circumstances most likely to excite democratical fury, a decree was proposed for the demolition or removal of all statues of tyrants, the surviving fame of the just and beneficent administration of Gelon had such weight with the popular mind that an exception was made in favour of his statue, which was accordingly preserved in its place.

Demetr. de
Eloc. s. 312.
Plut. v.
Timol.

The history of Carthage, where literature never flourished, is still more defectively transmitted than that of Syracuse; so that it does not appear to what should be attributed the total in exertion of its government in Sicily for near a century after the battle of Himera. The testimony of Aristotle to the lasting internal quiet of that wisely-constituted common-

wealth seems to warrant belief that no domestic trouble impeded; and this tends to corroborate the presumptive evidence, arising from other circumstances, that Carthage had yet no great resources. She was providing them by the successful extension of her commerce, and of her settlements on the western shores of the Mediterranean; and accordingly, between sixty and seventy years after, Carthage is found accounted by Thucydides, not formidable as a warlike state, but the richest commonwealth known. Her factories in Sicily therefore, where less profit was to be acquired with far greater difficulty and hazard, were neglected; and thus Motya became an Agrigentine garrison. Panormus and Solois appear to have remained to the Carthaginians, who, as we learn from Thucydides, continued to hold establishments in the island; but among the various wars of the Sicilian Greeks, between themselves and with the barbarians, in whose number Thucydides reckons the Elymians of Egesta, for more than seventy years no mention occurs of any interference of the Carthaginian government.³

SECT.
I.

Thucyd.
1.6. c. 34.

Diodor.
1.9. c. 90.

Thucyd.
1.6. c. 46.

c. 11.

³ Scarcely any equally important transactions in Grecian history remain so unsatisfactorily related as those of the Himeræan war. Herodotus says the Carthaginian army was of three hundred thousand men. This, the only improbable circumstance (indeed nearly an impossible one) in his concise narrative, and expressly given, not as what he would vouch for, but only as a Sicilian report, is the only one in which he has been followed by Diodorus and some later writers, who have added largely to the tale from stores now unknown. They say the fleet consisted of two thousand galleys; nearly double the number reported of the fleet of Xerxes, which has passed with some for incredible. (Diod. l. 11. c. 20.) The Carthaginians never, in the most flourishing times of their empire, sent out an army of half three hundred thousand men, and still less a fleet of two thousand galleys. They say then that Gelon led from Syracuse

SECTION II.

Of Italy: Tuscany: Rome: Latium: Sybaris: Crotona: Pythagoras: Thurium: Pæstum: Cuma: Campania: Lucania.

CHAP.
X.

AMONG the early inhabitants of Italy, the people named by the Romans Etruscans and Tuscans, and by the Greeks Tyrrhenes or Tyrsenes, became eminent,

fifty thousand foot and more than five thousand horse; neglecting the account of Ephorus, a much earlier writer than Diodorus, (which has been preserved to us by the scholiast on Pindar,) who says Gelon's army was of ten thousand foot and two thousand horse. Neither has the confident assertion of Diodorus, that the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily was made in consequence of a treaty between the Carthaginian commonwealth and the Persian court, merited the credit that it has found. Herodotus evidently had never heard of such a treaty: indeed his account virtually contradicts its existence. Not that it was impossible but, through the medium of Tyre, there may have been communication between the Carthaginian commonwealth and the Persian court. It was however widely alien from the temper of that court at that time to make treaties with little, distant, and almost unheard-of republics upon the terms mentioned by Diodorus. Herodotus sufficiently expresses it as Gelon's opinion, that the only terms upon which alliance could be made with Persia were submission, not only to the humiliating ceremony of delivering earth and water, but also to the payment of tribute. (Herodot. l. 7. c. 163.) That the Carthaginians were not, in that age, powerful enough to attract the notice of Persia upon a footing at all approaching to equality, the annoyance which the disunited little piratical Grecian republics in Sicily were always capable of giving them, and the success of the distant colony of Massilia against their fleet, amply indicate. (Herodot. l. 1. c. 166. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 13.) Justin, in reporting a treaty between Carthage and the Persian court, which however he attributes to the reign of Darius (Justin. l. 19. c. 1.), describes terms that could only be imposed on a subject people, and would never be acceded to by a state capable of raising at the same time an army of three hundred thousand men, and a fleet of two thousand ships of war. But

not only by their military prowess, and the extent of dominion which they acquired, but by their policy, their knowledge of letters, and their proficiency in arts. Concerning their origin, which the existing monuments of early art among them principally make an object of reasonable curiosity, Strabo agrees with Herodotus in tracing it from Lydia.⁴ Dionysius of

SECT.
II.

Herodot.
l. 1. c. 94.
Strabo,
l. 5. p. 219.
Dion. Hal.
Ant. Rom.
l. 1.

what Herodotus relates of the leading steps to the Carthaginian expedition into Sicily is perfectly consistent with everything that we learn on best authority of the circumstances of the times, and fully sufficient to account for the undertaking, without any assistance from fancied treaties with the court of Susa, by which the merchants of Carthage were to share the conquest and spoil of Europe with the monarch of the Persian empire. Finally, the silence of Thucydides concerning the immensity of the Carthaginian armament, and the splendour of the victory of Gelon, where, in treating of the principal military actions of the Greeks, he speaks of the power of the Sicilian tyrants of that age (Thucyd. l. 1. c. 14.), sufficiently proves that, if any such reports were in his time current, he thought them unworthy of notice. The account which Diodorus proceeds to give of the terrors at Carthage, lest Gelon, with his victorious army, should immediately cross the sea and lay siege to that city; of the tears of the Carthaginian ambassadors, and the generosity of the Syracusan prince, who scorned to conquer Africa, while he was really unable to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily; all these, with some other circumstances in the course of his narrative of this war, are too puerile for serious criticism. The naval victory is not noticed by either Herodotus or Diodorus, but remains reported in a quotation from the historian Ephorus by the scholiast on Pindar, and is mentioned by Pindar himself in his first Pythian ode, which is addressed to Hieron. Some notice of it also occurs in Pausanias, l. 6. c. 19. p. 499. The value of these authorities has been very ably discussed by West in a note to his translation of the ode above mentioned.

⁴ The ancient vases, which of late years have so much excited the attention of the lovers of antiquity and the arts, have contributed in some instances to give a celebrity to the Etruscan name which is not its due. The proof however of the proficiency of the Etruscans in the arts does not rest only upon the

CHAP.
X.Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 109.T. Liv.
Hist.
Rom. l. 1.
c. 1. & 5.Fab. Max. &
C. Sempron.
ap. Dion.
Hal.
c. 1. p. 9.
Strabo, l. 5.
p. 220. 222.
& 232.
& 233.
Virg. Æn.
l. 6. v. 96. &

Halicarnassus dissents ; yet a concurrence of ancient testimony makes it appear probable that the Tuscans migrated from the shores of the Ægean sea, where the Tyrrhene name appears to have been once extensive, and so late as the age of Thucydides was retained by a people on the Thracian coast. These were of acknowledged Pelasgian origin ; and, notwithstanding the declared opinion of Dionysius, the evidence collected by him tends strongly to show that the Tuscans, like the Greeks, were at least in part of Pelasgian race.⁵ The question however is not important to Grecian history ; and it may suffice that, according to every report collected on the subject by Dionysius and Strabo, and everything remaining from the Roman writers, traditions of some authenticity were preserved of migrations from the countries around the Ægean sea, at different times of the early ages, into Italy, and of settlements in Tuscany and on its northern and southern borders. The Ligurians were supposed a colony from Greece ; Pisa and Cære in Tuscany, Formiæ, Antium, Aricia, Ardea, Tibur and Præneste in Latium, and Rome itself, were held to be Grecian towns.

A colony however of later date, and concerning which testimony is more ample and more precise,

merit and the authenticity of the vases attributed to them. The sepulchral monuments of the ancient city of Tarquinii give more unquestionable and more complete information upon the subject. It is to be regretted that these are not yet better known by the publication, long promised, of the accurate delineations and description of the late James Byres.

⁵ According to Thucydides the ancient inhabitants of Athens, and according to Sophocles those of Argos, were Tyrrhene Pelasgians, Thucyd. l. 4. c. 109. Sophocl. ap. Dion. Hal. Antiq. Rom. l. 1. p. 17. This indeed is testimony only to a name ; but from such early authors it is remarkable testimony.

may have carried science and the arts into Tuscany, in a state of at least as much advancement as they seem ever to have attained there. It was led by Demaratus from Corinth, upon occasion of the revolution in that city, through which the democratical party, under Cypselus, became masters of the government; when the oligarchal chiefs, and particularly the family of the Bacchiadæ, of which Demaratus is said to have been, would find it desirable, or perhaps necessary, to seek settlements elsewhere. Demaratus found in Tarquinii, the principal city of Tuscany, a safe and honourable retreat for himself, his friends, and dependants; he married a lady of high rank there, and died in the peaceable possession of wealth, then esteemed extraordinary. A son of that marriage, inheriting the wealth, became, with the name of Tarquinius Priscus, king of Rome by election of the Roman people. The concurrence of testimonies, Greek and Roman, to these facts, though of so early an age, seems to go far toward proving one of two things; either that the Tuscans, and it may be added, the Romans, esteemed the Corinthians a kindred people, or that they found them a people superior to themselves in arts and general knowledge.

For the history of Etruria materials are very scanty. It appears however that its people, like the Greeks, but unlike the other Italians, applied themselves much to maritime affairs. Like the Greeks also they were at the same time a piratical and a commercial people. While they remained united under one government their power by land and sea was formidable; they extended their arms with success into Lombardy; they conquered Campania; and the shores of Sardinia and Corsica became appendages of their dominion. Afterward, separating into

1. 8. v. 54.
313.
Cecil. ap.
Strabon.
p. 230. &
Liv. Hist.
Rom. ut
sup.
Strabo,
1. 5. p. 22.
Dion. Hal.
1. 3. p. 136.
T. Liv.
Hist. Rom.
1. 1. c. 34.
Ch. 4. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Herodot.
1. 1. c. 196.
Strabo,
1. 5. p. 219.
& 232. &
1. 6. p. 267.

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several commonwealths, power sunk, arts declined, and, while the growing strength and growing ambition of Rome gave constant alarm on the land side, the Etrurian maritime force went into neglect and decay. Thus, except in one instance, which will require notice hereafter, they were prevented from interfering very materially with the interests of the Grecian colonies in Italy.

Polyb.
l. 3. p. 177.

Strabo,
l. 5. p. 232.

In the decline of the power of Tuscany the Carthaginians succeeded to a more entire command of the western parts of the Mediterranean: the shores of Sardinia and Corsica passed from the Tuscan to the Carthaginian dominion; and but for the newly risen power of Rome there would have been Carthaginian garrisons on the Latin coast. Assurance of this remains in that remarkable treaty between Carthage and Rome, in the time of the first consuls, twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, the original of which, engraved on a brazen tablet, remained to the time of Polybius among the archives in the Capitol. What gave cause to the treaty, with assistance from a passage of Strabo, its own words explain. The maritime towns of Latium carried on some commerce, but were more addicted to piracy. Even after their subjection to Rome, associating themselves with the corsairs of Tuscany, they pushed maritime depredation sometimes as far as the African coast; but they were principally annoying to the commerce with the new Carthaginian settlements in Sardinia and Corsica. At the same time Rome itself, powerful enough to hinder those strong measures of coercion by land, which the Carthaginian government had apparently attempted, was also rich enough to be an object for the Carthaginian merchants. Hence the equality

established for the subjects of the two republics by some articles of the treaty, while the general tenor of it is accommodated entirely to secure and promote the peculiar interest of Carthage; and nothing in it affords the least ground for supposing, with some modern writers, in opposition to all the Roman historians, that Rome had then any naval establishment.

While therefore the Sicilian Greeks, by their success against the Carthaginians, earned a glory which we want means justly to estimate, their fellow-countrymen in Italy, unassailed by any formidable foreign power, had no opportunity to acquire any similar fame. Their republics have nevertheless become objects of curiosity to posterity by the residence of the philosopher Pythagoras, and some of his principal disciples, among them, and by the wonderfully beneficial effects, political and moral, attributed to the propagation of his doctrine there. Unfortunately however, Pythagoras living while writing was little practised in Greece, both the doctrine and its effects, notwithstanding very assiduous researches of many learned men, remain very deficiently and uncertainly known; and the reports of the extraordinary populousness of some of the Italian Greek cities, and of the military force which, for want of a foreign foe worthy of it, they exerted against one another, though supported in some degree by authority so far respectable that they excite wonder, will not be found, upon examination, to deserve belief.

We learn however, on sufficient authority, that about the age of Solon and the Pisistratidæ, some of the Italian Greek cities were considerable. SYBARIS had twenty-five towns within its territory, and held four neighbouring tribes of barbarians in subjection.

Strabo,
l. 6. p. 263.
Athen.
l. 12. c. 6.

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The luxury of its citizens became proverbial. The application of the term luxury to anything that could exist among the little republics of that age has been ridiculed by some eminent modern writers ; yet, if we sufficiently consider the circumstances of those republics, we shall find perhaps reason to think the charge of luxury against them may have been founded, though the accounts of their military force are evidently fabulous. The luxury indeed of a narrow society, where manual labour is the business of slaves only, will differ from that of a great nation where all ranks are free ; and it will be likely to differ particularly in this, that, while general elegance in the style of living of persons in easy circumstances will be very inferior, particular indulgences will be carried to greater extravagance. We are told by Diodorus that, in consequence of the victory of the Sicilian Greeks over the Carthaginians near Himera, the number of slaves acquired by the Agrigentines was so great that many individuals shared each five hundred ; and it is to be presumed, from his account, that no citizen would be without a share. Allowing here largely for exaggeration, a probable fact may yet remain, so involving with it a sudden, general, great, and most pernicious change of manners that, among the modern nations of Europe, nothing can be imagined within the bounds of possibility parallel to it. Would we indeed see examples of the character of luxury among the ancient republics, we must seek them perhaps rather in our colonies than in our capitals. Though then the luxury of Sybaris remains chiefly recorded by writers who lived not till some centuries after Sybaris ceased to exist ; for Herodotus mentions only one Sybarite remarkably luxurious, yet we may not unreasonably believe that luxury was

Diodor.
l. 11. c. 25.

Herodot.
l. 6. c. 127.

extravagant there. It may have been even elegant, through the intercourse, which we learn was intimate, with the Asiatic Grecian cities ; and in regard to some points we are assured of its elegance ; for some of the Sybarite coins, yet existing, are of a beauty that modern art will with difficulty rival. Indeed the Lydian court might communicate, among the Greeks of its neighbourhood, many refinements little known in Proper Greece, which yet from Miletus might pass to the wealthy towns of Italy.

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Herodot.
l. 6. c. 21.

The government of Sybaris however was not better established than that of many other Grecian states. In the usual contest of the aristocratical and democratical factions the lower people, under the conduct of a demagogue named Telys, expelled the richer citizens, to the number of five hundred, and shared their property. The exiles found refuge in the neighbouring city of CROTONA. The Sybarite people under Telys, confident in their strength, (for the population of Sybaris far exceeded that of any other Italian city,) demanded the fugitives, and, on refusal, made war upon Crotona. Herodotus, in his account of this war, speaks with little confidence of any particulars, though, within little more than half a century after, he resided upon the spot. The current reports were evidently known to him, and his history appears to have been finished in Italy ; yet he mentions neither the philosopher Pythagoras, whom some later writers have made the counsellor of the Crotoniats upon the occasion, nor his disciple, the celebrated athlete Milo, who is asserted, on the same authority, to have been their general and hero. The event, which alone we learn with certainty, was, that the Sybarites were defeated, their city taken and destroyed, their commonwealth annihilated, and the very name lost.

Diodor.
l. 12. c. 9.

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Such is the account that can be now collected of Sybaris; and it involves almost the whole political history of the rival and conquering city Crotona. But the fame of Crotona does not rest on its political eminence only. We have already had occasion to observe, that, in many points of art and science, the Grecian colonies went before the mother-country. The medical school of Crotona, probably derived from Pythagoras, who is universally said to have applied himself, and to have directed his scholars, much to the study of nature, was of reputation, before the first Persian war, superior to any then in the world; insomuch that its fame reached the court of Susa, where the Crotoniat Democedes became the most esteemed physician, and acquired high favour with Darius. It is indeed remarkable that not any school within Greece, but that of the distant colony of Cyrene in Africa, held even the second rank in medical reputation. But Crotona acquired extraordinary renown also in another line: its air was esteemed singularly salubrious; whence the natives were supposed to derive a peculiar firmness of muscle, with a general superiority of strength and agility; and no city boasted so many victors in the athletic contests at the Olympian games. Of the political system established in Crotona by Pythagoras, or the scholars of Pythagoras, we have little or nothing on any good authority. The later Greeks alone mention it; while the earlier agree in ascribing all that was most valuable in legislation among the Italian and Sicilian cities to Zaleucus and Charondas. That the arts however flourished, the Crotoniat medals, yet remaining, testify; and the reputation of the physical school, in the want of authentic information more precise, would suffice to mark Crotona for a populous, wealthy, and well-

Herodot.
l. 3. c. 131.

regulated city, where security and leisure were enjoyed for the pursuit of science, and means for its encouragement.⁶

⁶ The accounts given by Diodorus, and other ancient writers, of the wonderful populousness of Crotona, and still much more of Sybaris, in themselves utterly improbable, are not only unauthorised, but virtually contradicted by the earlier Greek authors. They have therefore been rejected from the text; yet, as they have not only been followed by modern writers on the subject, but are countenanced by the respectable authority of Strabo among the ancients, it may be proper to take some farther notice of them in a note. The Sybarites, according to Diodorus, marched against Crotona, forming an army of three hundred thousand citizens. The Crotoniats met them with only one hundred thousand; but their general Milo, habited and armed in the wild manner ascribed by the poets to Hercules, was himself equal to half an army; and the astonishing slaughter, which he made with his club, was a principal cause of the victory, in consequence of which Sybaris was destroyed. Strabo also reports that the Sybarite army was of three hundred thousand men: but he has not, like Diodorus, called them citizens; so that, admitting his account, the greater part might be slaves. Before this event, according to Justin, l. 20. c. 3. et 4., (though he makes no mention of the event itself,) but after it, as it should seem from Strabo, l. 6. p. 261., a hundred and thirty thousand Crotoniats were defeated by the Locrians and Rhegians. This then will deserve notice: Strabo informs us that Herodotus the historian accompanied the Athenian colony which raised Thurium on the ruins of Sybaris, about sixty years, according to Diodorus, after its overthrow; and the authority of Strabo here is supported by a passage in the history itself of Herodotus which has manifestly been written in Italy, and for the Italian Greeks. The traditions preserved among the descendants of the Sybarites concerning their city, as well as those of their conquerors, have evidently enough been known to him. But if only a report remained of such a superiority of population in the Italian cities over those of Greece, it must have been striking. It never was nor can be imputed to Herodotus that he was backward to relate reports; and yet, though he mentions the destruction of Sybaris, with some disputed circumstances concerning it, he has not a syllable of the extraordinary numbers of the Sybarite and Cro-

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The other Italian Greek cities, of which Cuma, Rhegium, Locri-Epizephyrri, Tarentum, Brundisium were populous and rich, are scarcely objects for

toniat armies. Herodotus and Thucydides are very seldom found in contradiction; and the silence of the latter upon this occasion strongly confirms the negative testimony of the former; for Thucydides, professedly enumerating all the Grecian states which had been eminent for military power, and mentioning the naval strength of the Sicilian tyrants, far inferior to what Athens afterward possessed (Thucyd. l. 1. c. 14.), could not through ignorance, and would not through design, have omitted all notice of those immense armies of the Italian Greeks, to which no other Grecian state ever had anything comparable, had such armies existed. It is farther observable that Aristotle mentions Sybaris only to quote an instance of sedition. The name I believe never occurs in Plato's works, and the name of Crotona is mentioned by neither of them: an omission utterly unaccountable but upon the supposition that the effects attributed by later writers to the doctrine of Pythagoras were, for some ages after the time to which they are ascribed, unheard of. We may indeed wonder where later writers, and particularly Cicero (Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. 1. c. 16. and l. 4. c. 1.), had their information. Herodotus, who mentions Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus (l. 4. c. 90.), as an eminent sophist in Samos, has not taken the least notice of his residence in Italy. Plato, in the same passage in which he speaks of Charondas as the admired legislator of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, mentions Pythagoras in contradistinction to the great reformers of republics, as a private teacher, singularly beloved and respected indeed by his disciples, but the mere founder of a sect. (Plat. de Rep. l. 10. p. 599, 600. t. 2.) It is there only in Plato's works that his name occurs. Aristotle (Ethic. l. 1. c. 1.) mentions him as the first who attempted to teach moral philosophy among the Greeks, and refers to his physical and metaphysical doctrines, but nowhere gives the least hint that he was even a speculative politician. Isocrates (Busir. Encom. p. 402. t. 2.) also affirms that he was the first who brought philosophy into Greece, and that he introduced new magnificence in religious ceremonies; but of his politics he says nothing. The earliest testimony, in any extant author, to the Pythagoreans of Italy, is that of Polybius (l. 2. p. 126.): of Pythagoras himself that author makes no mention. In short, what remains

history, but as they become occasionally connected in transactions with states of greater political importance. To avoid interruption therefore in the account of the affairs of the leading republics of Greece, it may be convenient here to look forward to some of those transactions of the Italian states which principally deserve attention.

Among the consequences of the conquest of Sybaris by the Crotoniats, one is recorded, which particularly merits notice; because, though now of extraordinary appearance, yet, in the early ages, it was so far from uncommon, that it forms one among the characteristic marks of difference between the political state of the ancient and of the modern world. The Sybarite territory, chiefly a plain, watered by the little rivers Sybaris and Crathis, of no great extent, but uncommon fertility, scarcely forty miles from the

Diodor.
l. 12. c. 10.
Strabo,
l. 6. p. 263.

from earlier writers concerning this celebrated philosopher is next to nothing; later accounts are contradictory, and abound with gross and palpable fictions. ‘*Ne’ libri che si leggono,*’ as the learned Florentine doctor Antonio Cocchi, in his treatise concerning the Pythagorean diet, observes, ‘*ci si vede far figura, or di operator di miracoli per la sua bontà, ed ora di mago ridicolo e d’impostore.*’ That the Samian Pythagoras was eminent among the earliest fathers of Grecian philosophy is clearly established; but that he was a legislator the silence of all the earlier writers, and especially of Aristotle, seems to confute.

The passage of Herodotus which proves that a part of his history was written in Italy, and for the Italian Greeks, is in his fourth book; where, after describing some circumstances of the Tauric Chersonese, he illustrates them, for the inhabitants of Proper Greece, by a comparison with some circumstances of Attica; but as this might be no illustration for many of those among whom he then lived, he proceeds thus: ‘*Ὅς δὲ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ταῦτα μὴ παραπέπλωκε, ἐγὼ δὲ ἄλλως δηλώσω ὥς εἰ τῆς Ἰηπυγίης ἄλλο ἔθνος, καὶ μὴ Ἰήπυγες, ἀρξάμενοι ἐκ Βρεντεσίου λιμένος, ἀποταμοῖατο μέχρι Τάραντος, καὶ νεμοῖατο τὴν ἄκρην.*’ l. 4. c. 99.

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conquering city Crotona, and adjoining, or nearly so, to its domain, after the destruction of the city lay fifty-eight years unoccupied. The Crotoniats were unable to protect their own people in the cultivation of it, and their jealousy, perhaps a reasonable jealousy, deterred others. At length some Thessalians ventured to attempt a settlement there; but they were quickly expelled by the Crotoniats. Not thus however totally discouraged, associating such remnant of the Sybarite people as they could collect, they applied first to Lacedæmon and then to Athens for support. It was little in the general disposition of the Lacedæmonian government to engage in such enterprises; and, its circumstances at the time being adverse, as occasion will occur to observe more particularly in the sequel, nothing was obtained there. The circumstances of Athens, on the contrary, made such an application welcome. Under authority of the Athenian government, a proclamation was published over Greece to engage volunteers for the colony. To give efficacy to this, an encouraging response was procured from the oracle of Delphi; and ten ships of war, under the command of Lampon and Xenocritus, were furnished for the expedition. The adventurers became numerous, and some were of eminence; particularly Herodotus the historian, Protagoras the philosopher, scholar of Democritus, and Lysias, son of Cephalus, the friend of Socrates, himself afterwards the celebrated rhetorician, many of whose orations remain extant. Measures were wisely taken; and the colony was established, as far as appears, without opposition. The chosen spot was at a small distance from the ancient site of Sybaris, where the fountain Thuria afforded the advantage of a plentiful supply of water. The town was built on

Strabo,
l. 14. p. 656.
Diog. Laert.
v. Protag.
Lys. or. con.
Eratosth.

a regular plan, with three streets crossing four others at right angles ; and the ancient name being rejected, as of ill omen, the colonists assumed the appellation of Thurians, and the town was called Thuria or Thurium.⁷ A constitution was framed for the new state, according to Diogenes Laertius, by Protagoras. Probably he took the system of Charondas for his model, and thence may have arisen the mistake of Diodorus, who attributes to Charondas the honour of having founded the Thurian constitution.

When the advantageous circumstances under which this colony was established are considered, the uncommon abilities and uncommon power of the patron of the undertaking, (the great minister of Athens, Pericles,) the superiority of the men engaged in it, and the celebrity of the laws under which it long flourished, and we then look forward to what remains of its history, it is at the same time curious and shocking to find how little personal security was enjoyed under the best political constitutions of that age; how much less than under those governments of modern Europe which we, under a better constitution, are accustomed most to reprobate and despise; and then, while we exult in the singular blessings which we ourselves enjoy, we may be less disposed to blame others, who, in political circumstances far less fortunate, choose yet rather to rest under the lot de-

⁷ Λέγεται δὲ Θουρία καὶ Θούριον. Schol. in Aristoph. Nub. v. 331. Diodorus has transmitted the ichnography of Thurium and the names of the streets. The four parallel streets were called Heraclea, Aphrodisias, Olympias, Dionysius; or Hercules-street, Venus-street, Olympia-street, and Bacchus-street. Instead of favourite deities an analogous superstition, in the same country, in modern times, would have named them from some favourite saints. The other streets were called Heroa, Thuria, and Thurina.

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Arist. Polit.
1. 5. c. 3.
Strabo,
1. 6. p. 263.

rived from their ancestors than risk the horrors of civil war, to obtain, with final success, perhaps only a revival of those miseries with which most of the ancient republics abounded, and from which the happiest were never secure.⁸ All the wise regulations of Protagoras could not prevent the growth of sedition in Thurium. Disputes arose early between the foreign colonists and the Sybarites who were associated with them; and those disputes ended only with the massacre of a part, and the final dispersion of the rest, of that remnant of unfortunate people.

A remnant of the Sybarite people nevertheless survived, and it may be ventured even to add that they flourished; though ancient history has left scarcely three words about them. We are uninformed whether it was in the exuberance of the population of Sybaris that the colony was sent out, or in the calamity of the city that a portion of its people fled, to that extensive bay on the western coast of Italy, now called the gulf of Salerno; where the Greek city of POSIDONIA, otherwise named PÆSTUM, acknowledged Sybaris for its mother-country. To this day the magnificent remains of the public buildings of that place, amid the desolation surrounding them, interest as they astonish the curious traveller, whether ancient political history, or the history of the arts, or art itself be his object; while the obscurity and almost nullity of tradition concerning them afford endless room for conjecture.

It were difficult to say what advantage the world may or may not derive from those speculations on the ancient state of mankind, those visionary inquiries

⁸ This sentiment was deduced simply from Grecian history; having been long written, and some time published, before France began to exhibit horrors beyond all recorded example.

into ancient history, in prosecution of which so much ingenuity hath of late been employed, to overthrow every traditional testimony transmitted by the earliest writers. But when, on one side, we see it asserted that what have been four thousand years the finest climates of our globe were in its first ages uninhabitable through excess of heat, and that all science had its birth in the now frozen regions of Tartary, then alone, by their height above the ocean, affording that temperature of air in which men could live; when, on the other, we find not less force of erudition or of reason engaged in the attempt to show that the progress of things has been the reverse; and that the first civilised nations lived on a portion of the globe now covered to the depth of many hundred fathom by the Atlantic ocean; it seems probable that, these militating systems destroying one another, the fashion of all will pass; and that learned men, however wishing for better information about the early state of mankind than the oldest authors furnish, may nevertheless come to acknowledge that better is not likely to be obtained. In the spirit of inventive history it has been a supposition of late cherished by some among the curious and learned, that the noble piles whose ruins remain at Pæstum, as well as the various existing monuments of the arts of ancient Etruria, have been the produce of science and improvement not derived from Greece or the East, but the native growth of Italy; or however that, whether Italy received the arts from the lofty plains of Tartary, or from the submerged Atlantic continent, she had them before Greece, and at least assisted the eastern nations in communicating them to that country. I would avoid long discussion of matters which are rather of the province of the antiquarian; and indeed

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upon the subject in question it seems enough for the historian that neither Cicero, with all his partiality for Italy, and all his diligence, and all his means of inquiry, nor Horace, with all his desire to gratify his Etruscan patron, nor Virgil, nor Livy, nor Pliny appears to have had the least suspicion that their fellow-countrymen had any claim to the priority in science and art which it has been proposed by some learned moderns to attribute to them. Without therefore adding anything to what has been already said about Tuscany, I shall proceed to state some circumstances, not alien from the purpose of Grecian history, which may afford ground for estimating the state of civilisation and improvement among the inhabitants of the middle and southern parts of Italy, previous to the migration of the first Grecian colonies thither.

Occasion has heretofore occurred to mention that CUMA, situated a few miles north-west of the present city of Naples, was esteemed the oldest Grecian colony westward of the Ionian sea. The distance of Cuma from its mother-country Eubœa, and the extent of barbarian shores that, in the coasting navigation of the age, must be passed to reach it from any part of Greece, here deserve consideration. Of the course that was usually, or, it may be said, constantly held, if storms did not force the navigator out of his way, we are perfectly informed. The shores of Greece were measured, in fair weather, from headland to headland; but if the sky threatened, it was along the windings of the coast, as far as the island of Corcyra. The navigator then became particularly anxious for a serene sky and quiet water to cross the Ionian gulf. Having made the Iapygian promontory, if fair weather continued, he would avoid the circuit of

Ch. 5. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Thucyd.
1. 6. c. 34.
et al.
Xen. Hel.
1. 6. c. 2.
s. 17, 18.

the gulf of Tarentum, and stretch away for the Lacinian promontory, whence the coast would conduct him to the Messenian strait. The ancients seem to have little known the art of profiting from any wind that did not blow nearly in their course. The wind therefore, which had favoured the navigator from Eubœa to the southern capes of Peloponnesus, would oppose his progress toward the Epirot coast. In proceeding then to Messina, he would want another change; and to hold his way thence, between two and three hundred miles northward to Cuma, a third; or, in defect of these, weather so calm as not to impede his oars. The course from the nearest part of Greece to Cuma would be, even with favouring weather, about six hundred miles, and from Eubœa near a thousand.

With this length of navigation, and these difficulties insuperable from it, difficulties with which the Mediterranean coasting seamen are to this day well acquainted, the settlers at Cuma, it is evident, must rest their safety upon their own strength, compared with that of those who were likely to oppose them, and not upon any assistance to be expected from Greece. Those adventurers then, so risking themselves out of all reach of support from home, chose for their settlement no barren and worthless corner, likely to be neglected in a country which had any civilised inhabitants, but a critical post, on the verge of the CAMPANIAN plain, emphatically named the Happy Campania, the richest, and, from earliest ages, the most coveted part of Italy. The local circumstances deserve notice; and the whole Cumæan territory is so trodden by travellers, for the sake of the antiquities, the natural curiosities, and the picturesque beauties with which it abounds, that in speaking of it I shall speak of what is more familiar

Polyb.
l. 3. p. 336.
Strabo,
l. 5. p. 243.

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to many English readers than most parts of their own country ; and its features are so characteristical that to those who never saw it a good map may give sufficient assistance.

At the foot of the mountains which occupy so large a portion of the interior of Italy, the Campanian plain stretches about fifty miles in length, from the Massic hills to those which divide the bay of Naples from that of Salerno, and sometimes twenty in width, from the Apennine to the sea. The inclination of the ground suffices, in most parts, to give course to the streams which cross this plain, and yet scarcely any visible inequality interrupts the apparent level of the surface, except where a series of volcanoes has given form to the coast, from the bay of Cuma to the bay of Stabia. Of the hills however in this tract, except Vesuvius, none are too high for cultivation ; and the subterranean fires, which produced them, had long been quiet before the Greeks became acquainted with them ; even Vesuvius having been unknown to any ancient writer as a burning mountain till the eruption happened which destroyed Herculaneum and Pompeii.⁹

When Megasthenes, with his band of Eubœan adventurers, arrived on the Campanian coast, the bay of Baiæ, one of the best roadsteads that the Italian shores afford, presented harbours so commodious for the vessels of the age that they might have fixed the choice of those whose object was either commerce or piracy. But Megasthenes looked to greater things.

⁹ The Cumæan territory was however known to be volcanic ground as early as Pindar's time, as we learn from his first Pythian ode. Perhaps Mount Epomeus, in the neighbouring island of Ischia, might then emit flame. For this Strabo may be seen, l. 5. p. 248.

The Oscans, who then held the Campanian plain, are said to have won it by arms from the Ausonians; yet the evident weakness of those barbarian conquerors excited a hope that so rich a possession might be ravished from them. This view seems to have directed the founder in choosing the site of his town: and for the three purposes of security to a garrison, of commanding an extent of coast abounding with harbours, and of carrying on enterprise against the possessors of the plain, a spot could not perhaps have been more judiciously selected than the rocky summit, toward the western end of the volcanic hills, and at some distance from the shore, where the ruins of the castle of Cuma still remain. Immediately below is a small plain, guarded on the land side by the castle and by the hills themselves; and so protected toward the sea, by marshes, lakes, and broken ground, that a small force might defend it against a large one. This plain, in the infancy of the colony perhaps nearly sufficing to supply it with bread, became, in its increase, as relics everywhere still to be discovered testify, in large proportion covered by the city and its appendages. For his port Megasthenes chose, not the harbour of Misenum, whose superior advantages, considered by themselves, decided the Romans afterward to make it their principal naval arsenal, but a spot preferable for his purpose, on account of its readier communication with Cuma, where the town of Dicæarchia was built, better known afterward by the Roman name Puteoli.

The early success of the Eubœan adventurers answered the prudence with which their measures appear to have been concerted; for, though at what time and through what struggles we are uninformed, they conquered the Campanian plain. But they were

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X.

not allowed the quiet enjoyment of so valuable an acquisition; the Tuscans, then in the height of their power, whether solicited by the oppressed Oscans, or incited merely by ambition and avarice, carried their arms thither, and the force of Cuma was unequal to the contest. The Tuscans made themselves complete masters of the plain; they founded the city of Capua, which became its capital; and from them, according to Strabo, descended the people afterward known by the name of Campanians.

The Cumæans, after this reverse, which extinguished their hope to become a considerable power by land, nevertheless prospered as a maritime colony. They extended their maritime settlements, and, in spite of the force of Campania, vindicated to themselves the possession of the hills on the coast, at the eastern extremity of which they built the town of Naples. It was not till after they had flourished some centuries that faction, the common bane of Grecian cities, at length superinduced their ruin. The Campanians, with whom they seem to have had almost perpetual warfare, thus first got footing in Naples; and afterward reduced Cuma itself.¹⁰

Strabo, l. 5.
p. 243. &
246.

Such then having been the weakness and barbarism of the Italian tribes, the Tuscans alone excepted, that, according to every testimony of Greek and Roman writers, wherever almost a Grecian pirate chose to form a settlement on the coast he found no force among the natives capable of preventing his purpose, it seems needless to seek for other proof that such people were not the founders of those edifices at Posidonia, which have existed now between two

¹⁰ According to Diodorus, in the fourth year of the eighty-ninth Olympiad, the twelfth of the Peloponnesian war, and 420 before the Christian era. Diod. l. 12. c. 76.

and three thousand years, and survived, nine centuries, the total destruction of the city. It appears from Strabo that, when the Sybarite adventurers arrived there, they found a town either unfortified, or fortified so slightly that the barbarous inhabitants abandoned it almost without resistance, and betook themselves to the neighbouring mountains. The local circumstances were not such as the Greeks generally coveted for a settlement, yet such as they sometimes accepted. The place was strong, not by a lofty rock offering itself for a fortress, but by a marsh on which it bordered, and by a stream with which a surrounding ditch might be floated. These, with the neighbourhood of the sea, and the extent and fertility of the adjacent plain, were the advantages of the situation. The inconveniences at the same time were great. The neighbouring marsh infected the air, and the water of the stream is brackish and unwholesome. But security and sustenance were the great objects of the Sybarites. Having fortified the town, they thence commanded a large portion of the plain; and how they flourished, their works, now remaining amid wide desolation melancholy monuments of past human grandeur, largely testify.

But though, in the early ages, a small body of Sybarites, not the most renowned in arms among the Greeks, was superior to any force the barbarian Italians could oppose to them; though a few fugitive Phocæans from Asia Minor could establish themselves, and flourish in their settlement of Velia on the LUCANIAN coast, which became one of the earliest seats of philosophy; yet in process of years, arts and knowledge introducing themselves among the Italians, their population and their political strength increased; and those who had been unable to oppose the infancy

SECT.
II.

Strabo,
l. 6. p. 251.

Ch. 1. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Strabo,
l. 5. c. 251.

Ch. 6. s. 1.
of this Hist.

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X.

Strabo,
l. 6. p. 254.

of the Grecian towns could overpower their maturity. Thus not only the Campanians, who came originally fraught with all the arts of Etruria, reduced Cuma and its dependencies, but the once savage Lucanians conquered Posidonia and Velia.¹¹ Afterward, under Roman protection, Posidonia prospered again with the name of Pæstum, survived the Roman empire in the west, and about the beginning of the tenth century, in one unhappy hour, received its total ruin from the destructive hands of the Saracens.¹²

¹¹ Virgil, expressly bringing civilisation to Italy from Asia Minor,

(Æneas —

Bellum ingens geret Italiâ, populosque feroces
Contundet, moresque viris et mœnia ponet.

Æn. l. 1. v. 263.)

attributes barbarian cruelty and ignorance particularly to the tribes in the neighbourhood of Velia. Æn. l. 6. v. 359. 366.

¹² The style of the ruins of Pæstum, nearly resembling that of most of the temples remaining in Sicily, and of one of which small relics only are left at Pompeii, differs from what is found common in Greece and among the Grecian settlements in Asia, by greater massiveness, and a characteristical simplicity. Hence some have been disposed to infer that the Pæstan, Sicilian, and Pompeian buildings have all been anterior to the age to which they are commonly attributed, and that they are Italian and not Grecian architecture. But, without referring to the total want of testimony to the existence of an Italian people capable of teaching architecture to the Greeks, the following considerations may account for the difference between the style of the Attic and that of the Sicilian and Pæstan buildings. Sybaris was destroyed about eighteen years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the buildings of Agrigentum, where the noblest ruins of Sicily remain, were raised, according to Diodorus, immediately after that event, when Athens was also to be restored, after its complete destruction by the Persians. It is likely that the Agrigentines and Sybarites would build in the style of their forefathers: but we are well informed that the Athenians did otherwise. Themistocles, who superintended the rebuilding of Athens, splendid in his disposition, rather to excess, acquainted

with the elegancies of Asia Minor, and possessing power to command the science, art, and taste of that country, would not restore when he could improve. Cimon, who succeeded him in the administration, was also remarkable for his magnificence; and he too had seen whatever the Asiatic coast possessed of great and beautiful. But the ornamental buildings of both these great men were comparatively little to what were afterward raised under the superintendence of Pericles and the direction of Phidias. The fame of the buildings of Athens then spreading over Greece, a new style of architecture was introduced gradually everywhere. The Ionic order had been imported into Attica from Asia; the Corinthian was soon after invented by an Athenian architect; and the Doric itself began to change its ancient simple and massive grandeur, for more embellishment, lightness, and grace.

Mistakes about things often arise from mistakes about names. The order of architecture called Doric has been supposed, even by Vitruvius, originally peculiar to the Dorian Greeks; but apparently, indeed almost evidently, without foundation. For till after the age of Xerxes only one order of architecture, as we are well assured, was known in Greece; and that is not likely to have had a name; because names arise only from the necessity of distinguishing in speech two or more things of the same kind. But when the Ionic order was imported from Ionia in Asia by the Athenians, who were themselves original Ionians, the term Ionic would naturally grow into use as a distinguishing name for the new order; and then, and not before, a name was wanted for the old one. Ionic and Doric being the two great distinctions of the Greek nation, and the old style of architecture holding its vogue among the Dorian cities, for some time after the new one had been adopted by the Athenians, the Doric name thus would as naturally adhere to the one as the Ionic to the other.

CHAPTER XI.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THAT COMMONLY CALLED THE PERSIAN WAR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY FOR THE GREEKS AGAINST THE BARBARIANS BY THE SUCCESSES OF CIMON.

SECTION I.

State of the known world at the time of the retreat of Xerxes from Greece. Dedications, festivals, and monuments in Greece occasioned by the victories over the Persians. Restoration of Athens: jealousy of the Peloponnesians: administration of Themistocles: parties at Athens: banishment of Themistocles.

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RETURNING to the period whence we digressed, and looking over the world as far as history may carry the view, this appears to have been nearly the state of things: toward the east, the Persian empire, crippled for external exertion by immense waste of men and treasure, nevertheless continued to hold its power over almost all that was known of the Asiatic continent; for Scythia, though its formidable hordes had military fame, as a country, may be said to have been almost unknown. In the west, the rising power of Carthage had been checked by the great defeat received from the Greeks in Sicily; Tuscany, divided into several republics, was in a kind of natural decay; the growing strength of Rome, engaged in continual struggles with little states in its immediate neighbourhood, was hardly heard of beyond them; the southern Italians, excepting the Campanians, lived

unpolished among their mountains; the Greek cities on the Italian coast unconnected, and thus in the concerns of nations, inconsiderable, were nevertheless prosperous and wealthy seats of science and arts; the Sicilian Greeks, united under the abilities of Gelon, were the most powerful and flourishing people of the Grecian name. Civilisation had hitherto moved in a line eastward and westward, in the climate most favourable for the first exertions of man in society; and was confined there to the countries in the most favourable circumstances. It could not penetrate the mountainous and frozen continent immediately north of Greece. Under a more genial sky, Spain, though a great object for Carthaginian commerce, affords nothing for history; and of the extensive country of Gaul little was known beyond the small portion of its coast washed by the Mediterranean, the most inviting spots of which were occupied by the Massilian Greeks. Germany was one vast forest, impenetrable to civilised man; and Britain, esteemed almost beyond the limits of the world, was heard of only through uncertain reports of traders¹, Carthaginian

¹ The earliest mention of the British islands, that has fallen in my way, is that of Aristotle, in his treatise entitled, ‘On the World.’* Great Britain, with the name of Albion, and Ireland, with that of Ierne, (the same evidently with the modern Celtic name Erin,) were known to him to be islands, larger than any in the Mediterranean, with many smaller islands, near their shores; and all together were called the *BRETANIC ISLANDS*. Aristot. de Mundo, c. 3. In the age of Augustus, according to the circumstantial and probable account of Diodorus, the trade between the shores of the Mediterranean and those of Britain was carried across Gaul, by using the ready advantage of the rivers Rhone and Seine. Phenician or Carthaginian

[* The treatise *περὶ κόσμου* is suspected not to be Aristotle’s, and the very passage to which Mr. Mitford here refers has been considered a proof that it is the work of some other author. Indeed Mr. Mitford himself, quoting from it in vol. i. p. 93., speaks less positively, and says that it is ‘ascribed to Aristotle.’]

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or Phenician, unless the Massilian Greeks might have already interfered in the distant and hazardous, yet perhaps often lucrative, commercial adventure hither.

Such was the state of the known world when the Persian monarch withdrew from those great scenes of action where his immense armies and fleets had been destroyed, leaving to his officers, instead of the splendid views of conquest with which the war had been undertaken, the melancholy care to defend

barks may possibly have explored the length of hazardous coast from the strait of Gibraltar to that of Dover, and so may have reached Britain; but I know of no ancient authority for the notion of some modern writers, not, I think, duly considering the imperfection of ancient navigation, that the commerce of tin, the principal object of trade with Britain, was so carried on. The situation of Massilia afforded advantage to the Greeks of that eminent commercial republic, which, according to all indications, they used, for becoming masters of the trade with Gaul, and through them probably came that knowledge, not of Britain only, but also of the sea northward, which Aristotle possessed.

Ireland seems not then to have been known by any description but that of one of the Bretanic islands. Even Diodorus mentions it without a distinguishing name, but Strabo describes it by that of the 'Bretanic Ierne.' The three writers agree in calling all the islands, great and small collectively, 'the Bretanic Islands.' Diod. l. 3. c. 38. Strabo, l. 2. pp. 63. & 129.

When the crowns of England and Scotland were united, James the First wisely promoted the abolition of habitual antipathies, and assisted the foundation laid for uniting the people, by affording them one common name, through the elegant title he assumed of King of Great Britain. When the union was lately formed with Ireland, it may seem that the same just policy, and a similar sense of elegance, led to the Latin title which his Majesty's ministers recommended. Why the English title should so differ, has never been declared, and is not obvious. Its unwieldy frame seems calculated for nothing but to exclude the Irish from community in a name to which they have so old and clear a title, and to prevent the advantage of such a community, which is important for people living under one government.

the maritime provinces of his vast empire. Among the Greeks on the other hand the late events, dispelling those terrors of subjection to a foreign yoke which had been long impending, gave them, in the security of peace, to enjoy at leisure their exultation in the wonderful and glorious deliverance, which, under Divine Providence, their own valour and skill in arms, and the wholesome institutions, prevailing under pressure of necessity against the vices of their governments, had procured for them.

The usual piety of the Grecian people, exerting itself upon this great occasion, was not limited to the dedications made or decreed as already related, immediately after the division of the Persian spoil. Eighty talents of silver, allotted to Plataea, were employed by that heroic little commonwealth in building a temple to Minerva, and adorning it with paintings by the most eminent artists of the time, which were preserved with so much care that they remained perfect above six hundred years, according to Plutarch's testimony, to his time. A funeral solemnity was at the same time instituted, to be annually performed by the Plataeans; in which the first fruits of their country were offered to the gods, preservers of Greece, and to the souls of the heroes who had died in its defence; and this also remained in Plutarch's time. A festival repeated every fifth year in commemoration of the victory, probably not instituted till after the age of Thucydides, who mentions only the annual ceremony, was of similar duration.

After thanks to the gods, the merits of the men who had fallen in their country's service were taken into consideration. Means had not hitherto been open for paying due honours to the heroism of those who, in the preceding year, had fallen in the extra-

Ol. 75. 2.
B. C. 478.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 58.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 228.
Lycurg. or.
con. Leocr.
p. 215.
or. Gr. ed.
Reiske.
Strabo,
1. 9. p. 429.
Diod. Sic.
1. 11. c. 33.
Antholog.

ordinary action under Leonidas. The care of their obsequies, and of erecting monuments to perpetuate their well-earned fame, was now committed to the Amphictyonic Assembly. Two structures of marble marked the place of the engagement, with inscriptions which remained many ages ; and which, having been recorded by Herodotus, will probably be secured by the press against perishing while the world shall last. One was in honour of the Peloponnesians collectively, without mentioning the other Greeks who, under Leonidas, defended the pass ; the other commemorated only the Lacedæmonians who fell with that prince. The simplicity of these inscriptions characterises the manners of the age ; and the partiality to Peloponnesus and Lacedæmon marks the prevalence of Peloponnesian influence in the assembly. They were, as was then usual, in verse. The former may be literally translated thus : ‘ Here four thousand men from Peloponnesus fought with three millions :’ the other, ‘ Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that here we lie in obedience to their laws.’²

² Strabo says the monument, with the inscription, was in his time still in its place. The inscription remains reported by Herodotus, the Athenian orator Lycurgus, Strabo himself, Diodorus, and others, with some little variations, which show that some of them at least have trusted to memory. Cicero says it was composed by Simonides, and he has given a Latin translation of it thus :

*Dic, hospes, Spartæ nos te hîc vidisse jacentes,
Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur.*

M. T. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. 1. c. 42.

The original is thus variously reported :

ᾧ ξείν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι. Herodot.

ᾧ ξείν', ἀγγείλον Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων πειθόμενοι νομίμοις.

Lycurg. & Diod.

ᾧ ξέν' ἀπάγγειλον, κ. τ. λ. Strab.

More pressing cares meanwhile engaged the Athenians, the restoration of their country laid waste, and of their city reduced to ruins and ashes: yet now, according to Diodorus, they also instituted their public funeral anniversary; to which the superior genius of their orators, who pronounced the praises of the deceased, together with the political eminence which their commonwealth acquired, gave afterward a celebrity unequalled in other parts of Greece. Public funerals in honour of those who had merited highly of the commonwealth, as we learn from higher authority, were of earlier date; yet the ceremony may have been now first established in that form which became the rule for following times. Now also probably were raised the columns or terms, which remained many ages, on the barrows covering the bodies of those who fell in the field of Marathon; for it is little likely that monuments erected for such a purpose would have escaped the destructive hands of the Persians, and of those Greeks who sided with the Persians, while they possessed the country. Pausanias, visiting the spot above six hundred years after, found them, with the inscribed names of the slain, still perfect. One barrow covered the Athenians, another the Plataeans, together with the slaves; and, to make some amends to the memory of Miltiades for the ingratitude with which he had been treated when living, though he had not fallen in the field, a particular monument to his honour was erected there.³

SECT.
I.

Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 33.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 34.

Pausan.
l. 1. c. 32.

³ The inscription on the Athenian barrow remains reported by the orator Lycurgus thus:

Ἑλλήνων προμαχοῦντες Ἀθηναῖοι Μαραθῶνι
Χρυσοφόρον Μῆδων ἐστόρεσαν δύναμιν.

‘The Athenians, fighting at Marathon as the advanced guard of the Greek nation, overthrew the force of the gold-bearing Medes.’

CHAP.
XI.Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 89.Herodot.
l. 8. c. 125.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 27.
Plut. v.
Themist.Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 93.

The Athenians, in retaking possession of the site of their city, found only a small part of the walls standing, with a few houses which had been reserved for the residence of the principal Persian officers. During the past summer Themistocles appears to have been in no public situation. Some jealousy excited by the high distinction shown him at Sparta, and too boastful a display of his own glory, had given disgust, and the chief commands had been committed to Aristides and Xanthippus. In the following autumn however, when the reparation of the ravages of war came under deliberation, Themistocles again stepped forward, again found means to acquire the favour, and through that favour to become the ruler of the Athenian people. In restoring the city, which was the most urgent business, the late events would impress strongly upon their minds the necessity of providing, in the most effectual manner possible, for its future security. What others were anxious for, each with a view to his domestic ease, Themistocles urged to promote the political greatness of his country, to which he looked for the foundation of his own greatness. At his instigation therefore it was determined to postpone every thing to the completion of the fortifications; and these were put under his direction. A larger space was marked out than had been included within the former walls, and the work was prosecuted with the most zealous diligence.

While the Athenians were thus employed in repairing the past mischiefs of war, and providing against the future, the Lacedæmonians, who had suffered nothing but the loss of a very inconsiderable proportion of their citizens, had full leisure to contemplate the state of things around them, and the probable consequences of the late events. They had long been

SECT.
I.

accustomed, not only to esteem themselves, but to be esteemed by all Greece, as the superior state, entitled by a kind of prescriptive right to take the lead in all common concerns of the nation. This right had been disputed hitherto only by the Argives, who still claimed hereditary pre-eminence, transmitted, as they urged, from the Danaidean, Persidean, and Pelopidean monarchs, through the elder branch of the Heraclidean family. But Argos, continually torn by internal faction, and weakened by almost every external war in which it had been engaged, wanted force to support its claim ; while Sparta had the advantage, in public opinion, of boasting the regular descent of its reigning princes from Hercules, Pelops, and Perseus, with the more solid advantage of possessing superior military strength ; and this farther supported by the confidence of the Peloponnesian states in the wisdom and steadiness, which, through the superiority of its constitution, seldom failed to appear in its counsels. But the late transactions had brought forward a people hitherto of very inferior political weight among the Grecian states, of very inferior military power, and of the Ionian race, far inferior, in general estimation, to the Dorian. This rising state had been nearly crushed under the overwhelming pressure of the Persian arms ; but what had threatened its annihilation directed its strength to a new mode of exertion, through which it had acquired a new kind of power, to an amount that Lacedæmon could not hope immediately to rival. A jealousy thus unavoidably arose, and every motion of the Athenians was watched with suspicious attention ; a jealousy, according to the candid Thucydides, greater among some of the allies of Lacedæmon than among the Lacedæmonians themselves.

Isocrat. ad
Philip.
p. 340. t. 1.
ed. Auger.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 90.

Ol. 75. $\frac{3}{4}$.
 B. C. 477.*
 Diodor.
 l. 11. c. 39.
 Plut. &
 Corn. Nep.
 v. Themist.
 Justin.
 l. 2. c. 15.

No sooner therefore were the new fortifications of Athens begun than the Æginetans, whose ancient enmity had been smothered, not extinguished, by the terrors of the Persian invasion, sent ministers to excite the interference of Sparta. A remonstrance came in consequence to Athens. ‘Experience,’ it was urged, ‘had proved, that Athens, however fortified, could not withstand the force of the Persian empire. The erection therefore of fortifications, beyond Peloponnesus, was but forming a stronghold for the enemy; and the common interest of Greece required rather that all fortified places, so situate, should be dismantled. Peloponnesus would suffice as a temporary retreat for all who should be obliged to quit their possessions in the more exposed part of the country.’ Such, we are told by Thucydides, was the avowed policy, not of the Lacedæmonians only, but of all their Peloponnesian allies. If these arguments should immediately be enforced by arms, Athens was not in condition to resist: to temporise was necessary; and the conduct of Themistocles, upon this occasion, has been celebrated as a masterpiece of policy, where nothing was omitted by which a genius equally fertile, pliable, and daring could prosecute its purpose. To the Lacedæmonian ministers, who brought the remonstrance, it was answered that ‘Their government must certainly have been misinformed, both of what was doing and what was intended by the Athenian people. Athens was not, like Lacedæmon, an inland town: near as it lay to the coast, if totally

Thucyd.
 l. 1. c. 90.

⁴ This date and the next are conjectural. Dodwell is evidently wrong in supposing the walls completed, as well as all the negotiations about them, within the year. [* B. C. 478. ‘The Athenians rebuild their walls, and complete the walls of the Piræus.’ Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 254.]

‘unfortified, it would be liable to insult from every daring pirate. But, for their own sakes, not less than for the common interest of Greece, (for which of all Grecian people surely the Athenians least merited the suspicion of deficient zeal,) they would be careful not to form strong-holds for the common enemy. Ambassadors should however be immediately sent to Lacedæmon, who should account satisfactorily for the proceedings of the Athenian government.’ With this reply the Lacedæmonians were dismissed, according to the usual practice of the Greeks, the jealous temper of whose little commonwealths did not readily admit any long residence of foreigners in a public character.

Themistocles himself undertook the embassy to Sparta; and, to give it all possible weight and dignity, as among the ancients an embassy commonly consisted of more than one person, Aristides was appointed to accompany him, together with Abronychus, otherwise known only as the officer commanding the vessel stationed at Thermopylæ to communicate between the army under Leonidas and the fleet at Artemisium.⁵ Themistocles hastened his journey; but he provided that his colleagues, or at least one of them, should be detained till the walls of the city were of such a height as to give some security to a garrison. In the prosecution of the work the zeal of the people seconded the policy of their leader: freemen did not scruple to toil among slaves; the very women and children would assist for whatever their strength and skill were equal to; reliefs were established, so that in no hour of the day or night was the business intermitted; and, to save the time which the preparation of materials would have con-

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 91.

Ch. 8. s. 4.
of this Hist.

⁵ The name of his father, Lysicles, mentioned both by Herodotus and Thucydides, identifies him.

CHAP.
XI.

sumed, whatever could serve the purpose was taken, wherever it could be found, from the remains of buildings public and private, and even from the tombs. The patchwork thus occasioned, Thucydides observes, was evident in his time, in the external appearance of the walls of Athens.

Themistocles meanwhile arriving at Sparta was in no haste to open the business of his embassy. When at length urged by the Spartan ministry, he excused himself by saying, ‘He waited for his colleagues, who ‘had been detained by some business for which their ‘presence was indispensable; but he expected them ‘hourly, and indeed wondered they were not yet ‘arrived.’ The Lacedæmonians, it appears, even at home, notwithstanding the severity of their institutions, were not universally inaccessible to bribery; and of the expertness of Themistocles in the use of that engine of policy instances are recorded. Plutarch mentions it as reported by the historian Theopompus that he found means to corrupt even some of the Ephors. Certain it is that, through his management, time was gained for the Athenians to execute a very great work. The progress made however could not remain entirely unknown at Lacedæmon, and Themistocles was reproached with it. In reply, he denied that the Lacedæmonians had any just information upon the subject, and urged that it ill became them to found their proceedings upon unauthenticated reports. ‘Let men of sufficient rank,’ he said, ‘and ‘unimpeachable character be sent to Athens, whom ‘the Athenians may respect, and in whom yourselves ‘may place entire confidence. I will remain a hostage ‘in your hands, to insure the proper conduct of ‘the Athenian people.’ This requisition, boldly put, appearing in itself not unreasonable, was complied

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 131.

Plut. v.
Themist.

Thucyd.
ut sup.
Demosth.
in Leptin.
p. 478. t. 1.
ed. Reiske.

with. Three persons of the first consequence in Lacedæmon were sent to Athens; where, in pursuance of directions from Themistocles, they were received and treated with the utmost respect, but secretly watched; and effectual measures were taken to prevent their departure, should any violence or restraint be put upon the Athenian ambassadors.

SECT.
I.

Thucyd.
I. I. c. 91.

Not till the walls of Athens were advanced to that height which was, according to the expression of Thucydides, most indispensably necessary to give due advantage to a garrison, Aristides and Abronychus joined Themistocles at Sparta. The senate being then assembled, gave audience to the embassy; and Themistocles, laying aside that dissimulation which was no longer necessary, declared that, ‘By the last intelligence received, he had the satisfaction to learn that Athens was now sufficiently fortified for its security. The Lacedæmonians,’ he added, ‘and their allies, whenever they communicated with the Athenians by embassies, ought to consider them as a people capable of judging both what their own interest and what the common cause required. With regard to the object of their present meeting, all Greece surely ought to rejoice in the restoration of a city whose people, by their counsels, their actions, and their sufferings, had demonstrated that they consulted the interest of the whole nation not less than their own: nor would the Lacedæmonians themselves blame what had been done, unless they would prove to the world that, not the welfare of Greece, but the extension of their own command, was the object of their solicitude.’ Whatever the Lacedæmonians might feel upon this occasion, the steady wisdom, usual in their administration, showed itself in the suppression of all appearance of resent-

c. 92.

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ment. No reproaches of any kind were vented ; but, on the contrary, a civil apology was made for the interference of the Lacedæmonian government in a matter concerning which the Athenian people, it was acknowledged, were to decide for themselves ; though admonition (which was all that had been intended) to an ally, and concerning a point in which it was supposed the common interest and that of the Athenian people were one, could not be improper. The ambassadors of each state then returned home : and thus, by a train of conduct hazardous to comment upon, for its policy admirable, for its morality doubtful, yet commendable at least for its patriotism, Themistocles delivered his country from imminent danger of falling under the yoke of Lacedæmon, immediately after, and almost as a consequence of, its glorious exertions and heroic sufferings in the common cause against Persia.

This important and difficult negotiation thus successfully concluded, the views of Themistocles were yet but opening. Amid all her sufferings from the Persian war, Athens, through the superior abilities of her leaders, had been gradually rising to a rank far above what she had formerly held among the Grecian states. It had been the ancient policy, we are told, of the Athenian government, to discourage maritime commerce and a turn to naval affairs among the people ; relying upon agriculture as the source of wealth, and the land force as the means of being secure and respectable. Themistocles had already successfully combated this policy, with the highest, most undeniable, and most flattering advantage to the commonwealth ; for Athens not only owed the preservation even of its existence to its navy, but for the last two years had existed almost only in its navy ;

and this navy was become, not only superior in strength to that of any other Grecian state, but superior, by the glory of its actions, to any the world had yet known. It was now the purpose of Themistocles, after having given security to the Athenian people, to lead them to empire; and with this view he extended his favourite policy to a very extraordinary length. The circumstances of the times had indeed already gone far in preparing the business; for they had made almost all the Athenian people seamen: his object was to keep them so always.

The first thing wanting was a sufficient port. The Attic shore, in the part nearest to the city, had three nearly adjoining inlets, named, from three adjacent villages, Phalerum, Munychia, and Piræus. Phalerum, nearest of the three to the city, had been hitherto the principal harbour and arsenal; and it had sufficed for all the purposes of the state, when, without assistance from Corinth, Athens could not meet at sea the inhabitants of the Æginetan rock. But it was insufficient for the actual navy, and still more unequal to the great views of Themistocles. Munychia, much the smallest, was also otherwise comparatively incommodious. Piræus, most distant, but far most capacious, might, with some labour, be so improved as to form, for vessels of the ancient construction, drawing little water, the completest harbour of Greece. It was naturally divided into an inner port and an outer; the former capable of being made a perfect basin, fortified so as effectually to prevent the entrance of an enemy's fleet. Within this basin is a smaller basin, now, according to the report of travellers, choked with sand, but in the age of Themistocles in a different state; whence Thucydides describes Piræus as having three natural

SECT.
I.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 93.

Diodor.
l. 11. c. 41.

Descr.
Géogr. du
Golfe de
Venise, &c.
par Bellin.

Wheeler's &
Chandler's
Travels in
Greece.

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harbours. Adjoining to the outer port, on the south-west, is an excellent roadstead, protected by the islands Psyttalea and Salamis, which would be inestimable for a modern navy, and was not without its value to the ancients.

B. C. 481.
Thucyd.
l. i. c. 93.
Dodw. Ann.
Thuc. ad
ann. Diodor.
l. ii. c. 41.

The natural advantages thus offered did not escape the penetrating eye of Themistocles. When in the office of archon, in the year, it is supposed, before the expedition of Xerxes, having already meditated to make Athens a naval power, works had been under his direction begun for improving the port of Piræus, and constructing a naval arsenal there. He would now pursue the plan, but he still feared interruption from the jealousy of Lacedæmon. This he would have precluded by secrecy in preparation; but a democratical government little admits secrecy: it was absolutely necessary to have the sanction of the assembled people. To obtain this therefore, without betraying his project, he declared that he had measures to propose of the utmost importance to the prosperity and greatness of the commonwealth; but a public communication of them would defeat the purpose. He therefore wished that two men might be chosen, who should be thought best to deserve public confidence, to whom he might propose his plan; and who, if they judged it for the public good, might be authorised to direct the execution. Aristides and Xanthippus were accordingly named; popular jealousy itself favouring so advantageous a choice; for those two great men were generally political opponents of Themistocles. They nevertheless declared their approbation of his proposal. But fresh jealousy seized the people; they suspected that apparent coalition of the leaders of opposite parties, and nothing less would satisfy them than the commu-

Ol. 76. 4.
B. C. 476.
[See note 4.
sup.]
Diodor.
ut sup.

nication of the project to the council of Five Hundred, who should be bound to secrecy. The council however also approved, and then the business was committed to Themistocles.

Preparations were made with the utmost despatch, while the purpose remained a secret. Whatever the keenest politician could devise was practised; first to lull the Spartan government, and then to gain its approbation of the measure; tending, it was asserted, to nothing more than the forming of a port fit for the combined navy of Greece, and not at all to interfere with the views of the Lacedæmonians, who never affected maritime power. Fortifications meanwhile, much more complete than those of the city, arose around a space sufficient for a town almost equal to the city; the walls, of a thickness to admit two carriages abreast, were formed of large blocks of marble, squared and exactly fitted, without cement, but the outer stones firmly connected by cramps of iron fixed with lead. Only half the intended height was ever accomplished; the purpose of Themistocles having been to make the place defensible with the smallest possible garrison, old men and boys, so that every citizen capable of more active service might be spared, and the whole force of the commonwealth exerted at sea; yet, such as Piræus under his care became, it was the completest naval arsenal that the world had yet seen.⁶

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 93.
Plat.
Gorgias,
p. 455. t. 2.

⁶ Plutarch delighted in telling a good story, and, for what is here related, he has substituted one so brilliant that among modern writers of Grecian history (the diligent compilers of the ancient Universal History, as far as my observation has gone, are alone to be excepted) it has quite eclipsed the simple and probable narrative of Diodorus. The Athenian assembly, says Plutarch (vit. Themist.), directed Themistocles to communicate his proposal to Aristides alone. Aristides declared that nothing

Meanwhile the disappointment, rather a disgracing disappointment, which had attended the attempt to

could be either more advantageous or more wicked; upon which the people commanded that it should be no more thought of. Whether Aristides was the rogue, or Themistocles the fool, afterward to divulge the secret, Plutarch, with a thoughtlessness ordinary with him, omits to inform us: but he asserts, with perfect confidence, that the proposal of Themistocles was to burn the allied Grecian fleet assembled in the bay of Pagasæ; and with a farther thoughtlessness, which has justly excited the indignation of the good Rollin, he appears to give his approbation to such an infernal project as a great idea. But the evident impolicy of the measure, without taking anything else into consideration, might reasonably lead us to doubt the truth of the tale. Had it been executed, the Athenians indeed alone would have had a fleet; but where would they have found an ally? What would have been their prospect of command, and what even the security of their country, a continental territory, against the united resentment of Greece?

Thucydides mentions neither Plutarch's tale, nor what is related by Diodorus. But it was not his purpose to give a connected history of this period; and though Diodorus might perhaps stretch a point to favour his fellow-countrymen the Sicilian Greeks, or to tell a story of a hero with a club and a lion's skin, yet it was not his disposition, without authority, to relate a simple fact, merely illustrative of the inconvenience of democracy and of the temper of the Athenian people. We find however in Tully's *Offices*, l. 3. c. 11., the very story which Plutarch has told, but with the material difference, that the proposal of Themistocles was to burn, not the fleet of the whole Grecian confederacy in the bay of Pagasæ, where, after the battle of Salamis, we may venture to affirm that fleet never was, but only the Lacedæmonian fleet in the port of Gythium. This indeed appears not at all an improbable project for Themistocles to have conceived, when the forcible interference of Lacedæmon for preventing the fortifying of Athens and Piræus was apprehended; but we still want information how, consistently with the other circumstances of the story, it could be publicly known. Farther then it is to be observed that in Tully's moral works many doubtful and even contradicted reports are stated, not as authenticated, or even believed by the writer, but merely as ground for animadversion.

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prevent the fortifying of Athens, had not damped the ambition or changed the policy of the Lacedæmonian government. Ever attentive to strengthen and extend their ascendancy over the other Grecian commonwealths, and now more than ever jealous of Athens, yet cautious of farther interference in its internal concerns, they directed their intrigues to another quarter. In the council of Amphictyons, at their instigation, it was proposed that every Grecian state, which had taken part with the Persians in the late war, should be deemed to have forfeited all its Amphictyonic rights. This was particularly aimed against the Argives and Thebans; in the well-grounded hope that two of the most powerful states, and most inimical to Lacedæmon, being excluded, Lacedæmonian influence would thenceforward govern the assembly. But the vigilance and activity of Themistocles here again thwarted them. Inciting the sluggish and encouraging the cautious, he procured a decision, 'That it would be utterly unjust to 'deprive any Grecian state of its ancient privileges, 'on account of the crimes of those who, at any particular time, had directed its councils.'

Plut. v.
Themist.

Thus successful in his political administration, Themistocles took the command of the fleet, and going round the Ægean collected the subsidies apportioned to the island and Asiatic states toward carrying on the war against Persia. In the course of this business he was attentive to strengthen and extend the influence of Athens; but he is accused of having been on this occasion, and not on this alone, too attentive to his own interest. The factions, between which almost every little Grecian commonwealth was divided, would furnish abundant opportunity for both public service and private lucre. In one place nearly

Plut. v.
Themist.Plutarch.
ut sup.
Herod. l. 8.
c. 111, 112.

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Themist.

balanced, and each party, beyond all things, afraid of the other, they would contend for the favour and support of the Athenian government : in another, some wealthy citizens, banished, would be ready to pay largely for the interest of the Athenian admiral to procure their restoration. Loud complaints of partiality were circulated against Themistocles ; and Plutarch has transmitted some fragments of poems composed on the occasion by Timocreon, a principal man of Ialysus in Rhodes, valuable as genuine relics of political invective, of an age prior to the oldest remaining Greek historian. Timocreon had been banished for treason to the common cause of Greece, or, as the Greeks termed it, for Medizing : and he had gone far ; for it appears by his own free confession that he had bound himself by oath to the Persian cause. He hoped nevertheless, through his interest with Themistocles, with whom he was connected by hospitality, to procure his restoration. Being disappointed, he exerted his poetical talents in revenge. ‘ Let others,’ his poem says, ‘ extol Pausanias, or Xanthippus, or Leontychidas : my praise shall be for Aristides, the best man of sacred Athens. For Latona detests Themistocles, the false, the unjust, the traitor ; who for paltry pelf deserted the interest of Timocreon, his friend and host, and refused to restore him to his native Ialysus. Money guided the destructive course of the fleet ; while the corrupt commander, restoring unjustly, persecuting unjustly, some into banishment, some to death, as the larger bribe persuaded, filled his coffers. Most ridiculously then at the isthmus he courted favour with his entertainments : those who feasted on his dainties wished his ruin.’ From the concluding sentence it appears that a splendid hospi-

talities was among the means by which Themistocles endeavoured to extend his influence in Greece.

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Though we should not perhaps give entire credit to the angry Rhodian, yet imputations against Themistocles are too numerous, and too general among ancient writers, to permit the supposition that he supported a rigid integrity. Openings were thus found for giving efficacy to intrigue, which was always busy against every great public character in Athens. The superiority which Themistocles was not contented to possess, but would ostentatiously display, excited heartburnings among the old Athenian families. In political opposition to him Aristides had been scrupulously just, Xanthippus moderate, but Alcmaeon, head of the long powerful house of his name, became violent. He was warmly supported by all the influence of the Lacedæmonian government. Aristides and Xanthippus, though not disposed to entire concurrence with him, were among his friends: the latter was his near kinsman. To gain the zealous co-operation of Cimon son of Miltiades seemed the one thing wanting to acquire to the party a decisive superiority. Cimon, yet a young man, was however of young men by far the first in Athens; great by his father's greatness; powerful by his large possessions and the inherited influence of his family; of eminent abilities; of rough yet condescending and popular manners; with a supercilious neglect of elegant accomplishments, the reverse of the general Athenian temper, but marking him as a man to be connected with the Lacedæmonians. The house of Alcmaeon had indeed been the principal agents in procuring the condemnation of Miltiades. To overcome the repugnance which a generous young mind would feel at the proposal of a coalition with that

Plut. v.
Themist.

Plut. v.
Cim.

house, much diligence was used to stimulate the ambition of Cimon. To connexion with the Lacedæmonians he did not object, but by a union with the powerful house of Alcmaeon only he could hope to rise to the first situations in the commonwealth. Flattery, ably and assiduously applied, gained him to their party, while his openness, simplicity, and unbending integrity, not less than his abilities and influence, recommended him to Aristides, who wanted his support against the overbearing ambition of Themistocles.

But another party in Athens, more formidable than all the rest, was growing adverse to Themistocles. The party of the lower people, by whom he had raised himself, and whose power therefore it had been his policy to favour, was become of increased importance, by the events of the Persian war, beyond what even Themistocles desired. The temporary ruin of the country, the destruction of houses and estates, the ceasing of all income, the community of lot among families in the removal beyond sea, and the still nearer equality among men long engaged together in one common military service, from which no rank gave exemption, had tended strongly to level distinctions. Flattery and indulgence to the multitude had often been necessary toward keeping order and persuading to patience under hardship and misfortune. The extraordinary success afterward of their arms elevated and emboldened them. Victory they would then consider not as their leader's, but as their own. Did the commonwealth require their arms by sea or by land, they were ready to serve the commonwealth, because they were the commonwealth : having fought for their existence, they were ready still to fight for glory and power ; but it must

be for themselves, not for others as their superiors. Argument, such as will weigh with the people, and orators to urge it, may always be found in favour of the popular cause ; and so irresistible the torrent of popular ambition became that even Aristides was reduced to temporise, so far as not only to admit, but to promote, a very great change in the constitution of the government. The laws of Solon had gone far to level distinctions of birth : all Athenian citizens were reckoned sufficiently noble to execute the highest offices in the commonwealth, the priesthood only excepted ; though for civil offices a qualification by property was yet required. This restraint was now wholly done away. In the actions of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea the poor had contributed equally with the rich to save and to ennoble their country. All civil and military offices were therefore laid open, not only to those of meanest birth, but to those totally without property ; and the most important of the civil offices being conferred by ballot, though the expensiveness of most of them generally deterred the indigent from seeking them, yet the scrutiny of the Dokimasia, often perhaps a vain form, remained the only legal check.

While this condescension of Aristides to the ambitious requisition of the multitude increased his popularity and strengthened his situation, various clamours of the allies reached Athens against Themistocles. Occasional sallies of that ostentation in the display of his glory, which had before injured him, again gave umbrage. The intrigues of Lacedæmon were at the same time taking effect : reports were circulated of secret correspondence with the Persian satrap ; and it was insinuated that Themistocles carried his views to the tyranny of Athens, if

SECT.
I.

Plut. v.
Aristid.

Arist. Polit.
l. 2. c. 12.

Ch. 5. s. 4.
of this Hist.

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Aristid.

not of all Greece. This probably was calumny ; for Aristides, we are told, refused to join in any severe measure against him. But Alcmaeon, taking the lead of the opposition, engaged Cimon in his purpose. A capital accusation was not yet ventured ; but that less invidious attack of the ostracism, against which the integrity and modesty of Aristides had formerly been insufficient protection, all the policy of Themistocles proved now unable to resist, and he was compelled to leave Athens.

When this took place we are with no certainty informed. The summary account remaining from Thucydides of transactions in Greece from the Persian to the Peloponnesian war, inestimable for the authority with which it ascertains most of the principal facts reported by later writers, does not always distinguish their dates, or even the order in which they happened* ; and, though we have the lives of Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon written with much detail by Plutarch, and in a more abridged manner, with the addition of the life of Pausanias, by Cornelius Nepos, though we have the history of the times by Diodorus, distinguishing, as far as his information and judgment enabled him to distinguish, the events of every year, marking the year by the

[* In his *Fasti Hellenici*, p. 253., Mr. Clinton denies that the Summary of Thucydides is liable to these imputations. ‘In reality,’ he says, ‘that Summary is valuable with a view to the chronology of the times ; and accurate in following the order of time, which is only neglected in two cases : the first is the case of the Messenian war, the termination of which, for the sake of clearness, is subjoined to the account of its commencement ; the other is the Egyptian war, the termination of which is also related in connexion with the preceding events of that war. And the recital of these had been delayed by the historian that he might not break the continuity of his narrative.’]

names of the archons of Athens and the consuls of Rome, and stating both the number of the olympiad and the name of the victor in the stadion, yet the chronology of these times remains very imperfect.⁷ The removal of Themistocles would seemingly be the removal of an obstacle to that concert, which was now renewed between Lacedæmon and Athens, for the prosecution of hostilities against Persia. But the great works executed at Athens under his direction required considerable time. His policy might incline him to yield something to Spartan jealousy, rendered more dangerous by the state of parties at home, and perhaps even to desire the appointment of his rivals, Aristides and Cimon, to a distant command. His own residence at Athens would enable him the better to prosecute those great public works by which he meant to establish his country's power and his own glory; and it may have been desirable either for the prosecution of the projects of which he

⁷ 'Tandem aliquando ad Pausaniæ, Themistoclis, et Cimonis chronologiam constituendam accingimur, quæ omnis est in Diodoro vitiosissima.' Dodw. Ann. Thuc. ad ann. A.C. 470. The faults in the chronology of Diodorus are evident and gross, and the labours of Dodwell to elucidate the order of the transactions of these times are highly valuable. His assistance indeed is so great a relief to me that I can never willingly reject it; but he has certainly trusted too much to Plutarch, Justin, and other late writers, sometimes giving authority to merely constructive evidence from them. Plutarch seldom aims at exactness in the course of events. When he means to be exact indeed, he generally quotes his authorities, and thus gives additional value to his testimony. But taking Thucydides for my polar star, and trusting later writers only as they elucidate what he has left obscure, and, for the rest, comparing circumstances, and considering the probable, or even the possible connexion and course of things, I cannot but sometimes differ from Dodwell. I never quit him however but with regret, and always put myself under his guidance again the moment I can regain the same track.

CHAP. was accused, or to counterwork the calumnies of his
 XI. accusers.

SECTION II.

*War prosecuted against Persia, under Pausanias and Aristides.
 Treason of Pausanias: Athens head of a new confederacy,
 composed of the Greeks of the Ægean Islands, Asia Minor,
 and Thrace.*

CIRCUMSTANCES yet called for exertion against Persia. The efforts of that empire had been severely checked by the late glorious successes of the Greeks; but its disposition to hostility remained, and its resources were immense; its spirit was damped more than its power was reduced; and many Grecian towns, not only in Asia, but even in Europe, remained yet under its dominion. A fleet was therefore assembled, to the command in chief of which Pausanias was appointed: Aristides, attended by Cimon, commanded the Athenian squadron. They sailed first to Cyprus. The Persian garrisons there, cut off from all support through the mastery which the Greeks possessed of the sea, were apparently more solicitous to obtain favourable terms for themselves than to defend the island for their prince. It has already occurred to observe that it was ordinary with the Persian government to intrust command largely to persons selected from

Thucyd.
 I. I. c. 94.
 Diodor.
 I. 11. c. 44.
 Plut. v.
 Arist. et
 Cim.
 Ol. 77. 3.
 B. C. 470.
 Dodw.
 Ann. Thuc.
 [Ol. 75. 4.
 B. C. 477.
 Cl.*]

[* In affixing the date to this event Mr. Mitford has adopted the theory of Dodwell. Mr. Clinton, in his *Fasti Hellenici*, pp. 248—252., controverts Dodwell, and follows Diodorus. His careful and minute discussion of this point forms Chap. VI. of the Appendix, which, though too long for quotation here, will not admit of abridgment. The concluding words however present a summary of the objections which he considers established by his arguments against the hypothesis of Dodwell: ‘There is nothing then in Isocrates to warrant the theory of Dodwell. It is contrary to the probable course of events; contrary to the implied meaning of Thucydides, and to what has been delivered by Plutarch and Aristides; and to the duration assigned to the Athenian empire by Lysias, Isocrates himself, Plato, Demosthenes, Aristides, and, we may perhaps add, Lycurgus.’]

among the conquered people, and it seems probable that so it has been in Cyprus. Most of the Cyprian Greek cities however were rescued from the Persian dominion with so little effort that historians have left no particulars of the transactions. The fleet then proceeded to the Hellespont and the Propontis. The extraordinary advantages of situation which Byzantium possessed had not escaped the observation of the Persian commanders. It was made their principal place of arms for the countries around, and the key of communication with their European dominions. Pausanias laid siege to it, which the garrison maintained some time, but at length capitulated on such terms that several Persians of high rank, among whom are said to have been some connected by blood with the royal family, became prisoners.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 94.
& 128.

The mind of Pausanias was not of strength to bear his fortune. The lustre of his own glory won by the victory of Plataea (the greatest yet known on the records of European fame) had dazzled him. Early after that victory he had displayed a very indiscreet instance of vanity and arrogance. On the golden tripod dedicated at Delphi, in pursuance of a common decree of the confederates, an inscription was to be engraved commemorating the glorious event. The business being committed to Pausanias, he directed what may be literally translated thus: ‘Pausanias, general of the Greeks, having destroyed the Persian army, dedicated this memorial to Apollo.’ This gave great offence at Lacedæmon as well as throughout Greece. Accordingly the words were by order of the Spartan government erased, and a new inscription engraved, attributing the dedication to the cities of the confederacy, without any mention of the general. The splendour of Persian magni-

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 64.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 132.
Corn. Nep.
v. Paus.

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ficence and the sweets of Persian luxury, laid open to his view, allured him ; the austere simplicity of Spartan manners began to appear sordid and miserable, and especially the return from a great command to the insignificance and even subjection of Spartan royalty in peace too degrading. But beyond all things his haughty temper could least support the consideration that, after shining the first character in the known world, the leader of the glorious confederacy which had brought the pride of the Persian empire to crouch beneath it, he must yield the reins of command to the young king, his kinsman, and sink into the situation of a private citizen of Sparta.

But his communication in Asia, and the circumstances attending the conquest of Byzantium, completed the corruption of the mind of Pausanias and decided his views. He observed his kinsman, Demaratus, the banished king of Lacedæmon, lord of the Æolian cities of Pergamum, Teuthrania, and Halisarnia, given by the Persian monarch to himself and his heirs, living in ease and splendour that might leave, in most minds, little regret of the parsimonious and jealously-watched dignity of Spartan royalty ; perhaps indeed more an independent sovereign than a Spartan king living in Sparta. He became acquainted with an Eretrian, named Gongylus, whose treachery to his country, at the time of the invasion under Datis and Artaphernes, had been rewarded by the liberality of the Persian court with the hereditary lordship of four towns, also in Æolia. On the capture of Byzantium he became, through the Persians of rank, his prisoners, more intimately acquainted with Persian manners ; the pomp of command, the wide distinction between the higher and lower people, and all the refinements of the table, the bath, and

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 1.
s. 4.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 128.
Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 1.
s. 4.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 44.
Corn. Nep.
v. Paus.

every circumstance of Asiatic luxury. He formed friendship with Gongylus, already master of the Persian language, and versed in Persian manners. He even committed to that refugee the government of Byzantium, together with the custody of the principal Persian prisoners. These were all permitted, at several times, to escape, and at length Gongylus himself was despatched to the Persian court, carrying proposals from Pausanias for services, but stipulating for very high conditions. It is asserted to have been proposed that all Greece should be reduced under the Persian dominion; that, in reward for this, a daughter of Xerxes should be given in marriage to Pausanias, with every advantage of rank, command, and fortune that might become such lofty alliance. Not only this proposal is said to have been very favourably received, but Artabazus was sent to supersede Megabates in the Phrygian satrapy, purposely to prosecute the negotiation. Pausanias became elated beyond all bounds of moderation and discretion. As if already a Persian satrap, and son-in-law of the great king, his manners, dress, table, and his whole style of living and communication became Persian; inso-much that a guard of his Median and Egyptian prisoners became his constant attendants.

While the extent of the treason was yet hardly suspected high discontent arose in the armament. The Spartans were disgusted by the splendid and luxurious manner of living of their general; the allies were incensed by his tyrannical haughtiness; his affectation of Asiatic pomp was offensive to all, and excited suspicion. Consultations were held among the principal officers, by some of whom Pausanias was publicly insulted; and shortly a general determination was taken to submit to his arrogance

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 95.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 44.

no longer. The Peloponnesian allies sailed to their respective homes; the Asiatics, Hellespontines, and islanders, who had a nearer interest in the prosecution of the war, offered to follow Aristides, if, in taking them under his command, he would assure them of his protection. The Lacedæmonians themselves then, neither able nor desirous to support their chief in his extravagant and odious conduct, sent home charges against him, in consequence of which he was recalled, and Dorcis came commissioned to supersede him.

But the Lacedæmonian command had received a wound not of easy cure. The allies, whose affections the great and amiable characters of Aristides and Cimon had largely conciliated, refused obedience to Dorcis. That commander then with his principal officers, judging that to act in an inferior situation neither became themselves, nor would be satisfactory to the Spartan government, withdrew that portion of the allied armament which remained attached to Lacedæmon, and returned home. The principal men in the Lacedæmonian administration seem to have thought, and perhaps justly, that the present was not a moment either for resenting the conduct of the seceding allies, or for making any farther attempt to resume their lost authority. By a most sudden, unprojected, and unforeseen revolution thus that superiority among the Grecian states, which all the energy of the administration of Themistocles had been unable to procure for his country, was gratuitously given to the mild virtues, accompanying great abilities, in Aristides and Cimon.

The moderation of the Lacedæmonian government upon this occasion, like that of the Athenian when the confederate fleet was first assembled to oppose

the invasion of Xerxes, has been a subject of eulogy among ancient and modern writers. Commendation is certainly due to the wisdom of the leading men of both states; but it may be useful toward obtaining an insight into Grecian politics, having observed the causes of that moderation among the Athenians upon the former, to advert also to what appears to have influenced the conduct of the Lacedæmonians upon the present occasion. The Lacedæmonian administration was evidently weak: probably distracted by party. One of the kings, Leotychides, being of advanced age, and under imputation of taking bribes when commanding an expedition in Thessaly, the other, Plistarchus son of Leonidas, having scarcely reached manhood, neither, implicated as Greece yet was in war with the Persian empire, could stand in any competition, among the allies, with the great and popular characters of Aristides and Cimon. Even at home the small power which the constitution gave them was overborne by the influence and the intrigues of Pausanias. The change of the seat of war moreover was unfavourable to the Lacedæmonian command. Led, or rather forced, by the circumstances of the times to exertions toward the establishment of a marine, little congenial either to the temper of the government or the disposition of the people, Lacedæmon was yet so inferior as to be almost without a hope of equalling the naval power of Athens. If therefore weakness and distraction had not prevented exertion, policy, even an ambitious policy, might have induced the Lacedæmonian administration quietly to let the rival republic waste itself in distant warfare, and in making precarious distant acquisitions, while Sparta, nourishing her force at home, might watch opportunities for extending her power and influence

Herodot.
l. 6. c. 72.
Diod. l. 11.
Pausan.
l. 3. c. 8.
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 132.

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in Greece itself, where her former connexions remained entire, and no subordination to Athens was acknowledged. Thus Lacedæmon wisely yielded to the necessity of the moment, while the weak ambition of Pausanias assisted Aristides and Cimon to make Athens, for the purpose of prosecuting the war beyond sea against Persia, the leading state of Greece.

But probably neither the Lacedæmonian nor even the Athenian administration was immediately aware of all the extent of advantage about to accrue to Athens from this revolution. No great dissatisfaction, we are assured, appeared in Lacedæmon upon the occasion. Themistocles was obnoxious there; but the Athenian people, whatever jealousies existed among some warmer politicians, were not generally so. On the contrary, there was virtue enough among the greater part of the Lacedæmonian people to induce them to admire and esteem the Athenian character for the noble spirit shown during the Persian invasion. They were besides generally desirous to avoid being farther engaged in the prosecution of a war which must now lead them far from home; and they were therefore not displeased to have the Athenian government undertake the direction of those operations, whether for protecting Greece against attacks by sea, or for prosecuting hostilities offensively beyond sea, in which the superiority of its fleet to that of all other Grecian states gave it the fairest claim to command.

The wise moderation of Aristides and Cimon meanwhile, in the direction of the Athenian affairs, tended greatly to prevent occasion of jealousy among the Lacedæmonians and their adherents, and to strengthen the attachment of the other Grecian states to Athens. A system of executive command, and in some degree

Thucyd.
1.1. c. 95.

c. 75.

even of legislation, for the new confederacy was necessary. Corinth, as the place most equally accommodating the confederated states within and without Peloponnesus, had been originally chosen for the meeting of deputies from all; but latterly the superiority generally allowed to Lacedæmon had led to the consideration of Sparta as a common capital, and the place of assembly. Aristides, avoiding to claim any such superiority for Athens, appointed, for the place of meeting, the little island of Delos; venerated all over Greece as sacred ground, the favourite property of Apollo, and of whose people no state could have any political jealousy. The temple itself of the deity was made both senate-house and treasury. Some indication however of a disposition to arrogate a dangerous superiority seems to have appeared in the appointment of treasurers, who with the name of *Hellenotamiæ*, Treasurers of Greece, became a permanent magistracy, at the election, and under the controul, of the Athenian people. But the wisdom and equity of Aristides, who was first placed at the head of that board, satisfied the allies in present, and blinded them to consequences. The sum agreed upon to be annually raised was four hundred and sixty talents, about a hundred and fifteen thousand pounds sterling; and this was assessed upon the different states with such evident impartiality that not a murmur was heard upon the occasion, but, on the contrary, every part of Greece resounded the fame of the just Aristides.

The extraordinary success of that truly great man, in the execution of so hazardous and invidious an office, is the last public act in which history has noticed him. Probably he died soon after; but we are without certain information of the time, the place, or any

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 43.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 45.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 96.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 47.
Plut. v.
Aristid.

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Plut. v.
Aristid.
Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 690.

Plat.
Laches,
p. 180. t. 2.

of the circumstances of his end. Employed as he had been in the most important offices of the Athenian commonwealth, civil and military, and vested with its highest honours, it is said that he lived poor, and at his death left not enough to pay for a funeral. The commonwealth therefore, in honour of his virtues and in gratitude for his services, took upon itself the charge of his obsequies and the care of his family. A monument to his memory was raised in Phalerum, which remained in the time of Plutarch: an allotment of land, a sum of money, and a pension were given to Lysimachus, who seems to have been his only son, and suitable marriage-portions to his daughters. Lysimachus never put himself forward in public business; but the testimony of Plato remains to his having been of respected character in private life, living in intimacy with Sophroniscus the father of Socrates; and in advanced years, after the death of his friend, still the companion in leisure of the first men of the commonwealth.

SECTION III.

Administration of Cimon. Death of Xerxes, and accession of Artaxerxes to the Persian throne. Successes of the confederate arms under Cimon: piracy in the Ægean sea: battle of the Eurymedon.

THE banishment of Themistocles and the death of Aristides left Cimon without an equal in favour and authority with the Athenian people, at a time when, through the exertions of a succession of great men, amid favouring contingencies, to be the first citizen of Athens was nearly to be the most important personage in the world. No state ever before had such a fleet, such naval arsenals, such naval skill and disci-

pline, as Themistocles had formed for his country, to promote her glory and his own, and had left in the hands of his rivals. With these advantages, in addition to those of high birth, hereditary fame, and great talents, in the ninth year after the battle of Plataea, Cimon was appointed to the command in chief of the confederate forces by sea and land.

OL. 77. 3.
B. C. 470.

The circumstances of the Persian empire at this time invited attempts against it. Xerxes, disgusted with public affairs through the miserable failure of his great enterprise against Greece, is said to have abandoned himself to indolence and debauchery. In one of those intrigues of the palace, often so full of horrors in despotic countries, but of which the final catastrophe commonly alone becomes with certainty known to the public, the monarch and his eldest son were murdered; each under the shocking imputation of having at least intended the murder of the other. A civil war ensued; and it was not till after a bloody contest that peace was restored to the interior of the empire, Artaxerxes, third son of the late king, then obtaining possession of the throne.

Diodor.
l. 11. c. 69.
Ctesias,
Persic.
Justin.
l. 3. c. 1.
Arist. Polit.
l. 5. c. 10.

It was important for the Greeks to avail themselves of the opportunity for strengthening their confederacy, by rescuing from the Persian dominion the many Grecian cities yet remaining under it. Those of Europe attracted the first attention. Cimon led the confederate armament against Eion on the river Strymon in Thrace, formerly the settlement of the unfortunate Ionian chiefs Histiaeus and Aristagoras, and now commanded by a Persian noble, whose name, variously written by Greek authors, was, in the orthography of Herodotus, Boges. Cimon, having reduced the garrison to extremity, offered permission for their retreat into Asia. But Boges, with that

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Herodot.
1. 7. c. 107.
Thucyd.
1. 1. c. 98.
Diod. Sic.
1. 11. c. 60.
Plut. &
Corn. Nep.
v. Cim.

ferocious heroism which is sometimes found in sultry climates and under despotic governments, obstinately refused all terms ; and, when provisions totally failed, scattering all the gold and silver within the place into the Strymon, he caused a vast pile of wood to be formed, killed his wife, concubines, children, and slaves upon it, and then, setting fire to it, killed himself, and all were consumed together. The garrison, in no condition to stipulate, surrendered at discretion ; and, according to the common practice of the Greeks of that age, were made profitable by being made slaves.

Herodot.
1. 7. c. 106.

Mascames, the Persian governor of Doriscus, either was more able than Boges, or commanded a stronger garrison. He baffled all the many attempts made by different Grecian commanders against him, and, while he lived, held Doriscus for the Persian king. Herodotus alone, among the Grecian historians remaining, has had the candour to mention this, or to acknowledge that a Persian garrison continued to exist in Europe. But these events being posterior to the period which he had fixed for the term of his history, he has noticed them only incidentally ; so that we are without information of any farther particulars concerning that remarkable defence of Doriscus by Mascames. Every other garrison, both in Thrace and on the Hellespont, a name under which the early Grecian writers commonly included the whole water from the Ægean sea to the Euxine, with the shores on each side, yielded to the Grecian arms.

From the Trojan war to the invasion of Xerxes, Greece had never seen a fleet assembled from its several maritime states ; nor had any extensive confederacy been formed among them. It had depended therefore upon every state by itself to take the mea-

sures which its own convenience required, or its power admitted, for repressing those piracies which had never ceased to disturb the navigation of the *Ægean*. The inhabitants of the little island of *Scyrus*, of Thessalian origin, had made themselves particularly obnoxious by maritime depredations. The *Amphictyonic* assembly therefore, according to *Plutarch*, demanded that the armament which *Cimon* commanded should put an end to such enormities, and give peace to the Grecian seas, as well against domestic ruffians as foreign enemies. The *Scyrians*, however, compelled to surrender at discretion, were sold for slaves, and their lands were given to a colony from *Athens*. The *Carystians* of *Eubœa* by some means also incurred the indignation of the confederacy, insomuch that war was made upon them; but they obtained terms of accommodation.

Plut. v.
Cim.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 98.
Diod. Sic.
l. 11. c. 60.
Corn. Nep.
& *Plut.*
v. Cim.

Those great interests and urgent necessities, which had given birth to the confederacy against *Persia*, now ceased to exist; for *Greece* could no longer be supposed in any immediate danger from the ambition or the resentment of that empire. Yet the maintenance of a powerful navy, to deter or to repel any future attacks from a neighbour still so formidable, might be highly advisable; and the private interest of individuals, who enjoyed or hoped for commands, and the particular political interest of the *Athenian* commonwealth, whose power and influence were so greatly increased by its situation at the head of the confederacy, would concur both to enforce the maintenance of the navy, and to keep that navy employed. Many of the inferior states however, when danger no longer pressed, became first lukewarm, then averse to the continuance of the war and the burthens with which it loaded them. The citizens grew tired of

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 97.
& 99.
Plut. v.
Aristid.
& *Cim.*

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an endless service on shipboard, under what they esteemed, in some measure, a foreign command, and to promote no obvious interest of their several commonwealths. Their administrations therefore, accustomed to perfect independency, would still determine, each for itself, when it would no longer exert itself in the irksome and invidious office of taxing its citizens for the expenses of the navy, and the still more invidious office of compelling them to take their turn of personal service. The Athenian government, on the other hand, at first modest, and, under the administration of Aristides, scrupulously just in the exercise of its supremacy, began to grow first rigid, and then imperious⁸; and some of the subordinate commonwealths, either by some public interest, or by the interest and influence of a party, induced to concur in the measures of Athens, were jealous of the defection of others, and ready to join in compelling adherence to the confederacy.

Ch. 7. s. 1.
of this Hist.

The first to venture opposition were the people of the rich and populous island of Naxos. Confiding in that strength with which they had once baffled the force of the Persian empire, they sustained war for some time against the confederate arms. They were however at length compelled to capitulate, upon terms by which they surrendered their independency, and, contrary to the articles of confederacy, were reduced under subjection to the Athenian commonwealth.⁹

This example being made of the Naxians, some exertion against the common enemy became perhaps

⁸ Ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν, is the candid confession of the Athenian historian. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 99.

⁹ Παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη, is again the free confession of Thucydides, l. 1. c. 98.

necessary to prevent clamour, and to keep up that spirit of enterprise without which the confederacy could not long exist in vigour; and circumstances arose to call for the efforts of its arms. For, in the Grecian states bordering on the Persian empire, all who had been or who aspired to be tyrants, all, and they were often very numerous, whom faction had banished, all who were discontented at home with the government under which they lived, and bold enough to be active in attempting a change, but too weak to depend for success upon themselves alone, still looked to Persia for patronage. The prospect of revived vigour in the councils of that empire, under the administration of the new king, gave encouragement to such views, and most of the Cyprian towns had renounced the Grecian confederacy. There were moreover Grecian cities in Lesser Asia which had not yet been rescued from the Persian dominion. The confederate arms had not been carried so far southward as Caria; and the people of Phaselis, a Grecian settlement in the adjoining province of Pamphylia, did not scruple to profess preference of the Persian dominion to the Grecian alliance.

Plut. v.
Cim

These considerations directing the Athenian councils, Cimon led his forces to the Carian coast. Such then was the terror which the fame of their uninterrupted success inspired that several towns were deserted by those who bore arms before any enemy came in sight; and the spirit of the confederate troops, directed by the abilities of Cimon, quickly brought all the rest to surrender. Conquest was yet pursued; the army entered Pamphylia, and laid siege to Phaselis. But here was experienced the common bane of confederacies, discordant interests and jarring affections. The friendly connexion be-

Ol. 77. $\frac{3}{4}$.
B. C. 469.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.

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tween the people of Phaselis and of Chios had been such that the Chions of Cimon's army still considered the Phaselites, attached as they were to Persia, and consequently inimical to Greece, as friends to Chios. To save them therefore from the ruin which now threatened, they gave information by letters, fastened to arrows, of all measures taking against the town. The treason however was discovered, and Phaselis was at length compelled to submission.

The government of Artaxerxes was yet insufficiently established in the centre of the extensive empire to admit any great exertion on the frontiers, but it was beginning to acquire steadiness. The command of so many maritime provinces, especially Phenicia, gave means to be still formidable at sea. For the purpose of defence nevertheless apparently rather than of conquest, a numerous fleet had been assembled in the river Eurymedon on the Pamphylian coast, and an army, to co-operate with it, encamped on the banks: a reinforcement of eighty Phœnician triremes was expected, and upon its arrival it was proposed to begin operations.

Intelligence of these circumstances determined Cimon to quit the objects before him on the continent, and endeavour to bring the enemy to action by sea before the arrival of the expected squadron. Embarking therefore a considerable part of his forces, for, among the ancients, naval operations were almost always intimately connected with those by land, he sailed for the Eurymedon. On his arrival the enemy's fleet, already much more numerous than his own, came out to meet him. But the Persians, disheartened by the repeated ill success of their arms, sustained the action with no vigour. Quickly retreating with much confusion into the river, the crews

Thucyd.
1.1. c.100.
Diodor.
1.11. c.60,
61, 62.
Corn. Nep.
& Plut. v.
Cim.

landed to join the army drawn up on the shore. The ships being thus abandoned to the enemy, no less than two hundred trireme galleys, little damaged, are said to have been taken ; some were destroyed in action ; a very few escaped.

The Greeks, elate with this easy victory, joyfully received their commander's orders immediately to land, and attack the Persian army. Here the contest was more obstinate ; and in the exertion of the Athenian leaders, anxious to support a reputation equal to the new glory of their country, many men of rank fell. After a long and bloody struggle however the Greeks obtained a decisive success ; what survived of the Persian army was dissipated, and its camp became the prey of the conquerors. Thus Cimon acquired the singular glory of erecting two trophies for two victories, one at sea, the other at land, gained by the same armament in one day. Receiving intelligence then that the re-enforcement of Phœnician galleys, which had been expected to join the Persian fleet, lay in the port of Hydrus in Cyprus, he hastened thither with a sufficient squadron of his best ships, and every trireme was either destroyed or taken.¹⁰

Thucyd.
I. I. c. 100.

Plut. v.
Cim.

By this great success the naval strength of Persia was so broken, its land forces so disheartened, and the spirit of enterprise, which had formerly animated its councils and excited its commanders, was so depressed that offensive operations against Greece were totally intermitted ; and it became the boast of the

¹⁰ This fact I have ventured to relate on the authority of Plutarch ; Thucydides, in his concise mention of the affair of the Eurymedon, saying nothing of it. According to Diodorus, the Athenian fleet went twice to Cyprus ; but his account altogether is both romantic and blind, and appears indeed to have been written with little consideration of what was possible.

Isocr.
Panath.
& Areop.
Diodor.
ut ant.

Greek nation that no armed ship of Persia was to be seen westward of the Chelidonian islands on the coast of Pamphylia, or of the Cyanean rocks at the entrance of the Euxine; and that no Persian troops dared show themselves within a horseman's day's journey of the Grecian seas.¹¹

¹¹ In aftertimes report arose that a treaty of peace was regularly made between the Persian monarch and the Athenian commonwealth, in which it was forbidden for any Persian forces of land or sea to come within the limits mentioned in the text. Plutarch, in his *Life of Cimon*, speaks of it as the immediate result of the battle of the Eurymedon. Diodorus reports confidently that it took place twenty years later, in the fourth year of the eighty-second Olympiad; and he asserts it to have been stipulated, that no Persian ship of war should appear between Phaselis and the Cyaneans; that no land forces, nor even a satrap, should approach within three days' journey of the Grecian seas; and that all Grecian towns should be free.

Plutarch, not here bold in assertion like Diodorus, has treated the subject in his best manner, warning his reader that the existence of such a treaty was not undisputed, and giving authorities on both sides. Craterus, he says, in a collection of state papers which he published, inserted a copy of the treaty in question, as a genuine deed. But Callisthenes affirmed that no such treaty was ever concluded: Persian subjects indeed, he said, avoided navigating the Ægean sea, and approaching its shores by land; but it was only through fear of the Greeks, and not in consequence of any treaty. In the sequel of this history occasion will occur to observe that pretended state papers, among the Greeks, were not always to be trusted.

But, beyond the doubt that may thus arise, supported by the positive denial of credit by Callisthenes, powerful objections remain from the highest authorities. From the informed and accurate Thucydides we have a summary of the principal transactions of the Grecian republics before the Peloponnesian war. It is hardly imaginable that one so remarkable as such a treaty should escape his knowledge, or that he should leave one so important unnoticed; but in his history no mention of any such appears. Nor is his testimony simply thus negative: a degree of positive proof is involved in his narrative; which shows that hostilities between the Greeks and Persians, though at times re-

mitted, never entirely ceased; and that the Persian court, though perhaps not the worst patron of the free constitutions of the Asian-Greek cities, yet, far from admitting the perfect independency asserted by the pretended treaty, never desisted from its claim to a paramount dominion over all their territories, or from a requisition of tribute from all. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 5. & 6. Consonant testimony is found in a summary of the transactions of the same age by Plato, or however an author of Plato's age. No such treaty as Diodorus and Plutarch describe is mentioned, but the existence of such a treaty is virtually contradicted, in the boast that Greece owed its freedom from foreign attack to the perseverance of Athens in active hostilities against Persia, far from home, in Cyprus especially and in Egypt. Plat. Menex. p. 241. t. ii. To the same purpose also Isocrates has spoken. The Ionians, he says, never ceased to wage war with the barbarians, whose lands they held in spite of them. Isocr. Paneg. p. 246. t. i. ed. Auger.

Nevertheless it is proper to observe that two of the most eminent Athenian orators, Lycurgus and Demosthenes, mention a treaty in some degree corresponding in character with that reported by the authors before mentioned. They do not indeed pretend stipulations so disgraceful and injurious to Persia: they describe the treaty only as generally advantageous and honourable to Greece, and commonly allowed so among the Greeks. The negotiator, Callias, is named; but the time is not indicated. It seems however to have been long after that to which Plutarch and Diodorus attribute the treaties they describe, and apparently not long before that concluded by the Lacedæmonians, which became so well known by the title of the treaty of Antalcidas. Probably some treaty was made by Callias with some of the satraps, which may have afforded some ground for the assertions of Lycurgus and Demosthenes. But had a treaty of the tenor reported by Diodorus and Plutarch ever been concluded, its existence would not have been left doubtful by Grecian writers; it would not have had less notoriety than the treaty of Antalcidas; it would not less have been blazoned with panegyric than that treaty has been with reproach. The treaty of Callias, it may be reasonably presumed, from its being so little noticed, afforded really little ground for boasting.

But the fact, that Persian subjects dared not navigate the Ægean sea, that at times they could not even by land approach its shores, was, not unreasonably, matter of great national pride among the Greeks, and especially the Athenians. It would be

SECTION IV.

Treason and death of Pausanias. Prosecution and flight of Themistocles: his reception at the Persian court: his death.

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WHILE the power and renown of Athens were thus wonderfully advancing under the conduct of Aris-

a favourite topic for orators, desiring to cultivate popularity, or to put the people in good humour; and we find even the sober Isocrates, when his purpose was to improve the joy of the Panathenaic festival, pushing the boast to great extravagance. Not contented with asserting the exclusion of Persian subjects from the Ægean sea and its Asiatic shore, he says, (as if he would imply, though he could not venture to state, a treaty,) that the Persians were not allowed to come with arms westward of the river Halys. We must yield to the judgment of Isocrates for what might become the orator of the Panathenaic festival; but it could not be too much to pronounce such an assertion, from a historian, a monstrous extravagance; since it would make Sardis, with all Lydia and Phrygia, Grecian conquests; whereas it is abundantly evident, from Thucydides and Xenophon, that no Grecian force, before that under Agesilaus, could ever venture fifty miles from the shore, and Agesilaus himself never was within a hundred of the Halys.

Since the first publication of these observations, the very learned Dr. Hales of Dublin has controverted my conclusion. I have thence been led to advert to some passages of Thucydides bearing upon the point, which, while engaged with the foregoing note, had escaped me. Occasion has occurred to notice both in the sequel of this history; one at the end of the 5th section of the 16th chapter, the other in the 6th section of the 19th chapter; the former showing that the Persian territory extended in one part to the Ægean sea, the other, that a Lacedæmonian in high authority acknowledged the king of Persia's authority over the whole of Lesser Asia.

For the reader practised in observing matters for history otherwise than in his closet, it may seem superfluous to add the consideration of the evident want of inducement for the Persian court to conclude any such disadvantageous and disgraceful treaty.

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tides and Cimon, a train of circumstances continued long to deprive the Lacedæmonian government of the ability to take any leading part in the common concerns of the Greek nation. Pausanias, when recalled from his command, had been brought to trial; but his interest had sufficed to procure his acquittal from all public crimes; though suspicion, and, as it should seem from Thucydides, even proof, was strong against him. He was however convicted of injuries to individuals, and condemned to amends. But this did not suffice to repress his rash and extravagant ambition. The king his nephew was yet a minor, and himself still in the high office of regent. Without commission or authority from the government, hiring a Hermionian trireme galley, he went again to the Hellespont, and renewed his negotiation with Artabazus. As a more commodious situation for communicating with the satrap, he ventured even to proceed to Byzantium, then occupied by an Athenian garrison; hoping perhaps to find the more favour there as he had less in his own country. But he was quickly compelled to leave that place, and he passed to Colonæ in Troas. The Lacedæmonian government meanwhile, informed of his procedure, and both irritated and alarmed by the audaciousness of it, sent a herald bearing a scytale to Colonæ. The scytale was the ensign of high office among the Lacedæmonians, common to the general and the herald. It was a staff exactly tallied to another in possession of the ephors; and all orders and communications requiring secrecy were so written that, till applied in a particular manner to that staff, they were illegible.¹² By such an

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 96.

c. 131, 132.

Plut. v.
Lysand.

¹² The Athenian proboulos, in the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes (v. 985.), mistook the scytale borne by the Lacedæmonian herald for a spear. The staff and the written order communicated by it seem equally to have borne the name of scytale.

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order Pausanias was commanded to accompany the herald whithersoever he should go; with a denunciation of the enmity of the Spartan state against him if he disobeyed. His former indiscreet conduct had so baffled his own purposes that his scheme was yet very far from ripe for execution: he could have no hope of prosecuting it with success unless he could reingratiate himself with his own country; and such was already the deviation from the institutions of Lycurgus at Lacedæmon that, as Thucydides says confidently, he trusted in means to bribe the leading men for security against accusation. Obeying therefore implicitly the order contained in the scytale, he accompanied the herald to Sparta. On his arrival he was arrested by authority of the ephors, whose power now extended to the imprisonment even of the kings; but intrigue shortly procuring his liberty, he publicly defied accusers.

Emboldened now by repeated success in repelling crimination, he began again to seek means for prosecuting his treachery, and realising his dreams of enjoyment in all the oriental splendour and luxury of royalty. The obstacles to his reinstatement in that foreign command, which had formed his fairest ground of hope, seemed insuperable; but prospect appeared of other means to accomplish his purpose. The neighbouring commonwealth of Argos not only bore the most inveterate enmity to Sparta, but had sought alliance with Persia; and at Argos resided Themistocles, whose banishment might induce him to join in a project for his own aggrandisement at the expense of his country. It appears that they actually corresponded on the subject; though how far Themistocles acceded to the views of Pausanias remains uncertain. But in every Grecian state, and particularly in Laconia, the number of slaves, very far ex-

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 131,
132.

c. 135.
Plut. &
Corn. Nep.
v. Themist.
Thucyd.
l. i. c. 132.

ceeding that of freemen, invited the attention of the seditious. Pausanias tampered with the Helots ; proposing not only freedom, but all the rights of Spartan citizens as the reward of their successful support to him. Some of them betrayed his secret : but the deposition of slaves was esteemed insufficient ground for proceeding against a citizen. His correspondence with Artabazus meanwhile was continued as opportunity offered ; till a slave, charged with a letter to the satrap, suspecting danger in the service he was sent upon, from having observed that, of many messengers despatched toward the same quarter, not one had ever returned or been heard of, opened the letter intrusted to him ; and having thus assured himself both of his master's treason and of his own intended fate, (for the letter mentioned that the bearer should be put to death,) he carried it to the ephors. The extreme wariness which the Spartan institutions prescribed, and which the temper of the government disposed it to observe, in criminal prosecution against any Lacedæmonian citizen, but particularly against one of the blood of Hercules, uncle to the king, and actually in the high situation of regent, had very much favoured the treason of Pausanias, and encouraged him in it. Even his own letter was not thought ground to convict him upon, the evidence to its authenticity being deemed incomplete.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 133.

But the knowledge of his treasonable practices was now become too certain, and the danger of them too great and alarming, to allow the Spartan administration, however composed in part of those who were still his friends, any longer to neglect measures for putting an effectual stop to them. To obtain complete legal proof against him was the object, and the superstition of the age furnished the means. The

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Thucyd.
1.1. c. 133.
Diod. Sic.
1. 11. c. 45.
Corn. Nep.
v. Paus.

Thucyd.
1. 1. c. 134.

Ibid.
Lycurg.
or. con.
Leocr.
p. 226.
Ol. 77. 3.
B. C. 469.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.

slave, who brought the letter, must avoid the revenge of his master. While therefore his communication with the ephors remained yet unknown to Pausanias, he was directed to betake himself as a suppliant to the temple of Neptune on mount Tænarus; and, within its sacred precinct, to form a hut for his shelter, with a partition, behind which witnesses might be concealed. Pausanias, alarmed, as was foreseen, on hearing that his messenger, instead of executing the commission intrusted to him, had fled to an asylum, hastened to the place; and the conversation ensuing afforded the most unequivocal proof of his guilt. The ephors, who, with some chosen attendants, overheard all, proposed to arrest him on his return to the city; but one of them, more his friend than the rest, giving him intimation of his danger, he resorted to the temple of Minerva Chalciæca, a sanctuary highly venerated. Religion forbidding to force him thence, and yet his execution appearing absolutely indispensable for the security of the commonwealth, a wall was built around the temple, and he was starved to death; but to obviate profanation, when it was known that he was near expiring, being brought without the sacred place, he died in the hands of those who bore him. Superstition however being even thus alarmed, the Delphian oracle was consulted; and, in obedience to the supposed meaning of the obscure response, the body was buried in front of the temple¹³, the spot remaining marked by a monument with an inscription in the time of Thucydides, and two brazen statues were dedicated to the goddess.

The fate of Pausanias involved with it that of

¹³ Ἐν τῷ προτεμένίῳ.

Themistocles. The Spartan administration pretended that, in the course of their inquiry into the conduct of the former, full proof was discovered of the participation of Themistocles in the concerted treason against the liberties of Greece; and they insisted that he ought to be brought to trial, not before the Athenian assembly, or any Athenian judicature, but before the Amphictyons, or some other court of deputies from all the states of the Greek nation. The party adverse to him, now ruling at Athens, acceded to the requisition; and, under the joint authority of the government of Athens and Lacedæmon, persons were sent with orders to apprehend him, wherever he could be found. He had resided, since his banishment, principally at Argos; but he went occasionally to other parts of Peloponnesus, where he had cultivated an interest. Through his numerous friends and adherents he received information of his danger in time to pass to the island of Corcyra; whose people, in gratitude for particular good offices done to their commonwealth, were disposed to show him kindness. Though among the most powerful of the Grecian maritime states, they however could not venture to protect him in defiance of the united force of Lacedæmon and Athens. He proceeded therefore to the coast of Acarnania, and, at a loss otherwise to evade his pursuers, resolved to apply to Admetus king of the Molossians; trusting apparently in his knowledge of the magnanimity of that prince, from whom otherwise he had little reason to expect offices of friendship, Admetus having formerly been his open opponent in a transaction with the Athenian government.

The anecdote of his reception, reported by the authentic pen of Thucydides, affords a curious specimen of the relics then still subsisting in that remote

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 135.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 55.
Corn. Nep.
& Plut. v.
Themist.

Ol. 78. $\frac{2}{3}$.
B. C. 466.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.
Thuc. *ibid*.

CHAP.
XI.Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 136.Aristoph.
Lysistr.
v. 1139.
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 24.

province of the ancient hospitality connected with religion, which, with some difference of ceremony perhaps in different places, appears to have prevailed in the days of Homer throughout Greece. It happened that, when Themistocles arrived at the usual residence of Admetus, that prince was absent. He applied however to the queen; and, having the good fortune to conciliate her favour, she furnished him with means to insure protection from her husband. Among the Greeks some altar was the usual resource of fugitives; if they could reach one, their persons were generally secure against violence. But the queen of the Molossians, delivering her infant son to Themistocles, directed him to await the king's return, sitting by the hearth, with the child in his arms. No manner of supplication was held by the Molossians so sacred, so enforcing attention as a religious duty. An audience being thus insured, Themistocles won Admetus to receive him, not only into protection, but into friendship. The Lacedæmonian and Athenian messengers arrived soon after. The Molossian prince then, careful not to give unnecessary offence, urged the custom of his country, sanctified by religion, in excuse for a decisive refusal of permission to apprehend, within his dominion, a suppliant who had acquired a claim upon him so implicated with duty to the gods.

Molossis however was not a situation in which it was desirable for Themistocles to remain. With assistance therefore from his protector, having made the difficult journey across the mountains of Epirus and Macedonia to the seaport of Pydna, he embarked, in disguise, aboard a merchant-ship going for Asia. In the passage he was forced by stress of weather to the island of Naxos, where the confederate armament

under Cimon then lay. Choosing among dangers before him, he made himself known to the master of the vessel, alarmed him with representation of the consequences of having so far favoured the escape of a proscribed person, allured him with promises of large reward, and at length prevailed on him to put to sea again without permitting any of his people to go ashore. Arriving then safe at Ephesus, he proceeded immediately up the country under protection of a Persian to whom his introduction had been prepared. All his property that could be discovered at Athens, when the order was issued for apprehending his person, had been confiscated; yet his faithful friends there and at Argos had found means to preserve effects to a large amount, which they remitted to him as soon as they learned that he was in a place of security. The sum confiscated, as Plutarch informs us, was, according to Theophrastus, eighty talents; but, as Theopompus reported, a hundred, about twenty-five thousand pounds sterling. What was the value of the effects preserved by his friends we are not informed, but before entering on public business his whole property, according to Plutarch, had not amounted to three talents.

Though we are not assured that Themistocles was entirely innocent of the crime for which Pausanias suffered, yet that the prosecution against him was principally urged by party-spirit is sufficiently evident; and it is therefore no wonder if it was conducted with an acrimony regardless of justice, of humanity, and even of policy. Plutarch reports, on the authority of the historian Stesimbrotus, that Epicrates, at the prosecution of Cimon, was condemned to death and executed, for procuring the escape of the wife and children of Themistocles from Athens, and conveying

Plut. v.
Themist.

CHAP.
XI.

them in safety to the residence of Admetus. It may be hoped, for the sake of the generally amiable character which Cimon bore, that this was not strictly true in the unqualified manner in which it is related to us; yet the report shows, at least, what was thought possible of the temper of party-spirit in Athens. No law surely could exist at Athens to make the friendly and humane action of Epicrates a capital crime. His condemnation could proceed only from a decree of the absolute sovereign, the people. Plutarch expresses himself doubtful of the authority of Stesimbrotus, yet it appears not to have been because he thought the Athenian people incapable of making such a decree.

The sole hope then of security remaining to Themistocles, against the most cruel persecution that party-spirit could urge, was in the chance of protection from the great enemy of his country, the king of Persia. He might indeed think himself, beyond all others, obnoxious to the Persians, as a principal cause of their disgraces and losses in their attempts against Greece. Yet, as it had long been the policy of the Persian court to protect and encourage Grecian refugees, he might hope that the acquisition of him as a future friend would be valued, in proportion as he had been heretofore a formidable enemy. The state of the Persian empire, scarcely yet restored to secure internal quiet, moreover favoured his views. Thus encouraged he ventured to address a letter to Artaxerxes, then lately settled on the throne. Receiving a favourable answer, he applied himself diligently to learn the Persian language, and acquire information of Persian manners. Not then till he had thus employed a year did he go to Susa. His reception at the court there was such as no Greek had

Thucyd.
i. l. c. 138.

Ol. 78. §.
B. C. 465.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.

SECT.
IV.

ever before experienced. After having been treated some time with the highest distinction, an extensive command in Asia Minor was conferred upon him, with a revenue far exceeding ordinary Grecian ideas of private wealth. In the usual style of oriental magnificence, three the most flourishing of the Grecian cities yet remaining under the Persian dominion were, with their territories, assigned for the nominal purpose of supplying his table only : Magnesia was to furnish bread, Myus meat, Lampsacus wine. According to Thucydides, the reduction of Greece under the Persian dominion was the return which he was expected to make to the king for such munificence.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 138.
Strabo,
l. 14. p. 636.

Plutarch says that Themistocles lived long in this splendid banishment ; but his account is not altogether coherent ; and from earlier writers it rather appears that he did not live long : from all accounts it is evident that he did nothing memorable ; and probably he had little real enjoyment in all the advantages of high fortune to which the bounty of the Persian monarch raised him. His warm temper is likely to have been violently agitated by consideration of the circumstances in which he stood, and the business he had undertaken. To raise his country to power and splendour had been the object that through life his mind had pursued with singular ardour. He had succeeded, and his success had covered him with no common glory. The thought of being engaged, now in advanced years, in the purpose of bringing on that country destruction or slavery, of ruining his own great work, could not but embitter his best hopes ; while at the same time every fair hope was highly precarious ; the envy and jealousy of his new friends being little less to be apprehended than the swords of his ene-

Thucyd. l. 1.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 57,
58, 59.

CHAP.
XI.

mies ; and defeat, in such a cause, must involve him in tenfold misery and disgrace. Reports gained that he procured a voluntary death by poison : but, though the truth was not certainly known, Thucydides seems rather to have thought that his end was natural. A magnificent monument raised to his memory in the agora of Magnesia, on the Mæander, where had been his principal residence, mentioned by that early historian, is reported by Plutarch as yet remaining ; but his bones, in pursuance of his dying request, were carried to Attica, and privately buried there. This circumstance, to which, though it seems not to have been fully authenticated, Thucydides evidently gave credit, would mark strongly the regret he had in undertaking the part against his country to which the ruthless violence of his political opponents drove him.¹⁴

It cannot but be wished that the imputations against this great man could, with due regard to historical authority, be more completely done away : yet it may be owing to him to make large allowance for calumny, arising from that party-spirit from which in Greece, beyond all other countries, high political worth was wont to suffer.¹⁵ In abilities, and by his

¹⁴ Plutarch omits, in his *Life of Themistocles*, to inform us at what time the death of that extraordinary man happened. In his *Life of Cimon*, he says that Themistocles died about the time of the expedition into Cyprus under Cimon, and but little before the death of Cimon himself. Neither Thucydides nor Diodorus give any precise information upon the subject ; but it is rather implied in their narrative, and seems upon many accounts more likely, that he died some years earlier.

Dodwell, following Plutarch, places the death of Themistocles in the same year with that of Cimon, B. C. 449., twenty after his banishment, and sixteen after his journey to Susa.

¹⁵ Plato and Xenophon, whose authority is weighty, from the age in which they lived, as well as from their characters, and

actions, Themistocles was certainly one of the greatest men that Greece or the world ever produced. Not, like Leonidas and Pausanias, placed by the accident of birth at the head of the affairs of Greece, but born to an inferior station in an inferior commonwealth, he first raised himself to the head of that commonwealth, and then raised his little commonwealth, the territory of a single city, to be the leading power in the political affairs of the known world; and, even when afterward banished from that commonwealth and from Greece, and reduced to the simple importance of his own character, he remained still the most important political character of his time. Whatever relates to such a man is interesting. It appears, says Plutarch, by his statue still remaining at Athens in the temple of Diana Aristobule, built under his direction, that his person and countenance announced something uncommonly great and heroic. For the character of his understanding, we may best take it from Thucydides; who, by his own abilities, and by the age in which he lived, was most competent to form a just judgment. ‘In the mind of Themistocles,’ says that historian, ‘seems to have been displayed the utmost power of human nature; for the evident superiority of his capacity to that of all other men was truly wonderful. His penetration was such that, from the scantiest information and with the most instantaneous deliberation, he formed the justest judgment of the past, and gained the clearest insight into the future. He had a discern-

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 138.

whose united authority is the greater on account of their difference in political principles, both give very honourable testimony to Themistocles. Plato in Theages, p. 126. t. 1. and in Menon, p. 93. t. 2.; and Xenophon in his Memorials of Socrates, l. 2. c. 6. s. 13. Nor is the eulogy of Aristophanes, in his comedy of The Knights, v. 812. and 884., of no consideration.

CHAP.
XI.

‘ment that could develope the advantageous and the
 ‘pernicious in measures proposed, however involved
 ‘in perplexity and obscurity ; and he had not less
 ‘remarkably the faculty of explaining things clearly
 ‘to others than of judging clearly himself. Such, in
 ‘short, were the powers of his genius and the readi-
 ‘ness of his judgment that he was beyond all men
 ‘capable of directing all things upon every occasion.’¹⁶

He died, according to Plutarch, in his sixty-fifth year, leaving a numerous progeny, to whom a large share of the bounty of the Persian monarch was continued. Nor was a restoration to the privileges of their father’s country denied them, when, the interest of party no longer urging their persecution, the merits of Themistocles were remembered as far outweighing his failings. Some of his daughters were married to Athenian citizens ; and Cleophantus, his third son, is mentioned by Plato as having resided at Athens, but remembered for no higher qualification than that of a most extraordinary horseman, such as might vie with those who in our days most excel in public exhibition. We do not indeed find that any of his posterity were eminent as political characters ; but the estimation in which his own memory was held contributed to their benefit to late generations. By a decree of the people of Magnesia honours were granted to his family, which were still enjoyed by Themistocles, an Athenian, the friend of Plutarch, above six hundred years after the death of his great ancestor.

Pausan.
l. 1. c. 1.

Plut. v.
Themist.
Plat.
Menon.
p. 93. t. 2.

Plut. v.
Themist.

¹⁶ From Lysias we have a corresponding eulogy of him in one short sentence . . . στρατηγὸν μὲν Θεμιστοκλέα, ἱκανώτατον εἰπεῖν καὶ γνῶναι καὶ πράξει (Or. Fun. p. 194. vel 105.) ; and from Cicero, in a still shorter phrase, a very high panegyric, ‘Themistoclem, ‘quem facile Græciæ principem ponimus.’ M. T. Cic. Lucullus, s. 1.

CHAPTER XII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS
SECURITY AGAINST PERSIA TO THE TRUCE FOR THIRTY
YEARS BETWEEN ATHENS AND LACEDÆMON.

SECTION I.

Athens the seat of science and arts. Extension of the power of Athens: revolt of Thasos: jealousy of Lacedæmon: Earthquake at Lacedæmon: revolt of the Helots: assistance sent from Athens to Lacedæmon: renunciation of the Lacedæmonian confederacy by the Athenians. War of Argos and Mycenæ.

ATHENS, become, within a very few years, from the capital of a small province, in fact, though not yet in avowed pretension, the head of an empire, exhibited a new and singular phenomenon in politics, a sovereign people; a people, not, as in many other Grecian democracies, sovereign merely of that state which themselves, maintained by slaves, composed, but supreme over other people in subordinate republics, acknowledging a degree of subjection, yet claiming to be free.¹ Under this extraordinary po-

SECT.
I.

¹ Through alterations which have taken place in things, words are not always to be found in any modern language to express with precision ancient ideas. Perhaps the word *vassal*, most nearly of any in our language, expresses what the Greeks understood by their word ὑπήκοος. Yet feudal vassalage, though in many circumstances similar, so differed in the original idea from the kind of subjection by which the inferior Grecian commonwealths were bound to the more powerful that the use of the term in Grecian history, wanting as a term may be, would

litical constitution philosophy and the arts were beginning to make Athens their principal resort. Migrating from Egypt and the east, they had long been fostered on the western coast of Asia. In Greece itself they had owed some temporary encouragement principally to those called tyrants; the Pisistratidæ at Athens, and Periander at Corinth. But their efforts were desultory and comparatively feeble till the communication with the Asian Greeks, checked and interrupted by their subjection to Persia, was restored, and Athens, chief of the glorious confederacy by whose arms the deliverance had been effected, began to draw everything toward itself as a common centre, the capital of an empire. Already science and fine taste were so far perfected that Æschylus had exhibited tragedy in its utmost dignity, and Sophocles and Euripides were giving it the highest polish, when Cimon returned in triumph to his country. Together with trophies, such as Greece had never won before in so distant a field, he brought wealth to a large amount, the fruit of his victories; part of which enriched the public treasury, part rewarded the individuals who had fought under him, and a large proportion, which he had had the virtue and the good fortune to acquire without incurring

not be warrantable. Similar difficulty may be observed about many other terms. *Λιμὴν* signified a port or harbour for shipping; but the ancients often called by that name what our seamen would not allow to be a port or harbour. We are often at a loss to render the verb *πλέω* otherwise than by our verb *to sail*, though they are far from being of the same precise import. The use of oars, so prevalent in Grecian navigation, is so little known in our seas that *to sail* is our only general term for going by sea, and sailor is another word for seaman. Thus also for *ἀναγω* and *ἐξορμέω* we must risk the sea-phrase *to get under way*, or content ourselves with the inaccurate expression *to set sail*.

any charge of rapaciousness, became an addition to the large property inherited from his forefathers.

It was the peculiar felicity of Athens in this period that, of the constellation of great men which arose there, each was singularly fitted for the situation in which the circumstances of the time required him to act; and none filled his place more advantageously than Cimon. But the fate of all those great men, and the resources employed, mostly in vain, to avert it, sufficiently mark, in this splendid era, a defective constitution, and law and justice ill assured. Aristides, we are told, though it is not undisputed, had founded his security upon extreme poverty: Cimon endeavoured to establish himself by a splendid, and almost unbounded, yet politic liberality. To ward against envy, and to secure his party with that tremendous tyrant, as the comic poet not inaptly calls the sovereign people, he made a parade of throwing down the fences of his gardens and orchards in the neighbourhood of Athens, and permitted all to partake of their produce; a table was daily spread at his house for the poorer citizens, but more particularly for those of his own ward, whom he invited from the agora, the courts of justice, or the general assembly; a bounty which both enabled and disposed them to give their time at his call whenever his interest required their support. In going about the city he was commonly attended by a large retinue, handsomely clothed; and if he met an elderly citizen ill clad, he directed one of his attendants to change cloaks with him. To the indigent of higher rank he was equally attentive, lending or giving money, as he found their circumstances required, and always managing his bounty with the utmost care that the object of it should not be put to shame. His con-

SECT.
I.

Aristoph.
Eq. v.1111.
Theopomp.
ap. Athen.
l. 13. c. 8.
Corn. Nep.
& Plut. v.
Cim. &
Plut. v.
Pericl.

CHAP.
XII.

duct, in short, was a continual preparation for an election ; not, as in England, to decide whether the candidate should or should not be a member of the legislature ; but whether he should be head of the commonwealth or an exile. In his youth he had affected a roughness of manners, and a contempt for the elegances generally reckoned becoming his rank, and which his fortune enabled him to command. In his riper years he discovered that virtue and grossness have no natural connexion : he became himself a model of politeness, patronised every liberal art, and studied to procure elegant as well as useful indulgences for the people. By him were raised the first of those edifices which, for want of a more proper name, we call porticos, under whose magnificent shelter, in their torrid climate, it became the delight of the Athenians to assemble, and pass their leisure in promiscuous conversation. The widely celebrated groves of Academia acknowledged him as the founder of their fame. In the wood, before rude and without water, he formed commodious and elegant walks, and adorned them with running fountains. Nor was the planting of the agora, or great market-place of Athens, with that beautiful tree the oriental plane, forgotten as a benefit from Cimon ; while, ages after him, his trees flourished, affording an agreeable and salutary shade to those who exposed their wares there, and to those who came to purchase them. Much, if not the whole of these things, we are given to understand, was done at his private expense ; but our information upon the subject is inaccurate. Those stores, with which his victories had enriched the treasury, probably furnished the sums employed upon some of the public works executed under his direction, as, more especially, the completion of the fortification of the

citadel, whose principal defence hitherto, on the southern side, had been the precipitous form of the rock.

SECT.
I.

While with this splendid and princely liberality Cimon endeavoured to confirm his own interest, he was attentive to promote the general welfare, and to render permanent the superiority of Athens among the Grecian republics. The citizens of the allied states grew daily more impatient of the requisitions regularly made to take their turn of service on ship-board, and longed for uninterrupted enjoyment of their homes, in that security against foreign enemies which their past labours had, they thought, now sufficiently established. But that the common interest still required the maintenance of a fleet was a proposition that could not be denied, while the Persian empire existed, or while the Grecian seas offered temptation for piracy. Cimon therefore proposed that any commonwealth of the confederacy might compound for the personal service of its citizens, by furnishing ships, and paying a sum of money to the common treasury: the Athenians would then undertake the manning of the fleet. The proposal was in the moment popular; most of the allies acceded to it, unaware or heedless of the consequences; for, while they were thus depriving themselves of all maritime force, making that of Athens irresistible, they gave that ambitious republic claims upon them, uncertain in their nature, and which, as they might be made, could now also be enforced, at its pleasure.

Thucyd.
I. 1. c. 99.
Plut. v.
Cim.

Having thus at the same time strengthened itself and reduced to impotence many of the allied states, the Athenian government became less scrupulous of using force against any of the rest which might dispute its sovereign authority. The reduction of Eion,

CHAP.
XII.

Herodot.
1. 6. c. 47.
Thucyd.
1. 1. c. 100.
Diodor.
1. 11. c. 70.
Corn. Nep.
& Plut.
v. Cim.

B. C. 465.
Ol. 78. $\frac{3}{4}$.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.

Thucyd.
1. 1. c. 101.

by the confederate arms under Cimon, had led to new information of the value of the adjacent country; where some mines of gold and silver, and a lucrative commerce with the surrounding Thracian hordes, excited avidity. But the people of the neighbouring island of Thasos, very anciently possessed of that commerce, and of the more accessible mines, insisted that these, when recovered from the common enemy by the arms of that confederacy of which they were members, should revert entire to them. The Athenians, asserting the right of conquest, on the contrary, claimed the principal share as their own. The Thasians, irritated, renounced the confederacy. Cimon then was commanded to lead the confederate armament against them. They venturing an action at sea, were defeated; and Cimon, debarking his forces on the island, became quickly master of everything but the principal town, to which he laid siege. The Athenians then hastened to appropriate that inviting territory on the continent, which was their principal object, by sending thither a colony of no less than ten thousand men, partly Athenian citizens, partly from the allied commonwealths.

The Thasians had not originally trusted in their own strength alone for the hope of final success. Early in the dispute they had sent ministers to Lacedæmon, soliciting protection against the oppression of Athens. The pretence was certainly favourable, and the Lacedæmonian government, no longer pressed by domestic troubles, determined to use the opportunity for interfering to check the growing power of the rival commonwealth, so long an object of jealousy, and now become truly formidable. Without a fleet capable of contending with the Athenian, they could not send succour immediately to Thasos: but they

were taking measures secretly for a diversion in its favour, by invading Attica, when a sudden and extraordinary calamity, an earthquake which overthrew the city of Sparta, and in its immediate consequences threatened destruction to the commonwealth, compelled them to confine all their attention at home. Nevertheless the siege, carried on with great vigour, and with all the skill of the age under the direction of Cimon, was, during three years, obstinately resisted. Even then the Thasians obtained terms, severe indeed, but by which they obviated the miseries, death often for themselves and slavery for their families, to which Grecian people, less able to defend themselves, were frequently reduced by Grecian arms. Their fortifications however were destroyed; their ships of war were surrendered; they paid immediately a sum of money; they bound themselves to an annual tribute; and they yielded all claim upon the opposite continent, and the valuable mines there.

The sovereignty of the Athenian people over the allied republics would thus gain some present confirmation; but in the principal object their ambition and avarice were, apparently through over-greediness, disappointed. The town of Eion stood at the mouth of the river Strymon. For the new settlement a place called the Nine-ways, a few miles up the river, was chosen; commodious for the double purpose of communicating with the sea, and commanding the neighbouring country. But the Edonian Thracians, in whose territory it was, resenting the encroachment, infested the settlers with irregular but continual hostilities. To put an end to so troublesome a war the

SECT.
1.

B. C. 465.
Ol. 78. $\frac{3}{4}$.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.
[B. C. 464.
Cl.*]

B. C. 463.
Ol. 79. $\frac{1}{2}$.

[* Mr. Clinton settles this date from Pausan. iv. 24. 2. emended, compared with Diod. xi. 70., 'consistently with Thucyd. i. 101., who states the earthquake 'at Sparta and revolt of the Helots to have happened *after* the Thasian revolt, 'and with some interval.']

CHAP.
XII.

whole force of the colony marched against them. As the Greeks advanced, the Edonians retreated ; avoiding a general action, while they sent to all the neighbouring Thracian tribes for assistance, as in a common cause. When they were at length assembled in sufficient numbers, having engaged the Greeks far within a wild and difficult country, they attacked, overpowered, and cut in pieces their army, and annihilated the colony.

Corn. Nep.
& Plut.
v. Cim.
B. C. 462.
Ol. 79.²

Cimon, on his return to Athens, did not meet the acclamations to which he had been accustomed. Faction had been busy in his absence. Apparently the fall of the colony of the Nine-ways furnished both instigation and opportunity, perhaps assisted by circumstances of which no information remains. A prosecution was instituted against him, on the pretence, according to the biographers, that he ought to have extended the Athenian dominion by conquest in Macedonia, and that bribes from Alexander, king of that country, had stopped his exertions. The covetous ambition indeed of the Athenian people, inflamed by interested demagogues, was growing boundless. Cimon, indignant at the ungrateful return for a life divided between performing the most important services to his country, and studying how most to gratify the people, would enter little into particulars in refuting a charge, one part of which he considered as attributing to him no crime, the other as incapable of credit, and therefore beneath his regard. He told the assembled people that ‘ they mistook both him and the country which it ‘ was said he ought to have conquered. Other generals had cultivated an interest with the Ionians

² I am not perfectly satisfied with these dates assigned by Dodwell, but cannot undertake to correct them.

‘and the Thessalians, whose riches might make an interference in their concerns profitable. For himself, he had never sought any connexion with those people; but he confessed he esteemed the Macedonians, who were virtuous and brave, but not rich; nor would he ever prefer riches to those qualities, though he had his satisfaction in having enriched his country with the spoils of its enemies.’ The popularity of Cimon was yet great; his principal opponents apparently found it not a time for pushing matters to extremity against him, and such a defence sufficed to procure an honourable acquittal.

Meanwhile Lacedæmon had been in the utmost confusion and on the brink of ruin. The earthquake came suddenly at midday, with a violence before unheard of. The youths of the principal families, assembled in the gymnasium at the appointed hour for exercise, were in great numbers crushed by its fall: many of both sexes and of all ages were buried under the ruins of other buildings: the shocks were repeated; the earth opened in several places; vast fragments from the summits of Taygetus were tumbled down its sides: in the end only five houses remained standing in Sparta, and it was computed that twenty thousand lives were lost.

The first strokes of this awful calamity filled all ranks with the same apprehensions. But, in the continuance of it, that wretched multitude, excluded from all participation in the prosperity of their country, began to find hope on its distress: a proposal, obscurely made, was rapidly communicated, and the Helots assembled from various parts with one purpose, of putting their severe masters to death, and making the country their own. The ready foresight and prudent exertion of Archidamus, who had

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 101.
Diod. l. 11.
c. 63, 64.
Plut. v.
Cim.

CHAP.
XII.

succeeded his grandfather Leotychides in the throne of the house of Procles, preserved Lacedæmon. In the confusion of the first alarm, while some were endeavouring to save their most valuable effects from the ruins of the city, others flying various ways for personal safety, Archidamus, collecting what he could of his friends and attendants about him, caused trumpets to sound to arms, as if an enemy were at hand. The Lacedæmonians, universally trained to the strictest military discipline, obeyed the signal; arms were the only necessities sought; and civil rule, dissipated by the magnitude of the calamity, was, for the existing circumstances, most advantageously supplied by military order. The Helots, awed by the very unexpected appearance of a regular army instead of a confused and flying multitude, desisted from their meditated attempt; but, quitting the city, spread themselves over the country, and excited their fellows universally to rebellion.

Thueyd.
I. 1. c. 101.

The greater part of those miserable men, whom the Lacedæmonians held in so cruel a bondage, were descendants of the Messenians, men of the same blood with themselves, Greeks and Dorians. Memory of the wars of their ancestors, of their hero Aristomenes, and of the defence of Ithome, was not obsolete among them. Ithome accordingly they seized and made their principal post; and they so outnumbered the Lacedæmonians that, though deficiently armed, yet, being not without discipline acquired in attendance upon their masters in war, they were capable of being formidable even in the field. Nor was it thus only that the rebellion was distressing. The Lacedæmonians, singularly ready and able in the use of arms, were singularly helpless in almost every other business. Deprived of their slaves they were

nearly deprived of the means of subsistence; agriculture stopped, and mechanic arts ceased. Application was therefore made to the neighbouring allies for succour. The zealous friendship of the Æginetans upon the occasion we find afterward acknowledged by the Lacedæmonian government, and assistance came from as far as Plataea. Thus re-enforced the spirited and well directed exertions of Archidamus quickly so far reduced the rebellion that the insurgents remaining in arms were blockaded in Ithome. But the extraordinary natural strength of that place, the desperate obstinacy of the defenders, and the deficiency of the assailants in the science of attack, giving reason to apprehend that the business might not be soon accomplished, the Lacedæmonians sent to desire assistance from the Athenians, who were esteemed, beyond the other Greeks, experienced and skilful in the war of sieges.

This measure seems to have been on many accounts imprudent. There was found at Athens a strong disposition to refuse the aid. But Cimon, who, with a universal liberality, always professed particular esteem for the Lacedæmonians, prevailed upon his fellow-countrymen to take the generous part; and a considerable body of forces marched under his command into Peloponnesus. On their arrival at the camp of the besiegers an assault upon the place was attempted, but with so little success that recourse was again had to the old method of blockade. It was in the leisure of that inactive and tedious mode of attack that principally arose those heartburnings which first occasioned an avowed national aversion between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and led, not indeed immediately, but in a direct line, to the

SECT.
I.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 27.

l. 1. c. 101.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 64.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 102.
Diodor. ut
sup. Plut.
v. Cim.

B. C. 461.
Ol. 79. 3.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.

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fatal Peloponnesian war. All the prudence and all the authority of Cimon could not prevent the vivacious spirit of the Athenians from exulting, perhaps rather insultingly, in the new pre-eminence of their country: wherever danger called, they would be ostentatiously forward to meet it; and an assumed superiority, without a direct pretension to it, was continually appearing. The Spartan pride was offended by their arrogance; the Spartan gravity was disturbed by their lively forwardness: it began to be considered that, though Greeks, they were Ionians, whom the Peloponnesians considered as an alien race; and it occurred that if, in the continuance of the siege, any disgust should arise, there was no security that they might not renounce their present engagements, and even connect themselves with the Helots; who, as Greeks, had, not less than the Lacedæmonians, a claim to friendship and protection from every other Grecian people. Mistrust thus arose on one side; disgust became quickly manifest on both: and the Lacedæmonians shortly resolved to dismiss the Athenian forces. This however they endeavoured to do, as far as might be, without offence, by declaring that an 'assault having been found ineffectual, the 'assistance of the Athenians was superfluous for the 'blockade, and the Lacedæmonians would not give 'their allies unnecessary trouble.' All the other allies were however retained, and the Athenians alone returned home; so exasperated by this invidious distinction that, on their arrival at Athens, the party adverse to Cimon proposing a decree for renouncing the confederacy with Lacedæmon, it was carried. An alliance with Argos, the inveterate enemy of Sparta, immediately followed; and soon after the Thessalians acceded to the new confederacy.

While Lacedæmon was engaged with this dangerous insurrection, a petty war arose in Peloponnesus, affording one of the most remarkable, among the many strong instances on record, of the miseries to which the greater part of Greece was perpetually liable from the defects of its political system. Argos, the capital of Argolis, and formerly of Peloponnesus under the early kings of the Danaidean race, or perhaps before them, lost its pre-eminence, as we have already seen, during the reigns of the Persidean and Pelopidean princes, under whom Mycenæ became the first city of Greece. On the return of the Heraclidæ, Temenus fixed his residence at Argos, which thus regained its superiority. But, as the oppressions, arising from a defective political system, occasioned very generally through Greece the desire, so the troubles of the Argive government gave the means for the inferior towns to become independent republics. Like the rest, or perhaps more than the rest, generally oppressive, that government was certainly often ill-conducted and weak; and Lacedæmon, its perpetual enemy, fomented the rebellious disposition of its dependencies. During the ancient wars of Sparta and Messenia the Argives had expelled the people of their towns of Asinæa and Nauplia, and forced them to seek foreign settlements; a resource sufficiently marking a government both weak and oppressive. Mycenæ was now a much smaller town than Argos; but its people, encouraged by Lacedæmon, formed lofty pretensions. The far-famed temple of Juno, the tutelar deity of the country, situated about five miles from Argos, and little more than one from Mycenæ, was considered by the Argives as theirs; and, from the time, it was supposed, of the Heraclidæ, the priestess had been appointed

Diodor.
l. 11. c. 65.
Strabo,
l. 8. p. 377.
Pausan.
l. 2. c. 15.
l. 7. c. 25.
& l. 8. c. 33.

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and the sacred ceremonies administered under the protection of their government. Nevertheless the Mycenæans now claimed the right to this superintendency. The games of Nemea, from their institution, or, as it was called, their restoration, had been under the direction of the Argives; but the Mycenæan government claimed also the prior right to preside there. These however were but branches of a much more important claim; for they wanted only power, or sufficient assistance from Sparta, to assert a right of sovereignty over Argos itself and all Argolis; and they were continually urging another pretension, not the less invidious to Argos because better founded, a pretension to merit with all the Greek nation for having joined the confederacy against Persia, while the Argives allied themselves with the common enemy of Greece. The favourable opportunity afforded by the Helot rebellion was eagerly seized by the Argives for ridding themselves of such troublesome and dangerous neighbours, whom they considered as rebellious subjects. Laying siege to Mycenæ, they took the place, reduced the surviving people to slavery, and, dedicating a tenth of the spoil to the gods, destroyed the town, which was never rebuilt.

B. C. 464.
Ol. 78. 4.
[B. C.
468. Cl.]

SECTION II.

Change of administration at Athens, and banishment of Cimon. Renunciation of the Peloponnesian confederacy by Megara, and accession to the Athenian. Difficulties of the new Athenian administration: Ephialtes: Pericles: depression of the court of Areopagus: expedition to Egypt. War in Greece: siege of Ægina: relief of Megara by Myronides.

AT Athens, after the banishment of Themistocles, Cimon remained long in possession of a popularity

which nothing could resist; and his abilities, his successes, and his moderation, his connexion with the aristocratical interest, and his favour with the people, seemed altogether likely to insure, if anything could insure, permanency and quiet to his administration. But in Athens, as in every free government, there would always be a party adverse to the party in the direction of public affairs: matters had been for some time ripening for a change; and the renunciation of the Lacedæmonian alliance was the triumph of the opposition. The epithet *Philolacones*, friends to Lacedæmon, was circulated as the opprobrium of the existing administration. Cimon had always professed himself friendly to the Lacedæmonians, and an admirer of their institutions. His partiality had gone so far as to induce him to name his eldest son Lacedæmonius; and, the more completely to prove that he did not esteem the Athenian character a model of perfection, (apparently by way of admonition, both to his family and to his country,) he named his two other sons Thessalus and Eleus. All these circumstances were now turned to his disadvantage, with all the acrimony of party-spirit: a favourable moment was seized while the popular mind was heated; the ostracism was proposed and carried; and by his banishment the party in opposition to him became fully possessed of the government.

Plut. v.
Cim.

Plat. Gorg.
p. 516. t. 1.
Plut. &
Corn. Nep.
v. Cim.

In the divided state of Greece meanwhile circumstances were arising still to promote the power of the Athenian commonwealth. An ancient dispute between Megara and Corinth about the limits of their respective territories led to hostilities, in which the Megarians were pressed by the superior strength of their enemy. Megara was of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, but so also was Corinth, and the leading

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 103.

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Megarians could obtain no partial favour from the Lacedæmonian government. Under these circumstances the democratical party in Megara proposing to renounce the Peloponnesian for the Athenian confederacy, the oligarchal was obliged to yield. The situation and circumstances of their territory gave them importance. Almost wholly mountainous, it formed a very strong frontier for Attica against Peloponnesus : its situation against the isthmus completely commanded the communication by land between the peninsular and northern Greece : and its ports of Nisæa on the Saronic and Pegæ on the Corinthian gulf were valuable acquisitions to a maritime power ; on one side depriving the enemy of means to annoy Attica, on the other affording opportunity to distress the Peloponnesians, and to extend the Athenian command in the western seas. The new Athenian administration therefore very gladly accepted the proposal of the Megarians, and, under pretence of providing in the most effectual manner for the security of their new allies, they took the most effectual measures for holding them in subjection. Athenian garrisons were placed, not only in the port of Pegæ, but also in the city of Megara ; those who led the Megarian affairs submitting to this through fear of domestic, far more than of foreign foes. Fortifications were then raised connecting the city with its port of Nisæa, and these brought Megara itself in some degree under the controul of the Athenian fleet.

These circumstances, employing the minds of the Athenian people and flattering their ambition, were favourable to the new administration. Probably also the party in Megara, which effected the revolution there, would not so readily have connected themselves with the former Athenian administration, which was

better disposed toward Lacedæmon, and less friendly to unbalanced democracy. But the liberality of Cimon was quickly missed: to equal it from their own stores was beyond the private means of the new rulers; yet to find means for gratifying the people as they had been accustomed to be gratified, or even more, was absolutely necessary for those who took the lead in public affairs, if they would hold their situation, or if they would avoid the risk even of taking the place of Cimon in banishment. The public treasury tempted; but all issues thence were under the controul of the court of Areopagus, a large majority in which was of the aristocratical party, adverse to them and friendly to Cimon. No resource occurred but in that despotic power which the people in assembly might arrogate: the people might probably be persuaded to consent to the prostitution of the public money to their private emolument; and while thus, in reality, they bribed themselves, popular favour would accrue to the advisers of the gratifying measure. This was indeed hazardous in the extreme: the great barrier established by the constitution against excess of popular caprice would be done away: but the necessities of the administration were pressing; and the leading men, it was hoped, might still be able, by their influence, or their oratory, to guide the proceedings of the general assembly.

It was indeed not by ordinary men that Cimon was removed from his situation at the head of the commonwealth, and that these violent and hazardous changes were made. The ostensible head of the party was Ephialtes; but Pericles, son of Xanthippus, had lately been gaining a superiority in popular estimation. Pericles possessed extraordinary advantages from nature and from fortune. His father, a man of

SECT.
II.

Plut. v.
Cim. &
Pericl.

Plut. v.
Pericl.

Corn. Nep.
& Plut. v.
Pericl.

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Plut. v.
Pericl.
Plat.
Alcib. 1.
p. 118. t. 2.

Plat. *ibid.*

Plut. v.
Pericl.

one of the first families of Athens, and of large property, had distinguished himself in the prosecution of the great Miltiades, and had afterward much more advantageously distinguished himself in the command of the Athenian forces on the glorious day of Mycale. He married Agariste, niece of Clisthenes, chief of the Alcmaeonidean family, and leader of the party that expelled the Pisistratidæ. Their son, born with uncommon abilities, was educated under the ablest of those fathers of science and fine taste who at this time arose in Athens, or resorted thither from the various establishments of the Greek nation. Anaxagoras and Pythocles are mentioned as the instructors of his youth; Damon as the companion of his riper years. It was observed by old men that in person, manner, and voice he remarkably resembled Pisistratus: and this circumstance, communicated among a superstitious people, infused a jealousy that long deterred him from putting himself forward in public business. In his youth therefore arms employed his active hours, and science was the pursuit of his leisure. But when, Aristides being dead, Themistocles banished, and Cimon mostly absent on military commands, no superior man remained to take the lead in the popular assembly, Pericles was induced to show himself. His powers of eloquence far exceeded those of any orator of his age; and his speeches were distinguished by a new polish of style and manner which singularly captivated the Athenian people. His family-interest and his party-connexions joined to put him in unavoidable opposition to the aristocratical interest; which his private judgment and private inclination otherwise disposed him to support. He had taken a part in the prosecution instituted against Cimon on his return from the con-

quest of Thasos : yet the moderation with which he conducted himself in it showed private esteem in the midst of political opposition. The banishment by ostracism being reputed not a punishment, or at least no disgrace, he did not scruple to concur in such a measure, when its consequence would be to give his own party complete possession of the government. He was then induced, by the necessities of that party, to concur in the proposal, so fatal to the Athenian constitution, for contracting the powers and reducing the dignity of the court of Areopagus. Ephialtes was the instrument to bring forward the measure. What Ephialtes proposed the people willed, and it was done : the more important of those causes which, under the constitution of Solon, were cognisable by the court of Areopagus only, in future were to be brought before the assembly of the people ; and the assembly of the people was to direct, without controul, issues from the public treasury.³ This was the finishing stroke to form at Athens that union of all the powers of government, legislative, executive, financial, and judicial, in the same hands, which, according to the sage Montesquieu, constitutes the essence of despotism ; and hence the term tyrant was, even in that age, applied to the assembled Athenian people.⁴

Arist. Polit.
l. 2. c. 12.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 77.
Plut. v.
Cim. &
Pericl.

An individual despot has generally his favourites, who govern him, but a despotic multitude must ne-

³ Dodwell refers this transaction to the year B. C. 462., the year, according to him, preceding the banishment of Cimon ; but his proof is very deficient. I think Diodorus more probably right, in placing it in the first year of the 80th Olympiad, B. C. 460.

⁴ πάντες ἄν-
θρωποι δεδίασι σ' ὥσ-
περ ἄνδρα τύραννον.

Aristoph. Eq. v. 1112.

Ὡςπερ τυράννω, τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι.—Aristot. Polit. l. 2. c. 12.
Quotations from Thucydides, equally strong to the same purpose, will be found in following notes.

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cessarily have its favourites to guide its measures. The favourite of the multitude then becomes the real despot ; whence, among the Greeks, demagogues were so frequently qualified with the title of tyrant. Under the direction of Ephialtes, Pericles, and some other leading men, new or increased pay was given to the people for attendance upon the general assemblies and the courts of judicature : amusements the most elegant were provided for their leisure at the public expense : the sublime dramas of Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and the jocose satire of the comic poets, were alternately exhibited in magnificent theatres : the religious festivals were increased in number and celebrated with new splendour : on days of business the pay for attending the courts and assemblies fed the many ; on holidays the numerous victims of the sacrifices feasted them. But to support the increased expenses new supplies were necessary. The commanding power of the Athenian people, and the depression of the allies, were thought now so established that the former might exercise, and the latter must bear, any tyranny. Not only therefore the common treasury of the confederacy was removed from Delos to Athens ⁵, but the moderate assessment of Aristides, to which all the allies had cheerfully submitted, was greatly advanced. If disputes arose, the tribunals of Athens were to decide ; and hence new profit, new power, and very flattering distinction

Xenoph.
Resp.
Athen.

⁵ That this removal took place, and about this time, seems unquestionable, though Thucydides has not particularly mentioned it. Plutarch, in his Life of Aristides, quotes Theophrastus for its being the act of Aristides, with whose character it seems less congenial. In his Life of Pericles, he makes that able but less scrupulous statesman apologise for it as his act, and with this the account of Justin corresponds.

to even the meanest of the Athenians, who were to be judges, with most grievous humiliation and oppression to the people of those subject states which were still called allies.

These circumstances superinduced new necessity for maintaining the navy in vigour. But to be maintained in vigour it must be employed: and it was highly desirable that it should be employed, as under Cimon it had been, so as to bring new gratification to the people, and at the same time to acquire something toward the expense of its own maintenance. Cyprus appearing the most inviting object then in view, a fleet of two hundred trireme galleys was sent thither under Charitimis.⁶ But shortly a more alluring field of action presented itself.

In the relaxation of the Persian government during the last years of Xerxes, and the confusion which followed his death, Inarus, chief of some African tribes on the western border of Egypt, engaged the greater part of that rich country in rebellion. But when the empire became again settled under Artaxerxes, apprehensive that he should be unable to withstand its collected force, which would probably be soon directed against him, he looked round for foreign alliance. The little Athenian commonwealth, commanding the navy of the Grecian confederacy,

Thucyd.
1.1. c. 104.
Diodor.
1.11. c. 71.

⁶ Barthelemy (Anacharsis, p. 269. v. 1. ed. 8vo.) gives the command of this expedition to Cimon, and quotes Thucydides and Plutarch. He has probably trusted to his memory, which has deceived him. Neither Thucydides, nor Plutarch, nor Diodorus has mentioned the commander's name. It is here given on the authority of Ctesias. I will however say for Barthelemy that, for myself, I prefer a writer who, if he makes a mistake, may be corrected from the authority which himself quotes, to those who fastidiously require their readers to believe all on their own assertion.

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XII.Thucyd.
I. 4. c. 33.

was at this time by far the first maritime power in the world : and the difficulty of approach to Egypt by land, together with the command which the Persian monarch possessed of the Phenician navy, made a maritime ally of great importance to Inarus. The Grecian infantry of this age was also not less beyond all other in esteem ; and though, among themselves, the Peloponnesian, and especially the Lacedæmonian, had the reputation of superiority, yet among foreigners no Grecian name was of higher renown than the Athenian. Inarus therefore sent to Athens proposals of alliance ; offering very advantageous returns for assistance to complete the deliverance of Egypt from the Persian dominion.

Hist. of the
World,
b. 2. c. 7.
s. 5.

Sir Walter Raleigh, who looked upon this part of history certainly with a master's eye, but with too transient a glance, has imputed folly to the Athenian government for their conduct ; when, having it in their power to make the valuable acquisition of Cyprus, which their naval force would have enabled them to keep, they quitted so desirable an object for the wild project of acquiring dominion on the continent of Africa. If indeed the Athenian empire, as the confederacy under the controul of the Athenian commonwealth is often called by ancient writers, had been connected by any regular and settled form of government, or if the constitution of Athens itself had been such as to be capable of carrying any steady command, the observation would certainly have been just. But the circumstances of Athens offer at least an apology for those able men who promoted the expedition to Egypt. For, however valuable an acquisition Cyprus might in time have been made, under such a course of prudent and steady management as the constitution of Athens seemed utterly

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to deny, the wealth of Egypt was a far more tempting present object. There, it was hoped, victories might be obtained to rival those of Cimon; which through the ransom of wealthy prisoners, the spoils of Persian camps, and the produce of Thracian mines, had wonderfully enriched individuals and supplied the public treasury. Charitimus therefore was ordered to lead the whole force under his command from Cyprus to the Nile. His rapid success appeared at first to justify the enterprise: all yielded before him till he arrived at Memphis, the capital of Lower Egypt, and he possessed himself of two divisions out of three which composed that vast city. A numerous body of Persians, and of those Egyptians who had not joined in the revolt, retiring into the third division, prepared for a vigorous defence.

B. C. 459.⁷
Ol. 80. $\frac{1}{2}$.*

Thucyd.
l. 1. p. 102.
Diodor.
l. 9. c. 73.
Ctes. Persic.
B. C. 458.
Ol. 80. $\frac{3}{4}$.

Meanwhile the acquisition of Megara had involved Athens in war with the Corinthians, and in some measure with the whole Peloponnesian confederacy, of which Corinth was an important member, and Lacedæmon remained the head. In a descent at Haliæ, on the Argolic coast, their forces were defeated by the Corinthians assisted by the Epidaurians. Shortly after, in a naval action off Cecryphalia, the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians. The Æginetan fleet, which was considerable, then joined the Corinthian; and the assistance of the other Peloponnesian allies being called in, the Athenians also collected the

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 105.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 78.

⁷ I know not why, for the dates of the Egyptian war, Dodwell has given implicit credit to Diodorus, who, in regard to these, is as evidently contradictory to Thucydides, as he is clearly proved wrong by Dodwell himself, in regard to many preceding transactions. The account of Thucydides however not sufficing to ascertain the dates, they can be assigned only by conjecture. [* Mr. Clinton places the commencement of the Egyptian war B.C. 460. See note on the date of its termination, p. 265.]

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Arist. Rhet.
1. 3. c. 10.
Plut. v.
Pericl.

naval force of their confederacy. An action ensued, in which the Athenians gained a complete victory, took seventy ships, and then landing upon Ægina, under the conduct of Leocrates, laid siege to the capital town. It was an object, urged by Pericles, to subdue that island, which, from its situation, its naval strength, and the active and adverse temper of its people, he called emphatically the eye-sore of Piræus. The same circumstances made the Peloponnesians the more anxious to provide for its defence. Three hundred heavy-armed Corinthians and Epidaurians were introduced into the place. A larger re-enforcement might have endangered a failure of provisions, while the Athenians commanded the sea ; but, to give more effectual relief, the Corinthians invaded the Megarian territory, seized the heights of Gerania commanding the passage from the isthmus into northern Greece, and advanced toward Megara ; in confidence that, while so large a part of the Athenian force was absent in Egypt, either Megara must be exposed, or the siege of Ægina raised.

Thucyd.
1. 1. c. 105.

While, from the division of Greece into so many little republics, great talents were mostly confined within a very narrow circle, whence they could scarcely by any possibility emerge, the circumstances of Athens, little favourable to private security or domestic happiness, gave singular opportunity and ample scope for genius, wherever it existed among the people, to come forward and exert itself : and Athens was fruitful of great men at this period. Among those less known to fame, but high in merit, was Myronides, who, upon the present occasion, was appointed to the command of the forces ; for such was the general spirit of the Athenian people that, the leading men dreading the imputation of a timid policy, it was determined, with such an army as could

Ibid.

yet be collected within Attica, old men chiefly and boys, to march to the relief of Megara, rather than recal their more vigorous troops from a favourite enterprise. Myronides, with the army, such as it was, under his command, did not scruple to meet the flower of the Corinthian youth; and, though the event would not justify the boast of a decisive victory, he remained master of the field, and erected on it his trophy. The Corinthians, retreating within their own territory, were ill received by their fellow-citizens; who upbraided them with their inglorious return from a fruitless expedition, in which they had yielded the honour of the day to an enemy unable to conquer them. Urged by shame, and under no good conduct, on the twelfth day from the battle, the Corinthian youth returned to the field; and, to vindicate their honour, erected their own trophy in claim of victory. The able Myronides, using an advantageous opportunity for issuing with his motley troops from the walls of Megara, destroyed the detachment employed to erect the trophy, and then attacking the supporting army, put it completely to rout. A large body of the vanquished, pressed in their flight by the conquerors, and missing their road, entered an enclosure surrounded by a ditch, so wide and deep as to preclude passage. The Athenians, apprised of this, secured the only outlet with a sufficient body of their heavy-armed, and then disposing their light-armed around, plied their missile weapons so effectually that every Corinthian within perished. Corinth was so weakened by this severe blow as to be for some time incapable of any considerable exertion. It will be no wonder then if, after so cruel a use of the right of war, animosity and even hatred toward the Athenian people should be found popular

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 106.

passions at Corinth, and not dying with the existing generation, but passing to their children, and in the end bringing no small return of evil upon Athens.

SECTION III.

War between Doris and Phocis. Hostilities resulting between Athens and Lacedæmon: battle of Tanagra. Affairs of Bœotia: battle of Œenophyta: successes of the Athenians under Myronides. Ægina taken. Successes of the Athenians under Tolmides: Messenians established in Naupactus. Conclusion of the Egyptian expedition. War in Thessaly. Expedition under Pericles to the western coast of Greece.

LACEDÆMON, weakened by natural calamity, pressed by domestic disturbance, and usually slow in councils, had not been induced by the revolt of Megara, nor by the sufferings of so close an ally as Corinth, added to the inimical measures before taken by Athens, to come to an open rupture with that rising rival. But the division of Greece into so many little states precluded the possibility of secure peace through the country; and hostilities, begun in any obscure corner, always endangered the tranquillity of the whole. The rugged province of Doris, the mother-country of the greater part of the Peloponnesians, destitute of any considerable city, had three small towns, Bœon, Cytinion, Erineon, (names hardly elsewhere occurring in Grecian history,) in which the little public business of so poor and thinly peopled a territory was transacted. The Phocians, invading Doris, took one of those towns. The Lacedæmonians, who always bore a religious regard for their mother-country, were no sooner informed of its distress than they prepared to relieve it. Fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their own people, with no less than ten thousand of their allies, which, with the light-armed slaves attending, would make

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 107.

B. C. 457.
Ol. 80. $\frac{3}{4}$.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.

an army of perhaps twenty-five thousand men, marched toward Phocis. Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus commanded, as regent during the minority of his nephew, Plistoanax son of Pausanias, to whom the sceptre of Sparta had fallen by the premature death of Plistarchus son of Leonidas. The Phocians, unable to resist such a force, surrendered the Dorian town, and submitted to the conditions imposed by the Lacedæmonians.

There were at this time some of the aristocratical party in Athens so far from considering Lacedæmon as a hostile state, that they looked toward it for relief from the oppression which they suffered under the present administration of their country, and for the restoration of that constitution under which Athens had become great, and without which they thought it could not long flourish. Accordingly they opened a secret correspondence with Nicomedes. But the same circumstances, which led the partisans of aristocracy to desire a friendly connexion with Sparta, induced the leaders of the democratical interest, now ruling the republic, to confirm and inflame the animosity of the people against that state, and to persuade them of its determined enmity to Athens. It was therefore resolved to oppose the return of the Peloponnesian army into the peninsula, and means were much in their power: for possessing the strong places of Megara on one side of the isthmus, and Pegæ on the other, and keeping a guard on mount Gerania, they completely commanded the passes by land; and the port of Pegæ, together with an interest which they possessed among the towns of the Achæan coast, enabled them to keep a fleet in the Corinthian gulf, which would prevent an army from crossing it. Nicomedes was in consequence much at

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 107.

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a loss what measures to take ; but some political intrigues at Thebes, together with the overtures received from the aristocratical party at Athens, determined him to wait and watch opportunities ; and he wintered in Bœotia.⁸

This was highly suspicious to the Athenian administration. They had expected that the approach of the severe season, and the impatience of his troops, would have urged Nicomedes to the hazardous attempt of forcing the passage of the mountains : but observing no appearance of a disposition to move from his present situation, and suspecting intrigue, they resolved in the spring to attack him in the plain. A body of cavalry, which they obtained from their allies of Thessaly, they hoped would enable them to do this with advantage. Collecting therefore what other auxiliary troops they readily could, among which were a thousand from Argos, they formed, with their own forces, a body of fourteen thousand heavy-armed foot. These, with the cavalry and the attending slaves, would make an army of scarcely less than thirty thousand men, with which they marched into Bœotia. Nicomedes met them at Tanagra, and a severe action ensued, so equally maintained, that neither side could claim the victory. It was renewed on the following day, when the treachery of the Thessalian horse compelled the Athenians, after great slaughter on both sides, to leave the Peloponnesians masters of the field. Nicomedes then, plundering and wasting the Megarian territory as he

B. C. 456.
Ol. 80. 4.
[B. C. 457.
about Nov.
Cl.]

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 108.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 80.
Pausan.
l. 1. c. 29.

⁸ The chronology of Diodorus here so accords with and illustrates the summary narrative of Thucydides that he may have credit for this circumstance, not specified by Thucydides. [See Mr. Clinton's examination of this statement, as well as the defence of his date appended in the margin, quoted below, p. 260.]

passed it, without attempting to make any farther use of his victory, returned into Peloponnesus.

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The Thebans, always claiming rights of sovereignty over the other towns of Bœotia, but humbled by the event of the Persian war, had judged the opportunity favourable, while the Peloponnesian army lay in their neighbourhood, to attempt the recovery of their ancient authority. With this view they had engaged in a treaty with the Spartans; who readily acceded to the purpose of enabling a city, without Peloponnesus, to balance the power and curb the ambition of Athens. Thus most of the Bœotian towns seem to have been terrified into a composition: they were admitted to the honour and advantages of the Peloponnesian confederacy, as dependents of Thebes; acknowledging the supremacy of that city for superintending the general protection, and, for that purpose, directing the military affairs of all the Bœotian people.⁹ Whatever within Bœotia was immoveably adverse to their proposal, and particularly the heroic little commonwealth of Plataea, the ancient and faithful ally of Athens, was of course to be oppressed. Phocis and the Opuntian Locrians joined in their alliance.

Diodor.
l. 11. c. 80.
Herodot.
l. 6. c. 108.
Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 61.

Neither the force however nor the spirit of Athens were broken by the check received at Tanagra. As soon as the motions in Bœotia were known, it was determined to obviate their effects. Myronides was appointed general of the Athenian forces. On the

⁹ ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, according to the expression which Thucydides puts into the mouth of a Theban orator (l. 3. c. 61.). The value of this term is in some degree to be collected from a following passage (c. 67.) in the speech of the same orator, addressing himself to the Lacedæmonians: ἡγεμόνες, ὥσπερ νῦν ἵμεῖς.

B. C. 456
Ol. 81. 1.
Thueyd.
l. 1. c. 108.

sixty-second day after the unfortunate action of Tanagra he met the Bœotian army, much more numerous than his own, at Cœnophyta, and gained a

¹⁰ I think Dodwell clearly right in placing this event one year later than Diodorus, who has crowded together transactions that could not have passed within the year. Allowing this, the account of Diodorus will assist to illustrate that of Thucydides. The battle of Tanagra was fought in the spring of the year 456. before Christ, toward the conclusion of the fourth year of the eightieth Olympiad; for the Olympian year began a little after midsummer. The battle of Cœnophyta was fought in the beginning of the first year of the eighty-first Olympiad, in the autumn of the same year, before Christ 456.*

Thucydides says that the Peloponnesian army, in passing through the Megaris, after the battle of Tanagra, cut down the trees. Smith, in his translation of Thucydides, interprets *δενδροτομήσιντες* by the expression, *having cut down the woods*. The mistake is of a kind that an Englishman who never travelled in more southern countries might easily fall into, if he did not consider how little it could answer the Spartan general's purpose to delay his march by such laborious waste as that of cutting down, what in English is properly called, *woods*. Thucydides

[* On Mr. Mitford's dates and reasoning here Mr. Clinton makes the following observations:—' In fact Dodwell never questions Diodorus in placing the Theban war in Olymp. 80. 4., and distinctly asserts that the battle of Tanagra took place in the autumn of that year in which the Lacedæmonian army returned from its campaign in Doris. According to Mr. Mitford's date that army must have kept the field without hazarding a passage through the winter: for which he quotes Diodorus, giving him credit for this circumstance, not specified by Thucydides. [Note, p. 258.] But the two historians are at variance. In Thucydides, the Lacedæmonians after the action at Tanagra effect their passage home through the Isthmus: in Diodorus, it would seem that they remained in Bœotia till the battle of Cœnophyta, at which, according to his account, the Lacedæmonians assisted; while Thucydides mentions no Lacedæmonian forces at Cœnophyta. Plato (Menex. p. 242. b.) agrees with Thucydides in both these particulars: and Aristides (Panath. p. 156.) argues upon the assumption that the Lacedæmonians withdrew immediately after the battle of Tanagra.' To these remarks he subjoins in a note: 'Plutarch is aptly quoted by Dodwell to confirm the fact that the battle of Tanagra was fought in winter: Cimon. c. 17. νενικημένοι ἐν Τανάγρα, καὶ προσδοκῶντες εἰς ἄραν ἔτους στρατεῖαν Πελοποννησίων ἐπ' αὐτούς. Pericl. c. 110. ἡττημένους ἐπὶ τῶν ἄραν τῆς Ἀττικῆς, προσδοκῶντας δὲ καὶ βαρὺν εἰς ἔτους ἄραν πόλεμον. "Ωρα ἔτους would be 'the ensuing spring.' We may therefore place the battle of Tanagra about November; towards the end of autumn or beginning of winter.' Fasti Hellen. p. 255.]

complete victory. Tanagra was taken and dismantled; through all the towns encouragement was communicated to the democratical party, everywhere adverse to the Lacedæmonian connexion; and all Bœotia, except Thebes, was rapidly brought into alliance with Athens, which was, in effect, to be under its dominion.

The democratical party was strong in the neighbouring country of Phocis, yet the oligarchal, supported by Thebes and Lacedæmon, still prevailed there. Myronides without loss of time entered that province, and, overbearing opposition, committed the power in all the towns to those whose interest would keep them dependent on Athens; and thus Phocis, like Bœotia, became an appendage of the Athenian empire. The Opuntian Locrians, more attached to their oligarchal government and the Lacedæmonian alliance, but dreading the attack with which they next were threatened, delivered a hundred of their principal men as hostages to ensure the compliance of their state with terms imposed. This campaign of Myronides, though no detail of it remained even in the time of Diodorus, was esteemed equal to the most brilliant achievements of the Athenian arms.¹¹

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 95.

has intended only, or almost only, fruit-trees, principally olives and vines. He mentions no other waste, the corn having been probably not forward enough to be readily destroyed.

¹¹ Thucydides in his concise mention of the expedition under Myronides, though he particularises that the battle of Cænophyta was fought on the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra, does not name Thebes. I have been very cautious of following any other writer, in relating the transactions of these times, when not in some degree supported by him. Diodorus tells of many glorious and very surprising feats of Grecian arms, utterly unknown to Thucydides; of which his account of the expeditions to Cyprus and to Egypt afford some remarkable instances. They may however be nearly paralleled out of Livy; who tells of many victories gained by the Roman arms against the forces of Hannibal in Italy, and leaves us to wonder why they had no

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Thucyd.
l. i. c. 108.
B. C. 456.
Ol. 81. 1.*

It was no small addition to the joy, which the important conquests of Myronides gave at Athens, that about the same time Leocrates returned victorious over the little barren island of Ægina. Cut off from all relief, through the command which the Athenians possessed of the sea, the Æginetans had at length capitulated: their ships of war were surrendered, their fortifications were demolished, and they bound themselves to the payment of a perpetual tribute.

The Greeks, it has already occurred to remark, and will again occur, both coveted and dreaded maritime situation. Solicitous for communication with the sea, they nevertheless generally avoided for their towns, but especially for a town the seat of a government, a site immediately on the shore. Athens was five miles from its port. But thus while one danger was obviated another was incurred. An enemy superior in the field, though unable to force either city or port, might put both in danger, and especially distress the city, by stopping communication between them. Athens was peculiarly liable to this inconvenience since it was become an imperial city; consequences, till, upon looking into Polybius, we find the greatest reason to believe that they never had more than an imaginary existence. There is seldom equal temptation to romance concerning circumstances merely political. The narrative of Thucydides, in the part in question, though it may have sufficed for his contemporaries, and for his particular view in the prefatory part of his work, leaves us totally uninformed of the motives to the Bæotian war. These however may be gathered from some passages which afterward occur in his History (l. 3. c. 62. & 95.), and from what we find in Plato on the subject (Menex. p. 242. t. 2.); and thus what is here supplied from Diodorus, in itself probable, and consistent with every authenticated fact, appears sufficiently established.

[* Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 256., seems to bring the surrender of Ægina down to B.C. 455. In the Summary of Thucydides it is placed after the completion of the long walls: . . . τὰ τε τείχη τὰ ἐαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ ἐπετέλεσαν. Ὀμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ Αἰγινῆται μετὰ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, κ. τ. λ. i. 108.]

cause, to maintain empire, a large part of the strength of the city must be on distant service often, ready for it always, and the remainder, it had been found now by experience, hardly sufficed for remaining probable needs.

But, for a long course of years after the banishment, and even after the death of Themistocles, the spirit of that great man seemed to animate the Athenian councils. In all the changes of administration measures were in a great degree directed by the political principles which he first conceived, and of which he so forcibly demonstrated the advantage in practice: his ideas for ensuring safety, for acquiring power, for extending dominion, continued to be carried into execution. In prosecution of them, and with a spirit which distinguishes this age of Greece, and particularly of Athens, a very great and very costly work had been some time since begun; no less than to unite the city with its ports by strong fortifications, which might secure the communication against any interruption from an enemy. A wall was conducted to Phalerum, the distance about four miles, and another to Piræus, five miles, with towers at proper intervals. Thus Athens and Piræus came to be often distinguished by the names of the upper and the lower town, as two parts only of the same city. This great work was completed in the summer in which the empire of the Athenian people was extended so widely over the northern continent of Greece by the conquests of Myronides, and their maritime superiority was assured by the surrender of Ægina to the armament under Leocrates.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 107.
& l. 2. c. 13.

B. C. 456.
Ol. 81. 1.
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 108.

Confident now in their strength, the Athenian government resolved to prosecute offensive operations against their Peloponnesian enemies. Tolmides, with

Thucyd. ib.
B. C. 455.
Ol. 81. ½.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.

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a strong squadron under his command, sailing round Peloponnesus, burnt the Lacedæmonian naval arsenal at Gythium, and, proceeding into the Corinthian gulf, debarked his forces, defeated the Sicyonians in an action by land, and took the town of Chalcis, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Ætolia. It was not till the tenth year of the blockade of Ithome that the Helots there had been induced to capitulate; and they obtained liberty for themselves and their families, upon condition however that they should finally quit Peloponnesus. Tolmides collected those fugitives, and settled them at Naupactus, on the northern shore of the Corinthian gulf, which he conquered from the Ozolian Locrians. There with the revived name of Messenians, which they had never entirely lost, forming a free republic, or at least a republic of free citizens under the protection of Athens, they became once more numbered among the Grecian people.

While success was so generally attending the Athenians within Greece, their forces engaged in the distant operations in Egypt were experiencing a variety of fortune. Grecian valour and Grecian discipline at first so overbore the efforts of oriental arms that the Persian government was at a loss what to oppose to them. The measure taken marks very strongly what may be the weakness of despotic empire, while its territory and population are immense. Megabazus was sent with a large sum of money to Lacedæmon, to endeavour to obtain by bribes the alliance of that little republic, and procure the invasion of Attica by a Peloponnesian army. It tells very highly to the honour of the Spartan government of the time, from an Athenian writer almost contemporary, that Sparta was not to be bribed to a

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 109.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 74.

measure to which resentment, ambition, and political interest contributed so powerfully to incite. Megabazus, after having spent a part of his treasures uselessly, in ways which Thucydides does not explain, returned with the remainder into Asia, without having in any degree accomplished his purpose.

Then at length measures more consonant to the former dignity of the empire were taken for the recovery of Egypt. A very numerous army was assembled on the confines of Cilicia and Syria, and a fleet was prepared in Phenicia and the other maritime provinces. Megabazus, or Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, head of one of the six great families of Persia, was appointed to the command in chief. The spring and summer were employed in collecting troops; the autumn and winter in the endeavour to restore discipline and skill in arms among them; in the following spring Megabyzus led them into Egypt. His measures appear to have been judicious, and correspondent success followed. The Egyptians venturing a battle were defeated. The little army of Greeks, compelled to raise the siege of the White-castle of Memphis, retired into an island of the Nile called Prosopitis, where their fleet joined them. In this strong situation their valour and discipline defied the Persian assaults. Wealth and numbers however, under able management, may supply great deficiencies. Forming dikes and cutting water-courses, Megabyzus drained the channel in which the Athenian galleys lay; and while he thus made the fleet useless, which had been hitherto a great annoyance to him, he laid the army open to wide attack. Thus, after a siege of eighteen months, he took Prosopitis: a part

SECT.
III.

B. C. 457.
Ol. 90. $\frac{3}{4}$.
Thucyd. ib.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 75.

B. C. 456.
Ol. $\frac{80}{81}$. 1.

B. C. 454.
Ol. 81. $\frac{3}{4}$
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 110.
[B. C. 455.
Cl.*]

[* Mr. Clinton remarks that Mr. Mitford justly rejects Dodwell's chronology, founded on Diodorus, for the dates of the Egyptian war; 'but,' he adds, 'in fixing its termination at B. C. 454. he seems to have brought it down one year

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of the Grecian troops, forcing their way through Libya, escaped to Cyrene; but the greater part perished. Inarus, the mover of the war, betrayed by his followers, was put to death by crucifixion; and all Egypt, except the marshes, held by a chief named Amyrtæus, submitted again to the Persian dominion.

The misfortunes of the Athenian arms in this part of the world did not close thus. Fifty trireme galleys, going to Egypt, to relieve an equal number of the fleet there, entered the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, ignorant of what had happened. The Phenician fleet attacked them with superior force in the river, while the Persian army assisted from the shore: a few ships forced their way to sea and escaped, but the greater part were destroyed or taken. Such was the conclusion of the Athenian enterprise against Egypt, when it had been carried on six years.

Ch. 1. s. 3.
& ch. 5. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Circumstances meanwhile were arising still to extend the devastation of war within Greece. The early eminence of the Thessalians, and the following troubled state of their country, and the consequent deficiency of its history, have occurred heretofore for notice. Hereditary royalty seems to have been abolished there about the same age as in the southern provinces of Greece, so that every Thessalian town became a republic claiming independency. The expediency of some political union, such that the weaker might not be oppressed by the stronger, nor the stronger by a coalition of many weaker, was

' too low. For Thucydides plainly determines that they *still held out* at the time
' of the expedition into Thessaly, which was followed by the campaign of Pericles.
' The campaign of Tolmides is fixed to B.C. 455. by the surrender of Ithome,
' with which it is coincident: and the campaign of Pericles is fixed to the autumn
' of B.C. 454. The Egyptian war then ended in the course of the year 455.'
Fasti Hellen. p. 256.]

nevertheless admitted as desirable ; and the possibility of need for all to hold union for resistance to a foreign enemy was obvious. A superintending authority was therefore committed to a general assembly of deputies from all the towns ; a kind of states-general or parliament. Experience of war then had been sufficient among them to establish conviction of the necessity for simplicity in military command. To supply this part of the office of the kings of old therefore a commander in chief was elected, apparently for unlimited time, with the peculiar title of Tagus ; and, as to the generals in chief of the Athenian republic, so still more to those of the Thessalian confederacy, it was found expedient to commit a considerable share of civil superintendency.

Occasion will occur hereafter to observe that the union of the Thessalian republics was extremely imperfect, so that the office of tagus would be likely to be often of great difficulty. Contention for more power on his side, jealousy, and often unreasonable opposition, on the part of those who led the counsels of the several republics, could not fail to ensue. At the time of which we are treating the tagus Orestes, son of Echecratides, styled by Thucydides king of Thessaly¹², was compelled to fly his country. In no other part of Greece was the distinction of nobility and commonalty so maintained as in Thessaly. Circumstances make it probable that Orestes had been raised by the favour of the many, or, after his elevation,

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 111.

¹² Probably an Athenian version of the title tagus, peculiar to Thessaly, as consul to the first magistrates, chief military commanders at Rome, and suffetes to those of Carthage. These we find the Greek writers designated by their term *basileus*, king, though the character of their office was more nearly that of the Roman consuls.

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B. C. 454.
Ol. 81. 3.

courting their support, had been expelled by the order of nobles. He implored assistance from Athens. The Athenian people, exasperated against the Thessalian government for the treachery of their troops in the affair of Tanagra, and the Athenian chiefs, hoping to secure an effectual interest in that rich and populous province by supporting an opposing party, concurred in zeal for the cause of the young prince. An army composed of the newly acquired auxiliary force of Bœotia and Phocis, together with a body of Athenian troops, was placed under the command of Myronides. He entered Thessaly, and penetrated as far as Pharsalus. But with the usual deficiency of the southern Greek armies in cavalry, he was unable to contend with the Thessalian horse in the Thessalian plains. In the field wherever he turned his force nothing ventured to resist him; but he could detach nothing, and, according to the expression of Thucydides, beyond the immediate reach of his arms he could keep nothing. After an ineffectual attempt therefore upon the city of Pharsalus, he withdrew his army from Thessaly and returned to Athens.

Meanwhile the leading men in the Athenian councils were still directing their attention to extend the power of the republic on all sides. Masters of the Ægean sea, with the greater part of its shores and islands, and commanding a large proportion of the continent of Greece, they had great influence even in Peloponnesus. Argos was connected with them by its own necessary interest: the greater part of Achaia was in their dependency; and, possessing Naupactus near the entrance and Pegæ at the bottom of the Corinthian gulf, they commanded its navigation. With the general view apparently to protect

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 111.
& 115. &
l. 4. c. 21.
Plut. v.
Pericl.

their allies, molest their enemies, and extend their authority and influence, as opportunity might offer, a thousand Athenian soldiers were put aboard the squadron lying at Pegæ, and the command was committed to Pericles. Crossing the gulf, the troops were landed on the territory of Sicyon; and, the Sicyonians quitting their walls to protect their fields, Pericles gave them battle and defeated them. Then taking aboard a re-enforcement of Achæans, he proceeded to the Acarnanian coast, and after an unsuccessful attempt upon Cœniadæ, but not without a large collection of booty from the territory, always a great object of ancient warfare¹³, he conducted his squadron home.

SECT.
IV.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 111.
Diodor.
l. 11. c. 84.
& 87.
Plut. v.
Pericl.

SECTION IV.

Coalition of parties at Athens, and recal of Cimon: truce of five years with Peloponnesus. Long walls of Athens. Restoration of the order of knights, or cavalry. Colony of Athenian families sent to the Chersonese. Expedition to Cyprus: death of Cimon.

THE Athenian leaders thus, among some reverses altogether greatly successful, had however a most arduous office to sustain; the administration of what has been called an empire, but an empire without any regular constitution; held together partly by force, partly by accidental circumstances; the capricious populace of Athens being the sovereign; a large majority of the principal men in opposition; and a

¹³ In modern warfare it has reasonably been reckoned fair to raise contribution in an enemy's country; that is, to make the public revenue, which would in ordinary course have passed into the enemy's coffers, enabling him to continue the contest, pass into those of the invading power, whether in money or in contributions in kind for the subsistence of its forces.

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war to be conducted against a confederacy, whose land force far exceeded theirs. The very conquests already made distressed them; they were at a loss for means to keep what they had acquired. Feeling then that some respite from war was necessary, they knew that the most powerful enemies, the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, would be highly averse to any negotiation with them, but would readily treat with their opponents of the aristocratical party, and especially with Cimon. Pressed thus, they were perhaps farther stimulated by some ebullitions of democratical extravagance, disturbing or threatening their measures, to desire a coalition with the aristocratical leaders. The opposition, which looked to Cimon, though in exile, as its chief, was powerful; and the circumstances of a story related by Plutarch, however of a romantic cast, if founded, as it may have been, in truth, would not a little increase its weight. When the Athenians marched to meet the Lacedæmonian forces at Tanagra, Cimon, according to that writer, joined them where they passed the Attic border; and, the law of his exile not absolutely forbidding, desired to act with the troops of his ward as a volunteer. His request was denied, and he was ordered to quit the camp; but before he departed he had opportunity to communicate with his friends, whom he earnestly exhorted to prove, by their behaviour in the battle to ensue, the falsehood of the charge in which they were in some degree involved with him. Accordingly a band of a hundred pledged themselves to one another not to fly; and when the army was routed, they continued to fight around the panoply of Cimon, which they had carried into the field as their banner, till they were killed to a man. It would be difficult then any longer to contend that

Plut. v.
Cim.

Cimon or the friends of Cimon were enemies to their country. But, whatever may have been the motives, a coalition of the principal men, it is evident, was effected, and Pericles himself moved the decree for the recal of Cimon, after the expiration of only five years of the term of his banishment.¹⁴

Cimon was living on the lordship, his paternal inheritance, in the Thracian Chersonese; perhaps more at ease there, though a fortified dwelling and an armed train might be requisite for security against the neighbouring barbarians, than in Athens, amid the turbulence of a factious and jealous democracy. He did not however refuse himself to the call of his country. Nor was the expectation of advantage from his return disappointed. His liberality seems to have been met with corresponding liberality by the chiefs of those who had been his political adversaries, and a calm ensued in the administration of the commonwealth. Cimon was connected by hospitality with the Lacedæmonian state. The lead in the negotiation, on the part of Athens, being committed to him, a cessation of hostilities was quickly agreed upon. But among the numerous republics concerned as allies of Lacedæmon, all interests were not to be easily reconciled. Three years of intermitted war elapsed before any treaty was concluded, and then nothing more was effected than a truce for five years.

Andoc. de
Pace, p. 91.
t. 4. or. Gr.
Reiske.

Andoc. ut
sup.

B. C. 453.
Ol. 81. ³/₄.
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 112.
B. C. 450.
Ol. 82. ³/₄.

Such a pause however, used wisely and diligently,

¹⁴ Plutarch relates more circumstances than any other writer; yet his account is unsatisfactory in itself, and ill accords with the course of events marked in the Summary of Thucydides, to which I refer as a standard for authenticating other information. The reader who will take the trouble to compare the accounts of the battle of Tanagra and its consequences in Plutarch's Lives of Cimon and Pericles with the 107th to the 112th chapter of the first book of Thucydides may judge for himself.

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was very advantageous for Athens. To prepare in peace for the exigencies of war is a maxim that must be universally approved, and yet is rarely acted upon, unless with ambitious views; the peaceful being seldom to be persuaded to the trouble and expense till danger becomes alarming. In the leisure of the five years' truce however, whether indeed more with peaceful or ambitious purposes among some of the leaders perhaps may be questioned, a third long wall was added to the former two, passing between them to the middle harbour Munychia. Thenceforward, should an enemy force either of the outer walls, the city would still have secure communication with one of its harbours, either the northernmost Phalerum, or the greater and far more important one on the south, Piræus. Pericles was the orator who undertook to persuade the people to pass the decree directing this laborious and expensive work. From Plato we have the not uninteresting information that his master, Socrates, then a youth, was present when the successful speech was delivered.

Plat. Gorg.
p. 455. t. 2.

The deficiency of the commonwealth in cavalry was also taken into consideration. The order of knights, or horse-soldiers, was old at Athens; it had been retained in the constitution of Solon, and flourished under Pisistratus and his sons; but after them had fallen into insignificance, if it was not even annihilated. No mention is found of Athenian cavalry either at Marathon or at Plataea; whence it seems probable that, for the attachment of that superior order of citizens to the Pisistratidean party, it had been depressed, if not abolished by Clisthenes. Under the joint administration of Cimon and Pericles however it was restored to credit and efficacy; so that the Athenian cavalry acquired estimation as among the best of Greece. Though peaceful views are rarely

Andoc. de
Pace, p. 92.

prominent in Athenian counsels, yet such might lead to this measure; for, among the Greeks, cavalry was valued especially as a defensive weapon, for its superior efficacy in giving protection to the fields against the plunder and waste which were so commonly principal objects of Grecian invading armies. But possibly the coalesced leaders had moreover a view to their own security, and that of civil order altogether, in restoring that military establishment which is most efficacious for awing and repressing civil turbulence, so apt to break out where every individual of the people flattered himself that he was a sovereign.

Nearly at the same time another addition was made to the military strength of the republic, perhaps not wholly without also a similar political view. It is remarkable how many circumstances occur, in the course of Grecian history, showing the truth of that observation of Aristotle, which might appear on first view a paradox, That democracy and tyranny are very nearly related. Among the Greeks it was reckoned a common distinction between legitimate monarchy and tyranny, that kings had subjects for the guard of their persons, tyrants preferred foreigners. But the armed attendants of the magistrates of Athens, as it has been formerly observed, were foreign slaves, generally Scythians, whence Scythian came to be the common title of those armed attendants. Three hundred Scythian bowmen were now bought (such precisely is the expression in the original) for the use of the republic. A valuable addition probably to the military force, they would however perhaps still more strengthen the arm of the civil magistrate.¹⁵

[Aristot.
Polit.
1. 5. c. 10.]

Andoc. de
Pace, p. 92.

¹⁵ The oration on peace, transmitted under the name of Andocides, passed, it appears, to the Augustan age as a speech of

But so large a proportion of the Athenian people had now been so long accustomed to subsist by war, whether from pay or from plunder, that the cessation of hostilities filled the city with a very inconvenient number of men little disposed, and most of them little able, to earn a comfortable livelihood by peaceful industry; all however proud of the dignity of Athenian citizens, proud of their services to their country, and ready to claim support and reward suitable to that imaginary dignity, and to those services which they would not estimate below their worth. The inconvenience, or at least some degree of it, was common among the Grecian states; and the ordinary resource of the powerful was to send out colonies. Cimon's Thracian lordship in the Chersonese afforded opportunity, advantageous at the same time perhaps to the republic and to himself. Of particulars however we are no farther informed than that a squadron of fifty trireme galleys, under the command of Pericles, convoyed a thousand families of Athenian citizens to whom lands were allotted in that rich peninsula. Tolmides conducted an equal number, whether of Athenians to Naxos, or of Naxians to Eubœa, does not clearly appear.

that orator; but Dionysius of Halicarnassus believed it wrongly attributed to him. It was however in that critic's time ancient, and probably of the age of Andocides. That it has suffered from injury to copies or carelessness of transcribers, is evident. The five years' truce is spoken of in it as lasting thirteen years. But we have satisfactory assurance from Thucydides, that Athens was engaged in war again before the end of the five years, and that it was another truce, afterward made for thirty years, which was broken in the fourteenth. It seems beyond question also, that the names of Miltiades and Cimon have been inverted, so that, for *Μιλτιάδην τὸν Κίμωνος*, we should read *Κίμωνα τὸν Μιλτιάδου*.

But such was become the constitution of the Athenian commonwealth, such the temper of the people, and such the consequent difficulties to be contended with in the endeavour to preserve quiet at home, that, as soon as present peace was established by the conclusion of the five years' truce, Cimon concurred in the purpose of turning the spirit of enterprise once more toward foreign conquest, and exertion against the common enemy, in the hope so to prevent brooding faction at Athens, and brooding war within Greece. With this view he resumed the design of adding Cyprus to that dominion, which under the title of Confederacy the Athenian commonwealth held over so large a portion of the Greek nation. A fleet of two hundred trireme galleys was equipped, of which himself took the command. Amyrtæus, chief of the Egyptians of the marshes, maintained still the war against Persia. At his request Cimon sent sixty, having in view, apparently, to distract the attention of the Persian government, and perhaps to collect some booty, rather than to pursue any romantic purpose of conquest in Egypt. With his remaining force he laid siege to Cittium in Cyprus; and in the camp before that place, to the great misfortune of Athens and of Greece, he died. Foreseeing, it is said, both his own end, and the necessity of abandoning the enterprise, which, as we learn from Thucydides, arose immediately from want of provisions, he gave suitable directions to those in trust about him, with a requisition that his death should be concealed, and orders issued still in his name as if he was living. In passing Salamis the fleet was attacked by the Persian fleet, composed of squadrons from Phenicia, Cilicia, and Cyprus, which it defeated. The army, quitting Cittium, and marching along the coast to

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 112.

Diodor.
l. 12. c. 3.
Plut. v.
Cim.

B. C. 449.
Ol. 82. $\frac{3}{4}$.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.
Plut. ut ant.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 112.

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meet the fleet at a more commodious place for embarkation, was also attacked, and also gained the victory. Being joined then by the squadron from Egypt, the whole armament returned to Attica. The relics of Cimon, carried to Athens, were buried there; and a magnificent monument erected to his memory remained, with the name of the *Cimoneia*, to Plutarch's time.

Great as the military character of Cimon was, his wisdom, his integrity, his moderation, his conciliating temper, and the influence which enabled him to lead his fellow-countrymen in the paths of wisdom, integrity, and moderation, were found to be the qualities for which his loss was most to be regretted. Others could command fleets and armies, but others could not equally divert that compound, in the Grecian temper, of military spirit with the spirit of faction, from civil feud and domestic war. After Cimon, as Plutarch has justly observed, for a long time nothing great was done or even attempted against the barbarians; but the Greeks turned their arms against one another, to the great advantage of Persia, and to the unspeakable injury of Greece.

Plut. v.
Cim.

SECTION V.

Contest for command of the temple of Delphi. Athens at the summit of her greatness. State of parties: Pericles: Thucydides. Policy of the Grecian republics for holding the weaker republics in subjection. Revolt of Bœotia; of Eubœa; of Megara: invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Thirty years' truce. Power of Pericles.

DIVIDED among so many little republics, each necessarily jealous of the others, public rights and private in constant danger, and every citizen therefore

always ready with arms, the Greek nation was singularly framed to be formidable to all around, if it could be united in steady confederacy, and otherwise to be always lacerating and preying upon itself. In Lacedæmon, under the consideration of her diminished authority and lowered rank among the Grecian people, some uneasiness of the public mind would be natural, and not wholly unreasonable; and this could not but be heightened by a view of the rapid progress Athens had made in power, with indications of ambition holding corresponding growth. In these circumstances a dispute arose among some communities of little weight themselves, involving nevertheless matter of such deep national interest as imperiously to require the interposition of the more powerful states.

The common federal government of the several towns of the province of Phocis had been long, as formerly has been observed, the guardian of the temple and oracle and treasury of Delphi. The Delphian citizens, on what old or new pretension does not appear, now claimed that important office to the exclusion of the other Phocians, and resort to arms was threatened. It might become the Lacedæmonians to interfere; and they did so, but not under wise or apparently just counsel. Instead of calling for the common support of the Greeks, and assuming their wonted lead with a dignified moderation, they took upon themselves to decide all; and, sending a military force into Phocis, they put the Delphians into possession of the temple. The Delphians then, with ready gratitude, passed a decree granting to Lacedæmon the honours of the Promanteia, or precedence in the consultation of the oracle, and caused it to be engraved on the forehead of a brazen statue of a wolf consecrated in the temple.

Ch. 3. s. 3.
of this Hist.
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 112.
Strabo,
l. 9. p. 423.
Plut. v.
Pericl.

B. C. 448.
Ol. $\frac{8}{81}$. $\frac{4}{1}$.

So arbitrary an exertion of exclusive authority by the Lacedæmonian government in what was esteemed, beyond all things, a common concern of the Greek nation, could not fail to excite indignation at Athens; and the more as the power of that state had recently been so extended in northern Greece, and as Phocis was among its allies. An army was ordered to march, and the command was committed to Pericles. Thus what the Greeks call a sacred war was kindled. But, through the incapacity of the little Grecian states to maintain troops on foreign service, the Lacedæmonian troops being gone, the Delphians felt their inability to resist, and no bloodshed seems to have ensued. Pericles restored the supremacy of the temple and its appendages to the Phocian people; who immediately passed a decree giving the Promanteia to Athens, which they caused to be engraved on the side of the same brazen wolf whose forehead bore the decree of the Delphian citizens in favour of Lacedæmon. Whether the command which the Athenians through their possession of the Megarian territory held of the isthmus, or, what seems not improbable, civil dissension in Lacedæmon, and the prevalence of a party adverse to that which had directed the ill-judged expedition to Delphi, was the cause, no measures of resentment seem to have followed.

This appears to have been the era of the most extensive empire of the Athenian commonwealth. On the continent of Greece it commanded Megaris, Bœotia, Locris, Phocis, and the territory of Naupactus. In Peloponnesus an Athenian garrison held Trœzen; Athenian influence governed all Achaia, properly so called; and even Argos was but a subordinate ally. The large and fruitful island of Eu-

bœa, separated only by a narrow strait, had long been an appendage of Attica ; and all the other islands of the Ægean sea, Melus and Thera with part of Crete excepted, most of the Grecian cities of Asia Minor, and all those of Thrace, the Hellespont, and the Propontis, acknowledged the sovereignty of the Athenian people.

Had Athens had a government so constituted as to be capable of a wise and steady administration, men were not wanting, qualified by abilities and by information, to direct the business of an empire. While Cimon lived Pericles was contented to be the second person of the republic ; and, harmony subsisting between them, the disposition to party violence among inferior men was restrained by their influence, and the aristocratical and democratical interests were held in unusual union. But all would not be equally pleased with the suspension of party-distinctions, which of necessity admitted some to situations that would have been the lot of others had either party ruled alone. On Cimon's death some of his principal adherents could ill brook the ascendancy which superior talents, superior popularity, an accumulation of advantages gave at once to Pericles : they would have one of their own party still at the head of the republic's affairs. Thucydides son of Melesias, brother-in-law of Cimon, to whom they looked in preference, was indeed a person well entitled to high consideration. His birth, his family alliances, his conduct through life, his public estimation, all were advantageous ; and he was not without military reputation, though more known as an experienced statesman and an able speaker. Apparently he was of himself disposed to liberality in politics ; but unfortunately without sufficiently possessing

Plat.
Laches,
p. 179. t. 2.

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Cimon's firmness to resist, or influence to repress, the imprudent heat or interested ambition of political associates. A war of oratory ensued, of which little account remains beyond an anecdote marking the extraordinary powers of Pericles, and the candid acknowledgment of them by Thucydides: 'When I 'wrestle with Pericles,' he said, 'if I throw him ever 'so decidedly, he can persuade the spectators that he 'threw me.' The aristocratical and democratical interests were thus anew divided, never equally, as under the joint lead of Pericles and Cimon, again to coalesce.

The breach however appears to have been gradual; Pericles did not at once set himself in direct opposition to the friends of Cimon. Meanwhile, though there was a powerful aristocratical party, there was no acknowledged constitutional balance to the democratical power, which was truly despotic. For holding the many states, which owned subjection to Athens, in any degree attached, never was liberality in administration more wanted than now. For the Athenian people, less than thirty thousand families, to coerce all by their own strength, was obviously impossible. But every untempered government must be jealous; and democracy, even beyond other untempered governments, is naturally selfish. The enlarged policy of the mixed constitution of Rome, which enabled her to become mistress of the world, associating conquered people, could not even be safely mentioned at Athens; and indeed there was very generally, among the Grecian republics, a strong prejudice against it. The policy for maintaining sovereignty common to all Grecian republics, which acquired dominion over other Grecian republics, rested on that division into parties to which occasion

has occurred so often to advert. In the ordinary course of things, when, after a critical contest in any republic, the aristocratical party prevailed, the leaders only of the lower people were expelled, with a few of the more turbulent of their followers, who were sometimes sold into foreign countries for slaves; and the rest were held under a severe subjection. But if the democratical party obtained the superiority, they often expelled all those men of rank and property whom they did not kill, and they shared among themselves their houses, estates, slaves, and whatever other effects they could seize. In all the many republics, where Athenian influence now extended, the democratical party was supported by Athenian patronage, and held all the powers of government. The prevalence then of that party, and especially the welfare of its chiefs, depending upon the connexion with Athens, the citizens of that party were themselves the garrison to hold their state in obedience to the Athenian commonwealth. Thus alone they could hope to maintain themselves in possession of the houses, the estates, and the honours of those whom they had killed or driven into banishment; toward whom they looked with the abhorrence natural for those who dreaded, at the same time, the loss of such advantages, and revenge for having usurped them. In Athens itself not the principles of democracy only, but more especially those by which democratical empire might best be promoted, would be sedulously inculcated and would become popular topics; and hence apparently what has been called, by later writers, the conquest of Bœotia by Myronides, was sometimes spoken of, among contemporaries, as the deliverance of the country and the establishment of its freedom. On this pretence (and

Plat.
Menex.
p. 242. l. 2.

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apparently to promote ambitious purposes) the Athenian citizens killed in that expedition were honoured with a funeral at the public expense, the first after those who fell in the Persian invasion.

Through circumstances like those just related Greece always swarmed with exiles; and those unhappy men were perpetually watching opportunities for a revolution which might restore them to their country. The impossibility of exact discrimination always left them some friends in their respective cities; and thus the foundation of sedition was ever ready. Those Bœotians who had been banished in consequence of the Athenian conquest found opportunity to make themselves masters of Orchomenus, Chæronea, and some smaller towns. Hopeless then of being permitted to retain quiet possession, necessity not less than inclination incited them to push for farther advantages. The Athenian government prepared an army to reduce them, composed chiefly of allies, with only one thousand heavy-armed Athenians. Tolmides, already renowned for his achievements in the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus, was appointed to the command. Apparently the party of Thucydides had been gaining ground, and Tolmides was of that party; for Pericles, as Plutarch informs us, disapproved the appointment of Tolmides, and augured ill of the expedition. Chæronea however was taken; those men of the best families and principal influence in Bœotia, who had held it, were condemned to slavery*, and a garrison was put in

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 113.
Diodor.
l. 12. c. 6.
Plut. v.
Pericl.

B. C. 447.
Bl. 83. $\frac{1}{2}$.

[* ‘... ἐλόντες καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες. Mr. Mitford has expanded the last word into a charge against the Athenians: ‘those men of the best families and principal influence in Bœotia, who had held Chæronea, were condemned to slavery.’ But it appears from the edition of Mr. Bekker that the words καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες ought to be omitted.’ Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. ix.]

the place. But meantime exiles from various parts, Bœotians and others¹⁶, had assembled in large numbers at Orchomenus, and the Locrians, who by timely submission to Athens and giving hostages had prevented any expulsion of their people, joined them with their whole strength. A powerful army was thus collected. The Athenian forces, returning toward Attica, were attacked near Coronea: Tolmides was killed, his army was completely defeated, and almost every surviving Athenian was made prisoner.

[B. C. 447.
towards
autumn.
Cl.]

The consequence of this misfortune is one among many instances of an inherent weakness in the governments of the little Grecian republics, which was not lessened at Athens by the extent of its command. Few Athenian families were wholly uninterested in the prisoners taken at Coronea, and the administration could ill avoid sacrificing public advantage to private feelings. But, in addition to the fermentation within the state, circumstances were threatening without. The Bœotians, now strong of themselves, would scarcely fail of assistance from Peloponnesus; for the enmity of Lacedæmon, though smothered on occasion of the affair of Delphi, could not but be apprehended when any encouraging opportunity might offer. At the same time therefore to gratify the people with the recovery of their captive kinsmen and friends, and to prevent, as far as possible, a combination of enemies which might endanger the remaining dependencies of the commonwealth, the Athenian administration hastily concluded a treaty with the Bœotians; agreeing to evacuate immediately whatever they still held in Bœotia, and surrender all claim upon that rich bordering province, apparently the

¹⁶ Οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες. Thuc. 1. 1. c. 113. We want information who *all the others* were.

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most desirable of all possible addition to the Athenian dominion.

The event showed the urgency for acceding to conditions seemingly so disadvantageous; for even thus the apprehended evils were not entirely obviated. The success of the Bœotians had encouraged others to follow their example. Eubœa, the nearest of the transmarine dependencies of Athens, and the most important, revolted. An army, under the command of Pericles, hastened to that island. It was scarcely landed when intelligence reached Athens that the adverse party in Megara, with assistance from Corinth, had risen upon the Athenian garrison, overpowered it, and put all to the sword who could not effect their retreat into Nisæa. This then was quickly followed by information still more alarming, that the Lacedæmonians were preparing for an invasion of Attica with the whole force of their confederacy.

The death of Tolmides and the distress of the commonwealth concurred to put all the powers of government into the hands of Pericles. That able statesman and general immediately led back his forces from Eubœa, defeated the Megarians, with their allies, who rashly attempted to protect their fields against his ravages, and compelled them to confine themselves within their walls.

The Peloponnesian invasion did not take place till the following spring.¹⁸ A very formidable army then

B. C. 446.
Ol. 83. $\frac{3}{4}$ ¹⁷
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.
[B. C. 445.
Cl.]
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 114.
Diod. l. 12.
c. 5. & 7.

B. C. 445.
Ol. $\frac{83}{4}$. $\frac{4}{1}$.

¹⁷ Diodorus places the revolt of Megara in the first year of the 83d Olympiad, the battle of Coronea in the second, and the revolt of Eubœa in the third. But Thucydides asserts expressly, that the news of the revolt of Megara arrived just as Pericles had debarked his forces in Eubœa to suppress the revolt there; which happened, he says, not long after the conclusion of the treaty with the Bœotians that followed the battle of Coronea.

¹⁸ Thus Dodwell, upon a comparison of authorities and cir-

marched. The command was committed, not to the mature age and tried abilities of Archidamus, whether because he was the personal friend of Pericles, or mere Lacedæmonian party-interest decided, but to the king of the Eurysthenidean house, Plistoanax, so young that Cleandridas was joined with him as the adviser of his inexperience. The army entered Attica, ravaged the Thriasian plain, and encamped near Eleusis. Pericles, with the whole force of Athens, took a station over against it: but, considering that a battle lost in existing circumstances might be fatal to the commonwealth, and delay, the ordinary resource of defensive war, would endanger all its dependencies, he had, it was commonly supposed, recourse to policy. Without any apparent cause the Peloponnesian army retreated into the peninsula, and the allies were dismissed as if the purpose of the expedition had been accomplished. It was commonly supposed that Pericles had succeeded in an attempt to bribe the Spartan general. In Lacedæmon such dissatisfaction ensued that Cleandridas took alarm, and fled: in his absence, capital condemnation was pronounced against him, and the young king himself being called into judgment, a fine was imposed upon him to such an amount that, being unable to discharge it, he also quitted his country. Pericles, in the usual report of the expenses of his command, stated ten talents, about two thousand five hundred pounds sterling, as employed for a necessary purpose, without expressing what. Secret-service money was not, it seems, commonly allowed to Athenian generals; and it is mentioned as an instance of singular con-

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 114.
& l. 2. c. 21.
Plut. v.
Pericl.

Plut. v.
Pericl.

circumstances, has apparently well determined. Ann. Thuc. ad ann. 445.

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fidence in Pericles, that the Athenian people permitted that article to pass unquestioned.

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 114.

The army under Pericles being then again transported into Eubœa, the whole island was quickly reduced. The Histiaëans were expelled, and their territory was apportioned among Athenian families. These, according to the universal course of the Greeks, were the garrison, as well as the ruling body under the supremacy of Athens, and their slaves cultivated the lands. The rest of the Eubœans were admitted to a capitulation, by which their estates and the municipal administration of their towns were preserved to them.

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 115.
Diodor.
l. 12. c. 7.
Plut. v.
Pericl.

The experienced insecurity of that command, which the Athenian people held over so many other little republics, now induced their leaders to seek an accommodation with the Peloponnesians. Callias and Chares, according to Diodorus, were the managers of the treaty on the part of the Athenians; and, before the end of the winter after the invasion of Attica, a truce was concluded for the term of thirty years. The conditions, which remain reported by the historian Thucydides, appear very disadvantageous to Athens. Bœotia was already lost; the city of Megara was lost; but the Athenians yet held the Megarian ports of Nisæa and Pegæ; they had still a garrison in the Peloponnesian city of Trœzen; and the Peloponnesian province of Achaia was in their interest. All these advantages were surrendered: garrisons were withdrawn; and where, as in the Achæan towns, the democratical party were as the garrison for Athens, no support from Athens was in future to be given to that party. The aristocratical interest then recovering predominant power, but wanting for its security the patronage of Lacedæmon,

Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.
ad ann.
445.

Achaia would return of course to the Lacedæmonian alliance.¹⁹ Such concessions, without any equivalent, sufficiently mark the sense which the Athenian administration had of the tottering fabric of the empire, and of the necessity for the leisure of peace to confirm that command which remained to the commonwealth over so many islands and so many transmarine states and colonies.

The train of distressing circumstances following the defeat of Tolmides concurred with the various successes of the new general to ruin the aristocratical interest at Athens. The opposite interest being then decisively superior in the popular assembly, Thucydides was banished by ostracism. Thus the opposition, which had compelled Pericles to resume the lead of the democratical interest against the aristocratical, contributed to advance his power and glory, making him in a manner prince of Athens. But as it was a power that could only be maintained by still cultivating the democratical interest, to the utter overthrow of the aristocratical, and the destruction of all balance in the constitution, the result was ultimately most pernicious to the commonwealth, and involved incalculable evils for all Greece.

¹⁹ ' Quæ fuerit illa Achaia, juxta cum ignarissimis ignoro. ' Nam de totâ provinciâ, quæ Achaia dicitur, locum intelligere, ' absurdum foret.' Not. 5. c. 115. l. 1. Thuc. ed. Duk. I must confess I am at a loss to guess at the difficulty. If any could arise upon the simple consideration of the passage in question, it appears fully cleared by what precedes and follows, c. 3. l. 1. c. 9. l. 2. and c. 21. l. 4. The fancy of Palmer and Hudson, that an obscure Corinthian settlement in Ætolia, of the name of Chalcis, was intended, appears strangely wild.

CHAPTER XIII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE TO THAT COMMONLY CALLED THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, WITH A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF MACEDONIA FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS.

SECTION I.

Administration of Pericles : science, arts, and fine taste at Athens. Change in the condition of women in Greece : Aspasia. Popular licentiousness at Athens. The Athenian empire asserted, and extended. Project for union of Greece.

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ATHENS now rested six years, unengaged in any hostilities ; a longer interval of perfect peace than she had before known in above forty years elapsed since she rose from her ashes after the Persian invasion. It is a wonderful and singular phenomenon in the history of mankind, little accounted for by anything recorded by ancient, or imagined by modern writers, that, during this period of turbulence, in a commonwealth whose whole population in free subjects amounted scarcely to thirty thousand families, art, science, fine taste, and politeness should have risen to that perfection which has made Athens the mistress of the world through all succeeding ages. Some sciences indeed have been carried higher in modern times, and art has put forth new branches, of which some have given new helps to science : but Athens, in that age, reached a perfection of taste that no country hath since surpassed ; but on the

contrary all have looked up to, as a polar star, by which, after sinking in the deepest barbarism, taste has been guided in its restoration to splendour, and the observation of which will probably ever be the surest preservative against its future corruption and decay.

Much of these circumstances of glory to Athens, and of improvement, since so extensively spread over the world, was owing to Pericles. Pisistratus had nourished the infancy of Attic genius; Pericles brought it to maturity. In the age of Pisistratus books were scarcely known, science was vague, and arts still rude. But during the turbulent period which intervened things had been so wonderfully prepared that, in the age of Pericles, science and every polite art waited, as it were, only his magic touch to exhibit them to the world in meridian splendour. The philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazomene, whose force of understanding and extent of science acquired him the appellation of the Intellect, had been the tutor of the youth of Pericles, and remained the friend of his riper years. Among those with whom he chiefly conversed was also the Athenian Phidias, who, with a capacity for every science, possessed the sublimest genius for the fine arts, and Damon, who, professing only music, was esteemed the ablest speculative politician that the world had yet produced. Nor must the celebrated Aspasia be omitted in the enumeration of those to whom Pericles was indebted for the cultivation of his mind; since we have it on the authority of Plato that Socrates himself acknowledged to have profited from the instruction of that extraordinary woman.

Plat.
Alcib. 1.
p. 118. t. 2.
Plut. v.
Pericl.

Plat.
Menex.

It will not be the place here to enlarge upon the manners any more than upon the arts and knowledge

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of the age of Pericles ; yet it may be requisite to advert to one point, in which a great change had taken place since the age which Homer has described. The political circumstances of Greece, and especially of Athens, had contributed much to exclude women of rank from general society. The turbulence, to which every commonwealth was continually liable from the contentions of faction, made it often unsafe, or at least unpleasant, for them to go abroad. But in democracies their situation was peculiarly untoward. That form of government compelled the men to associate all with all. The general assembly necessarily called all together ; and the vote of the meanest citizen being there of equal value with that of the highest, the more numerous body of the poor was always formidable to the wealthy few. Hence followed the utmost condescension, or something more than condescension, from the rich to the multitude ; and not to the collected multitude only, nor to the best among the multitude, but principally to the most turbulent, illmannered, and worthless. Not those alone who sought honours or commands, but all who desired security for their property, must not only meet these men upon a footing of equality in the general assembly, but associate with them in the gymnasia and porticos, flatter them, and sometimes cringe to them. The ladies, to avoid a society which their fathers and husbands could not avoid, lived with their female slaves, in a secluded part of the house ; associating little with one another, scarcely at all with the men, even their nearest relations, and seldom appearing in public but at those religious festivals in which ancient custom required the women to bear a part, and sacerdotal authority could ensure decency of conduct toward them. Hence the edu-

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cation of the Grecian ladies in general, and particularly the Athenian, was scarcely above that of their slaves; and, as we find them exhibited in lively picture in the little treatise upon domestic economy remaining from Xenophon, they were equally of uninstructed minds and unformed manners.

See also
Lysias
against
Diogiton.

The deficiencies to which women of rank were thus condemned, by custom which the new political circumstances of the country had superinduced upon the better manners of the heroic ages, gave occasion for that comparative superiority through which some of the Grecian courtesans attained extraordinary renown. Carefully instructed in every elegant accomplishment, and, from early years, accustomed to converse among men, and men of the highest rank and most improved talents, if they possessed understanding it became cultivated; and to their houses men resorted, not merely in the low pursuit of sensual pleasure, but to enjoy, often in the most polished company, the charms of female conversation, which, with women of rank and character, was totally forbidden. Hence, at the time of the invasion under Xerxes, more than one Grecian city is said to have been engaged in the Persian interest through the influence of Thargelia, a Milesian courtesan, who afterward became, as her title is expressed by historians, queen of Thessaly.

Plut. v.
Pericl.

Aspasia was also a Milesian, the daughter of Axiochus; for her celebrity has preserved her father's name. With uncommon beauty were joined in Aspasia still more uncommon talents; and, with a mind the most cultivated, manners so decent that, in her more advanced years, not only Socrates professed to have learned eloquence from her, but, as Plutarch relates, the ladies of Athens used to accom-

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Plat.
Menon.
p. 94. t. 2.
& Alcib. 1.
p. 118. t. 2.

pany their husbands to her house for the instruction of her conversation. Pericles became her passionate admirer, and she attached herself to him during his life : according to Plutarch he divorced his wife, with whom he had lived on ill terms, to marry her. We are informed, on higher authority, that he was not fortunate in his family, his sons being mentioned by Plato as youths of mean understanding. After he was firmly established at the head of the Athenian administration, he passed his little leisure from public business mostly in company with Aspasia and a few select friends ; avoiding that extensive society in which the Athenians in general delighted, and seldom seen by the people but in the exercise of some public office, or speaking in the general assembly : a reserve perhaps as advantageous to him as the contrary conduct was necessary to the ambitious, who were yet but aspiring at greatness, or to the wealthy without power, who desired security for their property.

Policy united with natural inclination to induce Pericles to patronise the arts, and call forth their finest productions for the admiration and delight of the Athenian people. The Athenian people were the despotic sovereign ; Pericles the favourite and minister, whose business it was to indulge the sovereign's caprices that he might direct their measures ; and he had the skill often to direct even their caprices. That fine taste, which he possessed eminently, was in some degree general among the Athenians ; and the gratification of that fine taste was one mean by which he retained his influence. Works were undertaken, according to the expression of Plutarch, in whose time they remained still perfect, of stupendous magnitude, and in form and grace inimitable ; all calculated for the accommodation or in

some way for the gratification of the multitude. Phidias was superintendent of the works: under him many architects and artists were employed, whose merit entitled them to fame with posterity, and of whose labours (such is the hardness of the Attic marble, their principal material, and the mildness of the Attic atmosphere) relics, which have escaped the violence of men, still, after the lapse of more than two thousand years, exhibit all the perfection of design, and even of workmanship, which earned that fame.

Meanwhile Phidias himself was executing works of statuary which, while they lasted, were the admiration of succeeding times. Nor does the testimony to these works rest merely upon Grecian report; for the Romans, when in possession of all the most exquisite productions of Grecian art, scanty relics of which have excited the wonder and formed the taste of modern ages, were at a loss to express their admiration of the sublimity of the works of Phidias. When such was the perfection of the art of sculpture, it were a solecism to suppose that the sister art of painting could be mean, since the names of Panæus, kinsman of Phidias, and Zeuxis and Parrhasius, contemporaries, remained always among the most celebrated of the Grecian school. At the same time the chaste sublimity of the great tragic poets Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and that extraordinary mixture of the most elegant satire with the grossest buffoonery, the old comedy as it is called, were alternately exhibited in immense theatres, at the public expense, and for the amusement of the whole people.

Thus captivating the Athenians by their relish for matters of taste and their passion for amusement, Pericles confirmed his authority principally by that great instrument for the management of a people, his

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Plut. v.
Pericl.
Plat.
Alcib. 1.
p. 104. t. 2.

eloquence : but this was supported by unremitted assiduity in public business, and evident superiority of capacity for the conduct of it ; and, above all, by an ostentatious integrity. The whole Athenian commonwealth thus, with all its appurtenances, or, in the words of contemporary authors, revenues, armies, fleets, islands, the sea, friendships and alliances with kings and various potentates, and influence that commanded several Grecian states and many barbarous nations, all were in a manner his possession. Plutarch says that, while thus during fifteen years ruling the Athenian empire, so strict and scrupulous was his economy in his private affairs that he neither increased nor diminished his paternal estate by a single drachma : but, according to the more probable assertion and higher authority of Isocrates, his private estate suffered in maintaining his public importance, so that he left it less to his sons than he had received it from his father.

Isocr. de
Pace, p. 254.
t. 2. ed.
Auger.

Plut. v.
Pericl.

But the political power of Pericles resting on the patronage, which he professed, of democracy, he was obliged to allow much of what a better constitution would have put under more restraint. Such was the popular licentiousness that the comic poets did not fear to vent, in the public theatres, the grossest jokes upon his person, the severest invectives against his administration, and even the most abominable calumnies upon his character. His connexion with Aspasia was not likely to escape their satire. She was called, on the public stage, the Omphale of her time, the Dejanira, and even the Juno. Many circumstances of the administration of Pericles were malevolently attributed to her influence, and much gross abuse and much improbable calumny was vented against both of them. It would indeed be scarcely possible

to distinguish almost any truth amid the licentiousness of wit, and the violence, not to say the atrociousness, of party-spirit at Athens, had we not generally, for this interesting period of history, the guidance of a contemporary author, Thucydides son of Olorus ; of uncommon abilities and still more uncommon impartiality, and whose ample fortune, great connexions, and high situation in the commonwealth opened to him superior means of information. For what is deficient in the concise view of Grecian affairs, which he has prefixed to his history of the Peloponnesian war, we have sometimes some testimony from Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, or the orators. To later writers, when not in some degree supported by these, it is seldom safe to trust. Sometimes they have adopted reports carelessly ; and often, as we find Plutarch frequently acknowledging, they have been unable to unravel truth amid contradiction and improbability. Indeed Plutarch, though often extremely negligent, is yet often, and especially for the life of Pericles, our best assistant. Frequently quoting authorities, he is then always valuable ; and generally it may be gathered from his manner where he deserves respect, where he has been led by prejudice, and where he has been writing what occurs too frequently, not history but romance.

Notwithstanding then the vague accusations reported by Diodorus and others, the united authorities of Thucydides, Isocrates, and Plutarch may warrant belief that the clear integrity of Pericles, not less than the wisdom of his public conduct, was his shield against the scurrility of the comic poets, so adapted to make impression on the popular mind, as well as against every effort of the opposing orators.¹ One

¹ The expression of Thucydides is of that forcible kind which is peculiar to him, and to which his character gives a weight

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great point however of his policy was to keep the people always either amused or employed. During peace an exercising squadron of sixty trireme galleys was sent out for eight months in every year. Nor was this without a farther use than merely engaging the attention of the people, and maintaining the navy in vigour. Himself occasionally took the command; and, sailing among the distant dependencies of the empire, settled disputes between them, and confirmed the power and extended the influence of Athens. The Ægean and the Propontis did not bound his voyages: he penetrated into the Euxine; and finding the distant Grecian settlement of Sinope divided between Timesileos, who affected the tyranny, and an opposing party, he left there Lamachus with thirteen ships, and a land force, with whose assistance to the popular side the tyrant and those of his faction were expelled. The justice of what followed may indeed appear questionable. Their houses and property, apportioned into six hundred lots, were offered to so many Athenian citizens; and volunteers were not wanting to accept the offer, and settle at Sinope. To disburthen the government at home, by providing advantageous establishments, in distant parts, for the poor and discontented among the sovereign citizens of Athens, was a policy more than once resorted to by Pericles. The colony conducted by himself to the Thracian Chersonese has been formerly noticed. It was then during his administration, in the year, according to Diodorus, in which the thirty years' truce was concluded, that the deputation came from the Thessalian adventurers who had been expelled by the Crotoniats from their attempted establishment in the

Ch. 12. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Diod. l. 12.
c. 9. & seq.
Ch. 2. s. 2.
of this Hist.

which it would hardly have from any other writer: Περικλῆς . . . δυνατὸς ὢν τῇ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ, χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδυσλόγητος γενόμενος. Thucyd. l. 2. c. 65.

deserted territory of Sybaris, in consequence of which, under his patronage, the colony was settled with which the historian Herodotus then, and afterward the orator Lysias, passing to Thurium, both established themselves there.

Plutarch has attributed to Pericles a noble project, unnoticed by any earlier extant author, but worthy of his capacious mind, and otherwise also bearing some characters of authenticity and truth. It was no less than to unite all Greece under one great federal government, of which Athens should be the capital. But the immediate and direct avowal of such a purpose would be likely to raise jealousies so numerous and extensive as to form insuperable obstacles to the execution. The religion of the nation was that alone in which the Grecian people universally claimed a clear common interest ; and even in this every town and almost every family claimed something peculiar to itself. In the vehemence of public alarm, during the Persian invasion, vows had been, in some places, made to the gods for sacrifices, to an extent beyond what the votaries, when blessed with deliverance beyond hope, were able to perform ; and some temples, destroyed by the invaders, were not yet restored ; probably because the means of those in whose territories they had stood were deficient. Taking these circumstances then for his ground, Pericles proposed that a congress of deputies from every republic of the nation should be assembled at Athens, for the purpose first of inquiring concerning vows for the safety of Greece yet unperformed, and temples, injured by the barbarians, not yet restored ; and then of proceeding to concert measures for the lasting security of navigation in the Grecian seas, and for the preservation of peace by land also between all the states

composing the Greek nation. The naval question, but still more the ruin which, in the Persian invasion, had befallen Northern Greece, and especially Attica, while Peloponnesus had felt nothing of its evils, gave pretensions for Athens to take the lead in the business. On the motion of Pericles, a decree of the Athenian people directed the appointment of ministers to invite every Grecian state to send its deputies. Plutarch, rarely attentive to political information, has not at all indicated what attention was shown, or what participation proposed, for Lacedæmon. His prejudices indeed we find very generally adverse to the Lacedæmonian government, and favouring the Athenian democracy. But, judging from the friendship which, according to the authentic information of Thucydides, subsisted between Pericles and Archidamus king of Lacedæmon through life, it is little likely that, in putting forward the project for the peace of Greece, Pericles would have proposed any thing derogatory to the just weight and dignity of Sparta; which indeed would have been, with peace the pretence, only putting forward a project of contest. Pericles, when he formed his coalition with Cimon, seems to have entered heartily into the enlarged views of that great man; and, with the hope that, through their coalition, both the oligarchal and the democratical powers in Athens might be held justly balanced, had early in view to establish the peace of Greece on a union between Athens and Lacedæmon. It is however evident, from the narrative of Thucydides, that Archidamus rarely could direct the measures of the Lacedæmonian government. On a view of all information then it may seem probable that the project of Pericles was concerted with Archidamus; and that the opposition of those in Lace-

dæmon of an adverse faction concurred with opposition from those in Athens, who apprehended injury to their interest from a new coalition with the aristocratical party, to compel the great projector to abandon his magnificent and beneficent purpose, in a stage so early that it was no object for the notice of the able and accurate contemporary historian, in that valuable abridgment of early Grecian history which precedes his narrative of the Peloponnesian war.

SECTION II.

War between Samos and Miletus: interference of Athens: armament under Pericles: Samos taken. Funeral solemnity at Athens in honour of the slain in their country's service.

PEACE between Lacedæmon and Athens was indispensable toward the quiet of the rest of the nation, but, in the want of such a union as Pericles had projected, was unfortunately far from ensuring it; and, when war began anywhere, though among the most distant settlements of the Grecian people, how far it might extend was not to be foreseen. A dispute between two Asiatic states of the Athenian confederacy led Athens into a war which greatly endangered the truce made for thirty years, when it had scarcely lasted six. Miletus and Samos, each claiming the sovereignty of Priene, originally a free Grecian commonwealth, asserted their respective pretensions by arms. The Milesians, not till they were suffering under defeat, applied to Athens for redress, as of a flagrant injury done them. The usual feuds within every Grecian state furnished assistance to their clamour; for, the aristocracy prevailing at that time

B. C. 440.
Ol. 83. 1.
Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 115.

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XIII.Plut. v.
Pericl.

in Samos, the leaders of the democratical party joined the enemies of their country in accusing the proceedings of its government before the Athenian people. The opposition at Athens maliciously imputed the measures following to the weak compliance of Pericles with the solicitations of Aspasia in favour of her native city; but it appears clearly, from Thucydides, that no such motive was needful: the Athenian government would of course take cognisance of the cause; and, as might be expected, a requisition was sent to the Samian administration to answer, by deputies at Athens, to the charges urged against them. The Samians, unwilling to submit their claim to the arbitration of those who they knew were always systematically adverse to the aristocratical interest, refused to send deputies. A fleet of forty trireme galleys however brought them to immediate submission; their government was changed to a democracy, in which those who had headed the opposition of course took the lead; and, to ensure permanent acquiescence from the aristocratical party, fifty men and fifty boys, of the first families of the island, were taken as hostages, and placed under an Athenian guard in the island of Lemnos.

What Herodotus mentions, as an observation applicable generally, we may readily believe was on this occasion experienced in Samos, ‘that the lower people were most unpleasant associates to the nobles.’² A number of these, unable to support the oppression to which they found themselves exposed, quitted the island, and applied to Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis. The project of conquering Greece by arms appears to have been abandoned by the Persian government; but the urgency for constantly

² Συνέκρημα ἀχαριτότατον. Herodot. l. 7. c. 156.

watching its politics, and interfering, as occasion might offer, with a view to the safety, if not to the extension, of the western border of the empire, was obvious; and it appears that the western satraps were instructed accordingly. The Samian refugees were favourably received by Pissuthnes. They corresponded with many of their party yet remaining in the island, and they engaged in their interest the city of Byzantium, itself a subject ally of Athens. Collecting then about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, they crossed by night the narrow channel which separates Samos from the continent, and, being joined by their friends, they surprised and overpowered the new administration. Without delay they proceeded to Lemnos, and so well conducted their enterprise that they carried off their hostages, together with the Athenian guard set over them. To win then more effectually the favour of the satrap, the Athenian prisoners were presented to him. Assured of assistance from Byzantium, being also not without hopes from Lacedæmon, they prepared to prosecute their success by immediately undertaking an expedition against Miletus.

Information of these transactions arriving quickly at Athens, Pericles, with nine others, according to the ancient military constitution, joined with him in command, hastened to Samos with a fleet of sixty trireme galleys. Sixteen of these were detached, some to Chios and Lesbos, to require the assistance of the squadrons of those islands, the rest to the Carian coast, to look for a Phœnician fleet in the Persian service, which was expected to support the Samians. Pericles, with the remaining forty-four ships, met the Samian fleet of seventy returning from Miletus, and defeated it. Being soon after joined

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 116,
117.

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by forty more galleys from Athens, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, he debarked his infantry on the island of Samos, and laid siege to the city by land and sea. Intelligence meanwhile arriving that the fleet from Phenicia was approaching, Pericles went with sixty of his galleys to Caunus in Caria; apparently apprehensive for his small squadron there. The Samians, under the conduct of the able Melissus, (who, as not unusual in that age, united the characters of philosopher and military commander,) hastened to profit from his absence. Issuing unexpectedly from the harbour with their fleet, they attacked the Athenian naval camp, which was unfortified, destroyed the ships stationed as an advanced guard³, and then defeated the rest of the fleet, hastily formed for action against them. Becoming thus masters of the sea, during fourteen days they had all opportunity for carrying supplies into the town.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 41.

Meanwhile an assembly of deputies from the states of the Peloponnesian confederacy was held at Sparta, to consider whether the democratical party in Samos should be protected in what, according to Grecian political tenets extensively held in that age, was rebellion.⁴ The Corinthians, yet weak from the consequences of their last war with Athens, principally decided the assembly to the rejection of the proposal.

³ Τὰς προφυλακίδας ναῦς: for which may be consulted Scheffer's *Treatise de Militiâ Navali*, l. 3. c. 4. p. 108., though he is not very satisfactory. I would not however undervalue his laborious compilation, which may often guard against the supposition of what was not, where it fails to inform what was.

⁴ Ministers from Corinth, afterward giving an account to the Athenian assembly of what had passed at Sparta upon the occasion, affirmed that their députies had asserted the right of every leading city to PUNISH its allies: τοὺς σφετέρους συμμάχους αὐτὸν τινα κολάζειν. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 43.

Indeed, unless an invasion of Attica by land might have been effectual, the confederacy had not means to carry it into execution, for its naval strength was very unequal to contention with that of Athens.

The Samians, thus disappointed of assistance from Peloponnesus, were weakly supported by the satrap, and the promised succour from Byzantium was delayed. The return of Pericles therefore compelled them to confine themselves within their harbour : and shortly a reinforcement arrived, which might have enabled a less skilful commander to overbear opposition ; forty galleys from Attica, under Thucydides, Agnon, and Phormion⁵, were followed by twenty more under Tlepolemus and Anticles, while thirty came from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians made one vain attempt to cut off a part of this formidable naval force ; and then, in the ninth month from the commencement of the siege, they capitulated : their ships of war were surrendered, their fortifications were destroyed, they bound themselves to the payment of a sum of money by instalment for the expenses of the war, and they gave hostages as pledges of their fidelity to the sovereign commonwealth of Athens. The Byzantines, not waiting the approach of the coercing fleet, sent their request to be re-

⁵ The historian not having distinguished the Thucydides here spoken of by the mention of his father's name, it remains in doubt who he was. Some have supposed him the historian himself ; others, the son of Melesias, once the opponent of Pericles, now reconciled to him ; while others have imagined a third person of the name, nowhere else mentioned in history. Certainty cannot be had, and the matter is not important ; but the first supposition appears to me far the most probable. In the course of the history Agnon and Phormion become farther known.

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admitted to their former terms of subjection, which was granted.

This rebellion, alarming and troublesome at the time to the administration of Athens, otherwise little disturbed the internal peace of the commonwealth; and, in the event, contributed rather to strengthen its command over its dependencies. Pericles took occasion from it to acquire fresh popularity. On the return of the armament to Athens the accustomed solemnities, in honour of those who had fallen in the war, were performed with new splendour; and, in speaking the funeral oration, he exerted the powers of his eloquence very highly to the gratification of the people. As he descended from the bema, the stand whence orations were delivered to the people, the women presented him with chaplets; an idea derived from the ceremonies of the public games, where the crowning with a chaplet was the distinction of the victors, and, as something approaching to divine honour, was held among the highest tokens of admiration, esteem, and respect.

SECTION III.

Affairs of Corcyra: sedition at Epidamnus: war between Corcyra and Corinth: defect of the ancient ships of war: deficient naval skill of the Peloponnesians: sea-fight off Actium: accession of the Corcyræans to the Athenian confederacy: sea-fight off Sybota: infraction of the thirty years' truce.

THE threatened renewal of general war in Greece having been obviated by the determination of the Peloponnesian congress not to interfere between the Athenians and their Asiatic allies, peace prevailed during the next three years after the submission of the Samians; or, if hostilities occurred anywhere,

they were of so little importance that no account of them remains. A fatal spark then, raising fire in a corner of the country hitherto little within the notice of history, the blaze rapidly spread over the whole with inextinguishable fury; insomuch that the farther history of Greece, with some splendid episodes, is chiefly a tale of calamities, which the nation, in ceaseless exertions of misdirected valour and genius, brought upon itself.

The island of Corcyra had been occupied, in an early age, by a colony from Corinth. The political connexion of colonies with the mother-country will always depend upon their respective strength; and the Grecian colonies, all having been the offspring of very small states, in many instances acquired more than the parent's force. Corcyra thus had grown too powerful to remain obedient to Corinth, and, in independency, was too near a neighbour, and too much engaged in the same course of maritime commerce, not to become the rival, and thence the enemy, of its metropolis. Yet it was common for the Grecian colonies, even when they acknowledged no political subjection, to esteem a reverential regard for the mother-country a duty; holding themselves bound by a kind of religious superiority. Thus, unless in actual hostility, the citizens of the mother-country were complimented with the precedence at public sacrifices and all festivals; and, if a colony was to be sent out, it was usual to desire a citizen of the mother-country for the leader. Thus, it was supposed, the gods of their forefathers would still be their gods, would favour the enterprise, and extend their lasting protection to the settlement.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 25.

c. 24.

Corcyra, already populous, had not yet entirely broken its connexion with Corinth, when the resolu-

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tion was taken by its government to settle a colony on the Illyrian coast. An embassy was therefore sent, in due form, to desire a Corinthian for the leader. Phalius, of a family boasting its descent from Hercules, was accordingly appointed to that honour : some Corinthians and others of Dorian race accompanied him ; and Phalius thus became the nominal founder of Epidamnus, which was however considered as a Corcyraean, not a Corinthian colony.

But in process of time Epidamnus growing populous and wealthy followed the example of its mother-country, asserted independency, and maintained the claim. Like most other Grecian cities, it was then, during many years, torn by sedition ; and a war supervening with the neighbouring barbarians, it fell much from its former flourishing state. But the spirit of faction remaining in spite of misfortune untamed, the commonalty at length expelled all the higher citizens. These, finding refuge among the Illyrians, engaged with them in a predatory war, which was unremittingly carried on against the city by land and sea. Unable thus to rest, and almost to subsist, the Epidamnians in possession requested assistance from Corcyra. Conscious however that their state had no claim of merit with the mother-country, and the more doubtful of a favourable reception as at this time the Corcyraean government was aristocratical, those deputed for the purpose, instead of presenting themselves with the confidence of public ministers, put on the usual habit of suppliants, betook themselves to the temple of Juno, as a place whose sanctity would ensure them present security, and thence offered their petition ; in which still they ventured to solicit nothing more than the mediation of their metropolis with their expelled fellow-citizens, and protection

against the barbarians. Even this humble supplication however was rejected.

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On the return of their ministers, the Epidamnians, in great distress, determined to recur to the ancient resource of desponding states, the Delphian oracle. Sending a solemn deputation to Delphi, they put the question to the god, ‘Whether it would be proper ‘for them to endeavour to obtain protection from ‘Corinth, by acknowledging that city as their me- ‘tropolis, and submitting themselves accordingly to ‘its authority.’ The response directed them, in clear terms, to do so; and, thus warranted by the deity, they hastened a deputation to Corinth.⁶

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 25.

Fortunately for their object, though peace had not yet been broken, yet animosity between Corinth and Corcyra had so risen that the Corcyræans, who had long refused political dependency, now denied to the Corinthians all those honours and compliments usually paid by Grecian colonies to their parent states. Under stimulation thus from affront, and with encouragement from the oracle, the prospect of an acquisition of dominion was too tempting, and the proposal of the Epidamnians was accepted. Adventurers were collected to strengthen the colony; and

⁶ . . . Εἰ παραδοῖεν Κορινθίοις τὴν πόλιν, ὡς οἰκισταῖς. . . .
‘Ὁ δ’ αὐτοῖς ἀνείλε, παραδοῦναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας ποιεῖσθαι. Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 25. In Thucydides’s account of the disputes between Corinth, Corcyra, and Epidamnus, and of that which followed about Potidæa, we have more authentic information concerning the proper connexion between a Grecian colony and its metropolis than is perhaps elsewhere to be found; but we are without means of determining the exact import of the expressions παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς οἰκιστῆς and ἡγεμόνας ποιεῖσθαι, and we are equally uninformed of the proper authority of those Corinthian magistrates whom we find, in the sequel, annually sent to the colony of Potidæa in Thrace.

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XIII.B. C. 436.
Ol. 85. 4.

a body of Corinthian troops, with some Ambraciot and Leucadian auxiliaries, was appointed to convoy them. Fearful however of the naval force of Corcyra, which far exceeded that of Corinth, they passed by land to Apollonia, and, there embarking, proceeded by sea to Epidamnus.

The measures of the Epidamnians in possession becoming known to the expelled, these, before apparently hoping for final success with their own strength, and desirous to avoid dependency, now at length in alarm sent a deputation to solicit support from Corcyra. No sooner then was it known there that the Corinthians had taken possession of a colony in whose affairs the Corcyræans themselves had refused to interfere than the affair was taken up with warm resentment. Twenty-five triremes were immediately dispatched, with a requisition to the Epidamnians to receive their expelled fellow-citizens, (for these had now been supplicating protection from Corcyra,) and to dismiss the Corinthian colonists and garrison. This being refused, a re-enforcement was sent to the squadron, which, in conjunction with the expelled Epidamnians and the neighbouring Illyrians, laid siege to the town.

Thucyd.
I. 1. c. 27.

The Corinthian government was prepared to expect such measures. As soon therefore as intelligence of them was received, a proclamation was published, offering the privileges of a citizen of Epidamnus to any who would go immediately to settle there. What the proposed advantages of the citizenship of Epidamnus were we are not informed. An allotment of land however would be among them, and perhaps a dwelling in the town, with a vote in an assembly, whether of more or less power. All however would be precarious, and especially the land, in the actual

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circumstances, would be most insecure property. The sense which the Corinthian government had of this is marked in the farther offer of the same advantages to any who, avoiding the dangers of the present circumstances, would pay fifty drachmas, less than three pounds sterling, toward the expense of the expedition. Corinth had rich men, and throughout Greece poor commonly abounded, ready for any adventure. Accordingly some were found to offer their persons, and some to pay for the chance of profit from the event. But Corinth had at this time only thirty ships of war, whereas Corcyra was able to put to sea near four times the number; being, next to Athens, the most powerful maritime state of Greece. Application for naval assistance was therefore made to the republics with which Corinth was most bound in friendship, and thus more than forty vessels were obtained; Megara sending eight, the Paleans of Cephallenia four, Epidaurus five, Hermione one, Træzen two, Leucas ten, Ambracia eight, all with their complements of men; the Eleans some unmanned. Loans of money were obtained from the Eleans, Phliasians, and Thebans.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 27.
& c. 30.

It had been the settled policy of the Corcyræans, islanders and strong at sea, to engage in no alliances. They had avoided both the Peloponnesian and the Athenian confederacy; and hitherto with this policy they had prospered. But, alarmed now at the combination formed against them, and fearing it might still be extended, they sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Sicyon; who prevailed so far that ministers from those two states accompanied them to Corinth, as mediators in the existing differences. In presence of these the Corcyræan ambassadors proposed to submit the matters in dispute to the arbitration of

c. 32. &
seq.

c. 28.

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any Peloponnesian states, or to the Delphian oracle, which the Corinthians had supposed already favourable to them. The Corinthians however, now prepared for war, and apparently persuaded that neither Lacedæmon nor Sicyon would take any active part against them, refused to treat upon any equal terms, and the Corcyræan ambassadors departed.

B. C. 435.
Ol. 87. $\frac{1}{2}$.

The Corinthians then hastened to use the force they had collected. The troops were already embarked when they sent a herald to Corcyra formally to declare war; a ceremony required by custom, which, throughout Greece, was held sacred. But, though they would not omit this, they would delay it till it might in the least possible degree answer its proper purpose. The armament consisting of seventy-five triremes, with two thousand heavy-armed infantry, under the command of Aristeus son of Pellicas, proceeded for Epidamnus. Off Actium in the Anactorian territory, at the entrance of the Ambracian gulf, where the temple of Apollo stands, (so the contemporary historian describes the place destined to be in after-times the scene of more important action,) a vessel came to them with a herald from Corcyra, deprecating hostilities. The Corcyræans had manned those of their ships which were already equipped, and hastily prepared some of those less in readiness, when their herald returned, bearing no friendly answer. With eighty galleys then they quitted their port, met the enemy, and gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen ships. Returning to Corcyra, they erected their trophy on the neadland of Leucimne, and they immediately put to death all their prisoners, except the Corinthians, whom, as pledges, they kept in bonds. Epidamnus surrendered to their forces on the same day.

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The opportunities now open, for both revenge and profit, were not neglected by the Corcyræans. They first plundered the territory of Leucas, a Corinthian colony, still connected with the mother-country; and then, going to the coast of Peloponnesus, they burnt Cyllene, the naval arsenal of Elis. During that year, unopposed on the sea, there was scarcely an intermission of their smaller enterprises; by some of which they gained booty, by others only gave alarm, but by all together greatly distressed the Corinthians and their allies. It was not till late in the following spring that the Corinthians sent a fleet and some troops to Actium, to give protection to their friends, wherever occasion might require. All the ensuing summer the rival armaments watched one another without coming to action. On the approach of winter both retired within their respective ports.

B. C. 434.
Ol. 87. $\frac{3}{4}$.

But since their misfortune off Actium the Corinthians had been unremittingly assiduous in repairing their loss, and in preparing to revenge it. Triremes were built, all necessities for a fleet were largely collected, rowers were engaged throughout Peloponnesus, and where else in any part of Greece they could be obtained for hire. The Corcyræans, informed of these measures, notwithstanding their past success, were uneasy with the consideration that their commonwealth stood single, while their enemies were members of an extensive confederacy; of which, though a part only had yet been induced to act, more powerful exertions were nevertheless to be apprehended. In this state of things it appeared necessary to abandon their ancient policy, and to seek alliances. Thucydides gives us to understand that they would have preferred the Peloponnesian to the Athenian confederacy; induced, apparently, both by their

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 31.

l. 1. c. 28.

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I. I. c. 31.

kindred origin, and their kindred form of government. But they were precluded by the circumstances of the existing war, Corinth being one of the most considerable members of the Peloponnesian confederacy; and it was beyond hope that Lacedæmon could be engaged in measures hostile to so old and useful an ally. It was therefore finally resolved to send an embassy to Athens.

A measure of this kind, among those ancient commonwealths which had any mixture of democracy, was unavoidably public; and this is one among circumstances favourable to ancient history, which counterbalance the want of some advantages open to the historians of modern ages. Gazettes were then unknown; records and state writings were comparatively few; party-intrigues indeed abounded; but public measures were publicly decided; and some of the principal historians were statesmen and generals. bred to a knowledge of politics and war, and possessing means, through their rank and situation, of knowing also the facts which they related. Such particularly was Thucydides, son of Olorus, who has transmitted to us the transactions of the times with which we are now engaged. From him we learn that, as soon as the purpose of the Corcyræans was known at Corinth, ambassadors were sent thence to Athens to remonstrate against it.

The Athenian people were assembled to receive the two embassies, each of which, in presence of the other, made its proposition in a formal oration. The point to be determined was highly critical for Athens. A truce existed, but not a peace, with a confederacy inferior in naval force, but far superior by land; and Attica, a continental territory, was open to attack by land. That recent circumstance in the Samian war,

the assembling of a congress at Sparta for the purpose of considering whether the Samians, an Ionian people, a colony from Athens, and members of the Athenian alliance, should not be supported in war against the head of their confederacy, also their mother-state, would weigh in the minds of the Athenian people. The mere summoning of such an assembly, to discuss such a question, strongly indicated the disposition at least of a powerful party in the Lacedæmonian confederacy; and the determination of the question, in the negative, rather demonstrated a present unreadiness, principally among the Corinthians, for the renewal of hostilities, than any friendly disposition toward Athens. The security of that state rested principally on its maritime superiority. But next to Athens Corcyra was the most powerful maritime republic; and to prevent the accession of its strength, through alliance, or through conquest, to the Peloponnesian confederacy, was, for the Athenian people, highly important. In the articles of the truce moreover it was expressly stipulated, that any Grecian state, not yet a member of either confederacy, might at pleasure be admitted to either. But, notwithstanding this, it was little less than certain that, in the present circumstances, an alliance with Corcyra must lead to a rupture with the Peloponnesians; and this consideration occasioned much suspense in the minds of the Athenians. Twice the assembly was held to debate the question. On the first day, the arguments of the Corinthian ambassadors had so far effect that nothing was decided: on the second, the spirit of ambition, ordinary in democracy, prevailed, and the question was carried for alliance with Corcyra.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 35.
& 40.

c. 44.

Thucydides gives no information what part Pericles took in this important and difficult conjuncture. If

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it was impossible, as it seems to have been, to establish secure peace with Lacedæmon, it would become the leader of the affairs of Athens to provide for maintaining future war; strengthening the Athenian confederacy, and obviating accession of strength to the Lacedæmonian. But we are enough informed that Pericles would be farther pressed by other circumstances. The difficulty of keeping civil order in a community of lordly beggars, such as the Athenian people were, which had driven Cimon, in advanced years, to end his life in distant enterprise, we shall find, in the sequel, a difficulty for which, even in speculation, the wisest politicians were unable to propose any remedy, beyond finding the fittest objects for restless ambition. It is therefore every way likely that Plutarch had ground for asserting that the eloquence of Pericles was directed to promote the decision to which the people came. The character of the measure taken, in pursuance of the decision, may then seem to indicate the wisdom of Pericles, guiding the business. With all other states of the confederacy the alliance was offensive and defensive; with Corcyra it was for defence only.

Thucyd.
I. I. c. 46.

Meanwhile the earnestness with which the Corinthians persevered in their purpose of prosecuting war against the Corcyræans, now to be supported by the power of Athens, appears to mark confidence in support, on their side, from the Lacedæmonian confederacy; some members of which indeed were evidently of ready zeal. The Corinthians increased their own trireme galleys to ninety. The Eleans, resenting the burning of Cyllene, had exerted themselves in naval preparation, and sent ten triremes completely manned to join them. Assistance from Megara, Leucas, and Ambracia made their whole fleet a hundred and fifty: the crews would hardly be

less than forty thousand men. With this large force they sailed to Chimerion, a port of Thesprotia, over against Corcyra, where, according to the practice of the Greeks, they formed their naval camp.

The Athenian government meanwhile, desirous to confirm their new alliance, yet still anxious to avoid a rupture with the Peloponnesian confederacy, had sent ten triremes to Corcyra, under the command of Lacedæmonius son of Cimon ; but with orders not to fight, unless a descent were made on the island, or any of its towns were attacked. The Corcyræans, on receiving intelligence that the enemy was approaching, put to sea with a hundred and ten triremes, exclusive of the Athenian, and formed their naval camp on one of the small islets called Sybota, the Sowleas or Sow-pastures, between their own island and the main. Their land forces at the same time, with a thousand auxiliaries from Zacynthus, encamped on the headland of Leucimne in Corcyra, to be prepared against invasion ; while on the opposite coast of the continent the barbarians, long since friendly to Corinth, assembled in large number.

Thucyd.
1. 1. c. 45.

c. 47.

The necessity among the ancients for debarking continually to encamp their crews arose from the make of their ships of war. To obtain that most valuable property for their manner of naval action, swiftness in rowing, burden was excluded ; inasmuch that not only they could not carry any stock of provisions, but the numerous crews could neither sleep nor even eat conveniently aboard. When the Corinthians quitted the port of Chimerion, with the purpose of bringing the Corcyræan fleet to action, they took three days' provision ; which Thucydides seems to have thought a circumstance for notice, because it appears to have been the practice of the

1. 4. c. 26.
1. 1. c. 44.

1. 7. c. 39.
& 40.

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I. 1. c. 48.

c. 50.

c. 49.

Athenians, when action was expected, hardly to encumber themselves with a meal. The Corinthians however, moving in the night, perceived in the dawn the Corcyraean fleet approaching. Both prepared immediately to engage. So great a number of ships had never before met in any action between Greeks and Greeks. The onset was vigorous ; and the battle was maintained, on either side, with much courage but little skill. Both Corcyraean and Corinthian ships were equipped in the ancient manner, very inartificially. The decks were crowded with soldiers, some heavy-armed, some with missile weapons ; and the action, in the eye of the Athenians, trained in the discipline of Themistocles, resembled a battle of infantry rather than a sea-fight. Once engaged, the number and throng of the vessels made free motion impossible : nor was there any attempt at the rapid evolution of the *diecplus*, as it was called, for piercing the enemy's line and dashing away his oars, the great objects of the improved naval tactics ; but the event depended, as of old, chiefly upon the heavy-armed soldiers who fought on the decks. Tumult and confusion thus prevailing everywhere, Lacedæmonius, restrained by his orders from fighting, gave yet some assistance to the Corcyraeans, by showing himself wherever he saw them particularly pressed, and alarming their enemies. The Corcyraeans were, in the left of their line, successful : twenty of their ships put to flight the Megarians and Ambraciots who were opposed to them, pursued to the shore, and, debarking, plundered and burnt the naval camp. But the Corinthians, in the other wing, had meanwhile been gaining an advantage which became decisive through the imprudent forwardness of the victorious Corcyraeans. The Athenians now

endeavoured, by more effectual assistance to their allies, to prevent a total rout: but disorder was already too prevalent, and advantage of numbers too great against them. The Corinthians pressed their success; the Corcyræans fled, the Athenians became mingled among them; and in the confusion of a running fight acts of hostility passed between the Athenians and Corinthians. The defeated however soon reached their own shore, whither the conquerors did not think proper to follow.

In the action several galleys had been sunk; most by the Corinthians, but some by the victorious part of the Corcyræan fleet. The crews had recourse as usual, to their boats; and it was common for the conquerors, when they could seize any of these, to take them in tow and make the men prisoners: but the Corinthians, in the first moment of success, gave no quarter; and, unaware of the disaster of the right of their fleet, in the hurry and confusion of the occasion, not easily distinguishing between Greeks and Greeks, inadvertently destroyed many of their unfortunate friends. When pursuit ceased, and they had collected whatever could be recovered of the wrecks and the dead, they carried them to a desert harbour, not distant, on the Thesprotian coast, called, like the neighbouring islets, Sybota: and depositing them under the care of their barbarian allies, who were there encamped, they returned, on the afternoon of the same day, with the purpose of renewing attack upon the Corcyræan fleet.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 50.

The Corcyræans meanwhile had been considering the probable consequences of leaving the enemy masters of the sea. They dreaded descents upon their island, and consequent ravage of their lands. The return of their victorious squadron gave them

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new spirits: Lacedæmonius encouraged them with assurance that, since hostilities had already passed, he would no longer scruple to afford them his utmost support; and they resolved upon the bold measure of quitting their port, and, though evening was already approaching, again giving the enemy battle. Instantly they proceeded to put this in execution. The pæan, the song of battle, was already sung, when the Corinthians began suddenly to retreat. The Corcyræans were at a loss immediately to account for this; but presently they discovered a squadron coming round a headland, which had concealed it longer from them than from the enemy. Still uncertain whether it might be friendly or hostile, they also retreated into their port; but shortly, to their great joy, twenty triremes under Glaucon and Andocides, sent from Attica, in the apprehension that the small force under Lacedæmonius might be unequal to the occurring exigencies, took their station by them.

Thucyd.
l. l. c. 51.

c. 52.

Next day the Corcyræans did not hesitate, with the thirty Athenian ships, for none of those under Lacedæmonius had suffered materially in the action, to show themselves off the harbour of Sybota, where the enemy lay, and offer battle. The Corinthians came out of the harbour, formed for action, and so rested. They were not desirous of risking an engagement against the increased strength of the enemy, but they could not remain conveniently in the station they had occupied, a desert shore, where they could neither refit their injured ships, nor recruit their stock of provisions; and they were encumbered with more than a thousand prisoners; a very inconvenient addition to the crowded complements of their galleys. Their object therefore was to return home: but they

were apprehensive that the Athenians, holding the truce as broken by the action of the preceding day, would not allow an unmolested passage. It was therefore determined to try their disposition by sending a small vessel with a message to the Athenian commanders, without the formality of a herald. This was a service not without danger. Those Corcyræans, who were near enough to observe what passed, exclaimed, in the vehemence of their animosity, 'that the bearers should be put to death;' which, considering them as enemies, would have been within the law of war of the Greeks. The Athenian commanders however thought proper to hold a different conduct. To the message delivered, which accused them of breaking the truce, by obstructing the passage of Corcyra, they replied that 'it was not their purpose to break the truce, but only to protect their allies. Wherever else the Corinthians chose to go, they might go without interruption from them; but any attempt against Corcyra, or any of its possessions, would be resisted by the Athenians to the utmost of their power.'

Thucyd.
I. 1. c. 53.

Upon receiving this answer, the Corinthians, after erecting a trophy at Sybota on the continent, proceeded homeward. In their way they took by stratagem Anactorium, a town at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, which had formerly been held in common by their commonwealth and the Corcyræans; and, leaving a garrison there, proceeded to Corinth. Of their prisoners they found near eight hundred had been slaves, and these they sold. The remainder, about two hundred and fifty, were strictly guarded, but otherwise treated with the utmost kindness. Among them were some of the first men of Corcyra; and through these the Corinthians hoped, at some

c. 54. & 55.

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future opportunity, to recover their ancient interest and authority in the island.

The Corcyræans meanwhile had gratified themselves with the erection of a trophy on the island Sybota, as a claim of victory, in opposition to the Corinthian trophy on the continent. The Athenian fleet returned home; and thus ended, without any treaty, that series of actions which is distinguished among Greek writers by the name of the Corcyræan, or, sometimes, the Corinthian war.

SECTION IV.

Summary view of the history of Macedonia. War of Athens with Macedonia: enmity of Corinth to Athens: revolt of Athenian dependencies in Thrace: battle and siege of Potidæa.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 44.
l. 6. c. 90.
Plut. v.
Pericl.

THE contemporary historian has strongly marked the difficulties of those who might have desired to guide the sovereign people of Athens in the paths of peace and moderation. The Corcyræan war was far too small an object for their glowing minds: the view toward Sicily and the adjacent Italian shores were fondly looked to for new enterprise. Nor was it intended to stop there. Where spoil allured, no difficulty daunted; and the wild vision of conquest was extended from Calabria to Tuscany, and from Sicily to Carthage. Pericles endeavoured to repress this extravagant and dishonest ambition; and his view was assisted by circumstances which necessarily engaged attention nearer home.

Plut. *ibid.*
& Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 144.

The towns which the Athenians held under their dependency on the northern shores of the Ægean, some highly valuable for their mines of gold and silver, others furnishing the principal supplies of na-

val timber, and all paying some tribute, gave Athens a near interest in the affairs of MACEDONIA. Peopled by the same Pelasgian race which principally gave origin to the Greeks, and brought afterward under the dominion of a Grecian colony, that country claimed always to be a part of Greece.* Its history however, as that of most other Grecian states, is almost only known through connexion with Athenian history. Thucydides, who must have had superior opportunity, appears to have been able to discover little more than the genealogy of its kings, downward from Perdiccas, who was ancestor in the seventh degree to Alexander son of Amyntas, the reigning prince at the time of the invasion of Greece under Xerxes.

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Æschyl.
Danaid.
[Suppl. 250.
sqq.]
Justin.
1.7. c. 1.

Thucydides and Herodotus agree in ascribing the foundation of the Macedonian monarchy to Perdiccas; but later writers have given the honour to a prince whom they call Caranus, reckoning Perdiccas his grandson. This addition to the pedigree of the Macedonian kings cannot but appear utterly doubtful, being opposed by the united authority of Herodotus and Thucydides, almost within whose memory that pedigree had been judiciously discussed at the Olympian meeting.⁷ Three brothers, according to Herodotus, Heraclidæ of the branch of Temenus, of whom Gavanus was the eldest, and Perdiccas the youngest, passed from Argos into Macedonia, where the latter acquired the sovereignty; and it seems not improbable that the ingenuity of chronologers, with a little

Herodot.
1.8. c. 137.
Thucyd.
1.2. c. 99.

* Macedonia is reckoned among the unquestioned parts of Greece by Strabo, l. 7. p. 465.

⁷ Thus the learned and generally judicious Henry Dodwell: 'Tres illos reges *Eusebianos* rescindendos arbitror.' Annal. Thucyd. ad ann. A. C. 454.

CHAP.
XIII.Herodot.
l. 8. c. 137.

alteration of the name, has converted the elder brother into the grandfather.⁸ The founder of the Macedonian royal family however was, according to every account, an Argive, descended from Temenus the Heraclidean, whence the princes of that family were commonly called Temenidæ. By a series of adventures, of which romantic reports only remain, he acquired command among the Macedonians; a Pelasgian clan, who held the inland province of *Æmathia*, otherwise called Macedonia proper, to the north of Thessaly, and then esteemed a part of Thrace.

Schol. ad
v. 226. l. 14.
Iliad.

The Macedonian name, according to fable, fabricated however apparently in a late age, had its origin from Macedon, son of Jupiter and *Æthria*. What led the followers of Perdiccas to assume it, and by what wars or what policy they acquired extensive dominion, precise information fails; but circumstances whence to deduce some probable conjecture remain reported. The innumerable clans who shared that extensive continent, being in a state of perpetual warfare among one another, the situation of the Macedonians, when the Argive adventurers arrived among them, might be such as to make them glad to associate strangers, whose skill in arms and general knowledge were superior. While civil and military pre-eminence were therefore yielded to the newcomers, and royalty became established in the family of their chief, the name of the ancient inhabitants, as the more numerous, remained. In the course of six or seven reigns the Macedonians extended their

⁸ According to the chronologers, Caranus began to reign 814 years before the Christian era, and 36 before the first Olympiad; Perdiccas 729 years before the Christian era, in the fourth year of the 12th Olympiad.

dominion over the neighbouring provinces of Pieria, Bottiæa, Mygdonia, part of Pæonia, Eordia, Almopia, Anthemous, Grestonia, and Bisaltia; all, together with Æmathia or Macedonia proper, forming what acquired the name of Lower Macedonia, which extended from mount Olympus to the river Strymon. The people of some of these provinces were exterminated; of some extirpated; some were admitted to the condition of subjects, and many probably reduced to slavery. The expelled Pierians established themselves in Thrace, at the foot of mount Pangæus; the Bottiæans found a settlement nearer their former home, in a tract on the border of Chalcidice, which Thucydides distinguishes by the name of Bottica. Lyncestis and Elimiotis, with some other inland and mountainous provinces, under the government of princes, in the manner of feudatories, acknowledging the sovereignty of the Macedonian kings, became known by the name of Upper Macedonia.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 99.
Strab.
l. 7. p. 468.
ed. Ox.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 99.
c. 101.

While wars almost unceasing with savage neighbours, and frequent rebellions of conquered subjects, prevented the progress of civilisation among the Macedonians, the weakness of the prince and the wants of the people concurred to encourage Grecian establishments on the coast; of which however the principal, those of Chalcidice and the three peninsulas, had been made probably before the Macedonian kingdom had acquired any considerable extent. But in so little estimation was Macedonia held by the Greeks at the time of the Persian wars, that when, in his father's lifetime, Alexander son of Amyntas offered himself as a competitor for the prize of the stadion at the Olympian games, it was objected to him that he was a barbarian. The prince however producing testimony that he was not only a Greek, but a He-

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Herod. 1. 5.
c. 22, &
1. 9. c. 45.
Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 99. &
1. 5. c. 80.
Herodot.
1. 5. c. 21. &
1. 8. c. 136.
Justin.
1. 7. c. 3.

raclidean of the race of Temenus, and this being admitted by the Hellanotics, and approved by the assembly, that illustrious origin of the royal family of Macedonia, fully acknowledged by both Herodotus and Thucydides, was, among all the invectives of the Grecian orators in aftertimes, never disputed.⁹ The marriage of Gygæa, sister of Alexander, with Bubaris, a Persian of high rank, contributed to the security of the Macedonian kingdom when Xerxes invaded Greece. Alexander was a prince of considerable ability, improved by communication both with Greeks and Persians; but after the retreat of Xerxes he had so many wars to sustain against the neighbouring barbarians that, though generally successful, he had little leisure for attending to the advancement of arts and knowledge among his people.

Long before the establishment of the Athenian sovereignty over the islands and coast of the Ægean, there had been friendly connexion between the commonwealth and the Macedonian kings; and in consequence, at the time of the Persian invasion, Alexander son of Amyntas, as it has been before observed, was esteemed the hereditary guest of Athens. While he lived the friendly connexion seems not to have been interrupted or impaired by any acquisition of sovereignty to the commonwealth extending over towns which might be esteemed within Macedonia. Alliance with the republic seems to have passed as an

Herodot.
1. 8. c. 136.

⁹ Demosthenes, among other illiberal language, adapted to excite his audience against the great Philip, would call that prince a barbarian. Æschines called Demosthenes a barbarian, and showed his ground for it; but Demosthenes has not ventured an attempt to show any for his imputation: he has merely thrown out the ugly nickname to the Athenian populace, for the chance of the vogue it might obtain, and the effect it might produce.

inheritance to his son and successor Perdiccas, who had been honoured with adoption to the citizenship of Athens, for merit with the Greek nation, in defeating a division of the Persian army, which, after the battle of Plataea, retreated from Greece under Artabazus.

But differences afterward arose. One of the principalities of Upper Macedonia was the appanage of Philip, younger brother of Perdiccas, and another was the inheritance of Derdas, a prince more distantly related to the royal family. About the time of the Corcyraean war, Perdiccas proposing to deprive both his brother and his cousin of their commands, the Athenian administration thought proper to take those princes under its protection, and support them against the intended injury. Perdiccas resented this as a breach of the ancient alliance; and perhaps he was, not without reason, jealous of the ambition of the Athenian people. The authority and influence of the two princes however were so considerable that to attack them, while they could be supported by the power of the Athenian commonwealth, would have been hazardous: but the circumstances of the times offered a resource suited to the genius of the Macedonian king; who, not possessing all his father's virtues, was not without abilities. The Athenians had just taken a decided part in the Corcyraean war. The hostile disposition of Corinth toward them was in consequence avowed; that a similar disposition prevailed in Lacedaemon was well known; and opportunity occurred for intrigue, which would probably involve the Athenian commonwealth in war, with Corinth immediately, and ultimately with Lacedaemon. Thus invited, Perdiccas, ambitious, active, crafty, and unrestrained by any principle of integrity,

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 100.

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(so the historian, describing only his conduct, marks his character,) determined to persevere in his purpose.

The town of Potidæa, critically situated on the isthmus which connects the fruitful peninsula of Pallene with Macedonia where it bordered on Thrace, was a Corinthian colony; so far still dependent upon the mother-country as to receive magistrates annually thence, and yet, such were the complicated interests of the Grecian republics, tributary allies of Athens. Perdiccas sent an offer to Corinth to assist in recovering Potidæa from the Athenian dominion. At the same time he sent to Lacedæmon a proposal to become a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Meanwhile he negotiated not only with the Potidæans, but also with the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, subjects of Athens in his neighbourhood, to induce them to revolt.

The Athenian government, informed of these transactions, and aware of the hostile disposition of Corinth, judged immediate precaution necessary for the preservation of their command on the northern shores of the Ægean. A squadron of thirty ships of war was already preparing in the port of Piræus, to be accompanied by a thousand heavy-armed infantry, for the support of the Macedonian princes, Philip and Derdas. According to that despotic authority which the Athenian people assumed over the Grecian states of their alliance, peremptory orders were sent to the Potidæans to demolish their fortifications on the side of Pallene, to give hostages for security of their fidelity, and to send away their Corinthian magistrates and receive no more. The Potidæans, afraid to dispute, yet very averse to obey, sent ministers to Athens requesting a recal or a mitigation of these commands; but at the same time, in common with

Thueyd.
1. 1. c. 56.
& 57.

the Corinthians, they communicated privately with Sparta, soliciting protection, if the Athenians should persevere in their requisition. From the Athenian people no remission was obtained. The leading men in the Spartan administration ¹⁰ promised that, if the Athenians attempted to enforce their commands by arms, a Peloponnesian army should invade Attica. The Potidæans communicated with the Chalcidians and Bottiæans; a league was formed and ratified in the usual manner by oaths, and all revolted together.

Ample assurance remains that the command of the Athenian people over their subject states, always arbitrary, was often very oppressive; but, as accounts of the times have reached us mostly from Athenian writers, particulars have been transmitted almost only when the circumstances have been extraordinary. By an Athenian writer however information is afforded of the measure next resorted to by the Chalcidians; and, under the foreseen necessity for such a measure, it must apparently have been a galling oppression that could induce a people to revolt. The lands of their rich peninsula would be open to ravage from the Athenian fleet, decidedly commanding the Ægean sea. Its produce then not only would be lost to them, but would assist the enemy to carry on the war against them. Founded on this view an extraordinary proposal was made to them by the king of Macedonia: that they should destroy all their sea-port towns, except Olynthus, which should be made their one strong place; and that all their people, beyond what the defence of that city might require, abandoning their lands, should remove, with their families, to a fruitful territory, which he would assign them,

¹⁰ Τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

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about the lake Bolbe in Mygdonia; by the cultivation of which they might subsist till the war should be over. Severe as the sacrifice must have been, the Chalcidians accepted the offer, and the measure, at least in great part, was executed.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 57.
& 59.

These transactions were yet unknown at Athens, when the armament intended for Macedonia sailed under the command of Archestratus. His instructions directed him to go first to Potidæa, and see the orders of the Athenian government executed there; then to take any measures that might appear expedient for preventing revolt in any other towns in that neighbourhood of the Athenian dominion or alliance; terms apparently equivocal, or nearly so, as applied to those towns; and not, till these were secured, to prosecute the proposed operations in Macedonia. On his arrival in Chalcidice, finding the revolt already complete, he judged his force insufficient for any effectual measures there, and he therefore turned immediately toward Macedonia, to favour a projected invasion of the inland frontier of that kingdom by the king's brother, Philip.

c. 40. & 60.

Meanwhile the Corinthians, who had dissuaded war when the common cause of their confederacy only had instigated, became vehement in the call to arms when the particular interest of their own state was endangered. No negotiation was proposed, no desire to have differences accommodated, according to the stipulations of the existing treaty, was mentioned; but while their ministers were everywhere assiduously endeavouring to excite alarm and indignation among their allies, they prepared themselves immediately to assert their cause by force. Sixteen hundred heavy-armed and four hundred light-armed troops, partly volunteers of Corinth, partly engaged

c. 69. 71.
& 78.

for hire among other states of Peloponnesus, were sent to Potidæa, under Aristeus son of Adimantus, who had particular connexions with that colony, and was esteemed there : and, so much diligence was used in the equipment, it was only the fortieth day after the revolt (the contemporary historian's term) when they arrived.

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The Athenians, on receiving intelligence of these proceedings of the Corinthian government, sent Callias son of Calliades, with forty triremes and two thousand heavy-armed, to join the little army under Archestratus. That army, with the assistance of its Macedonian confederates, had already taken Therme and was besieging Pydna, when Callias arrived. The business of the revolted colonies being deemed of more importance than the prosecution of hostilities, however successful, against Perdiccas, proposals were made to that prince. As he was not himself scrupulous, so apparently he had little confidence in any treaty with any of the republics. Views to present advantage prompting, not peace only between him and the Athenian republic, but a treaty of alliance was hastily concluded, in which, rather in opposition to his views, some care apparently was taken of the interests of his brother and the other revolted princes ; the interest of Athens so requiring. The whole Athenian force, and a considerable body of allied infantry, with the valuable addition of six hundred Macedonian horse, sent by Philip, then marched for Potidæa. These particulars, otherwise little interesting, are important, together with those which follow, toward a just understanding of the policy of the Grecian republics in the times of their greatest celebrity.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 61.

Perdiccas held his engagement with the Athenians

CHAP.
XIII.Thucyd.
l. i. c. 62.

no longer than to serve a present purpose. Possibly some gross insolence of the Athenian government, which the contemporary historian would prudently avoid to notice, offended him; for often those who best know can least properly or safely declare political truths. So complete however was his tergiversation that he sent two hundred horse to join the army of the Corinthians and their allies. In this confederate army then it was necessary to establish, by common consent, some system of command. It may seem that the Macedonian king, in this new choice of republican allies, was again disappointed; though perhaps the course taken by those republicans was that of prudence and reason. By election Aristeus, general of the Corinthian forces, was appointed commander-in-chief of the infantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry. The Macedonian prince, apparently little satisfied with the compliment, deputed his general Iolaus to execute the office. The Athenian army soon after approaching, an action ensued, in which Aristeus, with a chosen body, performing the duty more of a brave soldier than of an able general, for so the custom of war seems to have required, broke and pursued a part of the enemy's line, while the rest completely routed his remaining army, and drove the survivors for refuge within the walls of Potidæa. Callias, the Athenian general, was killed: but Aristeus, returning from pursuit, not without difficulty and loss, by a hazardous effort, joined his defeated troops in the town. The Athenian army sat down before it, and, being soon after re-enforced with sixteen hundred men under Phormion, blockaded it by land and sea.

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 63.

c. 64.

c. 65.

Aristeus, who, if error in the battle should be imputed to him, appears nevertheless to have been a

man of considerable abilities, as well as daring courage and indefatigable activity, having regulated things within the place in the best manner for sustaining the siege, found means to pass out of the harbour in a vessel unnoticed by the Athenian guard-ships. Going himself to Olynthus, to take the command of the allied forces there, he hastened dispatches to Peloponnesus with information of what had passed, and pressing for a re-enforcement, without which Potidæa, he said, could not be saved; for Phormion was now so superior that, after having completed a contravallation against the place, he could spare a part of his army to ravage Chalcidice and the Bottiæan territory, where he took some smaller towns.

SECTION V.

Assembly of deputies of the Peloponnesian confederacy at Lacedæmon: the thirty years' truce declared broken. Second assembly: war with Athens resolved. Embassies from Lacedæmon to Athens. Final rejection of the proposals from Lacedæmon by the Athenians.

IT is from the account, remaining from Thucydides, of that complicated and lasting war, to which the affairs just related immediately led, that we derive our best knowledge of the political and military state of Greece, with much collateral information concerning science, arts, and manners during the period most interesting; that remarkable period, when the leading Grecian commonwealths had a political importance in the affairs of the world, beyond all proportion to their natural strength, and when science and art arose among them to a splendour totally unknown in preceding ages, and never in all points equalled since. If therefore, in following the steps of that able writer, we meet with circumstances

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XIII.

which on first view appear little ; if armies engaged are not numerous ; if the affairs of single towns, and sometimes of small ones, occupy some space in narration ; it must not be concluded that the subject is trifling, since those apparently little matters are connected with consequences among the most important that occur in the history of mankind.

Of those Greeks who were not held in subjection, the Corinthians appear to have been most affected by the rising power of Athens. Their commerce was checked, and their colonial dependencies, not absolutely taken from them, were however compelled to acknowledge a degree of sovereignty in the Athenian people, and to pay a tribute ; originally, and still nominally, for common purposes of Greece, but more really for the particular benefit of Athens. The irritation excited by the check given, in former wars, to the ambition of those adverse to the Athenian supremacy, and particularly by the loss of friends and relations in the unfortunate action in which Myronides commanded against them, was thus kept alive, and the Corinthians nourished the sharpest animosity against the Athenians. When therefore intelligence came from Aristeus of the transactions in Chalcidice, far from remitting their ardour for war, the Corinthians applied themselves with increased sedulity to excite their whole confederacy, and especially Lacedæmon, to take up their cause : ‘The truce,’ they exclaimed, ‘was already broken, and Peloponnesus insulted and ‘injured.’ At the same time the Æginetans, who bore most impatiently their subjection to Athens, yet feared to make any open demonstration of a disposition to revolt, complained, by secret negotiation among the Peloponnesian states, of the dependency in which they were held, contrary, as they contended,

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 67.

to the treaty ; and they redoubled their importunity as they found a growing disposition to that hostility which would favour their cause. Thus instigated, the Lacedæmonians at length convoked the usual assembly of deputies from the states of their confederacy ; and they invited the attendance of ministers from any other Grecian republics which might have any complaint to prefer against Athens.

The detail remaining from Thucydides of the debates and negotiations which followed afford so much insight into the politics, the political manners, and the temper of Greece at the time, that, with the risk of some appearance of uncouthness to the modern reader, I shall venture to report the more material parts without abridgment, and with the least deviation that may be from the expression of the original. The deputies of the confederacy, or a large proportion of them (for it appears to have been not a full meeting) being arrived at Sparta, the general assembly of the Lacedæmonian people was convened. There happened to be present at the time ministers from Athens, commissioned on some other public business, and these were allowed to attend the audience. All being met, proclamation was made, according to the custom of the Grecian assemblies, declaring permission to speak on the subject for which the assembly was convened. Many came forward exhibiting various complaints against the Athenian government, mostly little important or doubtfully founded, excepting those of the Megarians and Corinthians. The former urged that, contrary to existing treaty, they were, by a decree of the Athenian people, prohibited all commercial intercourse by land with Attica, and excluded from all ports within the Athenian dominion. The Corinthians reserved themselves, till the others should

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 67.

c. 72.

c. 67.

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XIII.Thucyd.
I. I. c. 68.

have prepared the minds of the Lacedæmonian people for warmer instigation, and then spoke nearly thus :

‘ That strict faith, Lacedæmonians, which characterises your conduct in public and in private affairs, inclines you to disregard accusations against others ; and hence indeed you obtain the just praise of moderation and equity, but you remain ignorant of the transactions of foreign states. Often we have forewarned you of the wrongs which the Athenians were preparing for us ; but not till there was actual war, and we had already suffered, would you summon this assembly of our confederacy, in which we have perhaps more cause than others to come forward, injured as we have been by the Athenians, and neglected by you. Not that we alone are interested : all Greece is concerned ; many states being already reduced to subjection, and others notoriously threatened ; among which some, from treaties of alliance, have especial claim to our protection. Corcyra, capable of furnishing a fleet superior to that of any republic of our confederacy, is already taken from us ; and Potidæa, our most important post for holding dominion or carrying on commerce in Thrace, is at this time besieged.

c. 69.

‘ Nor can we avoid saying that these injuries, which we have thus suffered, are in great measure to be imputed to you. After the Persian war, you permitted the Athenians to fortify their city ; then to build their long walls ; and still you have continued to look on, though boasting to be vindicators of the freedom of Greece, while they have deprived of freedom, not only their own, but our confederates. Even now the convention of this assembly has been with difficulty obtained ; and even now we meet apparently not for the purpose which ought

‘ to be the object of our consideration. For is this
 ‘ a time to inquire whether we have been injured ?
 ‘ No, rather how we shall repel injury. You have
 ‘ the reputation of being provident and circumspect ;
 ‘ but facts do not justify the opinion. The Persians,
 ‘ we know, came against Peloponnesus from the
 ‘ farthest parts of the earth before you had made any
 ‘ adequate preparation for defence ; and now you are
 ‘ equally remiss against the Athenians in your neigh-
 ‘ bourhood. Thus, as the barbarian failed principally
 ‘ through his own misconduct, so their errors, and
 ‘ not your support, have enabled us hitherto to main-
 ‘ tain ourselves against the Athenians. Let it not
 ‘ however be imagined that this expostulation is
 ‘ prompted by resentment ; we expostulate with our
 ‘ friends who err ; we criminate our enemies who
 ‘ injure us.

‘ But you seem unaware what kind of people the
 ‘ Athenians are, and how totally they differ from you. Thucyd.
l. i. c. 70.
 ‘ They are restless projectors, and quick to execute
 ‘ their projects. You are ever bent upon the pre-
 ‘ servation of what you possess ; averse to new mea-
 ‘ sures, and in execution, even of those necessary,
 ‘ deficient. They, again, are daring above their
 ‘ strength, adventurous even beyond their own opi-
 ‘ nion of prudence, and full of hope in the midst of
 ‘ misfortune. It is your disposition always to do less
 ‘ than your power admits, to hesitate even when act-
 ‘ ing on the surest grounds, and to think yourselves
 ‘ never free from danger. They are quick, you di-
 ‘ latory ; they fond of roaming, you more than all
 ‘ others attached to your home ; they eager to make
 ‘ acquisitions in any distant parts ; you fearful, in
 ‘ seeking more, to injure what you already possess.
 ‘ They push victory to the utmost, and are least of

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‘ all men dejected by defeat ; exposing their bodies
 ‘ for their country, as if they had no interest in them,
 ‘ yet applying their minds in the public service, as if
 ‘ that and their private interest were one. Disap-
 ‘ pointment of a proposed acquisition they consider
 ‘ as loss of what already belonged to them ; success in
 ‘ any pursuit they esteem only a step toward farther
 ‘ advantages ; and, defeated in any attempt, they
 ‘ turn immediately to some new project by which to
 ‘ make themselves amends : insomuch that, through
 ‘ their celerity in executing whatever they propose,
 ‘ they seem to have the peculiar faculty of at the
 ‘ same time hoping and possessing. Thus they con-
 ‘ tinue ever, amid labours and dangers, enjoying no-
 ‘ thing through sedulity to acquire ; esteeming that
 ‘ only a time of festival in which they are prosecuting
 ‘ their projects ; and holding rest as a greater evil
 ‘ than the most laborious business. To sum up their
 ‘ character, it may be truly said, that they were born
 ‘ neither to enjoy quiet themselves, nor to suffer
 ‘ others to enjoy it.

Thucyd.
 l. i. c. 71.

‘ When such a commonwealth is adverse to you,
 ‘ Lacedæmonians, you still delay. You will consider
 ‘ those only as your enemies who avow hostility ;
 ‘ thinking to preserve peace through your antiquated
 ‘ maxims of policy and equity, defending yourselves,
 ‘ but offending none ; which are no longer fit for
 ‘ these times. It has been by other maxims, by new
 ‘ arts, and by a policy refined through modern ex-
 ‘ perience, that Athens has risen to a greatness which
 ‘ now threatens us all. Let this then be the term
 ‘ of your dilatoriness : give at length that assistance
 ‘ to your allies which, by the stipulations of our con-
 ‘ federacy, you owe them, and relieve the distressed
 ‘ Potidæans. This can no longer be effectually done

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‘ but by an immediate invasion of Attica ; the measure necessarily to be taken, unless you would leave a friendly and kindred people a prey to your most determined enemies, and compel us, disposed by every consideration of interest, affection, and habit to maintain our connexion with you, through despair to seek some new alliance. Consult then your own interest, and do not diminish that supremacy in Peloponnesus, which your forefathers have transmitted to you.’

The Athenian ministers judged it consonant neither to the dignity of their commonwealth, nor to the commission under which they acted, to answer particularly to the charges thus urged by the deputies of the Peloponnesian confederacy before the Lacedæmonian people ; yet they thought it not proper, on such an occasion, to be entirely silent. They applied therefore to the ephors for leave to address the assembly, which was allowed ¹¹, and they spoke to the following purpose : ‘ They considered themselves,’ they said, ‘ not at all in presence of those who had any right to assume cognisance of the conduct of the Athenian commonwealth or of its allies ; yet as they had been so publicly witnesses to so virulent an invective against those in whose service they were commissioned, they thought it proper to admonish the assembly not to determine lightly and hastily concerning a matter of very great moment.’ Having then mentioned the merit of the Athenian people with all Greece in the two Persian invasions, and the sense which the Lacedæmonians themselves at

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 72.

c. 73.

c. 73. & 74.

¹¹ Προσελθόντες οὖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔφασαν βούλεσθαι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐς τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν. *Cum igitur ad Lacedæmoniorum magistratus accessissent.*—This translation is justified by the context, and by other passages of the author.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 75.

the time expressed of it, they proceeded to observe that ‘the command of the Athenian people among
‘the Grecian states had been acquired, not by violence, but by the dereliction of the Lacedæmonians,
‘and by the consent, and even at the solicitation, of
‘the subordinate republics: that they had a fair interest in so glorious a possession, so honourably earned,
‘which their reputation, not less than the advantages
‘of command, would urge them to maintain; and
‘that even their just apprehensions forbade them to
‘relinquish it, since the jealousy of the Lacedæmonians, long apparent, and now especially evident in
‘the transaction of the present day, amply demonstrated what would be their danger in surrendering

c. 76. & 77. ‘the smallest portion of their present power.’ They then endeavoured to palliate, but they were indeed equally unable to deny as to justify, the general despotism of the Athenian people over their subject-states, and the particular measures of severity which had been taken against some of them. In conclusion they asserted, that the truce was not broken by them, neither had they yet to complain that the Lacedæmonians had broken it. They exhorted therefore perseverance in peaceful measures; they claimed for their commonwealth the justice to which it was entitled by the stipulations of the existing treaty, which directed a mode of judicial proceeding for the determination of disputes that might arise; and they declared themselves, in the name of their commonwealth, ready to abide judgment accordingly. ‘Should the
‘Lacedæmonians determine to refuse such justice,
‘they submitted their cause to the gods, who had
‘been invoked to attest the treaty, and their commonwealth would defend itself and its just command
‘to the utmost.’

c. 76.

When the Athenians had concluded, the foreign ^{Thucyd.} ministers were required to withdraw, and it remained ^{1. 1. c. 79.} for the Lacedæmonians to debate and to decide upon the question. Thucydides, in his exile, as himself ^{1. 5. c. 26.} informs us, had opportunities, not open to many foreigners, for acquiring information concerning the internal transactions of the Lacedæmonian state. The greater number of speakers, as he proceeds to ^{1. 1. c. 79.} relate, declared their opinion that the Athenians had already broken the truce, and that war should be immediately commenced. Archidamus then came forward ; the prince who above thirty years before had deserved so well of his country by his conduct in the Helot rebellion. In advanced age now, he maintained, the historian says, the reputation of a wise and temperate man ¹², and he addressed the assembly thus : ‘ I, Lacedæmonians, have had ex- ^{c. 80.} perience of many wars, and I see those among you, ‘ my equals in age, who will not, as happens to many ‘ through inexperience, urge war as in itself desirable, ‘ or in its consequences certain. Within Pelopon- ‘ nesus indeed, against bordering states, when hostili- ‘ ties arise, decision may be quick ; and, the forces ‘ on both sides being the same in kind, the prepon- ‘ derancy of one or the other may be a subject of ‘ calculation. But the war now proposed is widely ‘ different : operations are to be carried far from our ‘ frontier, against those whose fleets command the ‘ seas, who are superior to every Grecian state in ‘ wealth, population, and forces, cavalry as well as ‘ infantry, and who besides have under their dominion ‘ many tributary allies. In our present unprepared ‘ situation, to what do we trust for success in attack- ‘ ing such an enemy ? To our fleet ? No ; we are too

¹² Ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων.

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XIII.Thucyd.
1. 1. c. 81.

‘ inferior. To our riches? Far less: neither our public
 ‘ treasure nor our private wealth can bear any com-
 ‘ parison with theirs. We are superior, it is said, in
 ‘ the force of infantry of our confederacy, and we
 ‘ will ravage their country. But they have large
 ‘ possessions far beyond the reach of your infantry,
 ‘ and a fleet that will come and go with the produce,
 ‘ undisturbed by any force you can oppose to it, while
 ‘ your irresistible infantry will starve amid the de-
 ‘ vastation itself has made. Instead therefore of
 ‘ bringing your enemy immediately to terms by such
 ‘ measures, I rather fear you will leave the war as an
 ‘ inheritance to your posterity.

c. 82.

‘ Let it not however be imagined that I advise to
 ‘ suffer tamely the oppression of our allies, or to leave
 ‘ designs against ourselves unnoticed till the moment
 ‘ of execution. Let us, on the contrary, prepare for
 ‘ war; let us endeavour to extend our alliances, even
 ‘ among barbarous nations, if either naval or pecu-
 ‘ niary assistance can be obtained from them; let us
 ‘ also contribute liberally from our private properties
 ‘ to form a public fund equal to the probable need.
 ‘ But in the mean time let an embassy be sent to
 ‘ Athens; and, if our reasonable demands are com-
 ‘ plied with, our business will thus have its best con-
 ‘ clusion. In all events however, till we are fully
 ‘ prepared for war, let their country remain unhurt.
 ‘ It is a pledge always ready to our hands, the value
 ‘ of which we should not wantonly diminish.

c. 83.

‘ Nor let it be supposed that the delay, which I
 ‘ advise, will mark any pusillanimity. War is a busi-
 ‘ ness less of arms than of expense, which alone can
 ‘ make arms efficacious¹³; especially in the contest

¹³ Ἔστιν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὅπλων τὸ πλεόν, ἀλλὰ δαπάνης, δι’ ἣν τὰ ὅπλα
 ὠφελεῖ.

‘ of a continental with a maritime people. Money
 ‘ therefore must in the first place be provided. As
 ‘ for that slowness and dilatoriness with which you
 ‘ have heard yourselves upbraided, they flow from
 ‘ those institutions of our ancestors, which teach us,
 ‘ in public as in private life, to be modest, prudent,
 ‘ and just. Hence it is our character to be, less than
 ‘ all others, either elated by prosperity or dejected
 ‘ by misfortune : hence we are neither to be allured
 ‘ by the flattery which we have been hearing, nor
 ‘ irritated by the reproach : hence we are at the same
 ‘ time warlike and circumspect ; and hence we shall
 ‘ not be disposed to utter sounding words against our
 ‘ enemies, when we are unable to follow them up by
 ‘ deeds.

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Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 84,
& 85.

‘ Let us not then wander from those maxims and
 ‘ institutions of our forefathers, through which our
 ‘ state has long flourished great and free, and beyond
 ‘ all others glorious : nor let us hurry, in one short
 ‘ portion of a day, to a decision which must involve
 ‘ with it the lives of many individuals, the fortunes
 ‘ of many families, the fate of many cities, and our
 ‘ own glory. Other states may be under necessity
 ‘ of taking measures hastily : our strength gives us
 ‘ the option of leisure. Since then the Athenians
 ‘ profess themselves ready to submit the subjects of
 ‘ complaint to a legal decision, it appears little con-
 ‘ sonant to justice to proceed against those, as de-
 ‘ cidedly criminal, who offer themselves for trial. Let
 ‘ your determination therefore be to send an embassy
 ‘ to Athens, but meanwhile to prepare for war. Thus,
 ‘ more than by any other measure, you will be for-
 ‘ midable to your adversaries ; and thus you will best
 ‘ consult both your advantage and your honour.’

The effect, which this sensible and dispassionate c. 86.

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discourse should have had, was overborne by the following blunt speech of the ephor Sthenelaidas : ‘ The
 ‘ verbose oratory of the Athenians I do not under-
 ‘ stand. They have been large in their own praise,
 ‘ but their injurious conduct toward our allies, and
 ‘ toward Peloponnesus, they have not denied. If
 ‘ their behaviour formerly against the Persians was
 ‘ praiseworthy, and is now against us the reverse,
 ‘ they deserve double punishment ; for ceasing to be
 ‘ meritorious, and for becoming blameworthy. We
 ‘ have not yet changed our conduct ; and if we are
 ‘ wise, we shall not now overlook the wrong done to
 ‘ our allies, nor delay to revenge it. Others have
 ‘ money, and ships, and horses : we have good allies,
 ‘ who ought not to be abandoned to the Athenians.
 ‘ Nor are such disputes to be determined by words
 ‘ and legal process. It has not been by words that
 ‘ our allies have been injured. We must therefore
 ‘ avenge them quickly, and with our utmost force ;
 ‘ nor let any one persuade, that when we are injured
 ‘ we ought to deliberate. Those rather ought to
 ‘ take long time for deliberation who mean to com-
 ‘ mit injury. Let your determination therefore, La-
 ‘ cedæmonians, be, as becomes the dignity of Sparta,
 ‘ for war ; nor suffer the Athenians to increase in
 ‘ power, nor betray your allies, but, with the help of
 ‘ the gods, let us march against those who wrong us.’

Thucyd.
l. i. c. 87.

Having thus spoken, Sthenelaidas proceeded, in the function of his office, to put the question to the assembly. A clamour being raised on each side, (for in the Lacedæmonian assembly votes were given by the voice, and not, as at Athens, by silently holding up hands or by the perfect secrecy of a ballot), the presiding ephor declared he could not distinguish which had the majority. Thinking therefore, as

Thucydides supposes, that the necessity of manifesting more openly his party would urge every one the rather to vote for war, he put the question again thus : ‘ Whoever is of opinion that the truce is broken, and ‘ that the Athenians have been the aggressors, let ‘ him go to that side ; whoever is of a contrary opinion, ‘ to the other side.’ Upon the division, a large majority appeared for the affirmative. The deputies of the allies, then called, were informed of the determination, and farther told, that it was the wish of the Lacedæmonians to have another meeting of deputies from all the states of the confederacy, who should come authorised and prepared to decide, both concerning peace and war, and how the war, if resolved upon, should be carried on. With this the congress broke up, and the deputies of the allies hastened to their several homes. The Athenian ministers waited to finish the business of their mission.

The Lacedæmonian government, the contemporary historian says, was now determined for war ; not influenced so much by the representations of their allies, as by their own apprehensions of the growing power of the rival state. The Athenian dominion, within Greece, had indeed been greatly contracted by the conditions of the thirty years’ truce, and by the losses which led to it : but during fourteen years following, under the able administration of Pericles, it had been gaining consistency : its force was now so beyond that of any other single state of Greece that not even the extensive confederacy over which Lacedæmon presided was, at the instant, in condition to begin hostilities. To acquire a sanction therefore for their undertaking, which might encourage those engaged in it, they sent a solemn deputation to Delphi, to inquire of the god if they might hope for success.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 88.

c. 122.

c. 118.

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According to report, (so Thucydides expresses himself,) the god assured them that, ‘if they carried on the war with becoming vigour, they would be victorious; and that his favour should attend them, invoked or uninvoked.’

Thucyd.
I. I. c. 119.

Meanwhile the Corinthians were sedulous in canvassing the several states of the confederacy separately; endeavouring to alarm their fears and excite their indignation, and to promote by every imaginable method the resolution for war. Accordingly, when the congress met again at Lacedæmon, most of the deputies were vehement in accusation of the Athenians, and in requisition of the immediate commencement of hostilities. The Corinthians, in pursuance of their former policy, reserved themselves to the last, and then spoke thus :

c. 120.

‘We no longer, confederates, blame the Lacedæmonians, who, having now resolved on war, have summoned this assembly to desire its concurrence in the resolution. Presiding over the confederacy, the general prosperity requires that they should pay due attention to their own particular situation and circumstances; and hence arose their past delay; while the honours we pay them, and the command with which they are invested, impose on them the duty of constantly consulting the welfare of the whole; and hence flows their present determination. It were needless, we are indeed persuaded, to admonish any of you, who have had any experience of the Athenians, how much it behoves us to be upon our guard against them; but we will observe, that it imports the people of the inland commonwealths to reflect that, unless they support the maritime states, not only they will be deprived of the many advantages which accrue, even to them, from maritime

‘ commerce, but if they look on till we are subdued,
 ‘ their subjection must follow. Ultimately thus we
 ‘ are all equally interested in the matter on which we
 ‘ are going to decide ; differing more in regard to
 ‘ the time when we may expect the evil to fall upon
 ‘ us, than the degree in which it will affect us.

‘ It is then to repel and to prevent injuries, and
 ‘ not with any ambitious view, that we are earnest
 ‘ for war. Our cause of complaint against the Athe-
 ‘ nians is ample : but when we have redressed our
 ‘ wrongs, peace will be our object. Nor have we
 ‘ reason to doubt of success. Our land force is
 ‘ greater than theirs, and in military skill we excel
 ‘ them ; and surely a more unanimous zeal may be
 ‘ expected in our confederacy than in theirs. They
 ‘ are strong at sea : but if we duly employ the means
 ‘ which we severally possess, and add the wealth
 ‘ which we may borrow from Delphi¹⁴ and Olympia,
 ‘ we can equal them even on that element. The
 ‘ offer of greater pay would entice the people of their
 ‘ alliance from their service ; for it is to be remem-
 ‘ bered, that the power of Athens consists more in a
 ‘ purchased than a native force ; whereas ours de-
 ‘ pends less upon our riches than upon ourselves.
 ‘ One naval victory would therefore probably com-
 ‘ plete our business. Should that not immediately
 ‘ be obtained, yet their maritime skill will soon cease
 ‘ to give them any advantage, because ours will of

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 121.

¹⁴ It appears from this passage and some following ones (l. 1. c. 143. and l. 2. c. 9.) that through some revolution, not particularly mentioned by Thucydides, but probably a consequence of the thirty years’ truce, not only Delphi was again brought under Lacedæmonian influence, but the Phocian people were gained to the Lacedæmonian interest ; or, which would operate to the same purpose, were put under oligarchal government.

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‘ course improve with increased experience. But,
 ‘ even without a superiority at sea, we possess abun-
 ‘ dant means to distress them ; among which we may
 ‘ reckon, as very important, the easy possibility of
 ‘ gaining their allies.

‘ It is however not our purpose to persuade you
 ‘ that the dispute before us resembles those which,
 ‘ for ages, have been common within Greece, of each
 ‘ republic with its neighbour, of nearly equal force,
 ‘ concerning the limits of their respective territories.
 ‘ On the contrary, it deserves your most serious con-
 ‘ sideration that the Athenians have attained a degree
 ‘ of power to enable them to contend with us alto-
 ‘ gether ; and, what is disgraceful to Peloponnesus
 ‘ even to mention, the question is, whether we shall
 ‘ remain independent, or become their subjects. Our
 ‘ fathers were the vindicators of the freedom of
 ‘ Greece. We fall short indeed of their worth, if we
 ‘ cannot maintain our own freedom ; and, while we
 ‘ anxiously oppose the establishment of monarchy in
 ‘ any state, yet suffer an ambitious commonwealth to
 ‘ be tyrant over all.¹⁵

Thucyd.
I. 1. c. 123.

‘ To undergo any labour and risk any danger, in a
 ‘ virtuous cause, hath been transmitted to us for an
 ‘ hereditary rule of conduct. Ill would it become us
 ‘ now to deviate from it ; and, so much richer and
 ‘ more powerful as we are than our forefathers, to
 ‘ lose amid abundance what they gained in penury.
 ‘ Let us therefore cheerfully engage in a war which
 ‘ the god himself hath recommended, with even a

¹⁵ Τύραννον δὲ ἐῷμεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν, c. 122. Thucydides after-
 ward puts a similar expression into the mouths both of Pericles and
 of Cleon, when speaking to the Athenian assembly, and having
 in view something very different from reproach, I. 2. c. 63. and
 I. 3. c. 37: Τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν.

‘ promise of his favour in it. All Greece will be with us ; and right is on our side ; as not only notorious facts prove, but the god has declared. Nor let there be delay ; for be it remembered that the Potidæans, Dorians, our kinsmen, are at this time besieged by an Ionian army. Let us therefore immediately take measures to reduce that proud republic which is aiming at the tyranny of Greece, that we may ourselves live in peace and independency, and that we may restore freedom to those Grecian states which are now so injuriously held in subjection.’

This speech concluding the debate, the question was put, and war was the determination of the majority. Notwithstanding however the clamour for hastening hostilities, and notwithstanding even the danger of delay after such a resolution so publicly taken, it was presently found, so deficiently was the confederacy yet prepared, that delay was unavoidable. The leading men therefore recurred to negotiation, in which they had three distinct purposes : to induce the Athenians to suspend hostilities while their own preparations should be advancing ; to strengthen their own cause among the Grecian states, by making the Athenians the refusers of offered peace ; and to sow dissension among the Athenians themselves.

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 125.

With these objects in view, ministers were sent to Athens, commissioned to make representations concerning a matter wholly foreign to every thing that had been yet in dispute between the two republics, and of no importance but what Grecian superstition might give. Complete atonement, it was pretended, had never been made for the sacrilege committed, near a century before, when, under the direction of the archon Megacles, the partisans of Cylon were

c. 126.

CHAP.
XIII.Thucyd.
l. i. c. 127.

taken from the altars to be executed. Many who now enjoyed the privileges of Athenian citizens, it was urged, stood affected by that pollution; which, according to prevailing ideas of the age, adhered to all the descendants of the sacrilegious. Lest therefore the contamination should bring down the vengeance of the gods of Greece in some general calamity, the Lacedæmonians, as assertors of the common welfare, required that all such persons should be banished, and the pollution completely expiated. This was intended as a blow principally against Pericles, who, by his mother, was descended from Megacles: not however with the expectation that the requisition would produce his banishment; but with the hope that, through alarm to the popular mind, some embarrassment might be created for the administration.

Pericles however was not at a loss for a measure to oppose to this. Two sacrilegious pollutions were recollected, in which many of the principal families of Lacedæmon were involved; the death of Pausanias who had been starved in the temple of Minerva Chalcioeca, and the execution of some Helots who had been dragged from the sanctuary of Neptune on mount Tænarus. The latter was esteemed a profanation so grossly impious that popular superstition attributed to it that tremendous calamity the great earthquake of Sparta. It was therefore required of the Lacedæmonian government to set the example of regard for the welfare of Greece, and respect for the gods its protectors, by removing all those who were contaminated through either of those sacrileges. With an answer to this purpose, the Lacedæmonian ministers returned to Sparta.

c. 139.

A second embassy arrived at Athens soon after,

very differently instructed. As preliminaries to a general peace, these ministers urged that the siege of Potidæa ought to be raised, and Ægina restored to independency; but chiefly they insisted, that the prohibitory decree against Megara should be revoked; and, that only being done, they pledged themselves that Lacedæmon would not commence hostilities. The two first propositions, little insisted on, were with little ceremony rejected. To the third it was answered that ‘the Megarians had made themselves ‘obnoxious to gods and men by cultivating the extralimetary land between the boundaries of Attica ‘and Megaris, which was consecrated to the Eleusinian goddesses¹⁶; and that they received and ‘encouraged Athenian runaway slaves.’ With this answer the second embassy returned to Sparta. Soon after arrived a third, of three members, Rhamphias, Melesippus, and Agesander; probably men of more eminence than the former ministers, Thucydides distinguishing only these by name. In their representations they noticed none of the requisitions of their predecessors, but they demanded, as the one condition of peace, that all Grecian states held in subjection by Athens be restored to independency.

An assembly of the people was then convened, and it was proposed to consider of a decisive and final answer. Many spoke, some urging war, some contending for peace, and particularly insisting that the offensive decree against Megara ought not to remain

¹⁶ Ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου. *Megarensibus crimini dantes quod sacrum nullisque limitibus finitum solum colerent.*—*Land that was sacred; land not marked out for culture.* Smith.—These interpretations are totally unsatisfactory. The scholiast, who has not equally evaded the difficulty, seems to warrant the sense ventured in the text.

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an obstacle. At length Pericles ascending the bema declared himself thus :

Thucyd. '
l. 1. c. 140.

‘ My opinion, Athenians, has been always, that
‘ we ought not to submit to the Peloponnesians, and
‘ it remains the same ; sensible as I am that men sel-
‘ dom support a war throughout with the same ani-
‘ mation with which they ordinarily begin it, but
‘ that, in disasters, even such as must in the course
‘ of things be expected, their spirits droop, and their
‘ opinions change. Beforehand therefore I claim,
‘ from those who agree with me in opinion now, to
‘ concur with me in effort whenever misfortune may
‘ arise ; or else at once to renounce all pretension
‘ to merit, should success attend our endeavours.

‘ With regard to the grounds of my opinion, the
‘ insidious designs of the Lacedæmonians against this
‘ commonwealth have long been obvious, and are now
‘ become more than ever manifest. For, notwith-
‘ standing that the articles of the existing treaty point
‘ out the manner in which disputes between the two
‘ states should be adjusted, declaring that in the mean
‘ time each party should hold what it possesses, yet
‘ not only they have not desired such adjustment, but
‘ they refuse to admit it. They are, in short, evi-
‘ dently enough determined to support their allega-
‘ tions against us, not by argument, but by arms :
‘ they come to us, not accusing, but commanding :
‘ they require imperiously, that the siege of Potidæa
‘ shall be raised ; that Ægina shall be independent ;
‘ that the decree against Megara shall be annulled ;
‘ and, now at last, that we shall renounce our com-
‘ mand over all Grecian states. Let it not be ima-
‘ gined that even the Megarian decree is too light a
‘ matter to be supported as a cause for war. That
‘ comparatively little matter has been proposed merely

‘ to try your steadiness. Were you to yield that
 ‘ point, a greater trial would quickly be imposed
 ‘ upon you : resisting that, you give them to under-
 ‘ stand that they must treat with you as equals, not
 ‘ command you as subjects.

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‘ It behoves you therefore at once to resolve either
 ‘ to submit to a state of dependency, without uselessly
 ‘ incurring the unavoidable evils of resistance, or,
 ‘ what appears to me far preferable, to take arms
 ‘ with a determination to yield to no command,
 ‘ whether concerning a matter in itself of great or
 ‘ of little moment, nor at any rate to hold what you
 ‘ possess in fear and under controul. For in the mo-
 ‘ ment in which you give up your right of judgment,
 ‘ and yield obedience to a command, however unim-
 ‘ portant the object of that command, your subjection
 ‘ is decided.

Thucyd.
 l. 1. c. 141.

‘ If then we cast our view upon the means of each
 ‘ party, we shall find ours not the unfavourable pro-
 ‘ spect. The funds of the Peloponnesians must be
 ‘ drawn from the produce of Peloponnesus ; for they
 ‘ have no foreign dependencies capable of affording
 ‘ considerable supplies ; and in Peloponnesus neither
 ‘ private nor public wealth abounds.¹⁷ In protracted
 ‘ war, and in maritime war, they are equally un-
 ‘ experienced ; for their poverty has always disabled
 ‘ them for both. They cannot equip fleets ; nor can
 ‘ they send armies often, or maintain them long from
 ‘ home. For, through the scantiness of their public
 ‘ revenue, every man must subsist on service from

¹⁷ We find this observation repeated more than once in the speeches reported by Thucydides, without any exception for the Corinthians, who were commercial and rich, and had colonies ; but their wealth bore but small proportion either to the resources of Athens, or to the wants of Peloponnesus.

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‘ his private means ; and, by long absence from their
 ‘ domestic affairs, even those means must be ruined.
 ‘ A superfluity of wealth alone, and not the strained
 ‘ contributions of a people barely above want, can
 ‘ support lengthened and distant hostilities. Such
 ‘ people are commonly readier to make war with their
 ‘ persons than with their purses : they hope that
 ‘ those will finally escape ; but these may be com-
 ‘ pletely drained and the business yet unfinished. The
 ‘ Peloponnesians indeed, with their allies, for a single
 ‘ battle might be equal to all the rest of Greece. But
 ‘ for protracted war, besides their want of money,
 ‘ which is their great and insuperable deficiency,
 ‘ wanting one common administration, each state
 ‘ having its equal voice for the decision of measures,
 ‘ and each its separate interest¹⁸, each anxious for its
 ‘ own particular concerns, the general good will be
 ‘ sometimes thwarted, often neglected, and no great
 ‘ design can be steadily pursued.

Thucyd.
I. 1. c. 142.

c. 143.

‘ You need therefore neither fear that posts will
 ‘ be occupied and fortified within your country, with
 ‘ which some would alarm you, nor that a formidable
 ‘ navy can be raised against you. Since the Persian
 ‘ war, now above fifty years, you have been assidu-
 ‘ ously applying to naval affairs, and your proficiency
 ‘ is still far below perfection. Naval science, and the
 ‘ skill of experienced seamen, are not to be acquired
 ‘ by a people when they please, and in moments of
 ‘ leisure : on the contrary, they require practice to
 ‘ the exclusion of almost all leisure. Nor, should
 ‘ the Peloponnesians seize the Olympic or Delphian
 ‘ treasures, will even that avail them, to the degree
 ‘ that some seem to suppose. They cannot, with

¹⁸ ἰσόψηφοι ὄντες, καὶ οὐχ ὁμόφρονοι.

‘ these, form naval commanders and seamen, such as
‘ we possess among our own citizens, more and abler
‘ than all Greece besides : nor is it to be supposed
‘ that the seamen of our allies, for a temporary in-
‘ crease of pay, will banish themselves from their
‘ country, and join the party which has the worst
‘ prospect of final success.

‘ Such are the deficiencies under which the Pelo-
‘ ponnesians labour, while we not only are free from
‘ these, but possess advantages peculiar to ourselves.
‘ If they are strong enough to invade our country
‘ by land, we are equally able to harass them by sea ;
‘ and should we waste but a small part of Pelopon-
‘ nesus, and they even the whole of Attica, the dis-
‘ tress would be far greater to them than to us ; for
‘ they have no other country whence to obtain sup-
‘ plies, while we have our choice among islands and
‘ continents. The command of the sea is indeed a
‘ most important possession. Consider then : were
‘ we islanders, who would be so secure against all
‘ hostile attempts ? What therefore should be now
‘ our aim, but to put ourselves as nearly as possible
‘ into the situation of islanders ? Our lands and
‘ their appurtenances within Attica should be put out
‘ of consideration : no vain attempt should be made
‘ to protect them against the superior land force of
‘ the enemy : our whole attention should be directed
‘ to the safety of the city and the command of the
‘ sea. Could we gain a battle, fresh and perhaps
‘ greater forces would be brought against us. But
‘ should we lose one, the revolt of our allies, the
‘ sources of our wealth and strength, would follow ;
‘ for they will no longer rest under their present
‘ subjection than while we have power to compel
‘ them. Not the loss of lands and houses therefore,

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‘ but the loss of valuable lives, whenever it may happen, is to be deplored ; for lands cannot produce men ; but let us keep ourselves strong in men, and we shall not want for lands. If therefore I thought I could persuade you, I would propose that you should yourselves go forth and waste Attica ; to show the Peloponnesians how vain is their expectation that the fear of such an evil may induce you to surrender your independency.

Thucyd.
1. 1. c. 144.

‘ I have indeed many other grounds for clear hope of success, provided our own impatience and rashness, and the wild desire of conquest, when defence should be our object, injure us not more than the strength or policy of our enemies. On these topics however admonition may better be reserved for the circumstances when they arise. The answer now to be returned to Lacedæmon should be this : ‘ Our ports and markets shall be open to the Megarians, provided the Lacedæmonians will abrogate their prohibitions of the residence of strangers within their territory, as far as regards us and our allies : for the treaty of truce leaves these matters equally open to both parties.¹⁹ We will give independency to those states of our alliance, which were inde-

¹⁹ The rough manner in which the Lacedæmonians executed their decrees for the expulsion of strangers, is noticed by Aristophanes in his comedy of the Birds :

Meton. τί δ' ἐστὶ δεινόν ; Pisthetærus. "ὅσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι,
Ξενηλατοῦνται, καὶ κενύονται τινες
Πληγαὶ συχναὶ κατ' ἄστυ. v. 1014.

Where it seems also implied that Lacedæmon afforded temptation for strangers to go thither, probably for gain by sale or exchange of commodities. In the difficulties made for commerce by the Lacedæmonian laws, especially the prohibition of money, the trader would always have advantage over the exchanger, not a professional trader.

‘ ‘ pendent when the truce was concluded, whenever
 ‘ ‘ the Lacedæmonians will allow to the states of their
 ‘ ‘ alliance free agency in whatever concerns their
 ‘ ‘ several governments, and will no longer enforce
 ‘ ‘ among them a constitution and a mode of admini-
 ‘ ‘ stration which, under the show of independency,
 ‘ ‘ keep them in effectual subjection to Lacedæmon.²⁰
 ‘ ‘ Finally, we are ready to submit any disputed points
 ‘ ‘ to a judicial determination according to the terms
 ‘ ‘ of the treaty; and we will not begin war, but we
 ‘ ‘ will defend ourselves to the utmost.’ Such an
 ‘ answer will be just, will be honourable, will be con-
 ‘ sonant to the renown and to the wisdom of our an-
 ‘ cestors, who raised this empire, which we ought not
 ‘ to transmit diminished to our posterity.’

The assembly assented to the opinion of Pericles, and an answer was accordingly delivered to the Lacedæmonian ambassadors nearly in the terms of his speech; concluding with the declaration, ‘That the Athenian commonwealth would obey the commands of no power upon earth, but would readily abide the event of a judicial determination, conducted upon a footing of equality between the parties, in the mode directed by the existing treaty.’²¹

With this answer the Lacedæmonians returned home, and no more embassies were sent. Hitherto the people of the two states had communicated, as in peace, without the intervention of a herald, though not without caution and suspicion; for, since the

²⁰ Ὅταν κάκεῖνοι ταῖς ἐαυτῶν ἀποεῶσι πύλεσι μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. To turn this into modern language, or perhaps into any language, long circumlocution is necessary.

²¹ We want information from Thucydides what that *Δίκη κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας*, which he so repeatedly mentions, was to have been.

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affairs of Coreyra and Potidæa, the truce was considered on both sides as broken, and war as impending. But now, though no hostilities immediately ensued, yet communication was ventured on neither side without the same formalities as if war had been declared.

SECTION VI.

Attempt of the Thebans against Plataea.

Herodot.
1. 6. c. 198.
Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 5.

WHILE want of preparation still withheld the Peloponnesians, the Thebans, judging war to be now unavoidable, thought the moment of suspense advantageous for an attempt toward the more complete establishment of their own sovereignty over Bœotia: Lacedæmon must favour them; Athens would fear to attack them.

Herodot.
ut sup.
Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 55.

The little town of Plataea, with a territory of scarcely half a dozen miles square, utterly unable by its own strength to subsist in independency, nevertheless, for near a century, had been resolutely resisting all controul from Thebes, whence it was less than nine miles distant. When, before the Persian war, Cleomenes king of Sparta was with an army in the neighbourhood, the Plataeans, to obtain the protection, had offered to put themselves under the dominion of Lacedæmon. The answer which, with his usual expressive simplicity, Herodotus attributes to the Lacedæmonians upon the occasion, strongly paints the state of Greece: ‘We,’ they said, ‘live afar off, ‘and ours would be a cold kind of assistance²²; for ‘you might be overpowered and sold for slaves, before ‘any intelligence about you could reach us. We

²² Ταιήδε τις γίνουσι ἀν ἐπικουρή ψυχρή.

‘recommend to you therefore rather to put yourselves under the dominion of Athens²³, a bordering state, and able to protect you.’ This advice, adds the historian, they gave, not through any goodwill to the Plataeans, but with a view to create embarrassment for the Athenians by embroiling them with the Bœotians. The Plataeans however followed the advice. The solemnity of the sacrifice to the twelve gods being chosen for the occasion, ambassadors were sent to Athens, but in the habit and character of suppliants. Placing themselves at the altar, according to the customary forms of supplication, these ministers thence urged their petition that ‘their commonwealth might be taken under the sovereignty and protection of Athens.’²⁴ The Athenian people acceded to the humble request.

The Thebans, upon the first intelligence of this transaction, marched against Plataea. An Athenian army moved at the same time to protect the new dependency of the commonwealth. The Corinthians however interfering, it was agreed to submit the matter to their arbitration. Actuated apparently by a spirit of justice and of liberty, and desirous to give as great extent as the nature of things would admit to that doubtful independency which could be enjoyed by the smaller Grecian commonwealths, the Corinthians decided, ‘That the Thebans were entitled to no sovereignty over any towns of Bœotia whose people chose to renounce the advantages of that Bœotian confederacy of which the Thebans had assumed the lead.’ On this the Athenians moved homeward. The Thebans, irritated by the decision

²³ The expression of Herodotus is very strong, *δοῦναι ἑμίας αὐτοῖς*, *to give yourselves*.

²⁴ Ἐδίδουσαν σφέας αὐτοῦς.

which the presence of the Athenian force had encouraged, followed and attacked it. Being defeated, the Athenians then took upon themselves to prescribe terms. They extended the limits fixed by the Corinthians for the Plataean territory; took the neighbouring little town of Hysiaë also under their protection; and, to provide better security for the Plataean and Hysian lands, declared the river Asopus their boundary against the Thebaid.

Thenceforward Plataea, more than ever averse to Thebes, became warm in political attachment to Athens. The whole force of the little commonwealth was exerted on the glorious day of Marathon, in the honour of which the Plataeans alone partook with the Athenians. In the not less memorable action of Salamis, though an inland people, they had their share aboard the Athenian fleet; and they had distinguished themselves, under the command of Aristides, in that great and decisive battle, fought near their town, which, beyond all other circumstances, hath given celebrity to its name. Under the patronage of Athens democracy of course prevailed at Plataea. But as Athens itself was not without an aristocratical party, so there were in Plataea persons to whom democratical government, sometimes perhaps partially oppressive, and always an obstacle to their ambition, would be dissatisfactory. Their cause being hopeless under the dominion of Athens, Thebes remained the protecting power to which they looked for an alteration in their favour.

Thucyd.
1.2. c. 2.

In these circumstances a plot was concerted between Naucledes, the leading man of the aristocratical Plataeans, and Eurymachus, who held the greatest influence in Thebes. The official directors of the Theban government were gained to it; and, in the

fifteenth year of the thirty years' truce, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood at Argos, Ænesias ephor at Sparta, and two months were yet wanting to complete the archonship of Pythodorus at Athens, in the sixth month after the battle of Potidæa, the spring then beginning, (thus, in the want of a readier and more perfect method, Thucydides has marked the date,) an armed body, of somewhat more than three hundred Thebans, reached Plataea about the first sleep. The Bœotarchs Pythangelus and Diemporus commanded, and they were accompanied by Eurymachus. In so small a city, which scarcely had a public revenue, no guard was maintained: the gates only for security were shut at night. These were now opened by the party friendly to the enterprise, and the Thebans entered unresisted. Naclides and the Plataeans about him, in the too commonly atrocious spirit of Greek sedition, would have completed the business by the immediate massacre of the principal of their fellow-townsmen of the opposite party. But Eurymachus and the Bœotarchs, not equally stimulated by the passions either of fear or resentment, refused concurrence in the proposal. Reckoning themselves already masters of the place, and depending upon the ready support of a body of troops, which was to follow from Thebes, they lodged their arms in the agora; and sending heralds around the town, with a conciliating proclamation, they invited all, who were

B. C. 431.
Ol. 87. $\frac{1}{2}$.
7th May,
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.
but more
likely 8th
April.²⁵

²⁵ Eighty days, according to Thucydides (l. 2. c. 19.), after the corn of Attica was nearly ripe. Eighty days from the eighth of April would be the twenty-seventh of June, rather a late harvest season in Attica. Eighty days after the seventh of May, namely the twenty-sixth of July, wheat is often ripe in the south of England.

CHAP.
XIII.Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 3.

disposed to accede to the confederacy of the Bœotian people, to come and place their arms by theirs.

The Plataëans, hastily and in great alarm assembling, rejoiced, in the moment, on finding a disposition so far friendly among those who seemed to have them, their families, and their whole state completely at mercy. They showed therefore a ready disposition to accede to the terms proposed. But in the course of the ensuing communication, having opportunity to discover, amid the darkness, how few the Thebans were, they began to observe to one another that they were abundantly able to overpower those who had thus insidiously surprised them; and the resolution was taken to make the attempt. That they might not be noticed in preparation, they broke ways through the partitions of houses, and they formed a barricade of carts and waggons, from behind which they might make their assault. Waiting then till just before daybreak, while darkness might yet at the same time give them the greater advantage from their intimate knowledge of the place, and increase the alarm and uncertainty of the enemy, they began the attack. Twice or thrice they were repulsed; but they returned to the charge, the women and slaves at the same time throwing stones and tiles from the house-tops, with an unceasing clamour which enhanced the confusion, while a heavy rain made the obscurity more complete. The Thebans, unable to hear commands or see commanders, and thus incapable of acting in concert, at length fled, each as he could find a passage, in darkness and in dirt, mostly ignorant of the ways, while their pursuers were acquainted with every turn. A Plataëan had shut the gate of the town by which they had entered, and which alone had been open; and, for want of other

means at hand, fastened it by thrusting the head of a javelin into the catch of the lock. Checked thus in their hope of flight, some of the Thebans mounted the rampart, and throwing themselves down on the outside mostly perished: some, finding a gate unguarded, obtained an axe from a woman, with which they forced the lock, and a few thus escaped. Many were killed, scattered about the town; but the greater part, who had kept more in a body, entered a large building adjoining the rampart, whose door, which stood open, they mistook for the town-gate. This being observed by the Plataëans, measures were immediately taken to confine them there. It was then proposed to set fire to the building and burn those in it; but, offering to surrender, they were received as prisoners at discretion; and shortly after, all the rest, who remained alive within the town, came and delivered their arms.

The march of the troops which should have supported the enterprise had been retarded by the rain. Arriving at the river Asopus, they found it swelled so as to be not without difficulty forded; and before they could reach Plataea, the miscarriage of those who had entered the place was complete. As soon as they were aware of this, the resource they resolved upon was to seize all the people they could find in the villages and fields as hostages for the security of their own people, prisoners in Plataea, and also to take all the moveable property. The Plataëans, expecting such a measure, sent a herald, threatening immediate death to the prisoners if any farther attempt were made against the persons or effects of the people of Plataea, but promising to restore them if the Thebans would immediately quit their territory. The agreement was presently made and ratified by oath, and

Thueyd.
1.2. c.5.

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the Theban army retired accordingly. Such, says Thucydides, is the Theban account: but the Plataeans deny that any oaths passed, and that any promise was given for the restoration of the prisoners, except on condition that a treaty should be concluded between the two states. The Plataeans however allowed no opportunity for farther treaty. Hastening the removal of their effects from the country within their fortifications, they put to death all their prisoners, to the number of a hundred and eighty, among whom was Eurymachus, the author of the enterprise.

Such was the inauspicious prelude to the Peloponnesian war. The execution of the unhappy prisoners, supposing no compact to forbid it, seems indeed to have been in strict conformity to what may be called the national law of the Greeks; upon the principle on which spies, traitors, and pirates are liable to capital punishment by the law of nations in modern Europe. The Grecian law of humanity then was not so extravagantly violated but that, through the intervention of heralds, the bodies were restored for burial. But the Plataeans, aware that the Thebans would feel upon the occasion, and perhaps reason, differently from themselves, prepared for resisting the revenge to be expected. Immediately upon discovery that the town was surprised, a messenger had been dispatched to Athens with the intelligence; and as soon as the Thebans were made prisoners another was sent. On receiving the first news the Athenian administration issued orders for seizing all Bœotians within Attica: in return to the second, directions were sent to keep the prisoners made in Plataea in safe custody, till the Athenian government should determine what farther was to

be done. Unfortunately, such was the inconsiderate haste of the Plataëans, the fatal execution was completed before the messenger with this order arrived. So severe a measure, even supposing no breach of faith, plighted or implied, would, by its operation upon the passions, preclude negotiation. An Athenian army was therefore sent with a convoy of provisions to Plataea ; a small body was left to strengthen the place ; and the women, children, and whatever else would be useless in a siege, were brought away.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT
TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES, WITH A SUMMARY VIEW
OF THE HISTORY OF THRACE.

SECTION I.

State of the Athenian and Peloponnesian confederacies. Invasion and ravage of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Operations of the Athenian fleet in the western seas under Carcinus: gallant action of the Spartan Brasidas: ravage of the Peloponnesian coast, and acquisition of Cephallenia to the Athenian confederacy. Operations of the Athenian fleet in the eastern seas under Cleopompus. Measures for the security of Athens: remarkable decree: extermination of the Æginetans. Invasion and ravage of Megaris by the Athenians.

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Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 7.

c. 8.

THIS unfortunate transaction between two inferior republics, which no prudence in the leading states could prevent or foresee, made accommodation more than ever impracticable; and both parties prepared for hostilities with the most serious diligence. At this time, says Thucydides, who was a living witness, Greece abounded with youth, through inexperience ardent for war, while among those of more sober age many things contributed to stimulate ambition, or excite apprehension. Many oracular responses were circulated, many signs and wonders were reported; and some phenomena really occurred, of a kind to affect the imaginations of men in a superstitious age: to raise hope or inspire alarm. Among these, what most engaged attention was an earth-

quake that shook the sacred island of Delos ; which never before, within the reach of tradition, had been so affected. Amid this universal irritation of men's minds, a very general disposition prevailed, so the candid Athenian in the most explicit terms avows, to favour the Lacedæmonian cause, as the cause of liberty and independency ; while animosity and indignation were the sentiments excited by that arbitrary and oppressive command which a large portion of the Grecian people experienced, and the rest dreaded, from the sovereign Many of Athens.

The two confederacies, now upon the point of engaging in war, were very differently composed, but the force of the Greek nation was very equally divided between them. With the Lacedæmonians all the Peloponnesian states joined, except the Argives, who remained neuter, and the Achæans ; of whom the Pellenians only took part in the beginning. Of northern Greece, the Megarians, Bœotians, Locrians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anaactorians joined the Peloponnesian alliance. The navy was to be formed by the Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Megarians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians. The Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry ; the other states infantry only ; their mountainous territories being mostly ill suited to either the breeding of horses or action with them. It was proposed to raise no less than five hundred trireme galleys within the confederacy ; its proportion being assessed upon every maritime state ; and contributions in money were required from all. Ministers were sent to endeavour to form alliances among foreign nations ; and the great king, as the king of Persia was called, or oftener simply the King, was not neglected ; but for external assistance the

Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 9.

c. 7.
Diod. l. 12.
c. 41.

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principal expectation was from the Italian and Sicilian Greeks, who possessed considerable maritime force, and mostly favoured the Peloponnesian interest.

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 22.

c. 9.

Athens had few allies, properly so called. On the continent of Greece the principal were the Thessalians and the Acarnanians; the former little engaged by interest or inclination, but bound by a treaty of long standing: most of the Acarnanian towns, though some were adverse, joined with more zeal in the Athenian cause. The Plataeans are besides named, and the Messenians of Naupactus: the republic of the former however, the mere garrison of their town excepted, existing only within the walls of Athens; and that of the latter holding means to exist only under Athenian protection. Of the islands, Corcyra, Zacynthus, Chios, and Lesbos are alone to be properly reckoned among the allies of Athens. Chios and the several republics of Lesbos had been still treated with some respect by the Athenian government, as independent states; and they still possessed their own fleets. All the other islands of the Ægean sea, except the Lacedæmonian colonies of Melos and Thera, all the numerous and wealthy Grecian cities of Asia Minor, the Hellespont, and Thrace, were tributary subjects of the Athenian people; not allowed to possess ships of war, but dependent upon Athens for protection, and liable to every kind and degree of controul from the people of that imperial state.

c. 10.

News of the transactions at Plataea arriving at Lacedæmon hastened the measure, before in some degree resolved upon, to invade Attica. Summonses were sent through the confederacy, in pursuance of which two-thirds of the whole land force of the Peloponnesian states met the Lacedæmonian army, on

an appointed day, at the Corinthian isthmus. The command in chief was not denied to the venerable king Archidamus, notwithstanding his known disapprobation of the war, nor did he scruple, in that command, to show his steadiness in the principles he had always professed. Before he would lead his forces out of Peloponnesus he sent a herald, to make one more trial whether the threatening storm, now ready to burst, might have produced any disposition in the Athenians to relax. Thucydides has left no room to doubt either that his purpose was liberal and generous, or that to guide the counsels of the confederacy in the way of liberality and generosity, the way which the common good of Greece required, and the good of Lacedæmon with all Peloponnesus, as inseparable from the common good of Greece, required, his influence was very deficient. Answer was returned, probably under direction of Pericles, importing that, if the Peloponnesians would communicate with the Athenians, they must withdraw their army, and send the troops of the several states to their respective homes. The Lacedæmonian herald, charged with the communication, was required to leave Athens the same day, and, for his security, was conducted by a guard to the Attic border. Archidamus then proceeded on his march. The Thebans, sending a part of their force to waste the Plataean lands, joined him in the Megarian territory with the remainder.

While the Peloponnesian troops were assembling, Pericles had been engaged in the arduous office of preparing the minds of the Athenian people for what he foresaw would follow; exerting himself to obviate the clamours of faction, to calm the discontent which would arise from the unavoidable calamities of a

Thucyd.
1.2. c. 13.

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defensive war, and lessen the jealousies to which his own situation of first minister of the commonwealth would now more than ever expose him. According to the ordinary military establishment of Athens, he had been elected with nine colleagues to command the Athenian forces. But, since the first Persian invasion, the practice seems to have gained to appoint, by popular election, one of the ten commander in chief, with the title of general of the commonwealth, and with the sole power to convoke, at his discretion, extraordinary assemblies of the people. Pericles was now so elected. He had always lived in habits of friendship with the Spartan king Archidamus; engaged with him in the league of hospitality, deemed sacred. Possibly Archidamus, amid the general ravage of Attica, might, in kindness to Pericles, procure favour to his estates: possibly, to excite envy and jealousy against him, the Lacedæmonians most hostile to him might procure ostentation of such favour toward him. In the assembly of the people Pericles declared his apprehension of this; adding that, if any of his lands should be more spared than those around them, they should be no longer his own but the public property. At the same time he took opportunity for repeating his exhortation to the people, to disregard the waste of their possessions in Attica, to avoid at any rate a general engagement by land, and give their utmost attention to their navy. This alone, he said, could maintain their dominion over their invaluable transmarine possessions and dependencies, and only those could ensure them that final success which superiority of revenue, under the direction of wise counsels, must always give. He proceeded then to a display of the means which the commonwealth possessed. The annual tribute from

transmarine dependencies, exclusively of other sources of revenue, he observed, amounted now to six hundred talents, about one hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. But there were actually in the treasury, in coined money, no less than six thousand talents, or one million five hundred thousand pounds sterling. The uncoined gold and silver which might be employed, should the necessities of the commonwealth require, offerings public and private, sacred vases used in processions and public festivals, Persian spoils, and a variety of smaller articles, would amount to not less than five hundred talents. Besides all this, the pure gold about the single statue of Minerva in the acropolis was of the weight of forty talents; precisely, according to Arbuthnot, a ton avoirdupois, in value about a hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling; and this quantity had been so adapted by Phidias that the whole might be taken off for use without injury to the statue, and replaced if returning public wealth in settled peace might afford means. The quantity of gold, to be so employed, may seem enormous. But when gold was amassed, means to make interest of it were not in those days ready; and to secure it against democratical extravagance, for a resource in calamity, no method was so effectual as dedicating it in a temple.

The military force of the commonwealth was at the same time formidable. The native heavy-armed foot were no less than twenty-nine thousand men. Sixteen thousand of these sufficed for guards and garrisons; and the eldest and the youngest of the citizens were competent for that service; so that there remained thirteen thousand, the flower of the Athenian youth, to be employed in annoying the enemy wherever opportunity might offer. The cavalry, in-

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cluding the horse-bowmen, were twelve hundred ; the foot-bowmen were sixteen hundred ; and the whole native force of the commonwealth thus amounted to near thirty-two thousand men, exclusively of the numerous light-armed slaves always attendant upon Grecian armies. What should be added for the forces which might be raised among the allies and subjects of the state no historian has informed us. The fleet consisting of three hundred trireme galleys, the crews would be more than fifty thousand men. How far slaves were employed, and how far the citizens of subject states, we have no precise information. But every Athenian was more or less a sea-man : even the heavy-armed sometimes worked at the oar ; and upon occasion all the seamen equally served by land. The mere sailor was commonly of the lowest order of citizens, carried only light armour, and was esteemed of inferior military rank to the heavy-armed, and perhaps to the middle-armed soldier.

Thucyd.
l. 6. c. 91.
& al.

Xen. Hel.
l. 1. c. 2.
s. 1, 2.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 14.

Persuaded, says Thucydides, by these and other arguments which Pericles was accustomed to urge, the Attic people applied themselves to the ungrateful task of stripping their own country, and fixing themselves with their families within that space, ample of its kind, which the walls surrounding Athens, and connecting it with its ports, inclosed. All their furniture they brought with them ; and many even the frames of their houses ; valuable in a country where the materials for building were wood and marble ; the former scarce ; the latter, though plentiful, yet in workmanship costly. Their cattle, great and small, and attending slaves, were transported to the neighbouring islands, principally to Eubœa. This measure however was not resolved on, even upon

conviction of the pressure of necessity, without extreme reluctance; for, continues the contemporary writer, the Attic people were, beyond all other Greeks, attached to their country possessions and a country life. The ravages of the Persian war were now repaired, with large improvement upon the ancient state of things; most of the houses were newly built; some lately completed, and elegantly and expensively furnished, so that, according to Isocrates, they were superior to the houses in the city. The temples also in the several borough towns, destroyed in the Persian war, had been zealously restored; and the people were warmly attached to those which they esteemed their own inherited religious rites, peculiar to that town which had been the town of their ancestors, before Theseus concentrated the religion, government, and jurisprudence of the country in Athens.

Isocr.
Areop.
p. 130. t. 2

Beside the prejudices thus to be violated and imaginary evils to be supported, the real inconveniences, unavoidably attending the measure, were great. While their improvements were to be demolished, and the revenues from their estates to cease, only a few of the more opulent could obtain houses for the habitation of their families; and but a small proportion could be received into those of their friends. The numerous temples of Athens afforded an incommodious shelter to many. All were occupied, excepting those within the citadel, and the magnificent and highly venerated Eleusinium, the fane of the mysterious Ceres, with one or two others, which were firmly locked. Even the superstition which had taught to dread the roof of the temple called the Pelasgic, as under a curse from the deity, yielded to the pressing necessity of the times. Those

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who, in the actual circumstances, took the lead in public business, had certainly a difficult and hazardous office: it was of urgent necessity for them to be cautious of pressing upon a larger portion of the sovereign multitude in favour of a smaller; and hence perhaps the distressed individuals from the country were not objects, as apparently they ought to have been, of the care of government, but were left almost entirely to their own means and their own discretion. When the temples were all occupied, the turrets of the city-walls were resorted to for private residence. But neither buildings nor space within the city sufficed for the multitude. Many families formed for themselves the best shelter they were able on the vacant ground inclosed within the long walls and about the port of Piræus. In this space, had the administration been provided with power to use the foresight and diligence, which it seems to have possessed, in the manner best for the public, all perhaps might have been tolerably accommodated. Measures against the enemy showed ability and energy. The most effectual steps were taken for applying the force of the allies; and a fleet of a hundred triremes was prepared for an expedition against Peloponnesus.

Thueyd.
1. 2. c. 18.

The Peloponnesian army had already entered Attica by the way of CEnoe, and laid siege to that town, critically situated for the defence of the border against Bœotia, and therefore strongly fortified and well provided. The reluctance of the Athenians to abandon their estates had been such that much of their effects might have been the prey of the invaders, if the delay occasioned by the siege of CEnoe had not given opportunity to complete the removal. Complaint was in consequence loud against Archidamus. That worthy prince had scarcely now given up all

SECT.
I.

hope that some disposition to concession on the part of the Athenians might afford opportunity for opening a treaty, and saving Greece from the ruin threatened by the exertion of its whole force so equally divided against itself. The siege was pressed for several days, with the machines then in use, and in all the known ways of attack upon fortifications¹, yet little progress was made. Discontent then spreading and growing more vehement through the army, and no symptom appearing of a disposition among the Athenians to treat, Archidamus yielded to the wishes of his troops. About eighty days after the attempt of the Thebans upon Platæa, when the corn was nearly ripe, raising the siege of Cœnoe, he advanced into Attica with an army, according to Plutarch, of sixty thousand men. The Eleusinian and Thriasian plains were immediately ravaged: a body of Athenian horse was defeated near Rhiti; and the army, keeping moun Ægaleon on the right, passed by the way of Cecropia to Acharnæ, the largest and richest borough of Attica, situate within eight miles of Athens.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 19.

26th June.

Plut. v.
Pericl.

Archidamus had expected that the Athenian people, strong in numbers, naturally high-spirited and impatient, and prepared for war as they had never been before, would not have borne, without opposition, the waste of the Eleusinian and Thriasian lands; but he depended still more upon the ruin now hanging over Acharnæ. The people of that borough formed no fewer than three thousand heavy-armed foot; they could not but have great weight in the Athenian assembly; and Archidamus thought it probable that their impatience, under the destruction of their property, would influence the whole people

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 20.¹ Μηχαναῖς τε καὶ ἄλλῃ τρόπῳ.

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to require that they should be led out to battle : or otherwise, that when the Acharnians saw their own estates ruined, they would with little zeal engage in the defence of those of others, and thus he might proceed with more security to ravage all the rest of the country. What passed in Athens proved the justness of his judgment. From the time of the Persian war, remembered only by a few of the oldest citizens, Attica had been exempt from that evil, so ordinary in many parts of Greece, the ravage of an enemy. About fourteen years before the Eleusinian and Thriasian plains had been plundered by the army under Plistoanax ; and so much was supported now as matter to be expected. But when the Peloponnesians encamped within sight of Athens, and the rich Acharnian vale was to be the next object of devastation, the whole city was in uproar. Some were vehement for marching out to defend their property ; others as warmly opposed a measure which would so endanger the commonwealth ; but on all sides there was an outcry against Pericles ; who, whether as advising the war, or refusing the means of engaging the enemy, was reproached as the principal author of the present evils.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 21.

c. 22.

Amid all the vehemence of clamour, the intrigues of faction, and the threats of popular animosity, Pericles remained immovable. Leaving the ferment to evaporate in altercation among individuals, he would convene no assembly ; he would hold no council ; but while he gave his own attention, he directed also that of others as much as possible to what, in any moment of sober reflection, all would admit to be of the first importance, the guard of the city and the preservation of good order. Meantime he was frequently sending out parties of cavalry to cut off

stragglers and prevent the extension of ravage to any distance from the Peloponnesian camp. Expectation thus raised, and an interest created for the public mind, popular passion was diverted, popular combination dissipated, and ruinous resolutions were prevented. In an action with the Bœotian horse the Athenian and Thessalian had the advantage, till a body of Peloponnesian foot coming up compelled them to retreat. They so far however vindicated the honour of their arms as to carry off their dead, without a truce, which the defeated usually solicited for the purpose; and it was not till the next day that the Peloponnesians, in claim of victory, erected a trophy on the field. After some time, provisions beginning to fail in the Peloponnesian camp, and every provocation appearing ineffectual against the resolution of the Athenians not to risk a general engagement, the army moved from Acharnæ. Ravaging the lands between the mountains Parnes and Brilessus, they proceeded by Oropus, whose territory they also ravaged, into Bœotia, and returning into Peloponnesus dispersed to their several homes.

SECT.
I.

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 23.

While, in this first summer of the war, Attica so suffered, a fleet of a hundred trireme galleys, with a thousand heavy foot and four hundred bowmen, under three commanders, Carcinus, Proteas, and Socrates son of Antigenes, was sent to retaliate devastation upon Peloponnesus. Fifty galleys from Corcyra, and a few from some of the other allies, joined this armament. A descent was made first on the Messenian coast, and the troops marched toward Methone, a town then ill fortified, and without a garrison. As it was known that there was no considerable military force in the neighbourhood, they encamped, scattered around the place, at the same time to prevent valuables

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from being carried out and to collect booty from the country. But Brasidas, who commanded the district with only a hundred Lacedæmonians, piercing their camp, got into Methone; and by the order which he established among the inhabitants, together with the small force which he brought, (for the Spartans were all bred to be either soldiers or officers as occasion might require,) secured the place against an assault.² The Athenian commanders finding their design thus frustrated, for it was not at all their purpose to engage in a siege, re-embarked their forces. By this bold and successful effort Brasidas gained great credit in Sparta, and became considered as an officer superiorly qualified for commands which might require activity and daring exertion.

The Peloponnesians early found that a navy was not to be created so rapidly as some of their warmer politicians had promised them. A wide extent of coast remained, and was likely to remain, open to the attacks of the Athenian fleet. The land force was again debarked near the Elean town of Phea, which was taken; the neighbouring country was ravaged, and the Eleans, assembling in haste to protect their property, were defeated. To keep Phea being however no object to the Athenian commanders, the Eleans were no sooner collected in force sufficient to oppose them than they re-embarked their troops, and, proceeding northward along the coast, continued their depredations wherever they found most tempt-

² Ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐνόητων is the phrase used by Thucydides in first speaking of Methone. In the very next sentence he says that Brasidas ἐβούλετο τοῖς ἐν τῇ χωρίῳ. His meaning therefore was, that there were no Lacedæmonians in the place, and consequently no soldiers; the inhabitants being all unarmed Messenians and Helots.

ation and least danger. They took Solium, a small town on the Ætolian coast belonging to the Corinthians, and gave it to the Acarnanians of Palira. They took Astacus in Acarnania, and, expelling its tyrant Evarchus, they committed the supreme power to the popular assembly, and the city became a member of the Athenian confederacy. They proceeded then to Cephallenia, which was at that time divided between no less than four republics, Pale, Crane, Same, and Prone. The particularity with which Thucydides describes its situation and circumstances implies that in his time those western islands were little generally known among the Greeks. Without any act of hostility, the whole of Cephallenia was induced to accede to the Athenian alliance. After these considerable services, the armament returned to Attica.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 30.

While war thus was carried into the western seas of Greece, a squadron of thirty galleys, under Cleopompus, sailed eastward and northward, to protect Eubœa, and to annoy the hostile states in its neighbourhood, especially Locris. Some of the lands on the Locrian coast were ravaged; the town of Thronium, capitulating, gave hostages to ensure performance of some compact; probably for paying a subsidy and abstaining from hostility. The Locrians of the other towns, taking the field to relieve Thronium, were defeated at Alope. To prevent depredations on the Eubœan coast, which the Opuntian Locrians were accustomed to make, the little island of Atalanta, near the coast of Locris, was fortified, and a small naval force was stationed there.

c. 26.

c. 32.

Within Attica meanwhile, after the departure of the Peloponnesian army, the counsels of the administration were diligently directed to provide the best

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security for the country that its exposed situation and the inferiority of its land force would admit: posts were occupied on the frontier, and guard-ships were stationed on different parts of the coast. A measure followed which, taking place at the time when Thucydides wrote and Pericles spoke, and while Pericles held the principal influence in the administration, strongly marks both the inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism of democratical government. A decree of the people directed that a thousand talents should be set a part in the treasury in the citadel, as a deposit, not to be touched unless the enemy should attack the city by sea; a circumstance which implied the prior ruin of the Athenian fleet, and the only one, it was supposed, which could superinduce the ruin of the commonwealth. But in a decree so important, sanctioned only by the present will of that giddy tyrant the multitude of Athens, against whose caprices, since the depression of the court of Areopagus, no balancing power remained, confidence so failed that the denunciation of capital punishment was added against whosoever should propose, and whosoever should concur in, any decree for the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or in any other circumstances. It was at the same time ordered, by the same authority, that a hundred triremes should be yearly selected, the best of the fleet, to be employed on the same occasion only.

Another measure, of no small actual severity, was thought justified by public expediency, and by the right and the duty of obviating public danger. It was judged unsafe to permit a people so inveterately inimical as the Æginetans, and known to have been active in exciting the war, any longer to hold, though under the controul of an Athenian garrison, that island

which had been emphatically termed the Eye-sore of Piræus. To disencumber the city of a part of the multitude which so inconveniently crowded it, was also desirable. With this double view the Æginetans were expelled from their island, and a colony of Athenians took possession. Thus by the same measure the government was relieved of some portion of the care incumbent on it to provide for citizens who were unable to provide for themselves, and a garrison was maintained in Ægina without public expense. A distribution of money from the public treasury alleviated the immediate wants of the remaining poor in Athens. For the exterminated Æginetans no provision seems to have been made or proposed by the Athenian government. Instances indeed are so familiar, in Grecian history, of an obnoxious people, a Grecian people, reduced to slavery by a Grecian people, that it might perhaps be thought an act of clemency to allow them to migrate in search of a better lot, which they were fortunate enough to find. The Lacedæmonians gave them the Thyreatis, a small territory on the confines of Laconia and Argolis, of which they would be as a garrison to protect the former against the inroads from the latter.³ A few only of the exiles found more peaceful establishments among their friends in other parts of Greece. Among the events of this summer Thucydides mentions a nearly total eclipse of the sun, beginning soon after mid-day, which ascertains the chronology.

SECT.
I.

Plut. v.
Pericl.

Thucyd.
ut sup.

3rd Aug.
Dodw.
Ann. Thuc.

³ The failure of mention, by the historian, of any former inhabitants appears to indicate that it had remained uninhabited and uncultivated, being so insecure a possession, divided by lofty mountains from the rest of Laconia, but more open to Argolis, that, unless under Argive protection, it could be an object only for those in the miserable condition of the expelled Æginetans.

Toward the close of autumn the whole force of Athens marched, under the command of Pericles, to retaliate the vengeance and reap the profit of ravage, where it could be done most readily, and now with complete security, in the bordering territory of Megara. The fleet under Carcinus, just returned from the western sea, was at Ægina. Proceeding to the Megarian coast, its land force joined that under Pericles. Thus was formed, according to Thucydides, the largest Athenian army ever assembled in the course of the war. The Athenians were not less than ten thousand, and the Metics, those denizens of Athens who had not the privileges of Athenian citizens, were four thousand heavy-armed foot: the number of light-armed he does not state, saying only that they were a large body. When plunder and waste had been carried as far as circumstances allowed, the whole armament returned to Piræus and Athens.

SECTION II.

Summary view of the history of Thrace: alliance negotiated by Athens with Sitacles king of Thrace and Perdiccas king of Macedonia. Public funeral at Athens in honour of the slain in their country's service. Expedition of the Corinthians against Acarnania and Cephallenia.

DURING these, the principal military transactions of the first summer of the war, negotiation had been diligently prosecuted by the Athenian government, chiefly with the view to provide security for that revenue, arising in tribute from transmarine Grecian states, which enabled Athens to maintain the most powerful navy then in the world, and to withstand the superior land force of the Peloponnesian con-

federacy. The enmity of the king of Macedonia threatened inconvenience ; and, especially to obviate this, an improvement of friendly connexion with the extensive monarchy of Thrace was desirable.

Thrace, as we have formerly observed, appears to have been occupied in early times by the same Pelasgian hordes who principally gave origin to the Grecian people. But instead of advancing with the Greeks in knowledge and civilisation, those glimmerings of science which, according to the oldest Grecian traditions, beamed upon their country before they reached Greece, were totally lost ; and two prejudices, perhaps brought by hordes from the mountains of the interior, who overwhelmed the civilised inhabitants of the coast, becoming leading principles over the whole nation, made the Thracians incorrigibly barbarous : ‘ To live by war and rapine,’ says Herodotus, ‘ is their delight and their glory ; and ‘ nothing they esteem so dishonourable as agriculture.’

Herodot.
l. 5. c. 6.

A most indispensable ornament of their persons was to have the skin punctured in various figures ; a whimsical practice of barbarism, remarkable for its extension ; found anciently among our ancestors the Britons, in the extreme of the old world, and lately among their antipodes in the little islands of the Pacific ocean ; who, but for the wonderful improvements of modern European navigation, must have remained ever equally unknown to the people of the old world, and of what has been called the new. Between mount Hæmus and the Danube lived the Getes, founders, it has been supposed, of the Gothic name ; a Thracian people, according to Thucydides, but still more barbarous than the other Thracians ; resembling in manners the Scythians, who wandered, to an unknown extent, over the vast continent to the

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 96,
97.

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XIV.

northward and north-eastward of the Danube and the Euxine.

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 29.

Under Darius the whole of the Thracian country had been brought to acknowledge the Persian dominion. The retreat of the Persians out of Europe, after the defeat of Xerxes, appears to have given opportunity for forming among its people an empire such as had been before unknown. Of what wars or what policy led to it information fails; but we are assured that Teres, chief of the Odrysian clan, became sovereign of all the Thracians, from the *Ægean* sea to the Danube, and from the Euxine to the Strymon; a country considerably larger than all Greece. Some mountaineers of the borders, and some clans of the plains, in the central part of the continent beyond the Strymon, alone maintained independency. The Grecian towns on the coast, all for safety to their commerce paying tribute to Athens, found it convenient also to pay tribute to the Thracian prince for safety to their lands. So far then owning subjection, and contributing to the strength and splendour of the monarchy, they were not objects of jealousy and oppression, but rather of protection and encouragement; for the Thracians, wealthy by the possession of ample and fruitful territory, by the produce of mines of the richest metals, and by the command of numerous tributaries, scorning to employ themselves in agriculture or commerce, did not despise conveniencies, or even luxuries, which only agriculture and commerce can give.

On the death of Teres the extensive monarchy of Thrace devolved to his son Sitalces, who had married the sister of Nymphodorus, a citizen of the Grecian town of Abdera, one of the subject dependencies of Athens. An advantageous opening was thus

offered to the Athenian government for improving their interest with the Thracian king. Through Nymphodorus an alliance was formed with Sitalces : and, such was the ascendancy which the little republics of Greece had acquired among foreign nations, Sadowus, eldest son of the powerful monarch of Thrace, accepted, as a valuable honour, his admission to the name and privileges of one of the Athenian people. The brother-in-law of Sitalces then undertook to be mediator between the king of Macedonia and the Athenian commonwealth ; and, for the cession of the town of Therme to him in sovereignty, Perdiccas joined the Thracian prince in the Athenian alliance.

Winter setting in, and military operations being suspended, Pericles did not neglect the means, which established custom offered, for animating the Athenian people in the cause in which they were engaged, and converting even the calamities of war into an occasion of triumph. The funeral of those who had fallen in their country's service was publicly solemnised ; and the manner of it remains particularly described by Thucydides. Three days before the ceremony of burial, the bones, collected from the bodies previously burnt according to the ordinary practice of the Greeks, were arranged under an ample awning. While thus, according to the modern phrase, they lay in state, it was usual for the relations to visit them, and throw on any thing that fancy or superstition gave to imagine a grateful offering to the spirits of the deceased, or honourable to their memory among the living. The day of the burial being arrived, the bones were placed in ten chests of cypress-wood, raised on carriages, one for each ward of Attica ; and an eleventh carriage bore an empty bier with a pall, in honour of those whose bodies could

Thucyd.
1.2. c. 34.

CHAP.
XIV.

Thucyd.
1.2. c.34.
& Not. ed.
Duk.

Thucyd.
ibid.

1.1. c.22.
1.1. c.35.
& 46.

not be recovered. Procession was then made in solemn march to the public tomb in the Ceramicus, the most beautiful suburb of the city; the female relations of the deceased attending, and, according to the Grecian custom, venting their lamentations aloud. From the time when the ceremony was instituted, the tomb in the Ceramicus had been the receptacle of all who had been honoured with a public funeral, excepting those who had fallen at Marathon; who, for the supereminence of their merit, and the singular glory of the action, had been buried in the field of battle, where their peculiar monument was raised over them. Always a person of superior dignity and acknowledged eminent ability was appointed by the people to speak the funeral panegyric. On the actual occasion every circumstance directed the public choice to Pericles. When therefore the ceremony of entombing was over, Pericles passed through the crowd to a lofty stand raised for the occasion, so that he might be heard by the attending multitude the most extensively possible; and thence delivered that oration, the heads of which at least Thucydides, who was probably present, has, from his own professions, it is to be presumed, faithfully collected, preserving in a great degree even the phrases. It remains to us a finished model of the simple and severe sublime in oratory, which, in its original language, has been the admiration of all succeeding ages; but which must sink in any translation, denies abridgment, and defies either imitation or paraphrase, perhaps beyond any composition that ever was committed to writing.

1.2. c.33.

The winter was not for all parts of Greece, as for Athens, a season of repose. Evarchus, the expelled tyrant of Astacus in Acarnania, applied to Corinth

for assistance to restore him to his little dominion. The ancients rarely ventured upon maritime expeditions in short days and stormy seasons; the narrowness of their seas, the height and rockiness of their coast, the frequency of sudden squalls, and the want of a guide in cloudy weather, rendering it far more dangerous than where the ocean is at hand, and, in a stout vessel, under guidance of the compass, distance from land is safety. The zeal of Corinth however was not to be deterred. Forty ships of war and fifteen hundred heavy foot, under Euphamidas, with some auxiliary mercenaries raised by Evarchus, recovered Astacus. Attempts were made upon some other towns of Acarnania, but without success. The Corinthians then moving homeward debarked in Cephalonia on the Cranæan lands. The Cranæans, amusing them with the pretence of a disposition to capitulate, attacked them unawares, and forced them to re-embark with loss. Without attempting anything farther they then returned to Corinth.

SECTION III.

Second invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Pestilence at Athens. Operations of the Athenian fleet on the Peloponnesian coast under Pericles; and on the Macedonian coast under Agnon. Effects of popular discontent at Athens. First effort of the Peloponnesian fleet. Attempt of the Peloponnesians to send an embassy into Persia. Barbarity of the Grecian system of war. An Athenian squadron stationed in the western sea. Surrender of Potiddæa to the Athenians. Death of Pericles.

THE events of the first campaign justify the wisdom both of Pericles and of Archidamus in the counsels they respectively gave before the commencement of hostilities. The Peloponnesians were evidently not prepared to wage offensive war against Athens with

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any advantage. A considerable part of Attica had been ravaged; the harvest had been consumed, carried off, or destroyed. But Athens could support that loss; and the Athenian fleets had meanwhile, with less expense and inconvenience, and probably with more profit, been dealing destruction and gathering spoil in various parts of Peloponnesus and its confederate states. At the same time negotiations had been concluded which promised great access of strength to Athens for the campaigns to ensue; while the Peloponnesians, endeavouring also to extend their alliances, had nowhere yet succeeded.

B. C. 430.

In the second year the Peloponnesian army was assembled in spring; and, toward the beginning of summer, under the command of Archidamus, again entered and ravaged Attica. But a natural calamity, far more terrible than the swords of their enemies, now attacked the Athenians; a pestilential fever, in many points nearly resembling that scourge which, under the name of the plague, has been, in modern times, continually desolating the fine climates of the east; yet, according to the accurate Thucydides, differing in some essential circumstances. It was then new to the Greeks. Like the modern plague, it was supposed to have originated in Ethiopia; whence, passing into Egypt, it was quickly communicated over the greater part of the Persian empire. Among the Greeks it was first observed in some towns of the Asian coast, and of the neighbouring islands, particularly Lemnos. Its first appearance among the Athenians was in Piræus; and so little were they aware how it came, or what it was, that a fancy arose, and gained some credit among them, that the wells had been poisoned by the Peloponnesians. Quickly it made its way into the upper

town, as Athens was often called, and then the mortality increased rapidly. What was the cause of this malady, says Thucydides, I will leave to others to investigate ; but I will describe its effects, which I can undertake to do exactly ; having both experienced them in my own person, and seen numbers of others under the same affliction.

The year, it is universally acknowledged, was remarkably healthy till the pestilence appeared ; and then every existing sickness seemed to change into that one, or lost its symptoms in the violence of the supervening disorder. Persons, apparently in perfect health, were suddenly seized, first with extreme heat in the head, attended with particular redness and inflammation of the eyes ; then quickly the tongue and throat assumed a bloody appearance, the breath became fetid, frequent sneezing followed, with hoarseness of the voice ; and before long the breast laboured, and a violent cough ensued. The stomach was then affected ; evacuations in all ways followed, attended with excessive colicky pains, and often with violent hiccoughs and spasms. The flesh meanwhile, not externally hot to the touch, appeared reddish and livid, and broke out in pustules and ulcers. But the internal fever was such that the patient could scarcely bear the lightest covering ; and what the affection of the moment gave to imagine as the most agreeable relief, was to plunge into cold water. Many of the poorer sort, ill attended, ran to the wells, and there indulged in extreme the immediate calls of immoderate thirst. Through the whole of the disorder to sleep was impossible ; yet, considering the violence of the symptoms, the sufferers were less weakened than might have been expected. The fever was mostly spent by the seventh, or, at farthest, by the ninth

Thueyd.
l. 2. c. 49.

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day ; and if the patient resisted so long, he was generally left not without some strength to combat what was to follow. But the ulceration of the bowels, which then took place, and the flux in consequence, destroyed numbers. For the disease, beginning with the head, pervaded the whole body, and finally fixed upon the extremities ; so that some who had supported all the vehemence of its attack upon the vital parts, survived, not without the loss of their hands, their feet, their privy members, or their eyes. Some were totally deprived of memory ; on their recovery not knowing their nearest friends, nor even themselves. The extreme and singular virulence of the disorder appeared also remarkably in the refusal of animals of prey to touch the numerous unburied corpses, and in the death which ensued to the more ravenous few which fed on them. Of birds of prey indeed there was a very remarkable scarcity, almost a dereliction of the country, so that the effect was observed principally in dogs.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 50.

c. 51.

For this terrible disease the skill of physicians was found utterly vain, and all attempted remedies were either useless or totally uncertain ; what seemed to relieve some patients appearing even injurious to others. Nor did any strength of constitution avail ; but the robust and the infirm were nearly equally affected. Among the first symptoms, and the most grievous, an extreme dejection of spirits was almost universal ; the patient lost the ability even to struggle for life ; and this despondency was rendered the more fatal by the infectious nature of the disorder, which either deterred assistance, or quickly involved the attendants upon the sick in the same evil and the same inability with those whom they served, or to whom their charity was afforded. Many therefore

died wholly unattended ; while others received little advantage from every assistance that could be given. One only comforting circumstance appeared to alleviate this dreadful calamity ; different from the modern plague, the disease was among those which, through some inscrutable management of Providence, the human frame is incapable of receiving more than once ; or, if not perfectly secured by once suffering against all future injury from the virulence of the infectious matter, yet incapable of receiving twice the full force of the disorder. Of those who had recovered from the Athenian pestilence none were again so infected by any communication with the diseased as to appear in any danger of their lives. Thus hope first shone upon the sick, upon those yet in health, and upon those who had borne the disease ; thus alarm first ceased to be universal, and thus the Athenian people seemed at length warranted against that utter extinction which the effects of the disorder had appeared to threaten.

The mortality was however tremendous ; and the misery was greatly enhanced by the increase of multitude in the city, which the war had occasioned. The want of sewers, a convenience unknown in Grecian towns, and of which the Romans appear to have given the first example, would also be severely felt upon this occasion.⁴ It was the hot season ; and not

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 52.

Strabo,
1. 5. p. 235.

⁴ The necessity of a drain for the marshy soil, as well as of a vent for the filth which accumulated in the hollow between the Palatine hill and the Capitoline, seems to have given occasion to that wonderful structure the Cloaca Maxima at Rome, perhaps the first and the greatest of its kind. Sewers are seen among the ruins of Carthage, or were so when Shaw visited the site of that city in the beginning of the past century ; but whether Carthaginian works or Roman, does not appear. Shaw's Travels, p. 151. ed. fol. 1738.

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only every house was fully occupied, but very many families of the poorer people were crowded together in stifling huts, where they died in heaps. To bury all regularly was impossible: corpses were rolled out into the streets, and there left; and numbers were to be found dead and dying about every fountain, whither intolerable thirst impelled them to seek relief. What would before have been esteemed a portentous pollution became now familiar; the temples of the gods, occupied as the habitations of men, were filled with dead bodies. Funeral rites were not less profaned, and a singular kind of robbery became common. When those who had means of burning the bodies of their deceased friends, according to the established practice, had formed their funeral pile, others would put on their dead, and immediately set fire to it. With less scruple, of course, where a pile was found burning, many, without ceremony, would throw on it a corpse, and go their way.

The moral effects of this extraordinary visitation, reported by that judicious eye-witness to whom we owe this detail, deserve notice. Wherever the doctrine of retribution in a life to come, for good and evil deeds in this world, has taken any hold on the minds of men, a general calamity strongly tends to check the passions, to inspire serious thought, to direct attention toward that future existence, and to make both hope and fear converge to the great Author of nature, the all-powerful, all-wise, and all-just God, who can recompense the sufferings of the good with endless blessings, and convert to lasting misery any short-lived joys that can arise from the perpetration of evil. But in Athens, where the Deity was looked to very generally and very anxiously, and almost only, for the dispensation of temporal

good and evil, it was otherwise.⁵ The fear of the divine power, says Thucydides, ceased; for it was observed, that to worship or not to worship the gods, to obey or not to obey those laws of morality which have always been held most sacred among men, availed nothing. All died alike; or, if there was a difference, the virtuous, the charitable, the generous, exposing themselves beyond others, were the first and the surest to suffer. An inordinate, and before unknown, licentiousness of manners followed. Let us enjoy ourselves, let us, if possible, drown thought in pleasure to-day, for to-morrow we die, was the prevailing maxim. No crime therefore that could give prospect of any enjoyment was scrupled; for such were the ravages of the disease that for perpetrator, accuser, and judges, all to survive, so that an offender could be convicted in regular course of law, was supposed against all chance. The final consummation already impending over equally the criminal and the innocent, by the decree of fate or of the gods, any punishment that human laws could decree was little regarded. How most to enjoy life while life remained became the only consideration; and this relaxation, almost to a dissolution of all moral principle, is lamented by Thucydides as a lasting effect of the pestilence of Athens.

The Peloponnesian army had already begun the ravage of Attica when the pestilence was first publicly observed. They wasted all the vale of Athens, and then proceeded through the sea-side country, more fruitful and better cultivated than the inland hills,

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 47.
54.

⁵ Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Pericles, seems to have been the first who taught that better religion, if the term may be allowed, which was afterward propagated by Socrates and his disciples, and he was persecuted for it as an atheist.

CHAP.
XIV.Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 56.

toward the silver-mines of mount Laurium. The firm mind of Pericles meanwhile was not to be depressed by all the calamities which surrounded him, nor by all the terrors which threatened, from the war, from the pestilence, and, above all, from the irritation and despair of the despotic people whose minister he was. Steadily persevering in his former policy, of avoiding any decisive action with the land force of the enemy, he prosecuted offensive operations by sea as if Athens were under no affliction; thinking probably in some degree to divert the public mind from brooding over domestic misfortune, and to suspend any rising acrimony against himself. He took the command of the armament destined against Peloponnesus, consisting of a fleet of a hundred Athenian and fifty Chian and Lesbian triremes, with an army of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. It appears from Thucydides that this was the first instance of the cavalry of any Grecian state going on an expedition by sea; though the practice was not new to the Asiatics, the Persians having, sixty years before, sent a large force of horse across the Ægean under Datis and Artaphernes. Vessels were sometimes built, sometimes only fitted, for the purpose, with the name of *hippagogi*, horse-transports. For the present occasion some old triremes were converted under the direction of Pericles. The first descent was made on the Epidaurian territory, the greater part of which was ravaged. The operations of waste and plunder were then continued along the coast, through the Troezenian, Halian, and Hermionian lands. The troops being then re-embarked, the fleet, having passed the friendly Argive coast, a second descent was made in Laconia, near the town of Prasiæ, which was taken. Ravage then having been extended through the neighbouring

country, as far as circumstances permitted, the whole armament returned to Piræus and Athens. The country was then clear of an enemy. The Peloponnesians, alarmed by the accounts given by deserters, probably slaves, of the rapid progress of the pestilence, and of its fatal effects in Athens, and seeing the frequent blazing of funeral piles, had hastened their retreat homeward, about the fortieth day after entering Attica.

The Athenian armament soon sailed again under Agnon son of Nicias, and Cleopompus son of Clinias, two of the nine colleagues of Pericles in the supreme military command. The purpose was to press the siege of Potidæa, which remained still blockaded by Phormion. This was apparently an ill-judged, and certainly an unfortunate measure. The fresh troops, carrying with them the pestilential disorder from Athens, not only fell themselves in great numbers, but communicated the infection to Phormion's army, which had before been healthy. After losing, within forty days, no fewer than fifteen hundred of his four thousand foot, Agnon returned with the remainder to Attica. Phormion, with about three thousand, continued the blockade of Potidæa.

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 58.

Ibid. &
1. 3. c. 17.

Accumulated evils, public and private, at length irritated beyond sufferance the minds of the Athenian people. Popular discontent will find an object on which to vent itself, and that object now was Pericles. Such was the depression of the public spirit that ambassadors were sent to Lacedæmon, to try the temper of the Peloponnesians, and endeavour to negotiate a peace; but as the Athenians drooped, the Lacedæmonians and their allies became arrogant, and the negotiation failed. The shame of disappointment and increased apprehension from the failure, being

1. 2. c. 59.

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thus added to former popular feelings, the ferment was such that Pericles judged it expedient more than previously to hold communication with the sovereign multitude. In his capacity of general of the commonwealth, or first of the board of war, if we may so express it, he had a right to summon the general assembly whenever he thought proper. The people met, and he mounted the speaker's stand. He began his oration with urging a maxim applicable to all states, but the force of which would be more particularly sensible in the little Grecian republics, 'That every individual has a deeper interest in the public than in his private prosperity; for the decay of private affluence must ever be involved with the country's ruin; but while the country flourishes opportunity will be open for the recovery of private fortune.' He proceeded then to assert, with manly confidence, his own claim to the merit of integrity above suspicion, and to reproach the people with that want of firmness which disposed them to impute, as a crime to him, a public misfortune, impossible equally to be prevented and to be foreseen; and which could reasonably be ascribed only to the inscrutable will of the Deity. 'So far then,' he added, 'from having just cause for that despondency which infected them, they were still in full possession of what, well used, would give them certain superiority over all their enemies. No potentate upon earth possessed such a navy as theirs, nor could any one prescribe bounds to the empire which they might acquire by it. Such an opinion he never had declared before; and, but for the universal depression of the public mind, he would not now have uttered a truth too flattering to them, and too alarming to all the world besides. What then were their houses and fields, the mo-

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 60.

c. 61, 62.

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‘mentary loss of which they deplored, in comparison
 ‘with such a possession? To others indeed neces-
 ‘saries; but to them merely incidental decorations
 ‘of high fortune; or, at most, luxuries and super-
 ‘fluous conveniencies, with which they might well,
 ‘for a time, dispense. Their fleet, on the contrary,
 ‘was truly essential; not only to their command, but
 ‘to their independency; not only to their prosperity,
 ‘but to their safety against the revenge which that
 ‘invidious empire, that tyranny which they had long
 ‘extensively held⁶, could not fail to excite. What
 ‘we suffer from the gods,’ continued Pericles, ‘we
 ‘should bear with patience; what from our enemies,
 ‘with manly firmness; and such were the maxims of
 ‘our forefathers. From unshaken fortitude in mis-
 ‘fortune hath arisen the present power of this com-
 ‘monwealth, together with that glory which, if our
 ‘empire, according to the lot of all earthly things,
 ‘decay, shall still survive to all posterity. Let no
 ‘more begging embassies then be sent to Lacedæ-
 ‘mon, nor let it any way appear that you are sinking
 ‘under your misfortunes; but be assured that the
 ‘steadiest resistance will bring our troubles to their
 ‘best conclusion.’

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 63.

c. 64.

This speech had not all the effect which Pericles c. 65.
 hoped from it. So far he prevailed that it was de-
 termined no more to take any measure bearing the
 appearance of suing for peace from Sparta. But the
 acrimony excited among the people by their private
 sufferings was not to be immediately appeased: many
 of the poor were reduced to total want, while the
 rich bore with extreme uneasiness the loss of revenue
 from their estates in Attica, the destruction of their
 country-houses, their favourite residences, and the

⁶ Ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν (τὴν ἀρχήν).

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waste of all the expense bestowed on them. But what now, says Thucydides, principally affected all was, that instead of peace they had war ; not, as often formerly, war far from home, but all the present evils of war at their doors, and apprehension of consequences which could not be considered without shuddering. The ferment did not subside till Pericles was deposed from his military command, and mulcted in a heavy fine.⁷

At the same time with this public disgrace, Pericles was suffering under the severest domestic misfortunes. Several of his children, some in this year, some in the former, had died of the pestilence ; which, with the return of warm weather, had broken out again in Athens. The same cruel disorder had deprived him of others of his nearest relations, together with some of those invaluable friends in whose assistance he could best confide for the administration of public affairs. During these successive and complicated scenes of private woe, rendered more distracting by the public calamity, and the pressure of that popular discontent which arose from it, the firmness of his mind was the admiration of all around him. That philosophy, then new in Greece, which had been the favourite study of his leisure, inculcated rather the pride of disdaining to complain, and of being above the feelings of humanity, than a just resignation to the will of a Supreme Being, infinitely wise and good ;

⁷ Thucydides, in mentioning the fine, does not name the sum. According to Diodorus, if we may trust our copies, it was no less than eighty talents, about nineteen thousand pounds sterling. (Diod. l. 12. c. 45.) But Plutarch says that, among various accounts extant in his time, none made it exceed fifty talents, about twelve thousand five hundred pounds ; whereas some asserted it to have been no more than fifteen, less than four thousand pounds sterling.

though such a Being it acknowledged for the author and preserver of nature. No complaint was heard from the disciple of Anaxagoras, no change of countenance or manner was perceptible in him, till he lost his favourite son Paralus. Even then he would not seem to feel the anguish which oppressed him. But when, according to custom, in the funeral ceremony, he approached the bier to put the chaplet on the head of the deceased youth, the sight overcame him, and he burst into tears.⁸ In this accumulation of distress to retire from public business was, in the moment, a relief.

Plut. v.
Pericl.

But the people had no sooner vented their anger than they repented of what they had done: the keen sensation of distress in their private affairs, says the contemporary historian, abated, while, upon reflection, they became aware that no other man was qualified, like Pericles, for the supreme direction of public business. First, or equal to any, in birth, clearly superior in abilities, eminent in tried integrity, in all together he had not a second. None of the other orators therefore, with all the support of faction they were able to muster, could satisfy the multitude. With loud and anxious voices Pericles was called to mount the bema, and declare his opinion of public affairs; what was the situation of things, and what measures, in his judgment, ought to be taken. He did not refuse to obey the honourable summons; and

⁸ According to Plutarch, Pericles lost all his legitimate sons by the pestilence, one of his own name, who survived him, being illegitimate. But Xenophon mentions Pericles, son of Pericles, without noticing any irregularity of his birth (Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 3. c. 5.); and it appears that he long survived his father. Plato also speaks of a son or sons of Pericles surviving him, and not as illegitimate.

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quickly a strong reflux of popular favour restored him to the situation of commander in chief and prime minister, if we may use the term, the nearest which modern language affords, but inadequate to express the plenitude of that power, which absolute possession of the favour of the people gave him over the Athenian empire.⁹

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 66.

While Athens, weakened by the pestilence, and labouring with internal discord and depression of public spirit, was in some degree disabled for exertion, the Peloponnesians, for the first time, ventured upon a naval expedition. A hundred triremes, with a thousand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians, sailed to Zacynthus; an Achæan colony, but of the Athenian confederacy. The troops debarking ravaged great part of the open country. But the fortified places all either deterred or resisted their efforts: the people could neither by threats nor promises be induced to treat, and the armament returned home.

c. 67.
Herodot.
1. 7. c. 137.

Toward the end of the summer a measure was taken in another line, from which more important advantages were expected. An embassy was appointed to go to the Persian court, with a view to negotiate an alliance, and particularly to obtain pecuniary assistance. It consisted of three Lacedæmonians, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodemus, with the Corinthian Aristeus, the Tegean Timagoras, and Polis an Argive, who went unauthorised by his own commonwealth; whence it appears that he was of the party in opposition to the ruling party there. But means to make their journey to Susa were not obvious; for the Athenians commanded all the western coast of

⁹ Στρατηγὸν εἶλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν. Thucyd. 1. 2. c. 65.

Asia Minor with the Hellespont ; and the hazards that might attend the unusual passage by the way of Phœnicia were many to their knowledge, and probably many which they could not know. It was therefore determined to go first to the court of Sitalces king of Thrace, whose alliance with Athens did not bind him to be the enemy of Lacedæmon ; hopes on the contrary being entertained of detaching him from the Athenian interest ; and his protection, it was reckoned, might be trusted for the journey through his dominion to the satrapy of Pharnaces, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, whence the progress to Susa, though long, would be secure. Though two Athenian ministers, Learchus and Aminiadès, were with the Thracian prince, the Lacedæmonians found a gracious reception ; but their endeavours to withdraw him from the Athenian alliance failed. No opposition to their journey however occurred ; and they proceeded. The Athenian ministers, equally unable to engage Sitalces in all their views, found however the zeal of an Athenian citizen in Sadocus his eldest son. That prince took upon himself to send a party, under the orders of Learchus and Aminiadès, in pursuit of the Peloponnesian ministers, who were seized before they could cross the Hellespont. Being conveyed to Athens, a decree of the people, without a trial, consigned them to the executioner. Thucydides acknowledges the most illiberal policy in his fellow-countrymen as, in part at least, instigating this measure : they dreaded the enterprising abilities of the Corinthian Aristeus, which had been conspicuous in operations against them in Chalcidice and Macedonia. The law of retaliation was alleged in justification of it ; and such was the illiberal and cruel spirit of war among the ancients that the law of re-

CHAP.
XIV.Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 67.

taliation might generally be pleaded to justify almost any atrocity. From the beginning of the war the Lacedæmonians, wherever they seized merchant-ships of the Athenians or their allies, or even of the neutral Greeks, had usually put the crews to death.

c. 68, 69.

Such were the transactions of the summer. In the beginning of winter circumstances arose, in the north-western parts of Greece, to call the attention of the Athenian administration; and Phormion, recalled from his command in Chalcidice, was sent with a squadron of twenty ships to block the Corinthian gulf. Meanwhile, though the Peloponnesians had no fleet at sea, yet their privateers¹⁰, harbouring on the coasts of Caria and Lycia, had been annoying the Athenian trade with Asia Minor and the eastern parts of the Mediterranean. A squadron of six triremes was thought sufficient, to prevent such depredations, and also to collect the tributes from the dependent states in those parts. But Melisander, who commanded, undertaking an expedition up the country of Lycia with the troops of his little squadron and some auxiliaries which he collected, was overpowered in an action in which he lost his life.

c. 70.

The winter was not far advanced when the Potidæans, pressed by famine so that they had begun, the historian says, to eat one another, and hopeless of succour, desired to capitulate. Xenophon, son of Euripides, who with two other generals commanded the besieging army, considering what their troops must suffer in winter operations, and what expense the commonwealth had already incurred by the siege, which was not less than two thousand talents, about

¹⁰ Τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων. Thucyd. l. 2. c. 69.

five hundred thousand pounds sterling, was induced to treat. The garrison and people were allowed to quit the place; the men each with one garment, the women with two; and both with a small specified sum of money, which might enable them to travel to such retreats as they could find in Chalcidice, or elsewhere in the neighbouring country. Xenophon and his colleagues did not escape censure from their sovereign, the Athenian people, for granting, without first consulting them, terms, even such terms; the Potidæans being considered as meriting vengeance, and, after the surrender it was found, were incapable of longer resistance. Thus however the Athenians, unable, in their full strength, to defend their own country, yet persevering amid affliction, gained that distant object of contention which had given immediate rise to the war.

Pericles lived probably to know the success of the Athenian arms against Potidæa, and it was not long after that he fell a victim to that calamity, the endemial disorder, which had already carried off so many of his nearest relations, and most valued friends. He survived however the violence of the fever, and died in full possession of his senses, of a lingering illness which it superinduced.

Plut. v.
Pericl.

No man seems to have been held in such estimation by most of the ablest writers of Rome equally as of Greece for universal superiority of talents as Pericles. The accounts remaining of his actions hardly support his renown; which was yet perhaps more fairly earned than that of many, the merit of whose achievements has been in a great degree due to others acting under them, whose very names have perished. The philosophy of Pericles taught him not to be vain-glorious, but to rest his fame upon essentially great and good,

CHAP.
XIV.Saxe's Me-
moirs.

rather than upon brilliant actions. It is observed by Plutarch that, often as he commanded the Athenian forces, he never was defeated; yet, though he won many trophies, he never gained a splendid victory. A battle, according to a great modern authority, is the resource of ignorant generals: when they know not what to do, they fight a battle. It was almost universally the resource of the age of Pericles: little conception was entertained of military operations beyond ravage and a battle. His genius led him to a superior system, which the wealth of his country enabled him to carry into practice. His favourite maxim was to spare the lives of his soldiers; and scarcely any general ever gained so many important advantages with so little bloodshed. It is said to have been his consolation and his boast, in his dying hours, that he never was the cause that a fellow-citizen wore mourning: a glorious and perhaps a singular subject of exultation for a head of a party in Greece; where, in the struggles of faction, secret assassinations, numerous public executions, and bloody contests in arms, were so ordinary. Pericles might almost equally have made it his boast as general of the commonwealth: for, when his soldiers fell, they fell victims to the necessity of their country's service, and not to the incapacity, rashness, or vanity of the commander. Had he been less a patriot, less a philosopher, less humane, his achievements might have been more brilliant, but he would not equally have earned, from the mouth of Socrates, and the report of Plato, the praise of supereminence in what was wise, great, and becoming.¹¹

¹¹ Περικλέα οὕτω μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα is a phrase which Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates, immediately after the mention of Themistocles and Aristides. Plat. Menon. p.94. t. 2.

This splendid character however perhaps may seem to receive some tarnish from the political conduct of Pericles ; the concurrence, at least, which is imputed to him, in depraving the Athenian constitution, to favour that popular power by which he ruled, and the revival and confirmation of that pernicious hostility between the democratical and aristocratical interests, first in Athens, and then, by the Peloponnesian war, throughout the nation. But it is remarkable that Thucydides and Xenophon, both suffering banishment, one for twenty years, the other for life, from that democratical power with which both express themselves abundantly dissatisfied, nevertheless always speak with the highest respect of Pericles. The testimony of Isocrates will also deserve consideration. Complaining of the depraved state of the Athenian constitution in his own time, that patriotic statesman says : ‘ Pericles found the constitution less perfect ‘ than it had been, but still tolerably good ; yet he did ‘ not use his extraordinary power for his own profit, ‘ but, leaving his private fortune less than he had received it from his father, he carried into the treasury ‘ eight thousand talents (near two millions sterling) ‘ over and above the proceeds of the sacred revenue.’ This concurrence of three such men, in successive ages, (of whom, Thucydides probably had personal acquaintance with him,) all friendly to the aristocratical interest, and all anxious for concord with Lacedæmon, strongly indicates that what may appear exceptionable in his conduct was, in their opinion, the result not of choice but of necessity ; a necessity produced by the violence of a party in opposition to him

Isocrat
de Pace,
p.254.

The force and elegance of the Greek, expressing in one compound adverb the great and the becoming, cannot be given perhaps in any other language.

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at home, together with the violence of a party in Peloponnesus adverse to the politics of his friend the king of Lacedæmon, Archidamus. By no other conduct probably the independency of Athens could have been preserved; and however the power of Athens, unless it might be moderated and modelled by an extraordinary union of political wisdom and moral rectitude in the leaders, was threatening to the liberty of every other Grecian state, yet the independency of Athens, as the event showed, was indispensable for the liberty of Greece. On such a view of things those three great writers may seem to have formed their judgment of the political conduct of Pericles, and to have reckoned that on his wisdom, his probity, and his influence, had his life been lengthened, would have rested the best chance for an advantageous settlement of the singularly troubled state of the Greek nation.

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE DEATH OF PERICLES, IN THE THIRD YEAR, TO THE APPLICATION FOR PEACE FROM LACEDÆMON, IN THE SEVENTH.

SECTION I.

Siege of Plataea by the Peloponnesians.

IN the third spring of the war the Peloponnesians changed their plan of offence. By the invasion and ravage of Attica for two following summers, though much injury had been done to the Athenians, little advantage had accrued to themselves: the booty was far from paying the expense of the expedition; the enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk a battle, and the great purpose of the war was little forwarded. The Peloponnesians were yet very unequal to attempt naval operations of any consequence. Of the continental dependencies of Athens none was so open to their attacks, and none so completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by its danger to superinduce that war of the field which they wished, as Plataea. Against that town therefore it was determined to direct the principal effort; and success was more reasonably expected as public councils at Athens were no longer directed, and popular passion no longer restrained, by the wisdom and influence of Pericles.

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B. C. 429.
Ol. 87. $\frac{3}{4}$.
P. W. 3.
Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 71.

Accordingly, under the command still of Archi-

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Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 72.
& 73.

damus, the confederate army entered the Plataeid, and ravage was begun. The Plataeans sent ministers to deprecate hostilities; urging the ancient merit of their commonwealth in the Persian wars, and the privileges solemnly granted to it when, after the glorious battle in their territory, Pausanias sacrificed to Jupiter the deliverer in the agora of their city. Archidamus was not disposed to harsh measures, and he offered them neutrality. The Plataeans professed that, if they could choose for themselves, they should willingly accept his offer; but without the consent of the Athenians, in whose power their wives and children were, they could decide nothing. Besides, should they lose the protection of Athens, they could never be secure against the superior power of the Thebans, their most bitter enemies, longer than while a Peloponnesian army remained in the neighbourhood. To obviate the latter objection, Archidamus made this remarkable proposal: ‘If such are your fears, deliver your city, your lands, and all your immoveable property in trust to the Lacedæmonians. Show us the boundaries of your territory, number your fruit-trees, and take an exact account of whatever else admits numeration or description. Go then yourselves wherever you can find the most convenient residence while the war shall last; and we will provide that your lands shall be duly cultivated; we will engage that subsistence shall be regularly remitted to you; and, when the war is over, every thing shall be restored.’ The Plataean deputies returning with this answer, the assembled people, or rather garrison, agreed to accept the conditions, provided the consent of the Athenian government could be obtained. Leave was readily granted by the Spartan prince to send to Athens;

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but those deputed returned with requisition that the Plataeans should abide by the terms of their confederacy with Athens, accompanied with assurance of every assistance. The Plataeans in consequence resolved to remain firm to the Athenian alliance; and, without sending to the Peloponnesian camp, they declared from their ramparts, 'That it was impossible for them to comply with the demands of the Lacedæmonians.' Archidamus then made this solemn address to the deities of the country: 'Ye gods and heroes who preside over Plataea, be witnesses that, not till the Plataeans had renounced the sworn terms of the general confederacy of the Greeks, we act hostilely against this land, in which our fathers, after due invocation to you, vanquished the Persians, you rendering it propitious to their arms. We have made liberal offers, which have been rejected. Grant therefore that they may receive that punishment which breach of faith deserves, and that we may obtain the success to which a righteous cause entitles.'

Thucyd.
1.2. c.74.

Then immediately was begun that siege, the first of which any connected detail remains in the annals of mankind. The town was small, as may be judged from the very small force which sufficed for an effectual garrison; only four hundred Plataeans, with eighty Athenians. There were besides in the place a hundred and ten women to prepare provisions, and no other person free or slave. The besieging army, composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian youth, was numerous. The first operation was to surround the town with a palisade, which might prevent any ready egress; the neighbouring forest of Cithæron supplying materials. Then, in a chosen spot, ground was broken, according to the modern phrase, for

c.75.

c.78.

c.75.

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making approaches. The business was to fill the town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, on which a force sufficient for assault might ascend. For this operation also the woods of Cithæron were highly serviceable. Either extremity of the mound was made firm with interwoven piles, and the interval was filled with wood, stones, earth, any thing that came readiest to hand. Seventy days were employed unintermittingly on this work: reliefs being established through the army, and Lacedæmonian officers always superintending; those appointed to the allies bearing the peculiar title of Xenage.

Such was at that time the inartificial process of a siege. Thucydides appears to have been well aware that it did no credit to the science of his age. The principal dependence of the besieging army, he says, was on the disproportionate superiority of its numbers. To oppose this mode of attack, the first measure of the besieged was to raise, on that part of their wall against which the mound was forming, a strong wooden frame, covered in front with leather and hides; and, within this, to build a rampart with bricks from the neighbouring houses. The wooden frame bound the whole, and kept it firm to a considerable height: the covering of hides protected both work and workmen against weapons discharged against them, especially fiery arrows. But the mound still rising as the superstructure on the wall rose, and this superstructure becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing height, while the mound was liable to no counterbalancing defect, it was necessary for the besieged to devise other opposition. Accordingly they broke through the bottom of their wall, where the mound bore against it, and brought in the earth. The Peloponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of loose

earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed in baskets. This requiring more labour to remove, the besieged undermined the mound ; and thus, for a long time unperceived, prevented it from gaining height. Still however, fearing that the efforts of their scanty numbers would be overborne by the multitude of hands which the besiegers could employ, they had recourse to another device. Within their town-wall they built, in a semilunar form, a second wall connected with the first at the extremities, which extended, on either side, beyond the mound ; so that should the enemy possess themselves of the outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a far less favourable situation.

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I.

Thucyd.
I. 2. c. 76.

Machines for battering walls were already known among the Greeks. According to the historian Ephorus, as Plutarch informs us, though he says it was disputed by other writers, they were first used by Pericles at the siege of Samos, under the direction of a lame engineer named Artemon ; who, being commonly carried among his works in a litter¹, had thence the surname of Periphoretus. Battering-rams were certainly of much earlier date in the east ; and Thucydides would scarcely have left unmentioned the first introduction of so remarkable a military engine among the Greeks, had it happened within his own memory. The Peloponnesians were not without it at the siege of Plataea, but they seem to have been unskilful in its use ; and probably the machine itself was far less adapted to its purpose than, through various improvements, it afterward became. A ram, advanced upon the Peloponnesian mound, battered the superstructure on the Plataean rampart,

Plut. v.
Pericl.

Thucyd.
ut ant.

¹ Φορέϊψ.

and shook it violently ; to the great alarm of the garrison, but with little farther effect. Other machines of the same kind were employed against different parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose. The Plataëans, letting down ropes from the rampart, dragged some out of their direction ; others they broke by dropping on them weighty beams suspended with chains. No means however were neglected by the besiegers that either approved practice suggested, or their ingenuity could devise, to promote their purpose ; yet, after much of the summer consumed, they found every effort of their numerous forces so completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to the tedious method of blockade they determined to try one more experiment, for which their numbers and the neighbouring woods of Cithæron gave them more than ordinary facility. Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage. On the faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on fire. ‘ The conflagration,’ says Thucydides, ‘ was such as was never before known to have been prepared by the hands of men ; though in mountain-forests the friction of dry wood, by the agitation of the wind, may sometimes have produced greater.’ Had the wind favoured, it must have had all the effect that the besiegers desired : great part of the town actually became unapproachable. But, fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain, brought on by a thunder-

storm without wind, extinguished the fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable than any they had before experienced.

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This attempt failing, the Peloponnesians determined to reduce the siege to a blockade; which, though slow and consequently expensive, would in the end be sure. To the palisade, which already surrounded the town, a contravallation was added; with a double ditch, one without, and one within. A sufficient body was then appointed to the guard of these works: the Bœotians undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy, and a little after the middle of September the rest of the army was dismissed for the winter.

Thucyd.
1.2. c. 78.
6th July.

19th Sept.

SECTION II.

Operations of the Athenians on the northern coast of the Ægean.

Affairs of the western parts of Greece: assistance sent by Peloponnesus to the Ambraciots against the Amphilocheian Argives and Acarnanians: battle near Stratus: sea-fight between the Peloponnesian fleet, under the Corinthian Machon, and the Athenian fleet, under Phormion: sea-fight between the Peloponnesian fleet, under the Spartan Cnemus, and the Athenian fleet, under Phormion. Attempt to surprise Piræus. Success of Phormion in Acarnania. Invasion of Macedonia by Sitacles king of Thrace.

WHILE the Peloponnesians were thus bending their whole strength, and hitherto so vainly, against the little town of Plataea, offensive operations were not neglected by the Athenians. Xenophon son of Euripides, who had commanded the Athenian forces at the taking of Potidæa, was sent again into Chalcidice with a body of two thousand heavy foot and two hundred horse. A little before harvest he entered

B. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.
P. W. 3.
Thucyd
1.2. c. 79.

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Bottiaëa, and ravaged the country about Spartolus. Often in the wars of the Greeks among one another the intrigues of faction did more than arms. Through such intrigue the Athenian general entertained hope of acquiring Spartolus ; but timely support, which the party in opposition to the Athenian interest obtained from the neighbouring city of Olynthus, disappointed him. A battle ensuing, the superiority of the enemy in cavalry prevailed against the superior discipline of the Athenian heavy foot : Xenophon, with two general officers his colleagues, and above four hundred of their heavy-armed, were killed ; and the remainder, who found an immediate refuge in Potidæa, too weak to prosecute offensive operations, returned to Athens.

Through this extensive war, upon which the Athenians fixed the name of the Peloponnesian, we become in some degree acquainted with the history of some parts of Greece, which otherwise might have remained wholly unknown. The Amphilocheian Argos, a city on the border of Acarnania against Epirus, was founded, according to Thucydides, by Amphilocheus, son of that Amphiaræus who is celebrated among the heroes of the war of Thebes. Amphilocheus himself fought at Troy. On his return to the Peloponnesian Argos, his native city, little satisfied with the state of things under the usurpation of Ægisthus, he departed with such as chose to follow his fortune, and settled his colony at the bottom of that gulf anciently called the Amphilocheian, but afterward the Ambracian. To the town which he built there he gave the name of that from which he had migrated ; and the same partiality fixed upon the river, near whose mouth it stood, the name of the Peloponnesian stream of Inachus. The epithet

Amphilochian was added to the town for the convenience of distinction. Situate among barbarians, at the extremity of Greece, or where Grecian and barbarian states were intermixed, the city of Amphilochus flourished; the inferiority in arts and knowledge of the neighbouring clans, to whom the Amphilochian name was communicated, but who, according to Thucydides, were barbarian, being perhaps a principal cause of its prosperity. Afterward, through various misfortunes, its strength was so reduced that it was scarcely able to support itself as an independent commonwealth; and, to obviate other evils, its people recurred to a dangerous expedient for weak states, that of associating a number of families from the neighbouring Corinthian colony of Ambracia. Disputes arose between the two people, and in the end the Ambraciots expelled the Argives from their own city. These applied to the neighbouring people of Acarnania, and the Acarnanians to the Athenians; who, a little before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, sent Phormion with thirty triremes to their assistance. Through the abilities of that officer, and the superior discipline of the very small body of Athenians which he commanded, Argos was taken by assault. The city and territory were restored to the Argives, with whom some Acarnanians were associated; and, according to the barbarous practice not unusual with the most polished of the Greeks, the Ambracian inhabitants and garrison were condemned to slavery. Hence followed the alliance of both Acarnania and the Amphilochian Argos with Athens, which has been mentioned as subsisting when the Peloponnesian war began.

In the second summer of that war, while the pestilence was raging at Athens, the Ambraciots, in-

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XV.Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 80.

censed against the Argives by the treatment of their captive fellow-citizens, determined to attempt revenge. Associating the Chaonian and some other barbarous clans of their neighbourhood, they overran the territory of the Acarnanian Argos, but, after some vain efforts against the city, returned home. In the following year, that of the siege of Plataea, they proposed not only to take Argos, but to conquer all Acarnania. With this view they applied to Lacedæmon; promising that, if they might have such support, naval and military, as they desired, not only they would reduce their particular enemies the Acarnanians, but they would bring over the neighbouring islands of Zacynthus and Cephallenia to the Peloponnesian confederacy, and they hoped also to take Naupactus. Thus the Athenians would be deprived of what principally enabled them to carry expeditions around Peloponnesus, and keep a fleet in the western seas. The project was alluring: the Corinthians instantly and zealously engaged in it; incited by their enmity to Athens, their connexion with Ambracia, the desire of revenge against Corcyra, and the hope of recovering their power in that island, to which any success in the proposed measures would be at least a step; and they induced the Lacedæmonians to concur.

The Athenian administration, receiving intelligence of these motions and preparations, and judging Phormion, apparently on account of his experience of the western people and western seas, most proper for the command there, recalled him from Chalcidice, and sent him, as we have seen, with twenty triremes to Naupactus. In the following summer, in pursuance of the measures concerted with the Peloponnesians, the naval force of the Leucadians,

Anactorians, and Ambraciots was assembled at Leucas; and the Spartan admiral Cnemus had the good fortune to join them from Cyllene, with a small squadron and a thousand heavy-armed Peloponnesian infantry, undiscovered in his passage by the Athenians. Assistance was also received from Molossis and Macedonia. The Corinthians and Sicyonians were preparing their naval force, but could not so readily escape out of their own gulf. Cnemus therefore, without waiting for them, determined to begin operations, by marching directly for Stratus, the largest town of Acarnania, in the hope of carrying it by assault; expecting thus so to break the force of the province that it would become an easy conquest.

The Acarnanians, informed that, beside the formidable army already in their country, a fleet was expected which might choose its points of attack upon their coast, resolved to remain within their respective towns, and attempt the protection of their fields, only so far as, with their strength and opportunities offering, might be prudent. In hope of assistance from the Athenian admiral at Naupactus they were disappointed. He gave them to understand that he could spare no part of his scanty force from attendance upon the Peloponnesian fleet in the Corinthian gulf which was ready to sail. Thus the hostile army marched unopposed from Leucas through the Argive territory into Acarnania, disposed in three columns; the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots forming the left, the Leucadians, Anactorians, and some other Greeks the right, and the barbarian Epirots the centre. The Greeks kept their columns regularly formed, and chose their camps carefully; which, according to their usual

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 81.

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practice in an enemy's country, they constantly fortified. But the Epirots, and particularly the Chaonians, vain of their reputation for superior prowess among the clans of that part of the continent, disdained the trouble and delay of nice choice of ground; they pressed forward in confidence that the town would yield to their first assault, and the glory would be all their own. Intelligence of these circumstances being carried to the Stratians by their scouts, they planted an ambush, into which the imprudent Epirots fell. The forces from the town sallied; the Epirots, partly through surprise, partly through the vigour of the attack, were instantly put to flight, a great number were killed, and the rest were pursued till they reached the Grecian camps. The Stratians would neither make any attempt upon these, nor risk any close engagement against the superior discipline of the Peloponnesians; but they gave unceasing annoyance from a distance with their slings; in the use of which the Acarnanians, through universal practice, excelled.

Information of this important success obtained by the Stratians was rapidly forwarded through all the Acarnanian towns, accompanied with exhortation to assemble the force of the country, and drive out a half-conquered enemy. Cnemus meanwhile found his measures so broken by the defeat of the Epirots that in the ensuing night he retreated to the river Anapus, ten miles from Stratus. Thence he sent a herald to desire a truce for the burial of the slain; and soon after, falling back to CEniadæ, he dismissed the allies, and embarked himself for Peloponnesus. Acarnania thus was completely freed from so alarming an invasion.

consisting of forty-seven trireme galleys, under the Corinthian admirals Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas, sailed out of the gulf. It was the purpose of Phormion, who, with only twenty, watched them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, on the Ætolian coast, to let them pass the straits, and attack them in the more open sea. The Corinthians, strong in men as well as in ships, but less confident in naval skill, hugged, according to the sea phrase, the southern shore as far as Patræ; and thence, in the night, pushed across for the Acarnanian coast; their object being less to fight the Athenians, than to join their allies in the prosecution of the preconcerted purposes of the campaign. The daring vigilance of Phormion surprised them in the middle of the passage. Though it was night, yet being perfectly clear and calm, they perceived his approach at some distance. Immediately they formed their fleet in a circle, the largest they could, so as not to give opportunity for that evolution of piercing the line, called the *diecplus*, in which the Athenians excelled, and which their enemies dreaded. The prows of course were on all sides outward; the transports², with a reserve of five of the swiftest triremes, were stationed in the centre; and thus, in posture of defence, as if to oppose an enemy who outnumbered them, forty-seven triremes remained to receive the attack of the twenty under Phormion, if, which they could not readily believe, he should be bold enough to attack them.

But the Athenian admiral, confident in his own abilities and experience, and in the practised skill of his people, and observing the order of the enemy to be very readily susceptible of confusion, bore

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 84.

² Τὰ λεπτὰ πλοῖα.

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immediately upon them with his line of battle formed ahead, and rowed around them ; having first directed his captains to threaten as near as possible, so as to avoid engaging, till they should have the signal from him. He well knew that when the breeze from the gulf sprang up, which seldom failed about daybreak, the enemy's circle could not long remain perfect ; and his purpose was, by alarming, to hasten and enhance the confusion. It happened precisely as he foresaw : the first of the breeze drove the windward ships against the transports in the centre : confusion immediately arose ; clamour, with expostulation from ship to ship, ensued ; orders were no longer heard ; signals remained unobserved ; the attention of the crews was wholly engaged in obviating the continually threatened shock of one ship against another, or of many against one ; and the swell, quickly arising, sufficed to prevent any effectual use of oars by rowers so little skilful. Phormion seized the critical moment for giving the signal of attack. In the first onset one of the Corinthian admirals was sunk ; several other ships were quickly disabled ; and such was the confusion that resistance was scarcely attempted, but the first effort of the Peloponnesians was to fly toward the friendly ports of Patræ and Dyme. The Athenians took twelve triremes, the greater part of whose crews they put to the sword. Having pursued as far as was judged convenient, they returned with their prizes to the Ætolian coast ; according to the usual practice, which landlocked and stormy seas, the want of the compass, and the deficiency of accommodation in the ancient ships of war made necessary. On the headland of Rhium they raised a trophy, and dedicated to Neptune one of the captive triremes. After these ceremonies they returned to their station

at Naupactus. Then the defeated Peloponnesians moved from the places of their first refuge to the Elean port of Cyllene, where Cnemus, with the forces from Acarnania, soon after joined them.

This action of Phormion, though the forces employed on either side were too small for the consequences to be very important, yet for the boldness of the attempt, the ability displayed in the execution, and the completeness of the success, has been deservedly reckoned by Plutarch among the most brilliant achievements of the war.³ It appears to have disturbed, not a little, the Peloponnesians, and particularly the Lacedæmonians. Those who directed the administration of their government, unversed in naval affairs, could not readily conceive a superiority of science among the Athenian commanders, and of skill among their seamen, that should give the advantage against more than double their numbers without great misbehaviour on the part of their own people; especially as in land war the superiority of the Peloponnesians, to all the world besides, was held incontestable. The unwise practice of dividing military command, ordinary with most of the other Greeks, was little usual with the Lacedæmonians; but now, in some indignation that the Peloponnesian navy should, by a squadron of only twenty ships, be excluded from the western seas, which were esteemed more peculiarly their own, three Spartan officers, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, were sent to be of council with Cnemus in his command. The ships damaged in the late action were diligently repaired; a re-enforcement was required from the

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 85.

³ We find a compliment to Phormion, which seems to mark the popularity of his character, in the comedy of Aristophanes called *The Knights*, v. 551.

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 Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 86.

maritime states of Peloponnesus; and a fleet of seventy-seven triremes was thus collected, which proceeded from Cyllene to Panormus on the Achæan coast; where a land army, in the ancient manner of naval war generally capable of advantageous co-operation with a fleet, was also assembled.

c. 85.

Phormion, informed of these preparations, had sent intelligence of them to Athens, and desired a re-enforcement. Twenty triremes were in consequence ordered to join him. It is upon this occasion that we first discover in history the importance of the loss of Pericles, and the want of those superior abilities for the direction of public affairs, which had hitherto, in so great a degree, obviated misfortune and commanded success. Nicias, a Cretan of Gortynium, having in view to advance his own power, proposed to the Athenian government the reduction of Cydonia in Crete, a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. It would be an easy conquest, he said, for the fleet which was ready to sail for Naupactus, and, with the assistance to be readily procured within the island, could occasion little delay. The Athenian people were ill-advised enough to decree as he desired. The armament went to Crete, and ravaged without opposition the Cydonian lands; but the town was found so strong, and its people so determined, that there appeared no probability of taking it without the tedious process of a siege, or perhaps a blockade. The commanders would have then hastened their voyage to Naupactus, but contrary winds detained them long in Crete.

c. 88.

Meantime Phormion was left to exert his abilities and his vigilance against an enemy who too much outnumbered him. Yet though they had nearly four times his strength, so confident was he in superior

skill that not only he did not refuse, but he appears to have been desirous to meet them wherever he could have sea-room. Moving therefore from Naupactus, he took a station just without the gulf, near the headland of the Molycrian or northern Rhium ; and a small army, composed chiefly of Naupactian Messenians, joined his naval camp on the shore, to assist in case of any attempt from a superior force upon the fleet in its station. This movement was not without danger, as the event proved ; but the apprehension that the squadron expected from Attica might be intercepted and overpowered by the Peloponnesian fleet, appears to have been his motive for quitting the security of his station at Naupactus, before that assistance arrived.

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 90.

The Peloponnesians however, with all their advantage of numbers, with all the pride of reputed pre-eminence in arms, and all the zeal of the Lacedæmonian commanders to incite them, so felt their inferiority in naval action, from the event of the late engagement, that they perseveringly avoided the open, and directed their endeavours to draw the Athenians into the narrow sea. From Panormus, which is a little within the gulf, and nearly opposite Naupactus, they moved to the Achæan or southern Rhium, over against the station of the Athenians. The two headlands, forming the mouth of the gulf, are less than a mile asunder : the stations of the two fleets would be somewhat more.

During six or seven days they watched one another c. 86. without moving. The Peloponnesians then practised a stratagem, apparently well imagined, for forcing the Athenian admiral to action within the gulf. The town of Naupactus, while its youth were in the army attending the Athenian fleet, was left almost without

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defence. At daybreak the Peloponnesians moved eastward, along the Achaean coast, in a column with four triremes abreast; twenty of the swiftest forming an advanced guard. Phormion was immediately in alarm for Naupactus. Hastening his people aboard from the naval camp, he proceeded eastward by the northern coast of the gulf, with his line of battle formed ahead; the Messenians at the same time pressing their march along the shore toward their town. This was precisely what the Peloponnesians wished. They no sooner saw the Athenian fleet irrecoverably engaged within the straits than, trusting to the advanced guard for preventing its escape into the harbour of Naupactus, they formed for action in line of battle abreast, and pushed across the gulf.

The eleven headmost ships of the Athenian line, through superior swiftness, outstretching the right wing of the Peloponnesians, escaped attack: the nine others were intercepted, overpowered, and forced ashore. One was taken with its whole crew: all fell into the hands of the Peloponnesians; but, of their people, many escaped by swimming; the rest were mostly put to the sword. What followed, reported by the authoritative pen of Thucydides, proves how important, in the ancient system of naval war, the co-operation of an army might be to a fleet. The brave Messenians, zealous in hereditary enmity to Lacedæmon, arriving on the beach, dashed completely armed through the surf, boarded the stranded galleys, and, driving out the conquerors, recovered all; though some were already taken in tow.

Meanwhile the twenty galleys of the Peloponnesian advanced guard were pursuing the eleven Athenian which had overstretched the main body. Ten of these reached the harbour of Naupactus; and, form-

SECT.
II.Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 92.

ing against the shore, prepared to resist any attack that might be attempted against them. A Leucadian trireme, the swiftest of the allied fleet in which was Timocrates, the first of the Lacedæmonian commissioners appointed to be of council with the admiral, pursued the eleventh, and gained upon her so fast that to escape into the harbour of Naupactus seemed impossible. It happened that a large merchant-ship was lying at anchor off the harbour's mouth. The Athenian captain having passed this vessel, turned close round it, and judged his time so well, and managed the evolution with such combined rapidity and exactness, that with his beak he struck the galley of the amazed Leucadians amidship, and with such force that she presently sunk. Timocrates, in a fit of passionate despair, stabbed himself; and his gored body, floating into the harbour of Naupactus, was taken up there. The rest of the advanced squadron was following in a disorderly manner, the crews singing the song of triumph, as if already completely conquerors.⁴ The catastrophe of their comrades, happening within sight of all, astonished and alarmed them. Some rested on their oars to await the main body of their fleet; but the main body of their fleet was far off, and the enemy near. Some, through ignorance of the coast, struck upon shoals. Their hesitation and distress were as a signal to the Athenians in the harbour. The Athenians, quickly aware of all circumstances, advanced in good order against the enemy yet in con-

⁴ The song of battle and the song of victory, both hymns to the gods, one a prayer before battle, and at the same time a signal for engaging, the other a thanksgiving for success, were equally called Pæan; but Thucydides distinguishes that it was the song of triumph which was sung upon this occasion: ... ἐπαιώνιζον τε ἅμα πλέοντες ὥς νενικηκότες.

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fusion. The contest was not long: the Peloponnesians fled for their port of Panormus, on the opposite coast of the gulf, distant about seven miles, losing six triremes taken by the Athenians. The main body of their fleet, too distant to give any considerable support, and apparently fearful of passing the night on a hostile coast with which they were imperfectly acquainted, also sought the security of the port.⁵ The success of the Athenians was altogether extraordinary: they took six of the enemy's triremes; they sunk one: they recovered all their own which had been taken or forced ashore, excepting only that which had fallen into the enemy's hands with its crew aboard; they collected the wreck and their own slain; they restored the slain of the enemy only through the customary ceremony of a truce solicited for the purpose; and, erecting their trophy, which was an easy part of the business, they vindicated to themselves, against a force so superior, every ordinary mark of decided victory. The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy at the Achæan Rhium, on pretence of their success in the early part of the day, and placed by it the single captured ship which had not been retaken, as an offering to the god of the sea.

If the event of the former action against Phormion had excited indignation at Lacedæmon, that of the recent battle would give Cnemus, and his two surviving coadjutors, to apprehend no very favourable reception on their return thither. A project therefore occurring, while the fleet remained yet assembled on

⁵ Thucydides does not with his usual accuracy account for the inefficiency of the main body of the Peloponnesian fleet in the latter part of the day. Perhaps there was among them something of that mismanagement frequently incident to confederate armaments, of which he was not himself perfectly informed.

the Corinthian coast, for attempting an important stroke against the enemy before they dispersed for the winter, was received, particularly by the enterprising Brasidas, with eager joy. It was known to the Megarians that the Athenian government, secure in naval superiority, left their harbour of Piræus without an adequate guard. That most important place therefore it was proposed to surprise. A select body of seamen was marched by land to Megara, each carrying his oar with its bag and thong.⁶ Arriving in the evening, they with all haste launched forty triremes which had been laid up in the port of Nisæa, and putting immediately to sea made for the Attic coast. A contrary wind presently arising gave them to apprehend that they should not be able to reach Piræus in time to accomplish a surprise. Doubtful therefore of the possibility of executing their original plan, they determined upon a smaller enterprise, which was clearly within their power. Instead of pushing for Piræus, they debarked on Salamis. Notice communicated to Athens, by fire-beacons, raised an alarm there, says Thucydides, equal to anything experienced in the course of the war. The immediate apprehension was, that the Peloponnesians were

⁶ Τὴν κώπην καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον καὶ τὸν τροπωτήρα.—*Cum singulis remis, et singulis pulvinis, quos sibi remigantibus substernerent, et cum singulis scalmis.*—Ἵπηρέσιον ἐστὶ τὸ κῶας ᾧ ἐπικάθηνται οἱ ἐρέσσοντες, διὰ τὸ μὴ συντρίβεσθαι αὐτῶν τὰς πυγὰς. Schol. This passage of Thucydides, and the Latin translation, and the scholiast's interpretation have been already noticed in the Appendix to the 8th chapter of this history. In the former editions I proposed for those who have leisure for the inquiry to decide whether the ὑπηρέσιον of Thucydides may have been such a case or bag, rather than a cushion to sit upon. Nothing having, to my knowledge, been advanced against the supposition, I have now ventured to adopt it in the text.

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already in Piræus ; and the inhabitants of that place supposed them at least masters of the town of Salamis, and that attack on themselves would presently follow. At daybreak the whole strength of Athens moved down to the port ; a strong garrison was appointed to Piræus, while the galleys were hastily launched and manned. The danger however was over almost as soon as known. The Peloponnesians meanwhile collected some booty, made some defenceless people prisoners, seized three tiremes from which the crews had fled, and then hastened back to Nisæa, not without apprehension that their leaky vessels might founder before they reached that port. Had the Peloponnesians persevered, says Thucydides, in their first design, supposing no hinderance from the wind, they might easily have succeeded. The event therefore was salutary to Athens, by the admonition it gave. A proper guard was thenceforward kept in Piræus, the mouth of the harbour was shut with a chain, and precaution was observed against surprises.

Winter, considered as forbidding naval enterprise, now approaching, the Peloponnesian seamen returned to their fleet, the ships were sent to their several homes, and laid up. But the active Phormion did not let the severe season pass unemployed. A party adverse to that which favoured the Athenian alliance was strong in some of the Acarnanian towns. As soon as certain intelligence arrived that the Peloponnesian fleet was dispersed, nothing remaining to be feared for Naupactus, he sailed to Astacus. Debarking there four hundred heavy-armed Athenians and as many Messenians, he marched through Acarnania, and, concerting measures with the friendly at Stratus, Coronta, and other principal towns, he banished the obnoxious. Such was the precarious con-

dition of the people of the Grecian republics, the population everywhere divided into parties, and the families of each uncertain when they might not be expelled from their little state, to seek their livelihood by adventure or beggary. Œniadæ, strongly situated among marshes near the mouth of the Achelous, alone of all the Acarnanian cities maintained its alliance with the Peloponnesians. Phormion then re-embarking with his escort returned to Naupactus, In spring he proceeded to Athens, taking with him the captured ships, and the prisoners : of whom the freemen were shortly exchanged for so many Athenians, prisoners with the Peloponnesians.

During these transactions in the western part of Greece, while in Lacedæmon and Athens war seemed to sleep for the winter, far more alarming movements occurred on the northern borders. Philip, brother of Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, dying, his son Amyntas claimed the succession to the principality which he had held in Upper Macedonia. Perdiccas, who had proposed to deprive his brother of that little subordinate sovereignty, seized it on his death. What the Macedonian law on the subject may have been we have no information, and perhaps it was not very well defined. Amyntas however resorted to the neighbouring powerful sovereign of Thrace, Sitalces. This prince, by his recent alliance with Athens, for what advantages in return is not said, had engaged to compel the revolted dependencies of Athens in Chalcidice to return to their obedience. Ready therefore with his army he took Amyntas under his patronage ; and, Perdiccas refusing to reinstate his nephew in the principality which had been held by his brother, he resolved to dethrone Perdiccas, and make Amyntas king of Macedonia.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 95.

Ch. 13. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel.
l. 7.

Thucyd.
l. 2. c. 98.

c. 100.

Winter was approaching ; but with the Thracians, in severer climate, winter warfare, we find, was more common than with the Greeks. The forces of Sitalces, unlike the little armies of the Grecian republics, almost rivalled in numbers the hosts of Asia : but, far alien from Asiatic effeminacy, Thrace was held by the Greeks themselves to be the favourite residence of Ares and Enyo, or, as the Romans named them, Mars and Bellona, the deities of war. Sitalces put himself at the head of, it is said, a hundred thousand foot and fifty thousand horse ; and, taking with him the Macedonian prince, marched toward that inland district of the Macedonian kingdom which had been his father's appanage. Here Amyntas had still friends, and the towns of Gortynia and Atalanta readily opened their gates to his protector. Perdiccas, though of no mean talents, and commanding a considerable dominion, yet weakened by civil war with the princes of his family, was utterly unequal to meet the Thracian army in battle. With his cavalry only he attended upon its motions, while his people sought refuge, some in the fortified towns ; but as these in Macedonia, a country yet little improved, were few and small, the greater part fled to the marshes, woods, and mountains.

The first opposition that Sitalces met was from the town of Idomene, which he took by assault. He next attacked Europus ; but, unskilled in sieges, and unprovided for them, he there failed. Meanwhile the Macedonian horse, armed for defence in the Grecian manner, did not fear to meet superior numbers ; and it was found that against the most numerous body of Thracians, wherever they made a charge, they made an impression. Being nevertheless constantly in the end overpowered, and continually liable

to be surrounded, they soon desisted from efforts which were found unavailing. All the open country therefore was at the mercy of the Thracian prince: the provinces of Mygdonia, Grestonia, Anthemous, and Æmathia were wasted. It had been concerted with the Athenian government, that an Athenian fleet should co-operate with the Thracian army: but, with so little expectation that Sitalces would perform his engagement at that season, or so little disposition among the Athenians to meet the usual storms of that season in vessels so ill adapted to bear them as the ancient ships of war, the fleet was never sent. As soon however as it was known that the Thracian prince had actually entered Macedonia, an embassy was dispatched to apologise for the omission, carrying presents, as the Thracian custom required. Sitalces, not to fail in his part of the engagement, sent a part of his army into Chalcidice, to the gratification of the revenge, rather than of any real interest of the Athenian people. The ravage of that country was added to the destruction made through so many other provinces, but the people found personal security in their towns; for against a Grecian town, moderately fortified, unless by surprise or by the slow operation of a blockade, all the force of Thrace was little efficacious.

Thucyd.
1. 2. c. 101.

The apprehensions excited by the fame of the vast army of Sitalces were not confined to Macedonia. All the Greeks, as far as Thermopylæ, were in alarm, and took measures for resisting the storm, should it reach them. The various clans of free Thracians, north of the Strymon, were not less apprehensive and not less in motion. But want and the rigour of the season began soon to press severely upon such a

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multitude, so unprovided as the army of Sitalces.⁷ The able Perdiccas used the opportunity for negotiation. He found means, through confidential persons, to communicate with Seuthes, nephew and principal favourite of the Thracian monarch. Stratonice, sister of Perdiccas, was offered him in marriage, with a large portion. The intrigue succeeded: the restoration of Amyntas to his father's principality was of course allowed; and, after a month spent in wasting Macedonia and Chalcidice, but no farther purpose of the expedition accomplished, Sitalces led his forces home. A treaty of amity followed between the two monarchs, and the Macedonian princess gave her hand to Seuthes.

SECTION III.

Fourth campaign: third invasion of Attica. Revolt of Mitylene. Flight of part of the garrison of Platea. Siege of Mitylene by Paches. Distress and exertions of Athens. Transactions under the Lacedæmonian Alcidas and the Athenian Paches on the Ionian coast.

Thucyd.
I. 3. c. 1.
B. C. 428.
Ol. 87. 4.
P. W. 4.

IN the former summer, as we have seen, invasion of Attica was intermitted by the Peloponnesians; but in the year to whose transactions we now proceed, the fourth of the war, they entered that country for the third time, still under the command of the Spartan king Archidamus. They chose, as usual, the season just before harvest, and extensive waste fol-

⁷ There is a remarkable resemblance between this expedition of the king of Thrace, as compendiously related by Thucydides, and that of the Khan of Crim Tartary, described at large by Baron Tott, who accompanied the Tartar prince in his winter campaign, in war between Russia and Turkey.

lowed: but the Athenian cavalry was successful in desultory attacks, and repressed the excursions of the Peloponnesian light troops beyond the protection of their heavy-armed, so that the lands immediately around Athens were little infested. After no long stay, the Peloponnesian army, having consumed the small stores brought with it, and what could be collected in Attica, returned home and was disbanded.

But new troubles were preparing for Athens, the more dangerous as they had their source in the defective constitution of the empire. Among its most valuable and most powerful dependencies was the island of Lesbos, about forty miles long only, and ten wide, yet divided between six republics, each claiming its separate and equal independency of all the rest, though all owned the sovereignty of the Athenian people. But in population and power Mitylene and Methymne were far superior to any of the other four. A consideration for their Æolian extraction tended to dispose all to the Lacedæmonian alliance, but more especially to the Bœotian, rather than to the Athenian, to which the course of events, the naval superiority of Athens, and their own situation as islanders, had led them. But the momentary interest of faction overwhelmed all other considerations, deadened all feeling for the ties of blood, and blinded to all views of enlarged policy. In Methymne the democratical party was decidedly superior, and its people held close alliance with those of the neighbouring island of Tenedos, who were influenced by the same political principles. The Methymnæans and Tenedians were therefore warmly attached to Athens. But in Mitylene the aristocratical party was powerful; and an aristocratical party, if not even

Thucyd.
1.3. c.2.

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oppressed, must be always insecure, where Athenian influence prevailed. Nor could men of observation and foresight consider without great apprehension what had already befallen other states of the Athenian confederacy; all of which, except those of Lesbos and Chios, were deprived of their marine, forbidden even fortifications for their defence, and reduced to complete subjection under the despotic will of the Athenian multitude.

Accordingly, before the war broke out between Athens and Lacedæmon, the principal Mitylenæans had sent offers to the Lacedæmonian administration to renounce the Athenian, and reunite themselves with the Peloponnesian confederacy. Their views indeed extended farther than the mere change of their domestic constitution and foreign connexions: they proposed to reduce the rival republic of Methymne, or at least to repress the democracy there; they had already a secure influence in the four inferior commonwealths; and thus the whole island would be brought under one dominion, in which they would have the principal, if not the sole authority. The Lacedæmonians however seemed to have judged far better on the occasion than the Mitylenæans. Aware that they were utterly incapable of protecting an ally across the Ægean, against the Athenian navy, they declined the proposal. The former sentiments nevertheless continuing to animate the Mitylenæans, when they saw the Athenians, between invasion and pestilence, in deep distress, they thought the season favourable for the execution of their project: they built ships of war; they strengthened the walls of their town; they took measures for giving security to their harbour; they imported corn from

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 5.

the Euxine to form magazines; and they increased their military force by hiring archers from the same parts.

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Information of these transactions at Mitylene, and of the prevailing political sentiments there, was repeatedly given to the Athenians by the Methymnæans, by the Tenedians, and by the democratical party in Mitylene itself; but in the dejection of the public mind, under severe and complicated calamity, there was great unwillingness to give it credit. At length commissioners of inquiry and inspection were sent, with a requisition for the Mitylenæans to desist from measures which gave alarm to the neighbouring commonwealth of Methymne, and umbrage to Athens. The Mitylenæans nevertheless continued active in preparation. On the return of the commissioners then the energy of the Athenian administration and people was roused, and it was determined to use every exertion for checking, in its beginning, an evil which, in its progress, might involve the ruin of the commonwealth.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 3.

The Peloponnesian army had now quitted Attica; and the news of the extraordinary successes of Phormion, manifesting a decided superiority in the Athenian marine, had somewhat reanimated administration and people. A squadron of forty triremes, under the command of Cleippides, was ready to sail on an expedition against the Peloponnesian coast. It was recollected by the Athenian administration that the festival of the Maloeian Apollo was approaching, in the celebration of which the whole Mitylenæan people would go in procession out of the city, Cleippides was ordered with his squadron to surprise them in the performance of this ceremony; but apparently a vote of the general assembly was deemed necessary

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to authorise the measure. To prevent the communication of intelligence therefore, ten Lesbian triremes, then in the ports of Attica as auxiliaries to the Athenian fleet, were stopped, and their crews put into safe custody. A private Lesbian nevertheless carried the intelligence. Hastening to Geræstus in Eubœa, and procuring a small vessel, he reached Mitylene on the third day from Athens. The Mitylenæans in consequence kept within their walls, and prepared for defence. Cleippides arriving shortly after, and finding the intended surprise frustrated, demanded the surrender of all ships of war, and the demolition of the fortifications of the city; informing the Mitylenæans that his instructions required him, in case of refusal, to denounce war against them, and immediately to begin operations. The Mitylenæans, yet incompletely prepared, endeavoured to gain time by negotiation; and Cleippides, thinking his force insufficient for the reduction of the place, permitted them to send a deputation to Athens. The deputies were directed to assure the Athenian people that no defection from political engagements had been intended by the Mitylenæans; and to give some colour to the assertion, one of the persons who had sent intelligence to Athens, but who had been gained over to the ruling party in Mitylene, was appointed of the deputation. Looking however only for the relief of delay from this sinister measure, the Mitylenæans at the same time privately dispatched information to Lacedæmon, with solicitation for assistance.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 4.

c. 5.

The Mitylenæan deputies returning from Athens without procuring any relaxation of the terms required, both parties prepared for hostilities. All Lesbos declared for the Mitylenæans, except Methymne, whose whole force joined the Athenian

armanent; and this was farther strengthened from Imbrus, Lemnos, and other places. The Mitylenæans at first endeavoured to gain credit to their cause by making a parade of their strength in taking the field against the Athenians; but, after an action in which, though not defeated, no advantage was obtained, they retired within their fortifications. Then the Athenian general sent with more confidence to require assistance from the other allies; and these came in with readier zeal as they began to conceive a worse opinion of the Mitylenæan affairs. The siege of Mitylene was thus regularly formed.

The Mitylenæan ministers arriving at Sparta found no very earnest disposition to engage in their cause. The Lacedæmonian government would neither of itself undertake it, nor call a congress of the confederacy. The season of the Olympian festival, the Mitylenæans were coldly told, was at hand. At Olympia they would find some principal persons of every state of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and there might have opportunity to learn how each was disposed. Going accordingly, they found readier favour among the subordinate than in the imperial government. After the conclusion of the festival, a meeting of deputies of the several states being held, it was determined to receive the Lesbians into alliance, and to make immediately a diversion in their favour by a fresh invasion of Attica. Summonses were issued for two thirds of the force of the confederacy to repair without delay to Corinth; and, to give new efficacy to the invasion, frames were prepared, on which to drag the triremes, which lay in the Corinthian gulf, across the isthmus, that a fleet might co-operate with the army; for, weakened as the Athenians were by the pestilence, by the repeated

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 8.
Ol. 88.
B. C. 428.
July.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 12.

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waste of their territory, and by the distraction of their forces, it was supposed impossible that they could make any considerable opposition by sea, without withdrawing their squadrons employed in the siege of Lesbos and on the coast of Thrace, and thus they would expose their maritime dependencies.

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 16.
& 17.

This new crisis roused the spirit of the Athenian administration and people. It was indeed become of the utmost importance to show that they had still resolution to dare, and still strength to execute. The formidable state of their navy at this time, which enabled so small a commonwealth to command such extensive dominion, and to resist such a powerful confederacy, is indeed truly wonderful, and does the highest honour to the foresight and exertions of Themistocles, by whom it was first raised, and of Pericles, by whom principally it was maintained and improved. Forty triremes were at this time employed at Lesbos, ten on the Thracian coast; thirty under Asopius son of Phormion were circumnavigating and ravaging Peloponnesus; and guard-ships were in various parts of the coasts of Attica and Eubœa. None were called in. A hundred remaining ready for service in the harbour of Piræus, it was determined immediately to use these. Every Athenian was in some degree a seaman. Excepting only those of the highest orders, distinguished by the titles of knights and *pentacosiomedimnians*, to whom, with the superannuated and the minors, the charge of the city was left, all within the age for foreign service, resident foreigners as well as Athenians, were required aboard. The fleet moving immediately for the isthmus displayed its strength in sight of the Peloponnesians, who remained in their ports motionless. Debarkations were made at pleasure, on various parts of the

August.

Peloponnesian coast, and a watch was kept on the movements of the Peloponnesian army.

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The Lacedæmonian leaders were astonished and distressed by this well-judged and successful bravado. They had confided in the report of the weakness of Athens, which the Lesbians were led by their interest to exaggerate. They had depended upon the compliance of their allies with the summons for their proportions of troops for the invasion of Attica ; and there too they were disappointed. Where the people are at the same time cultivators and soldiers, they cannot be always ready to go on distant expeditions, and leave the care of their domestic affairs to women and slaves. The Peloponnesians were now busy with their harvest ; they were already wearied with fruitless invasions of Attica, and they delayed to obey the call to arms. Meanwhile intelligence arriving that the armament under Asopius was ravaging Laconia, the projected invasion of Attica was abandoned, and the Lacedæmonian forces marched home. Then the Athenian fleet also retired within its ports.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 16.
c. 15.

The purpose of the Lacedæmonian government to obviate the immediate pressure of the siege of Mitylene had nevertheless been in some degree fulfilled. The Athenian force in Lesbos was so little equal to its object that the Mitylenæans, holding intelligence with the aristocratical faction in Methymne, marched to that place in hope of having it betrayed to them. They were disappointed ; but in their return they regulated, at leisure, the affairs of the subordinate republics of Antissa, Pyra, and Eresus, and without any effectual opposition from Cleippides, returned into Mitylene. Upon receiving intelligence of this, the Athenian government sent Paches son of Epicurus, with a re-inforcement of a thousand heavy-

c. 18.

Begin.
Octob.

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armed Athenians, to take the command in Lesbos. This sufficed to ensure superiority; and by the beginning of winter a contravallation was completed, and Mitylene was blockaded by land and sea.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 17.

The expenses of the war however had been so great to Athens that its treasury, wealthy as it had been at the beginning, was now exhausted. The daily pay of every Athenian foot-soldier on distant service (Thucydides mentions particularly those employed in the siege of Potidæa) was no less than two Attic drachmas, about twenty pence English; one drachma, for his own subsistence, the other for a slave-servant. The pay of the fleet was the same. Thucydides does not specify that the seamen had their servants aboard, but, what may imply the contrary, he says that the thousand soldiers, who went with Paches to Lesbos, themselves rowed the vessels which carried them. Upon other occasions also we find Athenian soldiers doing duties that would seem to be rather the business of servants, if any were attending; and as none are mentioned by the historian, we must suppose the indulgence was not always allowed. Sieges were the most expensive military operations of the age, and generally lasting. Extraordinary measures therefore were necessary to provide means for prosecuting the siege of Mitylene; and accordingly now, for the first time, a contribution, apparently in the way of a free gift, was collected from the Athenian citizens, to the amount of two hundred talents. This manner of taxation became afterward, as was likely in a government where the multitude was despotic, a source of intolerable oppression upon the higher ranks. A reduction of pay to the soldiers and seamen seems to have taken place, as a correspondent tax upon the lower; for we learn from Thucydides, that the pay

c. 19.

was afterwards considerably below what he states it to have been till this time. Exactions from the subject cities supplied the farther wants of the commonwealth.

While the vengeance of Athens was thus directed against the seceders from its confederacy, its faithful allies of the little republic of Plataea seem to have been forgotten. Closely blockaded now for above a year and a half, distress was coming fast upon them. It was already winter; they had nearly consumed their stores, relief was despaired of, to hold out much longer was impossible, and from their besiegers no mercy was expected. In this situation of their affairs the commander of the garrison, Eupolpidas, encouraged by his friend Theænetus, who was, either by reputation or by office, a prophet, proposed to attempt his escape, by forcing their passage across the enemy's lines. The proposal was at first joyfully accepted by the whole garrison, and preparation was made zealously for the execution; but on the nearer view of so hazardous an undertaking full half retracted. About two hundred and twenty however persevered with the commander. Friendly union fortunately remained between the parties, and co-operation proceeded probably the more readily, as, on one side, it would be considered that escape would be easier for half than all, and, on the other, that when half were gone, subsistence would last longer for the remainder, while relief from allies, or other favourable contingencies, might be hoped for. Accordingly ladders were prepared, equal to the height of the enemy's wall, which was calculated by counting the rows of bricks. The interval between the walls of circumvallation and contravallation, to use terms the nearest to the purpose that our language possesses, was sixteen feet. This

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 20.

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 Thucyd.
1.3. c.21.

space, being roofed, formed barracks for the besieging army, the appearance being that of one thick wall, with a parapet and battlements on each side. At the interval of every ten battlements were towers of equal width with the space enclosed by the walls; and in these the guards of the besieging army were kept, and, in bad weather, the sentries sheltered.

 B. C. 427.
after 25th
January.
Thucyd.
1.3. c.22.

It was midwinter when all was ready for the undertaking. A dark stormy night was chosen, with rain and sleet falling. The adventurers were all compactly armed; and, to tread more surely on the slippery soil, they went with the right foot bare. To avoid the clashing of arms, keeping distance, they directed their way to the middle of the interval between two towers. They passed the ditch unperceived, and then, placing ladders, twelve light-armed, with only a short sword and a breastplate, mounted under the command of Ammeas son of Corœbus, who himself led. On reaching the top they divided, six toward each tower, and waited. Others meanwhile hastened to support them, light-armed with small spears; their shields, that they might climb more nimbly, were borne by those who followed. Many had already mounted, while the din of the storm and the extreme darkness of the night prevented discovery, when a tile accidentally thrown from a battlement, fell with so much noise as to alarm the guard in the neighbouring tower. The call to arms was immediate, and the whole besieging army was quickly in motion. The remaining garrison, according to the plan concerted, attentive to this, sallied from the opposite part of the town, and made a feigned attack upon the contravallation. The besieging army being thus distracted, and in darkness and tempest unable to discover what were the real circumstances, none

dared quit his post : a body of three hundred only, appointed as a picket-guard to move whithersoever emergency might require, went without the wall of circumvallation, directing their march by the clamour. Fire-signals were raised to give notice to Thebes ; but, to render these unintelligible, the garrison formed similar signals in various parts of the town.

Meanwhile those Platæans who first mounted the wall had forced the towers on each side, put the guards to the sword, and, proceeding by their ladders to the tops of the towers, discharged missile weapons with advantage against those who approached to disturb the passage of their comrades. To make the passing easier, the parapet between the towers was thrown down ; ladders were placed on the outside, and every one, as soon as over the outer ditch, forming on the counterscarp, with arrows and darts co-operated with those on the towers in protecting the rest. To cross the ditch however was not easy ; for there was much water in it, frozen, but not so as to bear ; and before those from the tower-tops, who were the last to descend, could pass, the enemy's picket-guard approached. But the torches which these carried, of little use to themselves, enabled the Platæans to direct missile weapons against them, and so efficaciously as to give opportunity for the last of their own people to reach the unbroken ground. All then hastened off, and struck directly into the Theban road, as that which they would least be expected to take, leaving the temple of the hero Androcrates on the right ; so Thucydides describes their march. The stratagem was completely successful : they could plainly perceive the Peloponnesians with their torches pursuing along the Athenian road by Drycephalæ toward mount Cithæron.

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Having themselves followed the Theban road about three quarters of a mile, they turned short to the right, and, passing by Erythræ and Hysiæ, soon gained the mountains, whence they proceeded securely to Athens.

Of those who engaged in this hazardous but well-planned and ably-executed enterprise, two hundred and twelve profited from its success; none were killed; one only was taken on the counterscarp of the circumvallation; five or six returned into the town without attempting to scale the wall. These told the garrison that their comrades, who persevered, were all cut off. Next morning therefore a herald was sent to solicit the dead for burial, and by his return the success of the undertaking was first known in the town.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 16.

Relief of Mitylene meanwhile was not neglected at Lacedæmon. Requisitions were sent to the several maritime states of the confederacy to furnish their proportion of a fleet of forty ships of war; and toward spring, while these were preparing, Salæthus was forwarded with a single trireme to inspect the state of things, and direct what might be necessary. Salæthus, landing at Pyrrha, learnt that the contravallation, where it crossed a deep water-course, was incomplete, and he found opportunity that way to enter Mitylene.

c. 25.

After
23rd Feb.

The people, pressed by the able and vigorous conduct of Paches in the command of the besieging armament, were already talking of capitulation; but the exhortations of Salæthus, with assurance of speedy succour, encouraged them to persevere in defence. Early in summer the fleet, which the zeal of the confederacy had increased to forty-two ships of war, sailed for Mitylene under the command of Alcidas; and, shortly after, the Peloponnesian army, commanded by Cleomenes, as regent

B. C. 427.
P. W. 5.
Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 26.

for his minor nephew Pausanias, son of the banished king Plistoanax, invaded Attica. Not only the produce of the earth was destroyed, wherever cultivation had been attempted in the tract formerly ravaged, but parts of the country before untouched were now laid waste ; so that, excepting that of the second year of the war, this was the most destructive inroad that Attica had experienced.

Meanwhile, Alcidas loitering long on the coast of Peloponnesus, and then not pressing his voyage across the Ægean, the Mitylenæans, distressed by scarcity of provisions, began to despair of timely succour. Salæthus himself at length grew hopeless of that assistance of which he had brought the promise ; but he thought he saw a resource in the yet unexerted strength of the garrison. The oligarchal party in Mitylene, according to a policy common in the Grecian commonwealths, reserved to themselves exclusively the complete armour and efficacious weapons of the heavy-armed, and allowed the lower people the use of the inferior arms, and the practice of the inferior discipline, of the light-armed only. Salæthus, who, in an oligarchy supported by the extraordinary institutions of Lycurgus, was accustomed to see all the citizens, without inconvenience, equally intrusted with the completest armour, and trained in the completest discipline, thought that to enable the Mitylenæans, instead of starving within their walls, to meet Paches in the field, nothing was wanting but to distribute among the lower people the arms lying in their stores. The experiment was made under his authority, but the event was very wide of his hope. The lower people were no sooner vested with this new military importance than they assumed civil control ; they held their own assemblies ; they re-

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 29.

c. 27.

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Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 28.

quired that the remaining stock of provisions should be open to public inspection, and distributed equally to the people of all ranks; and they threatened, in case of refusal, to make immediately their own terms with the Athenians. In this state of things the leading men thought no time was to be lost: they proposed at once to the people to treat for a capitulation, in which all should be included. This was approved: a herald was sent to the Athenian general, and the following hard terms were accepted: That the Mitylenæans should surrender themselves to the pleasure of the Athenian people: That the Athenian army should be immediately admitted into the city: That the Mitylenæans should send deputies to Athens to plead their cause: That, before the return of these, the Athenian general should neither put to death, reduce to slavery, nor imprison any Mitylenæan. The concluding stipulation was intended particularly for the security of those of the aristocratical party who had been active in the negotiation with Lacedæmon. Many of them nevertheless, whether doubtful of Athenian faith, or apprehensive of vengeance from their fellow-citizens, who through their means chiefly had been led to their present disastrous situation, took refuge at the altars. Paches removed them under a guard to the island of Tenedos, there to await the judgment of the Athenian people. Such was the unhappy state of politics in the Grecian republics.

c. 29.

Alcidas, with the fleet which should have relieved Mitylene, was no farther advanced than the islands of Icarus and Myconus, when report of its surrender met him. Desirous of more authentic information he proceeded to Embatus, a port of the Erythræan territory on the Ionian coast; and there receiving assurance that the Athenian forces had been seven

days in possession of Mitylene, he summoned a council of war to concert measures. In the fleet were some Ionian refugees. These proposed to excite a defection of Ionia, the richest dependency of Athens, the great source of that revenue which supported the war. The people, they affirmed, would be found not averse : it would only be necessary, by a sudden and vigorous exertion, to get possession of some one Ionian city, or of Cuma in Æolis, for which the strength of the armament was more than sufficient, and the business would be done ; and beside that hardly a greater blow could be given to the Athenian power, it would lead of course to communication with the Persian satraps of the western provinces, who might probably be induced to form alliance with the Peloponnesians. The assertions of the Ionians were corroborated, and the project recommended, by those Mitylenæan ministers who had been sent to Peloponnesus, and were now with the fleet on their return. But Alcidas was not enterprising : all proposals for vigorous exertion were rejected, and he was most inclined to move immediately home. Weakness indeed seems to mark equally what was blameable and what was praiseworthy in his conduct. He proceeded at length eastward along the coast, as far as appears, without any decided object, unless to make prize of merchant-ships, of which he took numbers ; for since he had been in those seas none had avoided him ; some, not suspecting that a Peloponnesian fleet could show itself on the Asiatic coast, had made toward it, supposing it Athenian. At Myonnesus, in the Teian territory, he put to death the greater part of the prisoners thus made. Alarm spread in consequence, and deputies from Samos came to him, deprecating such barbarities. Convinced by their representations,

SECT.
III.

Thucyd.
1.3. c.31.

Ibid.

c. 32.

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at least of the impolicy of his proceeding, he dismissed many of his surviving prisoners, particularly the Chians, and he made no more such executions.

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 33.

Meanwhile intelligence reaching Paches that the Peloponnesian fleet was on the Ionian coast occasioned no small uneasiness. It was the ordinary policy of the Athenian imperial democracy, for holding subject republics in obedience, to demolish the fortifications of their towns; thus making them dependent upon the power or renown of the sovereign people for security against foreign enemies, and open to ready coercion from the same power, through the force which the Athenian navy could readily carry anywhere. But thus the rich commercial towns of Lesser Asia were now open also to attempts from the Peloponnesian fleet. Paches therefore hastening toward them with his fleet learnt in the way that the cautious Alcidas had already turned his course toward Peloponnesus. Paches having followed as far as Latmos *, and there finding pursuit vain, resolved to go himself to Ionia; opportunity being there open for doing service to his country; but it was by an act of united treachery and cruelty, which, through the impartial justice of the admirable historian his contemporary and fellow-countryman, has marred with a blot of eternal infamy a character otherwise of some glory, not without extending a stain to that of the Athenian government and people, who for the profit approved the deed.

c. 34.

Aristot.
Polit.
1. 4. c. 4.
Thucyd.
ut sup.

Colophon, once famous for the wealth of its citizens, and its general prosperity, was afterward, through violence of civil contention, greatly reduced. It was however still considerable when, about three years before the time of which we are treating, one party,

* [. . . μέχρι μὲν Πάτμου, κ. τ. λ. ed. Bekker. l. c.]

not scrupling to solicit Persian support, obtained from a neighbouring Persian officer what gave them so clear a superiority that their opponents withdrew from the city. It has been formerly observed that the capitals of the Grecian maritime republics were mostly at some distance from their ports. Notium was the port of Colophon; and the fugitives, gaining possession of that important place, maintained it so as to become there esteemed a separate commonwealth. But all the evils they had suffered through violence of faction were insufficient admonition to guard them against the growth of that common bane of every Grecian republic. It rose so among them that one party adopted the resource which had produced the division of their state and their own banishment from their capital, soliciting support from the neighbouring Persian satrap, Pissuthnes. Already the Persian satraps of the provinces bordering on the Grecian possessions in Asia had adopted the policy, for which the state of Greece afforded abundant opportunity, of entertaining a Grecian military force, composed mostly of exiles from their several republics, destitute of other means for subsistence. But in ancient Greece the Arcadians, as in modern Europe the Swiss, more than any other Greeks, perhaps on account of the poverty of their country, sought foreign military service. Pissuthnes had a body of these in his pay, which he sent to support the party soliciting assistance, together with a body of those whom the Greeks called barbarians, intrusting the chief command to the Arcadian commander, Hippias. Their opponents were in consequence expelled; but the result was not to their wishes; the satrap required the re-union of the Colophonian state, by which they became effectually subjects of their most inveterate enemies, their

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fellow-citizens who had retained possession of the city. This was the state of things when Paches came with his fleet into the neighbourhood. While their circumstances were thus probably uneasy enough, their fellow-citizens whom they had expelled would be far more deeply distressed. With joy and new hope therefore they saw an Athenian fleet approaching. They hastened to apply to Paches, claiming his protection, and that of the Athenian commonwealth, to which, they asserted, they had been faithful against barbarians and rebels, by whom they were oppressed. Paches, going accordingly to Notium, and landing his forces, desired a conference with Hippias, the commander of the Arcadian troops. Hippias, trusting in a safe-conduct, went into his camp, but was immediately arrested; and Paches advancing with his forces to Notium, where no such attempt was apprehended, took it, and put all the Arcadian and Persian troops to the sword. Not satisfied with this efficacious treachery, as if in mockery of good faith, conducting Hippias unhurt into the town, and claiming so to have complied with the terms of his engagement, he ordered that deluded officer to execution. The Colophonians of the party adverse to the Persian interest were then put in possession of Notium, and Paches returned to Mitylene. Notium was soon after strengthened by a colony of Athenians; the ancient constitution was superseded by the Athenian law, and the town was made an immediate appendage of Attica.

The measure which followed, on the return of Paches to Mitylene, seems to have been as little consistent with his plighted faith as his treatment of the unfortunate Hippias. All those Mitylenæans remaining in the city who had been active in the

revolt, that is, all the aristocratical party, were apprehended ; and, together with those who had been lodged in Tenedos, were sent to Athens. The Lacedæmonian Salæthus, who had been discovered in concealment during the absence of Paches, was sent prisoner with them. The greater part of the forces were sent home : the general remained to administer the affairs of the island.

SECTION IV.

State of the Athenian government after the death of Pericles.

Nicias : Cleon. Inhuman decree against the Mitylenæans : death of Paches. Platæa taken.

THE supreme direction of the Athenian affairs had now passed into very different hands from those whose extraordinary abilities had raised the commonwealth to its present power. After the abolition of royalty, and even after the establishment of the constitution of Solon, which reduced the aristocracy, while democratical sway was gradually advancing, illustrious birth had still been greatly considered among the Athenian people, and was almost necessary for rising to high political situations. For, little willing as the Athenians were to allow superiority of rank, superiority of political situation was indispensably to be given to some ; and they submitted to it less impatiently in families which they had been accustomed for ages to respect than in new men, yesterday their equals or inferiors. Themistocles and Aristides seem to have been the first whom the most extraordinary advantages of ability and character could raise, from even middle rank to that eminence which enabled them to take a decisive lead in public affairs. After them,

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in Cimon, and again in Pericles, superior talents met with illustrious birth. But even the constitution of Solon had contributed to transfer to riches that respect which was formerly paid to high ancestry. Other circumstances afterward assisted to give immoderate influence to the possession of wealth. The great Cimon set the injurious example, though probably not the first example, of bribing the people from his private purse. The great Pericles set the still more ruinous example of bribing the people from the public treasure. After his death no man was found capable of wielding like him a democracy, commanding, with little interruption, for fifteen years, a people, every individual of whom claimed equality with himself, as if he had, by the most undisputed claim, been their legal sovereign. But a constant succession of men possessing superior abilities, with disposition and constitution to exert them in public business, is not to be expected among the small numbers who compose the highest rank in any state. Nicias son of Niceratus, to whom the principal families, and sober men in general, now looked as the fittest person to lead the councils of the commonwealth, was a man of high merit, but unfortunately not, like the great men who had preceded him, born for the peculiar circumstances of the situation for which he was wanted. His abilities, political and military, were considerable. Integrity, piety, generosity, a pleasant complying temper, and an elegant taste were conspicuous in him. Decidedly adverse to democratical power, he was nevertheless so clear a friend to public welfare, so ready and so judicious in the employment of his large fortune in gratifications for the multitude, so humane and liberal in relieving the distressed and promoting the advantages

of individuals, that he was in no small degree a favourite of the people. But he was bashful and diffident : of clear courage in the field, in the assembly of the people he was a coward ; while a reserve, the effect of bashfulness, injured him as if it had been the effect of pride. It was said of him, that his generosity was a revenue to the deserving, and his fearfulness to the undeserving. Under a better government his character might have been splendid ; but his diffidence and want of firmness, amid the civil turbulence in which it was his fate to live, gave it sometimes the appearance even of weakness.⁸

In opposition to Nicias stood a man such as never before was known to sway the Athenian assembly. Cleon seems to have been as remarkably born for the depression of Athens as Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles for its exaltation. Bred among the lowest of the people, the son of a tanner, and said himself to have exercised that trade, he was the opposite of Nicias in character as in political interest. Of extraordinary impudence and little courage, slack in the field, but forward and noisy in the assembly, corrupt in practice as in principle, but boastful of integrity, and supported by a ready though coarse eloquence, he had gained such consideration, flattering the lower people and railing at the higher, that he stood in the situation of head of a party.⁹

⁸ Plato certainly esteemed Nicias an able statesman and general. See the dialogue *Laches* throughout, but particularly p. 198. t. ii. ed. Serran. Plutarch is large upon his defects.

⁹ 'Xerxes himself did not suffer more by the flattery of his courtiers than the Athenians by that of their orators.' Lord Littleton's dialogue of Pericles and Cosmo de' Medici.

B. C. 427.
 Ol. 87. $\frac{1}{2}$.
 P. W. 5.
 Thucyd.
 l. 3. c. 36.

Such was the state of things when the unhappy Mitylenæans surrendered their lives and fortunes to the pleasure of the Athenian people. On the arrival of the prisoners, the Lacedæmonian Salæthus was ordered, by the absolute command of the assembled people, for immediate execution. To obtain a respite he made large offers, and, among other things, undertook to procure the raising of the siege of Plataea; but in vain. The assembly then deliberated concerning the punishment to be inflicted upon the Mitylenæan people; and sentiments of anger, inflamed by the boisterous eloquence of Cleon, prevailing, the inhuman decree passed for putting every man to death, and reducing the women and children of all ranks to slavery. Such was the right which the Athenian people claimed over Greeks whom they called allies, and who had every pretension so to consider themselves; and such the punishment for renouncing that alliance, to connect themselves with other Greeks. The assembly was no sooner dismissed than a trireme was dispatched, with orders for Paches to carry the decree into immediate execution.

But the Athenians were not universally of a temper to sleep upon such a deed without remorse. The very next morning extensive repentance became evident; and many of the principal men joined the Mitylenæan deputies, in pressing the summoning of a second assembly, for the purpose of reconsidering the decree; and they prevailed. The people were hastily called together, and various opinions were delivered. The mild Nicias was a weak opponent to the insolent Cleon, who harangued with vehemence in support of the measure already taken. ‘What folly,’ he said, ‘to rescind, on one day, what had

‘ been, on due deliberation, resolved but on the pre-
 ‘ ceding! Without more stability in measurest here
 ‘ was an end of government. With regard to the
 ‘ purport of the decree complained of, example was
 ‘ become absolutely necessary; and a more just ex-
 ‘ ample than that decreed against the Mitylenæans
 ‘ never could be found. They had always been
 ‘ treated by Athens not only with justice but with
 ‘ kindness, not only without offence, but with cautious
 ‘ respect. And as nothing could be more unprovoked
 ‘ than the revolt, so nothing could be less defended
 ‘ upon any plea of necessity. The Mitylenæans could
 ‘ not be compelled to the part they had taken: being
 ‘ islanders, attack could hardly reach them; possess-
 ‘ ing ships and fortifications, they could have repelled
 ‘ it. Enjoying then these advantages, they had be-
 ‘ fore their eyes the example of others, who, having
 ‘ revolted against Athens, had been punished by de-
 ‘ privation of their marine, demolition of their for-
 ‘ tifications, and reduction under a strict subjection.
 ‘ Nevertheless, unsatisfied with possessed felicity, un-
 ‘ deterred by obvious example, they not barely re-
 ‘ nounced their political connexion, but they united
 ‘ themselves with those whose professed purpose was
 ‘ the destruction of Athens. Such being the case,
 ‘ it would be weakness to let sentiments of mercy
 ‘ prevail; and it would be folly even to delay that
 ‘ decision which wisdom required, but which, if the
 ‘ present anger of the people cooled, they would
 ‘ want resolution to make.’ These were the prin-
 ‘ cipal arguments in support of the inhuman sentence.
 But Cleon would enforce argument by menaces;
 and knowing that he could not use a more effectual
 weapon against the timid Nicias, impudently im-
 puting corrupt motives to any who should dare to

Thueyd.
 l. 3. c. 37,
 38, 39, 40.

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oppose him, he threatened criminal prosecution before that wild judicature, the assembled people.

The assertor of the cause of humanity, upon this occasion, was Diodotus son of Eucrates. He must have deserved to be better known, but upon this occasion only we find him mentioned in history.¹⁰ In the debate of the preceding day he had been the principal opponent of Cleon ; and he now again came forward with firmness, with zeal, and at the same time with prudence, to plead a cause which, he insisted, was not more that of humanity than of political wisdom. Such was the ferment of men's minds, and so much passion entered into the decision of political questions at Athens, that he would not venture to attribute injustice to the decree ; he would not venture to affirm that the Athenians might not, in strict right, condemn the whole Mitylenæan people to death ; but he desired them to consider, ' that the lower Mitylenæans had no sooner had the power, in consequence ' of having arms put into their hands, than they ' compelled the aristocratical party to treat with ' the Athenian general. Setting aside however the ' question of right and justice, he would consider the ' matter upon the point of expediency only. The ' terror of capital punishment, it was notorious, did ' not prevent the commission of crimes : it was the ' business therefore of a wise policy, by attentive precaution, to prevent revolt and not to enhance evils, ' to which negligence or misrule might give occasion, ' by making the situation of those engaged in revolt ' completely desperate : it was the business of a wise

Thucyd.
1.3. c. 41.

c. 42—48.

¹⁰ A brother of Nicias was named Eucrates (Lys. or. pro fil. Eucr.), and the manner in which family names were usually distributed among the Greeks would favour the supposition that the father of Diodotus may have been brother of Niceratus, the father of Nicias.

‘ policy to draw profit from conquest, and not to
 ‘ convert a city, capable of paying large tribute, into
 ‘ a heap of ruins, and a cultivated country to a desert.
 ‘ The lower people, he observed, even in the subject-
 ‘ states, were in general attached to Athens. Even
 ‘ were it just therefore, nothing could be more
 ‘ impolitic than, by an act of extreme severity, to
 ‘ alienate, in every subject-state, that party which
 ‘ alone was, or ever would be, well-disposed to them.’
 He concluded with recommending, ‘ that those who
 ‘ had been selected by Paches as most involved in the
 ‘ guilt of revolt should be, not condemned in haste
 ‘ and in anger, but judged at leisure with dispassionate
 ‘ deliberation, and that the rest of the Mitylenæan
 ‘ people should have a free pardon.’

The speeches being concluded, the question was
 put, and Diodotus prevailed; but the influence of
 Cleon was such that he prevailed but by a very small
 majority. It was, after all, very much feared that
 notice of the second decree could not be conveyed to
 Mitylene in time to prevent the execution of the
 first; orders for which had been forwarded nearly
 twenty-four hours. A trireme was in all haste
 dispatched, with no small promises to the crew for
 arriving in time. They rowed incessantly, refreshing
 themselves with a preparation of meal, wine, and oil,
 which they could take without quitting their labour,
 and sleeping by reliefs. Fortunately no adverse
 wind impeded; and the trireme with the first decree,
 going on an odious errand, did not press its way. It
 arrived however first; the general had opened the
 dispatches, and was taking measures for executing
 the horrid order, when the second trireme arrived
 with the happy countermand.

Thucyd.
1.3. c.49.

The case of those whom Paches had sent to Athens,
 as principal actors in the revolt, seems to have been

CHAP.
XV.Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 50.

hopeless, since Diodotus himself had not ventured to offer a word in their favour, farther than to claim for them a dispassionate trial. They were more than a thousand, and all were put to death. Nor were those saved from the executioner treated with the generosity which Diodotus recommended. All the ships of war of the Mitylenæan commonwealth were confiscated to the use of the Athenian people; the fortifications of the city were demolished, and the lands were disposed of in a manner which appears to have been new. According to the genius of democracy, it was calculated rather for private emolument than public advantage; being either required by the sovereign people, as an indulgence which they wished and could command, or proposed by some leading men as a bribe to obtain popular favour. The whole island of Lesbos, except the territory of Methymne, was divided into three thousand portions. Three hundred of these were dedicated to the gods; for such was Grecian religion that it was supposed the deity might be thus bribed, not only to pardon, but even to favour the most atrocious inhumanity. The remainder was divided by lot among the Athenian citizens, who were however not to have possession of the lands: that was to remain with the Lesbians, who, for each portion, were to pay a yearly rent, in the nature of our quitrents, of two mines, about eight pounds sterling. A territory belonging to the Lesbians, on the neighbouring continent, was disposed of in the same manner. Both the insular and the continental territory were reduced under complete and immediate subjection to the sovereignty of the Athenian people. But the gratification of individuals only was provided for; the public treasury derived nothing from the arrangement.

A very remarkable fact, unnoticed by Thucydides,

is however so asserted by Plutarch as authenticated that it must require mention here. The conduct of Paches, throughout his command, appears to have been able, and his services were certainly important. On his return to his country, he expected honour and respect suitable to those services; but he found himself called upon to answer a charge of peculation before the assembled people. The orators who conducted the accusation were virulent: their harangues had evident effect upon the multitude; and the indignation of Paches, perhaps less an orator than a soldier, was so raised that, in presence of the assembly, he stabbed himself to the heart.

Plut. v.
Aristid.
p. 335. &
v. Nic.
p. 526.

After proceeding thus far in Grecian history, we become so familiarised with instances of slaughter committed in cold blood, generally not without some claim of sanction from lawful authority, and a pretence to the execution of justice, that the horror lessens, and we are prepared for the tragedy which closed the siege of Plataea. We find Thucydides so often giving due measure of censure to his fellow-countrymen that it seems reasonable to suppose they would not have escaped his animadversion for neglecting all endeavour to succour the brave little garrison of that place, had there been any prospect of success from any attempt within their power. We may conceive indeed that the pestilence first, and then the revolt of Lesbos, would greatly weaken their means; not only reducing their ability for exertion, but increasing the danger of hazardous measures. The besieging army however alone would scarcely deter them; but the force of Boeotia was at hand, equally to support the besieging army, or to take advantage of the absence of the Athenian forces from Attica, and to intercept their return; and the

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loss of a battle, in the critical circumstances of that time, might have endangered all the dependencies of Athens, and even Athens itself.

Thucyd.
1.3. c. 52.

Such being the inability of the Athenians to relieve Plataea, in the course of the summer, the third of the siege, the garrison began to be severely pressed by famine. The first proposal for a capitulation was nevertheless made by the Lacedæmonian general, in pursuance of instructions, the result of an illiberal and even treacherous policy, which we should deem more unworthy of Sparta, were there fewer instances of it upon record to her shame. The success of the Peloponnesians in the war not having been so great and so rapid as they had promised themselves, it was foreseen that to restore places taken on both sides might probably become a necessary condition of any peace. But it was an object with the Lacedæmonian government, in compliment to Thebes, not to restore Plataea. As soon therefore as it was known that the garrison were in extremity of want, the general sent a herald with the proposal, ‘that if they would voluntarily submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians, and take them for their judges, the guilty only should be punished, and none without trial.’ The Plataeans, utterly unable to struggle for better terms, acceded to these, and surrendered their town and themselves to the Lacedæmonians.

Commissioners shortly arrived from Sparta, authorised to pronounce the doom of the unfortunate garrison, which seems to have been already determined; for the mode of trial promised nothing equitable. No accusation was preferred, but the simple question was put to the Plataeans, ‘Whether, in the existing war, they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians or their allies?’ Startled at

such a proceeding, the Platæans requested that they might be permitted to speak more largely for themselves than merely to answer that question. This being not denied, Astymachus and Lacon, the latter connected by hospitality with Sparta, were appointed to speak for the whole body. After urging their confidence in the justice of the Lacedæmonians, and the expectation of a different kind of trial, which had induced them to surrender themselves, they pleaded the acknowledged merit of their commonwealth with Lacedæmon and with all Greece in the Persian wars; and they mentioned their service to Sparta in particular in the Helot rebellion. They stated the refusal of the Lacedæmonians to undertake the protection of their commonwealth against the oppression of Thebes, which above ninety years before had given origin to their alliance with Athens; and they expatiated on the extreme hardship of their case, if they were to be punished for fidelity to that alliance, which they could not have deserted without the basest ingratitude and the foulest dishonour. They expostulated on the proposed desolation of those temples where thanksgiving had been offered to the gods for blessing Greece with liberty, through the glorious success obtained against the Persians, and on the abolition which, from the destruction of their commonwealth, would ensue to those solemn rites then appointed, by the grateful voice of Greece united, to be performed by the Platæan people. Finally, adjuring the Lacedæmonians by the sepulchres of their ancestors, to which the Platæans paid annual honours, they deprecated, beyond all things, being delivered to their inveterate enemies the Thebans, whose insidious attempts against them, they said, after having successfully resisted, they had justly

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punished; and they required rather to be restored to the possession of their town, to which, by the terms of the capitulation, they were equitably entitled, there to have the choice of their mode of perishing: but on the mercy of the Lacedæmonians they would willingly throw themselves.

The Thebans, with exasperation not abated by time, but rather increased by the difficulties they had undergone in obtaining means to revenge their friends and relations, murdered, according to their sentiment, by the Plataëans, undertook to reply. They began with asserting their claim to sovereignty over Plataea, derived from their ancestors, founders of all the municipal governments of Bœotia, when they conquered the country. They would allow no merit to the Plataëans for their exertions in the Persian war; to which they were led, it was insisted, not by an enlarged spirit of patriotism, not by any liberal regard for the common cause of Grecian freedom, but merely by an attachment to Athens, founded on the separate interest, not even of their city, but only of a faction in their city. No connexion with Athens however could excuse their defection from the general confederacy of the Greek nation, under the presidency of Lacedæmon, of which Athens itself had been a member. On the contrary, if it was dishonourable to betray any engagement, into which they had unguardedly entered with Athens, much more dishonourable and more criminal was it to betray the common cause of Greece, by supporting the Athenians in their endeavours to subdue the whole nation, against the Lacedæmonians and their allies, whose only purpose was to protect its liberties. Thus, among others, the Æginetans, whose commonwealth had been a member of the general confederacy, were

Thucyd.
1.3. c. 61.

c. 63.

c. 64.

already reduced to a state of subjection : and yet, notwithstanding these offences, liberal offers had been made to the Platæans before the siege, and had been rejected.

‘ With regard then,’ continued the Theban orator, ‘ to the attempt to surprise your city during an existing truce, which is so vehemently objected to us, had it been a measure of our own, or had we come hostilely against you, ravaged your lands and attacked your persons, you might indeed reasonably have accused us. But the leaders in that business were the best of your own citizens ; they invited us ; they opened your gates to us ; under their authority, who had the best title to authority among you, we acted ; nothing hostile was done, nothing intended, but the sole purpose was the salutary one of withdrawing you from a foreign connexion, and reuniting you to the body of the Bœotian people. Nevertheless the death of those of our fellow-citizens who fell in arms we are willing to pass over ; but for the assassination of those others, who submitted themselves to your mercy, whom in the moment you spared, and for whose safety you pledged yourselves to us, how can it be excused ? Shall then, Lacedæmonians, their lamentations and prayers for mercy avail them ? The fathers of those gallant youths, who have been thus murdered, were the very men who, by their deeds in the field of Coronea, rescued Bœotia from the Attic yoke, and restored it to the Grecian confederacy. Some of them fell there ; some, now in old age, living to bewail the treacherous massacre of their sons and the orbitude of their families, are with far better plea your suppliants for revenge. We therefore demand of you, Lacedæmonians, in the punishment

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 65.

c. 66.

c. 67.

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‘ of these men, that justice to which the laws and
‘ customs of Greece, so nefariously violated by them,
‘ entitle us.’

Thucydides, cautious almost to extreme of offending against that impartiality so valuable and so uncommon in a contemporary historian, avoids declaring any sentiment as his own upon this extraordinary transaction ; the more important to be related in some detail, because it was afterward but too much drawn into precedent, and because the circumstances, and the speeches commenting upon them, tend much to explain both the nature of the Grecian confederacy, and the ideas prevailing at the time, concerning the laws of nature and of nations. It is not indeed likely that the speeches made upon the occasion would come very exactly reported even to Thucydides. In what that historian therefore has given us for those speeches, as well as in what he attributes to the Lacedæmonian commissioners as the ground of their proceeding, he seems rather to have stated the arguments publicly circulated by the friends of the several parties. It appears to have been very generally held among the Greeks of that age, that men were bound by no duties to each other without some express compact. The property of foreigners might be anywhere seized, and themselves reduced to slavery, or even put to death, without the breach of any human law ; and not only without the breach of any divine law, but prayers were addressed to the gods for favour and assistance in the commission of such violences. Those connected with them by political or social compact the Greeks described by a term peculiar to themselves, *ENSPONDI* ; meaning, originally, persons with whom they had poured wine to the gods, or with whom they had made a compact, sanctified by

the ceremony of pouring wine to the gods: those who were bound to them by no compact, or who had forfeited their claim to the benefit of a compact once existing, they called ECSPONDI, out of compact, or outlaws. The Lacedæmonian commissioners, upon the present occasion, determined that the Plataean people, in consequence of their renunciation of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, and of their refusal of equitable terms offered them immediately before the siege, were ecspondi; and not only so, but they were ecspondi who had treated the Lacedæmonians and their allies injuriously. It was therefore resolved that the sentence should rest upon the answer that could be given, and supported, to the simple question first proposed. Accordingly the Plataeans were again called upon, one by one, to say, ‘Whether in the present war they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians or their allies.’ All answering in the negative, they were severally led aside and immediately put to death, to the number of not fewer than two hundred Plataeans, and twenty-five Athenians; to whom probably this severity was extended with the less hesitation, in consequence of the late execution of the Spartan, Salæthus, at Athens. The women were condemned to slavery; the town and territory were given to the Thebans. A few Plataean refugees of the aristocratical party, together with some Megarians, whom faction had also driven from their own city, were permitted to inhabit Plataea during one year. Afterward the lands were confiscated to the public use of the Theban state, and let to Theban citizens on leases for ten years; the town was levelled with the ground, the temples however being carefully preserved; and, adjoining to the temple of Juno, an inn two hundred feet square,

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 68.

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something like the modern caravanserais of the East, was built with the materials. In the spirit of Grecian piety, with which revenge was congenial, and no vice absolutely inconsistent, furniture for the inn, made of the iron and brass found in the town, was dedicated to Juno; and a new temple, a hundred feet long, was erected to the same goddess. Such was the fate of Plataea, in the ninety-third year from its first alliance with Athens.

SECTION V.

Sedition of Corcyra: Operations of the Athenian fleets under Nicostratus and Eurymedon, and of the Peloponnesian under Alcidas.

FROM this scene of bloodshed and desolation, such is the tenor of Grecian history, we proceed to another still more shocking, whence we should willingly avert our eyes, but for the more than curious information, the valuable instruction, which, as from a well-imagined tragic fable, may be derived from it. In the island of Corcyra, since its connexion with Athens, the democratical had been the prevailing interest. In the sea-fight with the Corinthians, off Sybota, a number of Corcyraeans of rank, as we have seen, had been made prisoners. To conciliate these became then the policy of the Corinthian government, in the hope, through them, to bring over Corcyra to the Peloponnesian confederacy, which would of course restore some portion of the ancient influence and authority of Corinth in the island. The Corcyraean nobles readily acceded to the first idea; and possibly a less reward than the change from a dungeon, with daily fear of death, to liberty, affluence, and power

Ch. 13. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 70.

might have induced them to accede to the second ; for to be masters of their island, under the sovereignty of Corinth, was likely to be far preferable to living under the rod of democratical rule in the hands of their fellow-citizens. They were accordingly set at liberty ; bound, as it was given out, by sufficient pledges to pay a large sum for their ransom. The real ransom however appeared in the sequel : every Corcyraean was canvassed separately for his support, in the general assembly, to a proposed motion for renouncing the Athenian alliance, and renewing the ancient connexion of Corcyra with Corinth its mother-city. Success in this intrigue was considerable ; but party became warm, and the whole island was in commotion. The democratical leaders, in alarm, sending information to Athens, the Athenian government dispatched ministers to watch over the interests of the commonwealth in Corcyra. Ministers from Corinth arrived nearly at the same time. An assembly of the Corcyraean people was held in presence of both ; the question concerning the alliance was discussed ; and the Corinthians so far prevailed that, though it was resolved to maintain the alliance with Athens, it was resolved also to maintain peace with Peloponnesus.

How far it might have been possible for the aristocratical party to stop there, and preserve quiet, means for judging fail ; but that no discreet zeal directed their following measures amply appears. A prosecution was commenced against Pithias, chief of the democratical party, the most powerful individual of the island, warm in the Athenian interest, and a public guest of the Athenian commonwealth. The vague accusation urged against him was, ‘ that he ‘ had subjected, or endeavoured to subject, his country

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‘to Athens.’ The aristocratical party had so ill considered their strength, or so ill concerted their measures, that he was acquitted. It was then perhaps necessary for him to ruin those who would ruin him ; and the interest which had enabled him to repel the attack would be likely to give him means of revenge. He accused five of the wealthiest of the aristocratical party of cutting stakes in the sacred groves of Jupiter and Alcinous. Superstition furnished the crime, and party-spirit would decide upon the fact. We have difficulty indeed to imagine an inducement for men of wealth and rank to risk the penalty, which was a stater, about a guinea, for every stake. The five were all condemned in fines to an amount that would reduce them to indigence. Immediate payment or imprisonment were the alternative, to be avoided only by flight, if indeed that were now practicable, or by taking refuge at the altars. They chose the latter expedient, hoping that their friends might yet obtain for them a mitigation of the penalty. The interest of Pithias however prevented ; and, more master in the supreme council in consequence of the absence of the five, he procured a resolution for proposing to the people an alliance offensive as well as defensive with Athens. The suppliants, looking upon their ruin and that of their party as complete if this should be carried, in the rage of despair quitted the altars, collected some of their adherents, armed themselves with daggers, and rushing into the council-hall killed Pithias, with others, some counsellors, some private persons, to the number of sixty. Those counsellors of the democratical party, who avoided the massacre, fled for refuge to the Athenian trireme, which lay in the harbour.

The five were no sooner thus masters of the council

than they summoned an assembly of the people, acknowledged what they had done, and claimed merit from it, as what alone could save the commonwealth from subjection to Athens; and then immediately proposed a decree for maintaining a strict neutrality, for refusing to admit more than one ship of war at a time belonging to either of the belligerent powers, and for declaring any attempt to introduce more into any port of Corcyra an act of hostility. Their own influence was extensive, their opponents were intimidated and without a head, the decree, moderate in its purposes, was well calculated to gain in the instant the approbation of all who were not violent in party, and it was carried. Ministers were then dispatched to Athens to apologise to the Athenian government for what had passed, as a measure, without forethought, produced by the crisis of the moment, and they were directed to reconcile, if possible, the Corcyræans who had fled thither. But instead of being received at Athens as deputed by due authority, they were apprehended as rebels, and sent in custody to Ægina.

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 71.

Meanwhile the aristocratical party in Corcyra, far from being decidedly masters of the government, drawing encouragement from the arrival of a Corinthian ship with ministers from Lacedæmon, attacked, and in the moment overpowered their opponents; who however not only held still the citadel, but also some of the higher parts of the town. Collecting then their strength, they took possession of one of the ports of the city, called the Hyllic. The aristocratical party remained yet in possession of the principal port, and also of the agora, the common place of general assembly. Next day both sent detachments into the country, inviting the peasant-

c. 73.

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slaves to their assistance, with promises of freedom. In this the democratical party had the greater success. The nobles on the other hand obtained eight hundred Epirot auxiliaries from the continent. In the course of the day light skirmishes passed with missile weapons.

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 74.

On the next day but one matters were brought to a crisis. System was now in some degree restored in the conduct of the affairs of the democratical party ; and leaders were become settled in command and influence, in the room of those who had been assassinated : superior in numbers, they possessed also, within the city, the more commanding situations. With these advantages, issuing from their quarters, they attacked their opponents ; and, such was the effect of party-spirit, the women took a zealous part in the action, throwing bricks and tiles from the house-tops, and supporting the tumult of battle, says Thucydides, with a resolution beyond their nature. Late in the evening the aristocratical party were compelled to yield ; and, fearing that their opponents, pressing upon them in their retreat, might become masters of the naval arsenal and the port, their last refuge, they set fire to all the buildings about the agora, sparing neither their own houses (for there the principal men mostly had their residence) nor those of others ; so that, beside dwellings, many warehouses full of valuable merchandise were consumed ; and, had any wind blown toward the city, the whole would have been destroyed. The conflagration effectually checked pursuit, and prevented that immediate destruction which the aristocratical party had apprehended ; but their reverse produced defection among their friends. In the night the greater part of the Epirot auxiliaries returned home,

and the commander of the Corinthian trireme consulted his safety by sailing away.

At the beginning of this civil war the democratical party had sent intelligence to Naupactus, where Nicostratus son of Diitrephes commanded the Athenian squadron. On the next day after the departure of the Epirot troops and the Corinthian ship Nicostratus arrived in the harbour of Corcyra with twelve triremes and five hundred heavy-armed Messenians. His purpose of course was to support the democratical, which was the Athenian party; but, in the actual circumstances, his arrival perhaps gave greater joy to the defeated nobles, who dreaded nothing so much as the unrestrained revenge of their fellow-citizens. Nor did he deceive their expectation: proposing a treaty, he succeeded in mediating an agreement, by which it was determined that ten only, who were named as the most guilty of the nobles, should be brought to trial, and that the rest should retain all their rights as citizens, under a democratical government. He provided then that even the selected ten should have opportunity to escape; and thus a sedition, begun with the most outrageous violence, was composed in a manner little heard of in Grecian annals, totally without bloodshed. The proposal for a league offensive and defensive with Athens was carried, as in the circumstances might be expected, without opposition.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 75.

Nicostratus would then have returned with his whole squadron to Naupactus; but, the more completely to ensure the continuance of quiet so happily restored, the democratical leaders requested that he would leave five of his ships; undertaking to supply him with as many of their own, completely manned. The magistrates, whose office it was to appoint citizens

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for this service, thought to gain farther security against fresh commotion by selecting for it many of the aristocratical party. Unfortunately a suspicion arose among these that the pretence of service was only a feint : that the purpose was to send them to Athens ; where, from the sovereign people, they expected no favourable measure. Under this persuasion they betook themselves, as suppliants, to the temple of Castor and Pollux, which no assurances from Nicostratus could persuade them to quit. This extreme and apparently weak mistrust excited suspicion among the democratical party. Arming themselves, they broke into the houses of the nobles to seize their arms ; and they would have proceeded to bloodshed, if Nicostratus had not prevented. The alarm of the aristocratical party then became universal, and four hundred took sanctuary in the temple of Juno. All the labours of Nicostratus to restore peace and harmony were thus frustrated ; for mutual jealousy prevented the possibility of accommodation. While the suppliants of Juno feared assassination, should they quit their sanctuary, and starving, if they remained, their opponents were apprehensive of some sudden blow meditated by them. To prevent this therefore they proposed to remove them to a small island not far from the shore, near which the temple stood, promising not only safety, but regular supplies of provisions. The utter inability of the suppliants in any way to help themselves induced them to consent. The same confidence earlier given to the oaths of their adversaries, under support of the faith of the generous Nicostratus, might have prevented the miseries that followed.

Thucyd.
1.3. c. 76.

Things had rested thus four or five days, when a Peloponnesian fleet of fifty-three ships of war ap-

peared in sight. Alcidas, its commander, had been ordered for the relief of Lesbos; but, on arriving at Cyllene, had found counter-orders requiring him to go immediately to Corcyra, with thirteen additional ships, taking Brasidas for his colleague in command. Consternation and tumult presently pervaded the town; the party now triumphant scarcely knowing whether most to dread the Peloponnesian armament or their own fellow-citizens. They however obeyed Nicostratus, who, with his little squadron, quitting the port to meet the Peloponnesian fleet, directed the Corcyræans to support him as they could get their triremes ready. Sixty were immediately launched; but they were manned with so little selection that, as they advanced, scattered, toward the enemy, two deserted; and in some others the crews went to blows among themselves. The Peloponnesians, observing their confusion, detached twenty triremes against them, retaining thirty-five, including the two deserters, to oppose the Athenian squadron. Nicostratus showed himself not less able in military than prudent and humane in civil command. By superiority in evolution, avoiding the enemy's centre, he attacked one wing, and sunk a ship. The Peloponnesians then, as in the engagement with Phormion off Rhium, formed in a circle. Nicostratus, as Phormion had done, rowed round them. With twelve triremes he was thus acting with advantage against thirty-five, when the detached squadron, which had obtained more decisive advantage against the Corcyræan fleet, returned to support their own. Nicostratus then retreated toward the port, in such order as to enable the distracted Corcyræans also to reach it without farther loss; but thirteen of their ships had been already taken.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 69.

c. 77.

c. 78.

c. 79.

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Evening was now advanced, and the alarm and confusion in Corcyra were extreme. An immediate attack was expected from the victorious fleet, while it was scarcely possible to be secure against the domestic foe. But the domestic, if powerful, being commonly the more horrible foe, among measures for the defence of the town, such as might be taken in the tumult of the moment, the removal of the suppliants of Juno from the island to their former situation in the temple, it being a great object to secure such hostages against relief from the Lacedæmonian fleet, is alone specified by the historian. The inability however of the Spartan commander in chief, and apparently his cowardice, uncommon as that defect was in a Spartan, seem to have given them their best security. After his naval victory, instead of immediately pushing his success and profiting from the consternation of the enemy, he retired with his prizes to the harbour of Sybota. Even on the next day the active zeal of Brasidas in vain exhorted attack upon the city; Alcidas would carry exertion no farther than to debark some troops, on the headland of Leucimne, and ravage the adjacent fields. The democratical Corcyræans nevertheless remained in the most anxious suspense. Their domestic opponents were indeed completely in their power, but a superior enemy might severely revenge any severity exercised against them. It was therefore resolved to try, in a conference, to make some arrangement for mutual benefit. The body of the aristocratical party still refused all confidence to their opponents: but some, both of those who had and of those who had not taken refuge in the temples, less fearful, consented to serve in the fleet; and thirty triremes were manned with mixed crews, those of the aristocratical

party being distributed so as best to obviate danger from their disaffection. Alcidas however, attempting no attack, about noon re-embarked his ravaging troops, and returned to his harbour of Sybota. In the evening he received intelligence by fire-signals, that a fleet of sixty Athenian ships of war was approaching. Immediately then he got under way; and hastening his course close under shore, as far as Leucadia, would not double the cape of that peninsula, but dragged his galleys across the isthmus, and so passed undiscovered to Peloponnesus.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 81.

No sooner were the democratical Corcyræans assured of the approach of the Athenian fleet and the flight of the Peloponnesians, than every dark passion mixed itself with the joy which instantly superseded their fears; and measures were deliberately taken for perpetrating one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. The Messenians, hitherto encamped without, to oppose the foreign enemy, were now introduced within the walls. The fleet was then directed to pass from the town port to the Hyllaic port. In the way all of the aristocratical party among the crews were thrown overboard, and in the same instant massacre began in the city. The suppliants only in the temple of Juno remained protected by that superstitious dread, which so generally possessed the Greeks, of temporal evil from the vengeance of the gods for affronts to themselves, while no apprehension was entertained for the grossest violation of every moral duty. The fear of starving nevertheless induced about fifty of them, on the persuasion of their opponents, to quit their situation and submit to a trial. They were all summarily condemned and instantly executed. Their miserable friends in the sanctuary, informed of their fate, yielded to extreme despair: some killed one another within the temple; some

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hanged themselves on the trees of the adjoining sacred grove ; all, in some way, put a hasty end to their wretchedness.

In the city, and through the island, the scene of murder was not so quickly closed. For seven days the democratical party continued hunting out their opponents, and massacring wherever they could find them. Some had taken sanctuary in the temple of Bacchus. Superstitious fear prevented any direct violence there, but a wall was built around the temple, and they were starved to death. Nor was difference of political principles and political connexions the only criterion of capital offence. Opportunities for private revenge, or private avarice, were in many instances used. Debtors cancelled their debts by the murder of their creditors; the nearest relations fell by each other's hands : audaciousness in crime went so far that some were forced from the temples to be murdered, and some even murdered in them ; and every enormity, says the historian, usual in seditions, was practised, and even more.

The Athenian admiral, Eurymedon son of Thucles, lay in the harbour with his powerful fleet, the quiet and apparently approving spectator of these disgraceful transactions ; and not till the democratical Corcyræans had carried revenge to the utmost sailed away. The impolicy of his conduct seems to have been equal to the inhumanity. Nicostratus, interfering as a generous mediator, had put Corcyra into a situation to be a valuable ally to Athens. The licence, which Eurymedon gave, to massacre all who were supposed adverse to the Athenian interest, had a very different effect.¹¹ About five hundred had

Thucyd.
1.3. c. 85.

¹¹ Thucydides in his manner of marking the different characters and different merits of the two Athenian commanders,

escaped ; some aboard the triremes which had deserted to the Peloponnesians, some on other occasions. They took possession of some forts and lands, which had belonged to the Corcyræan people, on the continent opposite to their island ; and thence, with all the activity that the spirit of revenge, the thirst of plunder, and the desire of recovering their ancient possessions united could excite, they carried on hostilities against Corcyra ; seizing ships, making descents on the coast, living by depredation, and wasting whatever they could not carry off. After this experience of the weakness of their adversaries, they determined to attempt the recovery of the island ; and having in vain solicited assistance from the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, who would no more risk their fleet against the naval force of Athens, they, with a few auxiliaries, who made their whole number only six hundred, debarked on Corcyra. The conduct of these undoubtedly brave, but apparently ill-judging men, misled by passion, remarkably supports an observation which Strabo, who lived in an age to see a long train of consequences, and advert to them at leisure, has made upon the conduct and character of his fellow-countrymen. The warmth of temper,

offers an admirable model for writers of contemporary history. Without any offensive observation, merely stating facts in the simplest manner, he gives the reader fully to discover which deserved the highest praise, and which disgraced himself and his country. Nicostratus, arriving in the very height of the sedition, with only a small force, with which he had soon to cope with a very superior enemy, interfered as a generous mediator, and so efficaciously as to prevent all outrage. Eurymedon came commanding what deterred opposition ; stayed seven days, during which all the enormities were committed, and went away. This is absolutely all that the historian says of Eurymedon : but that so short a tale, with so few circumstances marked, might not escape the reader's notice, with a slight variation of words, he has repeated it.

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which perpetually engaged their whole souls in party disputes and petty quarrels, disabled them for great objects; insomuch that they were continually employing, for mutual destruction, abilities and courage which, with more political union, might have enabled them to defend their independency for ever, against Rome, and against the world. The aristocratical Corcyræans, had they directed their views to their establishment on the soil where they had found refuge, might probably have raised a powerful city there. But passion, to an extraordinary degree, still directed their measures. Immediately on landing in Corcyra, determined to maintain themselves or die, they burnt those vessels by which they had hitherto been successful and even powerful. They then occupied mount Istone, a post naturally strong, and fortified it; and, from that advantageous post, issuing as opportunity offered, they compelled their adversaries to confinement within their walls, and themselves commanded the desolated country. The calamities which followed, being connected with Athenian history, will be for notice hereafter.

SECTION VI.

An Athenian squadron sent to Sicily under Laches. End of the pestilence at Athens. Sixth year of the war: operations of the Athenians, under Nicias on the eastern side of Greece, and under Demosthenes on the western: state of Ætolia: defeat of Demosthenes near Ægitiū: a Peloponnesian army sent into the western provinces; Ozolian Locris acquired to the Peloponnesian confederacy: Demosthenes elected general of the Acarnanians; battle of Olpæ; battle of Idomene: important successes of Demosthenes: peace between the Acarnanians and Ambraciots.

THE Sicilian Greeks, mostly well-disposed to the Peloponnesians, and engaged in alliance with them,

but distracted by a variety of political interests within their island, had given no assistance in operation. War had now broken out among themselves ; and toward the end of summer, after the return of Eurymedon from Corcyra, the Athenians sent a squadron of twenty ships, under Laches son of Melanopus, to assist the Leontines, an Ionian people, against the Syracusans, who were of Dorian race. The immediate consequences were not very important ; but those more remote will require much notice hereafter.

SECT.
VI.

B. C. 427.
Ol. 88. 2.
P. W. 5.
Thucyd.
1.3. c. 86.

In the beginning of the ensuing winter the pestilence again became a subject for the historian of Athens. It had never yet entirely ceased, though after the two first years there had been a remission : but in the renewal of its fury it seems to have worn itself out, and we hear of it no more. In its whole course it carried off not less than four thousand four hundred Athenians of the vigorous age in which they were required for enrolment among the heavy-armed, and three hundred men of the higher rank who served in the cavalry. Of the multitude of other persons who perished by it no means existed for ascertaining the number.

Archidamus king of Sparta did not long outlive the friend of his youth, whom, in elderhood, he was destined to oppose in arms, the illustrious citizen who with more than regal sway had directed the affairs of the Athenian democracy. Pericles died about the beginning of the third campaign of the war. Archidamus commanded the Peloponnesian army which invaded Attica in the following spring ; and it is the last occasion upon which the contemporary historian mentions him. In the fifth year Cleomenes, regent for the minor king of the other reigning family, had the office of general of the con-

B. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 3.
P. W. 6.
Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 89.

federacy; and now in the sixth spring the command was given to Agis son of Archidamus. The forces were assembled at the Corinthian isthmus for a proposed invasion of Attica, when the terrors of repeated earthquakes, which affected various parts of Greece with uncommon violence, checked the design, and the troops were dismissed.

As the war drew out in length, every circumstance tended more and more to justify the councils which led the Athenians to engage in it. Notwithstanding that calamity, beyond human prudence to foresee, which had so reduced the strength of the commonwealth; notwithstanding the loss of those talents which had prepared its resources during peace, and directed them during the two first years of hostility; Athens was advancing toward a superiority which promised, under able conduct in the administration, to be decisive. Indeed the energy of the Athenian government, directed for near a century by a succession of men of uncommon abilities, was so put into train that, notwithstanding the inferiority of the present leaders, it was scarcely perceived to slacken. Democracy, though a wretched regulator, is a powerful spring. The highest offices in Athens were now open to the lowest people. Great competition of course arose; and one consequence was, that men of rank and education, however unambitious, were forced to put themselves forward in public business, that they might avoid being trodden upon by their inferiors. Thus Nicias seems to have been rather compelled by circumstances, than induced by his own inclination, to accept the situation in which he was placed. He had succeeded Pericles in the office of commander-in-chief. Plutarch says that his cautious temper led him always to choose commands where

success might be certain, though the glory would be small ; not from any defect of personal, but of political courage ; he was less afraid of the swords of enemies than of the voices of fellow-citizens. After the reduction of Lesbos he had conducted the Athenian forces against a fortified islet, called Minoa, at the mouth of the harbour of Nisæa, the seaport of Megara. It was without much difficulty taken, and a garrison was left in it. The purpose was to prevent any future surprise, like that lately attempted upon Piræus, and to curb more effectually the Megarian privateers ; which, notwithstanding the look-out from Salamis, annoyed the Athenian trade.

In the present summer it was determined to send out two expeditions. Having recovered the principal of those dependencies in Thrace, whose revolt had given rise to the war, having checked defection in Asia by the severe punishment of the Lesbians, having learnt to despise the ravage of Attica, and, safe within their walls, possessing a navy that commanded the seas, the Athenian leaders had leisure and means to prosecute offensive operations. Nicias, with a fleet of sixty triremes, went to the island of Melos ; whose people, a Lacedæmonian colony, though through dread of a naval force of Athens they had avoided acting with the Peloponnesians, yet rejected the Athenian alliance, and refused to pay tribute. It was expected that the waste of their lands would have brought them to submission ; but the Melians shutting themselves within their walls with a declared determination not to treat, the tedious business of a siege was postponed for another enterprise, which had been concerted before the fleet left Attica. Passing to Oropus, on the confines of Bœotia, Nicias landed his forces by night, and marched immediately

Thucyd.
1.3. c. 91.

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to Tanagra. There he was met by the whole strength of Athens, under Hipponicus son of Callias, and Eurymedon son of Thucles, whose conduct at Corcyra, it appears, had not displeased the people his sovereign. The day was spent in ravaging the Tanagræan lands. On the following day the Tanagræans, re-enforced by a small body of Thebans, ventured an action, but were defeated. The forces under Hipponicus and Eurymedon then erecting their trophy marched back for Athens, and the others to their ships. Nicias proceeding with the fleet to the Locrian coast plundered and wasted what was readily within reach, and then returned home. The expedition indeed seems to have had no great object. Apparently the principal purpose was to acquire a little popularity to the leaders and obviate clamour against them, by retaliating the evils of invasion of those of their enemies who were most within reach, and by holding out the recompense of pillage to gratify the vulgar mind.

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 91.

c. 7.

The purpose of the other expedition was to support the allies, and extend the influence of Athens, in the western parts of Greece; a service on which a squadron had been employed every summer from the beginning of the war. Phormion, during his command on that station, had so endeared himself to the Acarnanians that they particularly requested his son, or at least some relation, for his successor. A petition so honourable to so deserving an officer was not denied. In the fourth year of the war Asopius son of Phormion was appointed to the command of a squadron of thirty ships. According to his instructions in circumnavigating Peloponnesus he landed on the coast of Laconia, where he was successful in ravage and plunder, with which he sent home eighteen ships,

and then proceeded to his station at Naupactus with only twelve. Anxious, on his arrival there, to show himself worthy of the preference given to a son of Phormion, he seems to have undertaken what his force was unequal to; and after an unsuccessful attempt against Cœniadæ he lost his life in an attack upon Leucas. In the next year we find the command committed to Nicostratus, who had distinguished himself so advantageously both in the Corcyræan sedition and in action with the Peloponnesian fleet. Thirty triremes were now sent to Naupactus, under Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes.

B. C. 425.
Ol. 88. $\frac{3}{4}$.
P. W. 7.
Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 91.

Demosthenes began operations by the surprise of Ellomenus, a port of the Leucadian territory, whose c. 94.
garrison he put to the sword; and then collecting the allies of those parts, Acarnanians, Zacynthians, and Cephallenians, in addition to the Naupactian Messenians, who were in effect Athenian subjects, and obtaining fifteen triremes from Corcyra, he proceeded against Leucas itself. The Leucadians, unable to resist such a force in the field, abandoned their territory to its ravages, and confined themselves within their walls. The Acarnanians were highly desirous to reduce a city perpetually hostile to them, and situate in a manner within their country. But, before the siege could be formed, Demosthenes was allured by a more splendid, though far more hazardous project, suggested by the Naupactian Messenians.

Ætolia was a much more formidable foe to Naupactus than Leucas to Acarnania. Always numbered among the members of the Greek nation, and according to Homer, in the age which he describes, among the most respectable, yet when science and art were approaching meridian splendour in Attica, scarcely

CHAP.
XV.Thueyd.
1. 3. c. 94.

sixty miles from their borders, the Ætolians were a most rude people. Since the Trojan war, barbarism instead of civilisation had gained among them. They lived scattered in unfortified villages: they spoke a dialect scarcely intelligible to the other Greeks; and one clan of them at least, the Eurytanian, was said to feed on raw flesh: they used only light arms; yet their warlike character was high. This barbarous and hostile people, the Messenians urged, might be subdued with the force now collected; and then nothing would remain, in that part of the continent, able to oppose the confederate arms. These arguments engaged the attention of Demosthenes, and the view which they opened led him to a more extensive plan. Having reduced Ætolia, he thought he should be able, without other force than that within his command, to penetrate through the Ozolian Locris, and, keeping the impassable summits of Parnassus on the right, traverse the high lands as far as Cytinion in Doris. Thence the descent would be easy into Phocis, whose people he hoped, from of old friendly to Athens, would zealously join him with their forces; for they had been withheld from the Athenian confederacy only by their situation, surrounded by the allies of the Peloponnesians; and if a party adverse to the Athenian interest should now prevail among them, his force would suffice to restore the superiority to its friends. Arrived in Phocis, he should be on the border of Bœotia; and, assisted by the Phocian forces, he could make such a diversion on the northern or western frontier of that powerful hostile province, that, with due co-operation from Athens, and some assistance from a party favouring democracy, which was to be found in every

Grecian state, there was no degree of success against the enemies of the commonwealth, in the northern parts of Greece, to which it might not lead.

In the opinion of Thucydides, if we may judge from the manner of a writer so cautious of declaring an opinion, the enterprise was ably projected ; but obstacles occurred against the projector's hopes. The Acarnanians, disappointed in their own views, and offended at the preference apparently given to the Messenians, refused to join in it. The Corcyræans, whose government, pressed by a domestic enemy, could ill spare any part of its strength, took the opportunity of example for returning home. The Cephallenians, Zacynthians, and Messenians remained ; apparently altogether no great force, and the Athenian infantry were only three hundred ; but the Ozolian Locrians of Cēneon, inveterate enemies of the Ætoli-ans, were ready to join in any attempt against them ; and their intimate knowledge of the country, and practice in war with the people, would make their assistance particularly valuable. The Messenians moreover, who were best acquainted with the strength of Ætolia, and were likely to be the greatest sufferers from a miscarriage of the undertaking, persevering in recommending it, Demosthenes was unwilling to give up a favourite project, with opportunities which might not recur. It was accordingly determined that the siege of Leucas should be postponed, and that the forces under the Athenian general should enter Ætolia by the nearest way from Cēneon, while the Cēneonians took a circuit to meet him in the interior country.

The army of Demosthenes was so little numerous that the whole passed a night in the precinct of the temple of Nemean Jupiter, on the borders of Locris,

Thucyd.
l.3. c.96.

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XV.Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 97.

where, according to report current in the country, the poet Hesiod died. Nevertheless, no force appearing in the field capable of opposing him, the three towns of Potidanium, Crocylum, and Tichium were taken in as many days; and plunder was collected to such an amount as to influence the decision of future measures. It was sent to Eupolium in Locris, while the army remained at Tichium. As soon as it was safely lodged, pursuing still the advice of the Messenians, without waiting for the Locrians, who had not yet joined him, Demosthenes proceeded to Ægittium, which, as unfortified, was abandoned on his approach, and he took possession of the empty town.

Ibid. &
1. 4. c. 30.

1. 3. c. 96.

He was now in a mountainous and woody country, full of defiles, with his little army consisting almost wholly of heavy-armed infantry. Meanwhile the Ætolians, who had early gathered his intention from his preparations, and who, by the time he passed their frontier had already collected their forces from the most distant parts, arrived in the neighbourhood of Ægittium. Well knowing their advantage, they would come to no regular engagement; but occupying the heights around, made desultory attacks upon the allied army in various parts, running down the hills, throwing their darts, retiring whenever the enemy advanced, pursuing when they retired, and, both in pursuit and in retreat, with their light armour, holding certain advantage.

c. 98.

Demosthenes had now to regret that he had not waited the arrival of his Locrian allies, armed like the Ætolians, and accustomed to contend with them in their desultory mode of action. As long as the few bowmen of his army had a supply of arrows, wherever they could give their assistance, their weapons, of longer flight, kept off the enemy, ill

armed for defence. But when, at length, all were worn with long exertion, and their arrows were nearly spent, their commander received a mortal wound. Presently then they dispersed, each to seek safety as he best might. The heavy-armed then, unable to stand the darts of the Ætolians, whom, with their weapons, they could not reach, had no resource but in hasty retreat. Pursued by active men, practised in running among rocks and mountains, many were killed. A Messenian, on whom they had principally depended as their guide in this wild and rough country, was among those who early fell. Some then strayed into impassable dells, and a considerable body entering a pathless wood, the Ætolians set fire to it, and all were destroyed. Order was now totally lost, and every form of flight and of destruction, says the contemporary historian, was experienced by the Athenians and their allies. Procles, the second in command, was killed, with a hundred and twenty of the three hundred heavy-armed Athenians; and of all the youth of Athens who fell in the whole war, continues the historian, those were the prime. Of the allies also a large proportion were slain. The survivors with difficulty reaching the coast, at the distance of about ten miles from the place of action, proceeded to Cœneon. The bodies of the dead, through the usual ceremony, being obtained for burial, those of the Athenians were carried to Athens by the returning fleet; but the unfortunate commander, fearing to meet the anger of his sovereign, the Athenian people, remained at Naupactus.

A circumstance which, in the eye of dispassionate reason, must tend to justify the attempt of Demosthenes, would perhaps enhance the immediate indignation of an ill-informed public. The Ætolians had

Thucyd.
1.3. c. 100.

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sent three ambassadors, one from each of their principal clans, to Corinth and Lacedæmon, requesting assistance against the common enemy; proposing, as their particular object, to take Naupactus, which would deprive the Athenians of their best means for keeping a fleet in the western seas. The success obtained against Demosthenes appears to have obviated former objections, and it was resolved to gratify the Ætolians. Whether the jealousy of the kings or of the people was the obstacle, to send a Lacedæmonian force beyond the Lacedæmonian frontier otherwise than under royal command seems always to have met with objection. The business of Ætolia being thought not important enough to require one of the kings of Sparta, no Lacedæmonian troops were sent: a body of three thousand of the allies only were, toward autumn, assembled at Delphi, and, such was the Lacedæmonian authority, placed under the orders of three Spartans, Eurylochus, Mecarius, and Menedæus.

Thueyd.
1.3. c. 101.

The Ozolian Locrians, whose country lay between Delphi and Ætolia, were then in alliance with Athens. But the people of Amphissa, one of the principal towns, alarmed at the prospect of attack from the Peloponnesian confederacy, and still more apprehensive of an interest which their neighbours and inveterate enemies, the Phocians, might acquire with the Lacedæmonian commanders, proposed to Eurylochus to revolt to the Lacedæmonian alliance, adding assurance that, so little firm was the Ozolian Locris in the Athenian interest, he might acquire the whole more readily by negotiation than by arms. The proposal perfectly suiting the views of the Spartan general, he sent ministers through all the towns. The narrow territory was at this time divided between no less than thirteen republics. Urged then at once

by the Peloponnesian arms, ready to fall upon them, and by both the example and the persuasion of the Amphissians, eight of those republics acceded to the Peloponnesian confederacy. Of the remainder, the Olpæans gave hostages as pledges that they would commit no hostility against the Peloponnesians, but refused to engage in offensive alliance against the Athenians. The Hyæans refused even to give hostages, till the Peloponnesian forces entered their territory and took one of their villages. The Cæneonians and Eupolitans persevering in fidelity to their engagements with Athens and with their neighbours of Naupactus, their towns were attacked and taken. The hostages were sent to Cytinion in Doris; the Ætolian forces joined the Peloponnesian, and Eurylochus, entering the Naupactian territory, ravaged the whole, and took the suburbs of Naupactus, which were unfortified. Postponing then the siege of the town, he proceeded to the easier conquest of the neighbouring town of Molycrium, a Corinthian colony, but long since subject to Athens.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 102.

Demosthenes, living as a private individual at Naupactus, saw with the utmost anxiety these consequences of his rash enterprise. Uncommissioned he went into Acarnania; and, though at first ill received, he persevered in apology, remonstrance, and solicitation, till he obtained a thousand heavy-armed Acarnanians, with whom he passed by sea to Naupactus. The principal hope of taking the place having been founded on the extent of the fortifications, and the disproportionate smallness of the garrison, this seasonable re-enforcement gave it security; for blockade by land would be nugatory against a town open to the sea, of which the Athenians were masters.

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The disappointment on this occasion was lessened to Eurylochus by greater views offering in another quarter. Ministers from Ambracia had solicited his assistance for the conquest of the Amphilochian Argos. Success, they urged, would be attended with the immediate submission of all Amphilochia; Acarnania might then be attacked with advantage; and the consequence, reasonably to be hoped for, would be the acquisition of all that part of the continent to the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Eurylochus acceded to the proposal, and, withdrawing his forces from Naupactus, waited in Ætolia while the Ambraciots should prepare for the execution of their part of the undertaking.

Thueyd.
l. 3. c. 105.

Autumn was already advanced when a body of three thousand Ambracian heavy-armed foot entered Argia (so the territory of the Amphilochian Argos was called) and seized Olpæ, a strong fortress upon a hill close upon the gulf; belonging to the Acarnanians, but little more than three miles from Argos. Intelligence was immediately communicated through Acarnania, and the force of the country was assembled; part marched to the assistance of Argos, part was stationed at Crenæ in Amphilochia, to watch the approach of Eurylochus, and despatches were sent to Aristoteles son of Timocrates, then commanding the Athenian squadron in the western seas, requesting succour. Meanwhile the Acarnanians came to a resolution of appearance somewhat extraordinary. Notwithstanding the offence they had taken at his preference of other interests, as they reckoned them to theirs, notwithstanding his lamentable failure in the measures to which he so gave his preference, and while he was, in consequence of that failure, yet afraid to meet the judgment of the despotic multitude in his own country, in this critical moment they sent

him an invitation to take the office of commander in chief of the forces of all the Acarnanian republics. This remarkable fact, highly honourable to Demosthenes, proves more than that he was personally esteemed among the Acarnanians. Their country was nearly equal in extent to Attica, and at least proportionally populous in free subjects, though not in slaves; but being divided among a number of village republics, no man could have either the education of Athenians of rank, or that acquaintance with public business upon a great scale, which the Athenians in office acquired. Hence, in a great measure, the admitted superiority of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to the other Greeks; and hence the Acarnanians felt the want of a man better educated and better initiated in public business than any among themselves to take, in the present moment of danger, the supreme direction of their affairs.

Eurylochus, informed of the movement of the Ambraciots, crossed the Achelous into Acarnania. Avoiding the towns, he passed unnoticed through the deserted country, the men being with the army, the women in the fortified places, till he reached Agrais, a detached district, occupied by an Ætolian tribe. Thence proceeding over an uncultivated mountainous tract, and evading thus the body of Acarnanians appointed to watch his entrance into Amphilochia, he descended by night into Argia, passed unperceived between the town of Argos and the Acarnanian camp, and joined the Ambraciots in Olpæ. Strong with this junction, he moved next morning, and chose a situation not far distant, where he encamped.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 106.

Strab.
l. 8. p. 338.

Aristoteles meanwhile, with his squadron of twenty ships, arrived in the Ambracian gulf, accompanied

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 107.

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by Demosthenes, who brought a small re-enforcement, two hundred heavy-armed Messenians, and sixty Athenian bowmen. The whole strength of Acarnania was already collected at Argos, with only a small body of Amphilochians, of whom the greater part, though friendly to the Athenian interest, were withheld by the Ambraciots. Invited by the Acarnanians only, Demosthenes was now elected commander in chief of all the allied forces; and the resolution was taken, by common consent, to give the enemy battle. The army in consequence moved toward Olpæ, and Demosthenes encamped on ground divided only by a deep valley from the camp of Eurylochus.

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 107,
108.

Thus situated, both armies rested five days, and on the sixth both prepared for battle. Demosthenes had observed that the enemy outnumbered him, and, to prevent being surrounded, he placed four hundred heavy and as many light-armed Acarnanians in a hollow covered with bushes, whence they could have opportunity to attack, in the rear, that extreme of the enemy's line which would overstretch his flank. The Messenians were placed in the right, with a few Athenians, apparently from the fleet, with whom he took post himself. The Amphilochians, who were not regular heavy-armed, but used javelins, were mixed with the Acarnanians in the rest of the line; the Argives are not mentioned, few of them probably being to be spared from the garrison of their town. On the other side Eurylochus, with a chosen body, took the left of his line, against Demosthenes and the Messenians: the Mantineans were posted next to him; the other Peloponnesians were mixed with the Ambraciots; who, being a Corinthian colony, preserved the Peloponnesian arms and discipline, and

were esteemed the best soldiers of that part of the continent.

The armies meeting, the Peloponnesian left, outstretching the right of the enemy, was wheeling to attack their flank, when they were themselves attacked in the rear by the Acarnanians from the ambush. Eurylochus was killed ; the Peloponnesians about him, panic-struck, fled ; and this immediate defeat of what was reputed the firmest part of the army spread dismay as far as the knowledge of it was communicated. Demosthenes profited from the opportunity, the Messenians in particular seconding him with a valour worthy of the fame of their ancient heroes ; and quickly the left and centre of the enemy were completely routed, the Mantineans only retreating into Olpæ in some order. But in the mean time the Ambraciots and others, who held the right of the Peloponnesian army, had defeated the Acarnanians opposed to them, and pursued as far as Argos. Here however the flying troops found refuge, while the conquerors, returning toward the field of battle, were met by superior numbers, and many fell ; the remainder joined their defeated comrades in Olpæ. The slaughter of the Peloponnesian army altogether was very great : of the three Spartan generals, Menedæus only survived.

By the unforeseen train of circumstances which led to this battle, and much by the activity and able conduct of Demosthenes, both in previous measures and in the action itself, the face of things was now completely changed in the western countries : the Athenian affairs were at once restored, as if the disaster in Ætolia had never happened ; and instead of gaining Naupactus, lately considered as the last refuge of the Athenian interest in those parts, the

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Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 109.

Peloponnesian cause was in a far worse situation than before any force from Peloponnesus was sent into the country. Menedæus, with whom the command of the defeated army remained, was at a loss for measures. He had force indeed sufficient to defend the fortress he held, but means were wanting to subsist there. He had no stores, and by land a victorious army, by sea the Athenian fleet, excluded supplies. On the day after the battle therefore, when he applied for leave to bury the dead, he sent proposals for surrendering Olpæ, upon condition of having safe passage for his troops to their several homes. Leave to bury the dead was readily granted ; the rest was openly refused ; but assurance was secretly given, that the Peloponnesians might depart in safety, if they would go quietly and quickly. In this Demosthenes and the Acarnanian chiefs had two objects ; to have the Ambraciots, and the mercenary troops in their service, at mercy ; and to weaken the Peloponnesian interest in those parts, by rendering the Peloponnesian name, and particularly the Lacedæmonian, odious for self-interestedness and treachery. Menedæus did not scruple to accept the conditions ; the dead were hastily buried ; and then the Peloponnesians, of whom the Mantineans were the largest surviving portion, went out in small parties, under pretence of gathering herbs and firewood. The Ambraciots and others, as soon as it was observed that all the Peloponnesians had quitted the place, and were already at a distance, in great alarm followed, in hope to overtake them. The Acarnanians from their camp perceiving this, without waiting for orders, immediately pursued equally Peloponnesians and Ambraciots ; and when their commanders interfered, some went so far as to throw darts at them, supposing the public interest

betrayed. The matter being however at length explained, the Peloponnesians, where they could be with certainty distinguished, were permitted to pass unmolested. But much doubt arose, and much contention, which were Peloponnesians; for the Ambraciots retained so nearly the armour, habit, and speech of their mother-country that the discrimination was difficult. About two hundred were killed; the rest reached Agrais, whose prince, Salynthius, gave them a kind reception.

The chiefs of Ambracia, on receiving intelligence that their troops were possessed of Olpæ, had hastened to support them with their whole remaining strength. Ignorant of what had since passed, they had already entered Amphilochia, when information of their march was brought to Demosthenes. Immediately that general sent a strong detachment of Acarnanian troops to pre-occupy the defiles among the highlands, which the enemy must cross to enter the plain of Argia. A few miles from Olpæ were two lofty hills, called Idomene, at the highest of which the detachment arrived by night, unperceived by the Ambraciots who were encamped on the other hill. Demosthenes, after having made the remainder of his army take refreshment, marched in the evening in two divisions; one he led himself by the plain, the other he sent over the Amphilochian mountains. About daybreak both arrived at the camp of the Ambraciots, who were still at their rest. Demosthenes had formed his advanced guard of Messenians; who, speaking the Doric dialect, deceived the Ambraciot out-guards, while it was yet too dark to see distinctly, so as to be taken for their friends from Olpæ. The surprise was in consequence complete, and the rout immediate. Great slaughter was made

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 110.

c. 112.

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on the spot ; the fugitives sought the highlands ; but the roads were pre-occupied by the Acarnanians of the advanced detachment ; and the light-armed Amphilochians, among their own mountains, were terrible in pursuit of the Ambraciots, ignorant of the country, and encumbered with their panoply. Some who had made toward the gulf, seeing the Athenian triremes close in with the shore, swam to them ; in the urgency of the moment, says Thucydides, choosing to receive their death from Grecian foes rather than from the barbarous and most inveterately hostile Amphilochians. As if blushing to declare in express terms their catastrophe, the historian adds no more than that a very small portion only of the defeated army escaped to Ambracia.

Thucyd.
1. 3. c. 113.

Next day a herald arrived from the Ambraciots, who had escaped with the Peloponnesians from Olpæ into Agrais, for leave to bury those who had been killed on that occasion. Ignorant of what had since passed, and astonished at the number of his slaughtered fellow-citizens, whom he saw lying scattered over the country, on being informed of the extent of the calamity, he was so overwhelmed with grief that he returned without executing his commission. During the whole war, says Thucydides, no Grecian city suffered equally, within so short a time ; and could Demosthenes have persuaded the Acarnanians and Amphilochians to march immediately to Ambracia, it must have yielded to the first assault. But a cause for jealousy, of which their chiefs were politicians enough to be aware, prevented. While there were cities in those parts connected with the Peloponnesians, the Acarnanians would be necessary allies to the Athenians, and would be treated with deference ; but, were nothing remaining adverse to the Athenian

interest, they would not long avoid the fate of so many other states, once allies, but now subject to the despotic rule of the Athenian people. Winter approaching, ordinarily the season of rest from warfare, it was resolved that the allies might go to their several homes ; the spoil being first divided, of which a third was allotted to Athens. In pursuance of a vote of the army then three hundred panoplies were selected for a present to their Athenian general, as an honourable testimony to his merit, and these Demosthenes, no longer fearing to meet his fellow-citizens, dedicated in the temples of Athens.

Thucyd.
l. 3. c. 114.

After the departure of Demosthenes and the Athenian fleet, the conduct of the Acarnanians was directed by a wise and liberal policy, of which we cannot but wish that Grecian history afforded more examples. They permitted the refugees in Agrais to pass, under assurance of safety, to Cœniadæ, and thence to their several homes ; and soon after they concluded a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, for a hundred years, with the Ambraciots, including in it the Amphilochians ; with a condition, judiciously added, that neither the Ambraciots should be bound to act offensively with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the Athenians. The only concessions required were, that whatever towns or lands the Ambraciots had taken from the Amphilochians should be restored, and that the Ambraciots should not assist Anactorium in the war in which it was engaged with Acarnania. This wise moderation of the Acarnanians was not without its reward. It established for a long time, in their part of the continent, not perfect peace, but more quiet than was usual among the Grecian republics ; and it tended to fix upon them that character of

Polyb.
l. 4. p. 299.

benevolence and uprightness by which we find they were long honourably distinguished, and for which they were respected throughout the Greek nation.

SECTION VII.

Seventh campaign : fifth invasion of Attica. Conquest in Sicily projected by the Athenian administration. Pylus occupied by Demosthenes : blockade of Sphacteria : negotiation of the Lacedæmonians at Athens. Cleon appointed general of the Athenian forces : Sphacteria taken : application for peace from Lacedæmon to Athens.

THE Athenians were now so familiarised to the invasion and waste of Attica, and to the inconvenience of confinement within their fortifications, which experience would teach to alleviate, that the eloquence and authority of Pericles had ceased to be necessary for persuading to bear them. The want of his wisdom and the want of his authority were however felt in the general conduct of affairs ; an authority capable of controlling every part of the administration, and of preserving concert and consistency throughout. While, in the seventh year of the war, Attica was a fifth time the prey of the Peloponnesian forces, now commanded by Agis king of Lacedæmon, the Athenians, contrary to the admonition of Pericles, were looking after foreign conquest. Instead of merely enabling their Sicilian allies to support themselves, and preventing naval assistance to Peloponnesus from their Sicilian enemies, the experience of their naval power led them to covet acquisition in that rich island, and to imagine that they might reduce the whole under subjection. In the winter a fleet of forty triremes had been preparing for that service. Pythodorus was hastened off, with those first ready,

B. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.
P. W. 7.
Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 2.

l. 3. c. 115.

to supersede Laches in the command in Sicily; and in spring the larger number followed, under Eurymedon son of Thucles and Sophocles son of Sostratidas. Intelligence having been received that the city of Corecra was reduced to extreme famine by the expelled Corcyræans, now masters of all the rest of the island, Eurymedon and Sophocles had orders to relieve it, in their way to Sicily. Those officers, and Pythodorus also, were apparently of the ten generals of the establishment. Demosthenes was in no office, military or civil; but he was now become a favourite of the people; and irregularities of all kinds were growing familiar in the Athenian government. Without any public character, and without any military rank¹², for under the Athenian government no military rank appears to have been held beyond the term for which the people specifically granted it, he was authorised to embark in the fleet with Eurymedon and Sophocles, and, during the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus, to employ its force, though those officers were present, as he might think proper.¹³

No opportunity for any service, within the plan of Demosthenes, had occurred, when, off the Laconian shore, under which description Thucydides commonly includes the Messenian, intelligence was met that a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty triremes had sailed from Cyllene, and was already at Corecra. Eurymedon and Sophocles, probably never well pleased with the unusual interference in their command, thought

¹² Ὅτι ἰδιώτη.

¹³ We are not accurately informed of the nature of the joint commands, so usual in the Athenian and other Grecian services. Thucydides sufficiently marks that there was a gradation, though the inferiors appear to have had some controlling power. The commission given to Demosthenes was of a different kind.

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themselves now justified in refusing to delay their voyage for any operations on the coast of Peloponnesus. Demosthenes on the contrary, claiming the authority committed to him by the Athenian people, insisted that they should stop at Pylus on the Messenian coast ; and when that service for which he was sent, and which the interest of the commonwealth required, was performed there, it would be time enough to proceed for Corcyra. The admirals persisted in refusal ; but it happened that a storm compelled them to seek refuge in the very port which Demosthenes desired to make.

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 3.
et al.
Strab. l. 7.
Désér. de
la Morée,
par Bellin.

The harbour of Pylus, one of the best of Greece, was at this time deserted : the ruins only of an old castle remained, and the bordering country, to a considerable extent, was uninhabited ; for the Lacedæmonians, in conquering Messenia, had acquired what, according to their institutions, they could little use. Here it was the purpose of Demosthenes to fortify some advantageous post, and place in it a garrison of Messenians from Naupactus ; whose zeal in vindicating a possession, which they esteemed of right their own, would second his views, and whose Doric speech would give them great advantage for incursion upon the Lacedæmonian lands. Unable however to persuade the generals at all to co-operate with him, he had recourse to a very dangerous expedient, for which democracy gave licence : he applied first to the soldiers and then to the officers, but still in vain. A regular system of military command, under a democratical government, was hardly possible ; and indeed due subordination appears to have been, in this age, nowhere established by law among the Greeks, excepting only the Lacedæmonians. But the military spirit of the Greek nation must have been great,

when with subordination so deficiently enforced, and in some cases so ill understood, a regularity of conduct, that would do credit to troops under the severest discipline, so generally prevailed. It happened that foul weather continuing prevented the departure of the fleet from Pylus; and at length, the soldiers, tired of inaction, took the inclination, for amusement, to construct the proposed fort. No preparation had been made for the work, no tools were brought for it. Loose stones, found about the spot, were carried by hand, and laid in the most advantageous manner that their accidental form and size permitted; and the interstices were filled with mud, which, for want of better means, the soldiers bore on their backs; bending, and locking their hands behind them. The fancy, thus taken, grew into zeal; all diligence was used to render the place defensible before it should be attacked, and the greater part of the circuit was strong by nature. In six days the rest was fortified, so far that, with the crews of five triremes, which the generals now consented to leave at Pylus, Demosthenes resolved to remain, while the fleet proceeded on its destination.

When the first intelligence of these transactions arrived at Lacedæmon, the people were celebrating one of those religious festivals which so much engaged the Greeks. The news gave little alarm, but rather excited ridicule; for, confident in the superiority of their land force, yearly experienced in the unopposed invasion of Attica, the Lacedæmonians could not immediately believe that the Athenians, through any management, could become formidable by land in Peloponnesus; and a fort raised in six days, they thought, could not cost the strength of Lacedæmon much time to take and destroy. The same intelligence

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 5.

CHAP.
XV.Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 6.After mid-
dle of May.

however, carried to the army in Attica, made a different impression. Moreover the invasion there having been made earlier than ever before, the corn of the country, commonly a considerable resource for the subsistence of an invading army, was yet green; provisions began to fail, and the weather, unusually stormy for the season, pressed them. After a stay therefore of only fifteen days in Attica, Agis hastened back into Peloponnesus.

Thucyd.
.4. c. 8.

It was not long before the business of Pylus began to be more seriously considered also at Lacedæmon. A fortress on their coast, occupied by an enemy commanding the sea, and garrisoned by men connected by blood with their slaves, of whom they were, not without cause, ever apprehensive, might indeed give very reasonable alarm; and the measures immediately taken in consequence would alone go far to justify what had been deemed at first, both by friends and foes, the improvident and extravagant project of Demosthenes. Beside promoting the evacuation of Attica, Coreyra was instantly relieved, the Peloponnesian fleet being in all haste recalled thence; and, to avoid observation and consequent attack from the Athenian fleet, it was again hauled across the Leucadian isthmus. Requisitions for auxiliary troops were at the same time despatched to all the allies within Peloponnesus; and the Spartans of the city marched for Pylus, while the Lacedæmonians of the provincial towns, just returned from one expedition, required some time for preparation to proceed on another.

The situation of Demosthenes however was highly critical. Already part of the enemy's forces was arrived to form the siege of his little garrison, when he descried their fleet also approaching. He just

saved opportunity for sending two of his triremes with despatches to Eurymedon at Zacynthus, and presently he was blockaded by land and sea.

It became immediately the object of the Lacedæmonians to push assault, so as to complete their business before the Athenian fleet could arrive; and this they hoped would not be difficult, against a fort so hastily constructed, and a garrison so small. At any rate however they wished to avoid a naval action, and yet to keep the command of the harbour; and then the fort, scantily provided, and cut off from supplies, could not hold long. The harbour of Pylus, now Navarino, is a spacious basin with two entrances, one at each end of an island, then called Sphacteria, near two miles long, uncultivated and woody. The northern entrance, near which stood the Athenian fort, barely admitted two triremes abreast; the southern not more than eight or nine. This island the Lacedæmonians occupied with a body of troops; other troops they disposed along the shore; and both entrances of the harbour they proposed to defend with triremes, moored with their prows toward the sea. Beyond the harbour's mouth, the coast was rocky and without landing-place.¹⁴

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 8.
Désér. du
Golfe de
Venise, par
Bellin.

Meanwhile Demosthenes, to make the most of the small force under his command, hauled ashore the three triremes which remained to him, and formed of them a kind of outwork against the sea, under his fort. Two small Messenian privateers had accidentally put into Pylus; and with some shields, mostly of wicker, and other sorry armour which he found aboard them, he armed the sailors from his

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 9.

¹⁴ Ἀλίμενα.

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triremes.¹⁵ Forty heavy-armed Messenians, who had formed part of the complement of the privateers were a more valuable addition to his garrison. In the hasty construction of his fort, he had been most careful to strengthen it toward the land, as the side on which the Lacedæmonians were generally most to be apprehended. Toward the sea it was far weaker, but then on that side it could be approached only from the sea. To resist an army and a fleet moving in concert to attack him, he selected, from his whole force, sixty heavy-armed and a few bowmen, whom he posted upon the beach to oppose debarkation, and of whom he took himself the immediate command. The remainder he appointed to the defence of the walls.

Where soldiers are members of that assembly in which sovereign power legally resides, and where persuasion may with impunity be attempted to induce them to disobey their officers, encouraging speeches previous to action may be often necessary; and to such a little band as that with which Demosthenes had engaged in a very arduous undertaking they would be easily addressed. ‘My fellow-soldiers, and ‘companions in the chance of war,’ said that able officer, ‘let no man now think to show his wisdom ‘by computing the exact magnitude of the danger ‘which threatens us, but rather let every one cheer- ‘fully resolve to exert himself to the utmost, as the ‘one thing necessary to the safety of us all. Never- ‘theless, I think, notwithstanding the disproportion ‘of numbers, the circumstances are in our favour, if

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 10.

¹⁵ *Ναῦτας*. Those who constructed the fort were soldiers, *στρατιῶται*, but the historian does not mention what proportion there was of each.

‘ we make the most of advantages in our possession.
 ‘ We Athenians, practised in naval war, well know
 ‘ that debarkation in the face of an enemy is no easy
 ‘ business, if opposed with firmness. Let the Pelo-
 ‘ ponnesians then, who have not the same experience,
 ‘ now try it ; for, adding the difficulties of this rocky
 ‘ shore, which will fight for us, I have no doubt of
 ‘ success, if we are only true to ourselves.’ This
 simple oratory, adapted to excite, not the boiling
 spirit of enterprise, which in the circumstances might
 have been even injurious, but the deliberate valour
 which defence requires, had the desired effect, and
 the Athenians waited in due preparation to receive
 the attack.

The Peloponnesian fleet consisted of forty-three triremes, mostly of the allies, but commanded in chief by Thrasymelidas, a Spartan.¹⁶ While the fort was threatened on all sides by sea and land, the principal attack was made from the fleet, precisely where Demosthenes expected. But a few triremes only could approach at a time, and those not without risk from the rocks and the surf. The attack was therefore carried on by reliefs, and no exhortation was omitted to promote exertion. Some of the captains and masters¹⁷ nevertheless hesitating at the view of the dangers of the shore, the Spartan Brasidas, who commanded a trireme, became presently distinguished by the Athenians, loud in expostulation :
 ‘ Ill it became them,’ he said, ‘ to spare their timbers,
 ‘ when the enemy possessed a post in the country :
 ‘ the Lacedæmonians deserved better things of their
 ‘ allies. Striking, splitting, landing anyhow, they

Thucyd.
1. 4. c. 11.

¹⁶ Ναύαρχος.

¹⁷ Τριήραρχοι καὶ κυβερνήται, answering precisely to our terms captain and master.

CHAP.
XV.Thueyd.
l. 4. c. 12.

c. 13.

c. 12.

‘should make themselves masters of the place and of the men who held it.’ Brasidas was not of a disposition thus to exhort others, without setting the example himself. Having compelled his master to lay his galley close to the shore, he was stepping upon the gangboard¹⁸, to lead the landing, when a number of the enemy’s missile weapons at once struck him; insomuch that he fainted and fell backward, fortunately into the ship, while his shield, which among the ancients it was highly disgraceful and even criminal to lose, dropped into the sea. Notwithstanding this ill success of Brasidas, the attempt to force a landing was repeated through the whole of that day, and part of the next, but was resisted so efficaciously that at length the fleet drew off. Demosthenes then, for the encouragement of his people, and not without just claim of victory, erected his trophy, of which the shield of Brasidas, taken by the Athenians, became the honourable ornament. No stain however could ensue to the reputation of the owner; but, on the contrary, the story being related through Greece, it was everywhere remarked, as a singular result of the incident, that what disgraced others brought glory to Brasidas.

The Lacedæmonian commanders, hopeless now of succeeding by assault, prepared immediately to proceed to a regular siege, and with that view sent some ships for timber to make battering-engines. Before these could return, Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian fleet; which, with the junction of four Chian ships, and a re-enforcement taken from the station of Naupactus, consisted of forty triremes. Approaching enough to observe that the harbour of Pylus was occupied by the enemy’s fleet, and the

¹⁸ Ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν.

island before it and the shore on each side by their army, Eurymedon withdrew, and encamped for the night on the small island of Prote, at no great distance. On the morrow he prepared for action, determined to attack the enemy in the harbour, if they would not meet him in the open sea.

The Peloponnesian fleet seems to have been ill commanded: the resolution was taken to await the enemy within the basin; where the confined space, and the army surrounding, it was thought, would give advantage; and the previously proposed blockade of the entrances was omitted. A larger proportion of the crews would thus have their nightly rest ashore, and the Lacedæmonians would desire to maintain their strength as entire as possible, to balance, as far as might be, the enemy's superiority of skill. But so deficient were they in circumspection that the Athenian fleet was entering the basin by both the mouths while the greater part of the Peloponnesian crews were but quitting their camp to go aboard. Some ships were already under way; but the crews, seeing they should not be supported, instantly fled to the shore. Five triremes were taken; the men however escaping from all except one. The Athenians then proceeded to attack the ships upon the beach, and to haul away those from which the crews had fled. The Lacedæmonian land forces, mortified by the disaster of their fleet, but far more alarmed for their troops in the island, pressed toward the shore. A fierce engagement ensued, between the Athenians from their galleys and the Lacedæmonians dashing into the water to defend theirs. After much bloodshed on both sides, the Lacedæmonians secured all their ships except the five first taken, with which the

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Athenians drew off, masters also of the enemy's dead, who were restored on the usual application from the defeated. Eurymedon erected his trophy, and then directed his care to keep a strict watch upon Sphacteria, looking upon the Lacedæmonians there as already his prisoners. They were four hundred and twenty, drafted by lot from the several lochi of the army, with attending Helots, whose number the historian does not mention. These indeed were little thought of; but among the others were some connected with most of the principal families of Lacedæmon.

The following transactions furnish very remarkable proof of the importance of a very few citizens to the most powerful of the little republics of Greece. Those republics were all so constituted that they could bear neither diminution nor any considerable increase of their citizens without inconvenience. It was not the loss of inhabitants to the country that would be felt, though of a small republic, when four hundred men were killed or taken; but it was the loss of those intimately connected with the ruling powers, by ties of blood, by religious prejudices, by political prejudices, and most of all if by party prejudices. Those who formed the strength of every Grecian state for every other purpose, the slaves, could not be trusted with arms. But the military establishment was composed of all the freemen capable of bearing arms. Losses in war therefore could be recruited only by time, which would bring boys to manhood, and by fresh births; unless the invidious and hazardous resource were admitted, of associating foreigners, or of raising slaves to be citizens. Of the small proportion then of the inhabitants who filled the military function,

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 8.

four hundred lost would affect a great number of families ; and hence private passion had such influence on public measures.

Intelligence of the transactions at Pylus filled Sparta with consternation. The men in Sphacteria had not, like the Romans whom, we are told, their country refused to ransom, disgraced themselves by flight or by the surrender of their arms ; but, placed in their present situation in the accidental turn of duty, with their honour clear, they were likely to become a sacrifice to the mismanagement or deficient exertion of those who, by more effectually opposing the Athenian fleet, ought to have preserved them from such calamitous circumstances. The principal magistrates therefore of Lacedæmon, the leaders of the administration¹⁹, came to the camp at Pylus to assure themselves of the exact state of things ; and, when they were satisfied that to rescue those in the island was impossible, it was immediately determined to enter into negotiation with the enemy, with a view to a treaty of peace. A truce was accordingly agreed upon, of which these were the conditions :
 ‘ That, as a preliminary measure, all the Peloponnesian ships of war which had been in the late action, and all others then in any port of the Lacedæmonian territory, should be delivered as pledges to the Athenian admiral at Pylus : That Lacedæmonian ambassadors should be conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme to treat concerning a peace, and brought back again by the same conveyance : That the truce should hold during their absence, and that, on their return, the ships delivered should be restored : That, in the mean time, the Lacedæmonians should be permitted to supply their people

Thucyd.
I. 4. c. 15.

¹⁹ Τὰ τέλη.

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‘ in the island with provisions in specified quantities,
 ‘ under the inspection of Athenian officers : that the
 ‘ Athenians should still keep their naval guard over
 ‘ the island, but not land upon it ; and that the La-
 ‘ cedæmonians should send no vessel thither, but in
 ‘ conformity to the terms of the truce : That a breach
 ‘ of any one article of the treaty should be esteemed
 ‘ an annihilation of the whole.’

The Lacedæmonian ambassadors ²⁰, arriving at Athens, had a business to manage, in itself difficult, and rendered more so by the forms of democratical administration, and the ready jealousy of a sovereign multitude. The distress which occasioned the negotiation was peculiar to their own state, but in any treaty their allies must be included ; the discussion of whose interest, before the assembled Athenian people, could scarcely be conducted so as to avoid offence. Before the assembled Athenian people however it was necessary that some declaration should be made of the purpose of their mission. In their speech therefore they simply proposed a treaty of peace, together with an alliance offensive and defensive between Lacedæmon and Athens, each party keeping what it possessed ; and in return for the restoration of their fellow-countrymen, in a manner prisoners in Sphacteria, they offered simply the glory which would redound to Athens from a peace solicited by those who were heretofore in a situation rather to grant conditions, together with gratitude for a generous deed, whence might arise that mutual good will between the two republics which alone could make a peace lasting.

²⁰ The name of the chief of the embassy, Archeptolemus, not mentioned by Thucydides, is given by Aristophanes, *Equit.* v. 794.

It was not however without probable ground for supposing the proposal would be welcome at Athens that the Lacedæmonian administration had determined thus to sue for peace. They knew that a large portion of the Athenian people had always been averse to the war ; and that a majority of them, since they had experienced its evils, had more than once manifested great anxiety for a conclusion of it. But, at this time, the favour which Cleon had acquired with the lower people proved an obstacle of which they could not be entirely aware. That turbulent orator reminded the assembly, that the Megarian ports of Nisæa and Pegæ had once belonged to the Athenian people ; that the Athenian people had commanded the city of Trœzen ; that all Achaia had been of their confederacy ; and that these possessions had been wrested from them, not in war, but by a treaty ; to the hard terms of which a calamity, similar to that which now pressed the Lacedæmonians, had compelled them to consent. This therefore was the time for recovering those possessions. It should be insisted that the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria should be brought prisoners to Athens ; to be released as soon as Nisæ and Pegæ were surrendered to the Athenians, and the administrations of Achaia and Trœzen restored to the footing upon which they stood before the thirty years' truce. Accordingly such were the terms which the sovereign assembly of Athens required.

To debate before a whole people concerning propositions affecting to such a degree the interests of the allies of Lacedæmon, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors judged utterly imprudent. Instead therefore of giving any answer, they desired that commissioners might be appointed to discuss the several points at

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 21.
Aristoph.
Pax et
Acharn.

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 22.

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more leisure than the nature of a general assembly admitted. This proposal suited the views of Cleon, only as it afforded opportunity to infuse into the people a jealousy of the ambassadors, and of those who were disposed to favour their purpose, and an opinion of his own political sagacity. He exclaimed against it accordingly in a style of indecent passion: 'Well he knew before,' he said, 'that the Lacedæmonian ambassadors came with injurious views, and for clandestine purposes; but now their refusal to declare themselves before the people, and their requisition to treat with a small number of commissioners, must make it manifest to all. If they had any thing just and honourable to propose, they need not hesitate to speak it publicly.' The ambassadors, highly desirous of an accommodation upon any moderate terms, yet seeing the Athenian people impracticable through the sway which Cleon held among them, and considering the probable ill consequences of publicly proposing conditions disagreeable to their allies, which might after all be rejected, immediately took their leave.

They arrived at Pylus about the twentieth day after their departure thence, and with their return the truce of course expired. The Lacedæmonians then demanded the restoration of their ships according to the treaty: but the Athenians refused; alleging some hostility committed against the garrison of the fort, and some other matters of little importance, contrary to the strict letter of the convention, but altogether, in the opinion evidently of the impartial but cautious Thucydides, not warranting a procedure so contrary to the spirit of it. Whether Demosthenes or Eurymedon was the principal actor in this business, we are not informed; but, in favour of either, it may

Thucyd.
1. 4. c. 23.
& c. 39.
End of
June.

be observed that to exercise any discretionary power was extremely hazardous, when responsibility was immediate to that despotic and wayward sovereign the Athenian people under the influence of Cleon. If Cleon, or any other turbulent orator, could persuade the people that their generals ought not to give up, of their own authority, any advantage that the letter of the treaty warranted, their utter ruin, even capital condemnation, might have been the consequence of a contrary conduct.

Both parties now prepared to prosecute hostilities with vigour. The Athenians directed their attention particularly to the guard of Sphacteria: two triremes were constantly circumnavigating it during day, and at night the whole fleet kept watch; in moderate weather all around the island; but fresher winds induced the necessity of leaving the side toward the sea unguarded. A re-enforcement of twenty triremes from Attica made the number of the besieging fleet seventy.

The Peloponnesians meanwhile pushed the siege of the fort. But the object for which the Lacedæmonians were most anxious was to relieve their people in Sphacteria; and what they chiefly apprehended for them was famine. Large rewards therefore were offered, freedom to Helots, and money to any free-men, who would introduce provisions. Many thus were allured to the attempt; and though some were taken, some succeeded; especially in blowing nights, when the Athenian triremes could not hold their station at the back of the island. Some supply was also carried by divers, who swam under water across the port, rising occasionally only for air, and dragging after them skins filled with bruised linseed, or with poppy-seed mixed with honey.

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 26.

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The blockade of the island being thus protracted, the Athenians began to suffer those very wants through which they had hoped to compel the Lacedæmonians to surrender. In their fort was one small spring, ample for the garrison, but very inadequate to the supply of the whole armament; the greater part of which was reduced to the use of brackish water, obtained by digging in the sand under the fort. All the rest of the coast was possessed by the superior land force of the Peloponnesians: and the triremes, far from capable of carrying supplies for any length of time, had not convenient room even for their crews to sleep or to eat aboard; insomuch that Thucydides mentions it among their hardships upon this occasion, that they went ashore by reliefs for their meals, living otherwise aboard their triremes at anchor.

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 27.

The uneasiness hence arising in the fleet and army was ere long communicated to Athens, and reasonable apprehension arose that approaching winter would increase the difficulties; that it would become impossible to supply the armament with provisions by the navigation around the capes of Peloponnesus, which in summer they found could not be done in the requisite extent; and that, even if supplies could be furnished, the fleet could not remain during the stormy season, on a coast where they possessed no port. It was then farther considered that, if the Lacedæmonians should recover their people from Sphacteria, not only an opportunity for making an advantageous peace was lost, but future opportunities were precluded: at least the first proposal must hereafter come from themselves; for the Lacedæmonians would scarcely risk the disgrace of a second refusal.

Public indignation was rising fast against Cleon, as the evil counsellor of the commonwealth, and

author of the evils felt or apprehended. He found it necessary, for obviating popular clamour and disgust, to exert himself in the assembly ; and, in a very extraordinary train of circumstances that followed, his impudence and his fortune (if, in the want of another, we may use that term) wonderfully favoured him. He began with boldly insisting that ‘the circumstances of the fleet and army were not so adverse as they were reported.’ This assertion called forward the officers who brought the intelligence : they desired that, ‘if they were thought unworthy of belief, proper persons might be sent to examine into the state of things.’ The assembly assented to this request, and Cleon himself was named among those to be commissioned for the purpose. Pressed by this proposal, which he was aware would not answer his end, and anxious anyhow to throw the weight of the business upon others, he seems in the moment to have lost his guard. ‘It were idle waste of time,’ he said, ‘to send commissioners to inquire, when they should rather send generals to execute. If those who directed the military affairs of the commonwealth were men, it would be easy, with the force which they could at all times command, to subdue the little band in Sphacteria : were he in that station, he would engage to effect it.’ The unenterprising Nicias, at this time commander-in-chief, being thus called upon, in his anxiety to obviate crimination, miserably betrayed the dignity of his high office. ‘As far as depended upon him,’ he said, ‘Cleon might take what force he pleased, and make the attempt.’ Cleon immediately accepted the offer, thinking it not seriously made ; but Nicias persisting, Cleon would have retracted, saying, ‘Nicias, not he, was general of the republic.’ Nicias however, observing that

Thueyd.
l. 4. c. 28.

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his proposal had not displeased the people, declared solemnly before the assembly that, for the business of Pylus, he waived his right to command. The more then Cleon appeared still anxious to withdraw, the more the people, in the usual temper of mobs²¹, (such is the historian's observation,) insisted that he should make his words good; with clamour requiring that Nicias should resign the command, and that Cleon should take it. Thus appointed general, Cleon, though alarmed with the danger, was elated with the extravagant honour; and in the next assembly held on the business²² he resumed his arrogant manner: 'He did not fear the Lacedæmonians,' he said; 'and for the expedition to Pylus, he would desire no Athenian forces: he would only take the Lemnian and Imbrian heavy-armed, at that time in Attica, with the middle-armed of Ænus, and four hundred bowmen of the allies; and, with that small addition to the armament then at Pylus, he would, within twenty days, either bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria prisoners to Athens, or put them to the sword upon the spot.' Amid the many very serious considerations involved with the business, this pompous boast excited a general laugh in the assembly, yet even the graver men, says the historian, were upon the whole pleased with the event, upon considering that of two good things one must result; either an important advantage must be gained over the Lacedæmonians, or, what they rather expected, they should be finally delivered from the importunity of Cleon.

It however soon appeared that though for a man,

²¹ Οἷον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν. Thucyd. l. 4. c. 28.

²² Thucydides does not specify that it was in a second assembly; but from the circumstances, and from the tenor of his narrative, it should seem that it must have been so.

like Cleon, unversed in military command, the undertaking was rash, and the bragging promise abundantly ridiculous, yet the business was not so desperate as it was in the moment generally imagined ; and in fact the folly of the Athenian people, in committing such a trust to such a man, far exceeded that of the man himself, whose impudence seldom carried him beyond the control of his cunning. He had received intelligence that Demosthenes had already formed the plan, and was preparing for the attempt, with the forces upon the spot or in the neighbourhood. Hence his apparent moderation in his demand for troops ; which he judiciously accommodated to the gratification of the Athenian people, by avoiding to require any Athenians. He farther showed his judgment, when the decree was to be passed which was finally to direct the expedition, by a request, which was readily granted, that Demosthenes might be joined with him in the command.

Thucyd.
I. 4. c. 29.

The natural strength of Sphacteria, uneven, rocky, woody, together with ignorance of the enemy's force there, had long deterred Demosthenes from attempting any attack ; and the more, because his misfortune in Ætolia had arisen from incautiously engaging himself, in a rough and woody country, against unknown numbers. But it had happened that a fire, made by the Lacedæmonians for dressing their provisions, had accidentally caught the woods, and, the wind favouring, had burnt almost the whole. Their best defence being thus destroyed, Demosthenes, now enabled to see his enemy and his ground, no longer hesitated concerning measures. He had sent for such re-enforcements as might be obtained from the nearest allies, but before they could join him Cleon arrived.

Demosthenes himself had been appointed to an

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anomalous command, interfering with the authority of the regular generals of the commonwealth ; and it does not appear that he made any difficulty of yielding to the wayward will of his sovereign, and taking the second rank in the command with Cleon. When the new general arrived at Pylus with his re-enforcement, it was determined first to try if their business could not be managed by negotiation ; and a message was accordingly sent to the commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonian army, proposing that the men in Sphacteria should surrender themselves prisoners, with the condition, that they should be liberally treated in confinement, till the two republics might come to some accommodation.

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 31.

This being refused, Cleon and Demosthenes prepared to use the force under their command. Giving one entire day of rest to their troops, on the next, at night, they embarked all their heavy-armed, who were only eight hundred, and, a little before dawn, landed at the same time on both sides of Sphacteria, from the harbour and from the open sea. An advanced post of the Lacedæmonians was surprised, and the guard put to the sword. As soon as day broke, the rest of the forces were landed, consisting of eight hundred bowmen, about as many middle-armed, a few Messenians and others from the garrison of the fort, and, except the rowers of the lowest bench, distinguished by the name of thalamians, all the seamen of the fleet ; who, as the triremes were more than seventy, would be a large body. The force all together was not of the most regular kind, but it was ample against those who held Sphacteria ; of whom the Lacedæmonians, the only regular troops, had been originally but four hundred and twenty, and thirty of those were killed in the outpost. Of

c. 31, 32.

the number of attendant slaves, and of those who, after landing provisions, may have remained in the island, we are not informed. Epitadas, the commander, had posted himself, with his main body, in the central and plainest part, near the only spring the island afforded. A small reserve he placed in an ancient fort, of rude construction, but strong by situation, at the extremity next Pylus.

The Lacedæmonians, and indeed all the Peloponnesians, seem to have been absurdly attached, through a point of honour, to the exclusive use of weapons for close fight. Among the early Greeks, the first purpose of arms, after self-defence, was to defend their cattle: the second, when civilisation advanced, to protect their harvest, and cultivated fruits: the third, and not least important, to hold a secure superiority over their numerous slaves. Hence, as well as because of the more determined courage requisite for the use of them, and of their greater efficacy in the hands of brave and able men, whenever they can be used, arms for stationary fight in plains were deemed more honourable than missile weapons. But as, under many circumstances, especially in mountainous countries, like the greatest part of Peloponnesus and of all Greece, it was easy to evade the force of the heavy-armed, yet we find the Lacedæmonians often suffering for want of light troops and missile weapons. Epitadas chose, with his little band, to meet an enemy who so outnumbered him, in the levellest part of the island; not only because the fountain there was necessary, but because there the weapons and the discipline of his people would be most efficacious. But among the Athenians, though the first honour was given to the panoply, yet the use of the bow was cultivated; and we find the Athenian archers frequently men

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tioned as superior troops of their kind. Demosthenes had been taught by misfortune both how to value light troops, and how to use them ; and Cleon's prudence left him the direction of operations. Placing his light-armed in detached bodies of about two hundred each on the heights around the Lacedæmonian station, he proceeded with his heavy-armed within a certain distance of the front of it, and then halted.

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 33.

Epitadas did not refuse to meet superior numbers ; but, as he advanced to attack Demosthenes, he was assailed on each flank and in his rear with darts, arrows, and stones. If he turned, those who thus annoyed him instantly fled from his attack, and his heavy-armed would in vain pursue them ; but the moment he resumed his march towards Demosthenes, they renewed their annoyance. Such was the character of the Lacedæmonian heavy infantry at this time in Greece, that, with all the advantage of numbers on their side, the light-armed of the Athenian army had not approached them without awe, and, as Thucydides expresses it, a kind of servile apprehension. But encouraged by the effect which their first wary exertions derived from the able disposition of Demosthenes, and by the evident inability of the Lacedæmonians for efficacious pursuit, the light-armed pressed their attacks. This desultory manner of action astonished the Lacedæmonians with its novelty : the ashes and dust, formed by the late conflagration, rising and mingling their darkness with that of the constant flight of missile weapons, disabled them from seeing their enemy, whom with their arms they could not reach, if they could see ; while the clamorous noise of the irregular assailants drowned the voice of command. Utterly at a loss for means of effectual opposition, when many were already severely wounded,

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 33.

they retreated in a compact body toward their reserve in the castle, which was not far distant. The light-armed then pressed their assault with increased ardour: the Lacedæmonians gained the fort, but not without loss.

The efficacy of the light troops being now obviated, Demosthenes led his heavy-armed to the attack; but the Lacedæmonians having great advantage of ground, as well as some defence from the old walls, maintained an equal conflict against superior numbers. It was already late in the day; both parties were suffering from heat, thirst, and fatigue, and neither had any prospect of decisive advantage, when the commander of the Messenian troops coming to Cleon and Demosthenes, told them he had discovered a way by which, with a party of light-armed bowmen, he thought he could scale the fort. The party he desired being accordingly put under his orders, he led them, so as to avoid being seen by the enemy, to a precipitous part of the rock, where, through confidence in the natural strength of the place, no guard was kept. Climbing with great difficulty, he made his way good, and appeared suddenly on the summit. Effectual resistance was now no longer possible for the Lacedæmonians, worn with incessant action through a sultry day, and surrounded by superior numbers. Cleon and Demosthenes therefore, desirous of carrying them prisoners to Athens, checked their troops, who would shortly have put them to the sword; and sent a herald to offer quarter, upon condition that they should surrender themselves to the mercy of the Athenian people. It was doubted whether, even in their hopeless situation, Lacedæmonians would submit to become prisoners; but as soon as they saw the heralds approaching they

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 36.

c. 37.

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grounded their shields and waved their hands, intimating that they were disposed to hear proposals. Epitadas was no more; Hippagretes, his second in command, had been so severely wounded that he lay for lifeless among the slain; Styphon, on whom the command had thus devolved, desired permission to send a herald to the Lacedæmonian army on the continent for orders. This was refused, but the Athenian generals sent for a herald from the Lacedæmonian army; and after the interchange of two or three messages a final answer came to the garrison of the island in these terms: ‘The Lacedæmonians permit you to consult your own safety, admitting nothing disgraceful.’²³ After a short consultation, they then surrendered, according to the Greek expression, their arms and themselves.

On the morrow the commanders of the Lacedæmonian army on the continent sent a herald for their slain, and the Athenians erected their trophy. The killed were a hundred and twenty-eight Lacedæmonians, and the prisoners two hundred and ninety-two. Of the fate of the Helots and others, who were with the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria, we have no information. The blockade, from the action in the harbour to that in the island, had continued seventy-two days, including the truce of twenty days, during which the garrison was regularly served with provisions. For the rest of the time they had only had such casual supplies as could be introduced by stealth; yet, such had been the economy of Epitadas, provisions remained when the island was taken. The Athenian commanders, leaving a garrison in Pylus, sailed away with the fleet; Eurymedon with his division for

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 39.

²³ Μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντας.

Corcyra and Sicily, and Cleon and Demosthenes for Attica: and the engagement of Cleon was completely fulfilled; for they entered the port of Piræus with their prisoners within twenty days after he had quitted it.

SECT.
VII.

Toward
the end of
August.

Nothing during the whole war, says Thucydides, happened so contrary to the general opinion and expectation of the Greeks as this event; for it was supposed that neither hunger, nor the pressure of any other the severest necessity, would induce Lacedæmonians to surrender their arms; insomuch that among some it was doubted whether the prisoners were of the same race, or at least if they were of equal rank with their comrades who had been killed. Hence an Athenian auxiliary, with more ill manners than wit, asked one of the prisoners, ‘Whether those who fell in the island were the men of superior rank and merit.’²⁴ To which the Spartan coldly replied, ‘An arrow would indeed be a valuable weapon, if it could distinguish rank and merit.’

Thucyd.
l. 4. c. 40.

The prisoners, being many of them connected with the first families of Sparta, were considered by the Athenians as most valuable pledges. It was determined by a decree of the people, that they should be kept in chains²⁵ till the two republics should come to some accommodation, unless any invasion of Attica should be attempted by the Peloponnesians. In that case the decree declared, in terror to the Lacedæmonian public, that they should be put to death. Such were at that time the maxims of warfare among those who boasted to be the most civilised, and indeed the only civilised people upon earth; and such the

²⁴ Καλοὶ καὶ γαθοὶ, a phrase which cannot be exactly translated.

²⁵ Δεσμοῖς.

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motives for preferring death in the field to the condition, in modern Europe so mild, except in France during the usurpation, of a prisoner of war.

By the event of the business of Pylus, the Lacedæmonians were in a state of distress totally new to them. From the first establishment of their ancestors in Peloponnesus, it was not known by tradition that such a number of their citizens had fallen into the hands of an enemy ; and it was as little remembered that an enemy had ever possessed a post within their country. Pylus was now so fortified that, as long as it was open to supplies by sea, no mode of attack by land, with which the Lacedæmonians were acquainted, would be effectual against it : a garrison of Messenians from Naupactus infested the neighbouring country with continual incursions ; and the Helots, deserting in numbers, found sure protection. In this situation of things, the Lacedæmonian government, anxiously desirous of peace, expected only insult from the haughty temper of their enemy, should they send ministers publicly to propose terms. They made however repeated trials by secret negotiation. The wiser and more moderate Athenians, and those of higher rank in general, would gladly have profited from present prosperity, to make an advantageous accommodation. But the arrogance of the people, fed by success, and inflamed by the boisterous eloquence of Cleon, now the popular favourite, made all endeavours for the salutary purpose fruitless.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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
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